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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of the state in the provision of domestic ' 
water supply and sanitation in rural Botswana. The delivery of these 
services reflects wider international commitment to this sector. Support 
has been directed through the United Nations' International Drinking Water 
, , 
Supply and Sanitation Decade, which has provided member governments with 
policy recommendations and financial and technical assistance. These 
recommendations have prescribed the use of bottom-up delivery systems 
based upon community participation and local government intervention to 
ensure the achievement of policy objectives. 
The thesis considers how far the recommendations of the Decade have been 
implemented in Botswana in providing rural water and sanitation and 
assesses the extent to which policy objectives have been met. By means of 
, a political economy approach to investigate the role of the state in rural 
development and fieldwork carried out to investigate the implementation of 
two specific projects, attention has focussed on the constraints to policy 
formulation and, implementation in achieving 'these objectives • 
.It "is suggested that'the managerial informed prescriptions provided by the 
Decade are often, inappropriate to the policy arena of specific countries. 
This is because policy formulation and implementation are determined by 
factors which are politically motivated and which are not necessarily 
compatible with managerial or techfl6'Crat,tcci)nsiderations. It is this 
inconsistency which has in large ~{fe~e~rlr~s'p6~sib'-e for the 
non-attainment of POlicy,Obj~ctiv~SY":'~~: -:'-, :c. 
" -
-.". ~. 
Through detailed field investigations carried 'out 'in;,Botswana, the roles 
ascribed by the state to different institutions--at.the local government 
and community levels in rural policy formulation and implementation are 
examined in the context of the concept of decentralisation. The 
suitability of this policy arena for the delivery of the water and 
sanitation projects is then considered. From the analysis the conclusion, 
is reached that the context in which rural policy formulation and 
implementation takes place is not conducive to supporting a bottom-up 
strategy as prescribed by the Decade. Reasons for this lie in colonial 
history and in the political 'and 'economic circumstances of contemporary 
Botswana. In consequence, the provision of domestfc water supply and 
sanitation has been affected in two important ways. Ftrst, the state has 
been unwilling to adopt the comprehensive prescriptions'offered by the 
Decade. Second, where it has, constraints'rooted in the state's 
unwillingness to decentralise rural development has prevented ttie 
achievement of policy objectives. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS: 
INTRODUCTION: 
Since the beginning of the 1980's, the United Nations has been 
encouraging, the provision of domestic water supplies and sanitation in 
developing countries as a means of reducing the incidence of 
environmental disease and social drudgery. Despite widespread support 
at the international and national levels, results to date have been 
disappointing. This thesis examines the provision of water supply and 
sanitation in a particular developing country - 80tswana - in order to 
consider how far the prescriptions of the international community can be 
transferred and translated into action in the field and considers 
constraints that are experienced in achieving policy objectives. 
Specific examples of the implementation of associated projects in a 
particular country are used as the'basis for explaining why policy 
objectives set out by the United Nations have n6t been achieved. 
Evidence of practical 'constraints to implementation, gathered in the 
field, is complemented by a consideration of the wider context of rural 
development within which these projects take place. This is based on a 
theoretical explanation of the role of the state in determining 
development-related policy in post-colonial societies. It is precisely 
this approach to explanation which appears to have been overlooked in 
existing evaluations of project implementation. 
The analysis of rural water supply and sanitation provision in Botswana 
is, therefore, undertaken against the background of significant 
international commitment to these sectors focussed through the United 
Nations' International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 
(UNIDWSSD) for the period 1981 and 1990. The aim of the Decade is to 
increase access to clean wat~r suppl ies and improved sanitatio,n 
facilities for the rural and urban populations of the Third World as 
part of a broader Primary Health Care strategy to reduce infant 
mortality and debility resulting from environmental disease. In order 
to achieve its objectives. the Decade prescribes the use of bottom-up 
project delivery systems based on community participation and local 
" 
, 
2 
government coordination. This bottom-up approach, modelled on the 
guidelines for Primary Health Care delivery, is considered to be the 
best means of ensuring widest access to health benefits at the lowest 
cost. 
At the mid-point of the Decade, however, the results of related projects' 
around the world have, generally, been disappointing. There is evidence 
of poor standards of implementation, high levels of breakdown or misuse 
of installed systems and insufficient attention paid to health 
education, with a consequent low awareness of health issues by 
recipients. Furthermore, there is evidence of inadequate overall 
support for these sectors. In particular, sanitation, and provision to 
rural areas have received less attention than water supply and the urban 
sector and it for this precise reason that this study focusses on 
sanitation as well as on water supply and focusses on the rural sector 
rather than the urban sector. 
The focus of attention in this thesis are the delivery systems 
prescribed by the Decade and used in the provision of community water 
supplies and sanitation in Botswana. A delivery system is understood to 
consist of the resources, decision-making processes, implementation 
procedures and institutions, which through functionally defined 
responsibilties provide the means for the achievement of policy 
objectives. The Decade places emphasis on a number of components of 
their recommended delivery system. These include self-help 
contributions by recipients, institution-buildin'g at the community level 
to support the mobilisation of participants and the long term 
replication of services, decentralised project coordination through 
local government and direct resource allocation to the recipients. To 
achieve these objectives, it is necessary to support the development of 
appropriate technologies which are affordable, are socially acceptable 
and which can be maintained and operated by the COmmunity, and 
simultaneously to support a health education campaign to encourage 
mobilisation and behavioural changes in household and community hygiene 
practices. These components constitute a bottom-up formula for ensuring 
that projects can achieve their long term objectives. 
A bottom~up delivery system, of the kind prescribed by the Decade, 
demands a commitment to decentralised decision-making and 'implementation 
;) 
by sub-national institutions, Participation in decision-making is 
considered a pre-condition for building up an implementation capacity 
which can be replicated, for encouraging self-reliance and for 
motivating recipient groups to support objectives. It is argued here 
that in the case of Botswana, the commitment to decentralised 
decision-making has not been achieved and that this is prinCipally due 
to the policy of the government in rural development. While it 
supports the concept of bottom-up de 1 i very, in rea 1 ity thi s has been 
restricted to encouraging wider.participation in implementation by local 
government and the rural community. Decision-making, however, has 
remained centralised. As a result, the bottom-up prescriptions of the 
Decade are being used in the most restricted sense and in some cases the 
choice of project delivery system has been entirely top-down. 
The case study of Botswana focusses on two projects for which these 
observations are relevant. One is the Self-Help Environmental 
Sanitation Project (SHESP) in which a limited bottom-up form of delivery 
has been adopted and which has received support from the Decade. The 
other is the Village Water Supply Programme which has been organised 
from the centre and implemented from the centre. The examination of 
these two programmes provides a case study for identifying the problems 
associated with the Decade in achieving its goals. The case study shows 
to what extent a specific country has been willing to follow the 
prescriptions of the Decade both in terms of the objectives set and the 
methods used to aChieve those objectives. It examines why policy 
objectives of a host country may differ to·those of the Decade and why 
the adoption of a bottom-up approach mi.ght be unsuitable or in fact 
undesirabre. In examining the experience of the Decade in a particular 
country, it is possible to identify the type of constraints that may 
more generally be encountered in putting into practice the policy 
. prescriptions of the international development community. 
The explanations of these constraints in Botswana are supported by an 
examination of the role of the state in rural development. It is 
necessary to identify the reasons why it is that the government has been 
unwilling to decentralise decisioh-making to sub-national institutions. 
This can only be achieved by examining the influence of wider politicai 
, 
. and economic factors in influencing policy in this field. This approach 
can be constrasted to existing explanations which commonly are 
., 
restricted to an examination of technical and managerial factors 
specific to project implementation, which have ignored the influence of 
broader political and economic factors in determining the environment in 
which those projects take place., 
Rural policy formulation and implementation in Botswana is characterised 
by a high level of central government intervention. At the sub-national 
level, a number of institutions have been created to 
policy but are restricted to policy implementation. 
support state 
A degree of 
conflict and confusion resulting in non-cooperation is also apparent 
between these institutions. This is most serious at the community level 
which has'served as an obstacle to community mobilisation. Moreover, 
rural development objectives have been biased towards the provision of 
social 'infrastructure without at the same time providing for the 
establishment of productive activities. As a result, resources have had 
to be allocated from outside the sector which has made it more difficult 
for the rural sector to be self-reliant and to be able to support 
bottom-up delivery. This is apparent at the district, village and 
household levels. Increasingly, the state has been perceived as the 
sole provider of social services. In these circumstances, the sort of 
project de 1 i very Sys tem prescr i bed by the Decade f aces many obstac les. 
The case study of Botswana highlights a situation in which project 
objectives are frustrated when the prescribed delivery system is 
incompatible with the ,indigenous system of rural development formulation 
and implementation. On the basis of these findings, it is suggested 
that when designing project delivery systems from outside, awareness and 
sensitivity must be demonstrated towards local circumstances and the 
influence of specific policies on the implementation of rural 
development. The two projects examined in this thesis can be outlined 
here. 
The Self-Help Environmental Sanitation Project (SHESP): 
This project seeks to promote the construction of on-site pit latrines 
in rural villages and to mobilise an accompanying health education 
campaign. It is the more recent of the two programmes and uses a 
delivery system which closely resembles the prescriptions of the Decade. 
It is based on a nominally bottom-up approach which depends upon 
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cOTllTlunity participation, self-help, local institution-building and 
decentralised coordination. However, experience in the field has so far 
demonstrated ,the limited success of this bottom-up approach. 
The Village Water Supply Programme (VWSP): 
This programme aims to provide all recognised rural villages with 
reticulated public water supplies. It is considerably older than the 
SHESP project, representing one of ~he first programmes established by 
the government for its rural development programme. Influenced largely 
by internal factors, the programme uses a top-down 'delivery system 
designed to ensure the rapid installation of infrastructure. Factors, 
such as the government's rural policy of providing social 
infrastructure, and the water sector implementation capacity inherited 
at independence, have influenced the delivery system 'adopted, rather 
than the prescriptions of the Decade. The programme has been relatively 
successful in achieving the limited goals that were originally set. In 
the future, however, it is probable that the programme will become more 
decentralised as a result of the current influence of the Decade and an 
awareness of the long term problems associated with project operation 
and implementation which were not addressed in the original policy. 
Yet, in decentralising the programme, the constraints experienced in the 
SHESP project,are likely to be faced by the VWSP unless the existing 
system of rural,policy formulation and implementation is changed. 
WIDER RELEVANCE: 
Beyond its immediate objectives, this thesis can be of wider relevance 
to both pure and applied research. First, the approach used here, and 
the conclusions reached, can be of assistance to wider Tesearch on the 
Decade by providing explanations of the constraints involved in applying 
general prescriptions in anyone locality. Second, the examination of 
water supply and sanitation can be of relevance to the study of rural 
development and community participation more generally by emphasising 
the problems that can be encountered in translating policy into action 
within a bottom-up framework. The example of cOTllTlunity water supply and 
sanitation is especially appropriate for several reasons. 'It requires 
the mobilisation of international, government and community 
institutions, the provision of both physical infrastructure and 
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education/training while seeking to change sensitive culture-bound 
customs of the recipient populations. 
Moreover, the emphasis placed on the analysis of delivery systems and on 
the impact of institutional capacity on policy implementation are highly 
topical. The recolTlllendation and prescription of delivery systems which 
require institutional restructuring and economic and financial reform 
has become an increaSingly accepted component of aid assistance packages 
provided by international institutions such as the World Bank (IBRD). 
They argue that a major factor responsible for poor achievement is 
inadequate planning and implementation capacity. In particular, 
inadequate manpower'and financial resources have been identified as the 
cause of lowjnstitutional capacity. This is so at the central 
government level but is also a serious problem at the local government 
level. Therefore, aid packages increasingiy include an 
institution-building component to support capital and technical 
investments. Criticism has been made of swollen central government 
bureaucracies which are unable to manage major projects due to 
inefficiency and over-burdened staff. Recommendations have, therefore, 
been made to devol ve respons i b il ity from central government to 
parastatal organisations, local authorities and the private sector 
(Cohen et al, 1986). 
Such prescriptions for institutional reform and reorganisation, conmonly 
referred to as "conditions-precedent" (Cohen et al, 1986), are inspired 
by an administrative or organisational rationale which seek to establish 
the most efficient delivery systems. It is suggested here that the 
delegation of decision-making and implementation capacity necessarily 
involves political considerations. These are often overlooked by 
technocratic planners, who fail to recognise that such prescriptions for 
institutional reform may threaten political interests by exposing or 
destabilising the organisation and distribution of political and 
economic power. Institution-building must, therefore, be examined from 
the perspective of political economy, since institutional reform 
fundamentally affects the way in which the state shares power. It is, 
therefore, not uncommon for host governments to reject reforms advocated 
by aid agencies when it is'felt that to do so might compromise,discreet 
vested interests (Ayres, 1983; Cohen et al, 1986). In this respect, it 
becomes necessary to recognise the socio-political and administrative 
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structures of particular countries in the context of their wider 
political economy. 
Third, the thesis answers the call for more research to be undertaken 
·which reconciles theories of the post-colonial state, undertaken in the 
abstract, with practical evidence from the field, particularly as it 
affects the study of the .implementation of policy. The state in 
post-colonial society must be understood to be largely responsible for 
the design and implementation of development objectives (Higgott, 1983). 
Fourth, in examining the process of project delivery, the thesis 
complements research on public access to state-provided goods and 
services. Schaffer et al (1975) have examined how different approaches 
to policy. implementation affect the distribution of and access to public 
services. This is examined, in particular, in relatibn to the 
bureaucratic-adminstrative state in developing countries. Attention 
focusses on the politics of implementation, and how, depending on 
circumstances, obstacles can be placed to restrict access. These issues 
have also been discussed in terms of spatial access concerning location, 
and social access concerning the way in which eligibility is determined 
by socio-economic parameters (Antipode, 1971). 
While this thesis does not address the issue of access as a primary 
concern, the examination of institutional performance in the delivery of 
water and sanitation complements the subject. 
of quality is discussed as it affects the user 
community participation in decision making has 
resource allocation. The choice of a·top-down 
In particular, the issue 
while the analysis of 
clear implications for 
or a bottom-up approach 
will affect both the quality of provision, the nature of distribution 
and the rules of access. The choice of approach is, therefore, 
political. Top-down allows the state to define needs and determine 
distribution and access while bottom-up extends decision making to the 
reci pi ent. 
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ARGUMENT: 
MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
This thesis combines a study of the design and implementation of 
specific projects with a study of the structure and political economy of 
a post-colonial African country, within which those projects are 
_ implemented. Analysis, therefore, includes at one end, practical 
research on project delivery in the field, based- on participant 
observation and action research, and at the other end, a more theory 
informed examination of the state and development in post-colonial 
societies. This approach can be used to overcome the existing gulf 
between empirical or practical studies which examine specific policies 
in the field, and theory-laden research on the Third world which 
focusses on abstract notions of structure, power and class: 
On the one hand, practical and often short-term evaluations or 
appraisals, based upon narrowly defined terms of reference which are 
based on a restricted view of development, are used as the basis of 
policy analysis and for the provision of future guidelines. On the 
other hand, lengthy academically informed explanations are generated 
often in an atmosphere of isolation, which more often than not, are 
shelved in academic institutions where they rarely filter through to the 
policy makers. There is, therefore, an all too apparent rift between 
the former and latter modes of explanation. They appear to be mutually 
exclusive when in fact they ought to be of mutual benefit (Conyers, 
1986) . 
In this thesis, an attempt is made to overcome the separation between 
theoretical and practical explanations. In so doing,. it is recognised 
that this may only be achieved by compromising. some of the guiding 
principles of theoretical and applied research (Conyers, 1986). Yet, in 
so dOing, it is hoped that a thorough but broad explanation informed by 
theoretical argument and practical experience, can go some way to 
explaining the constraints which prevent the achievement of policy 
objectives in the field, especially when they are prescribed by an 
outside agency. 
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The adoption of this approach is appropriate to academic research on 
development in the Third World. This is especially so at a time when 
development studies as a discipline has had to reappraise its 
objectives, scope and methodology, seriously (Conyers, 1986). Within 
academia, research on the development process has been polarised between 
abstract theorising which has focussed on political and economic issues 
at the international and national scales (see for example Gutkind & 
Wallerstein, 1976;.Gutkind & Waterman, 1977), and in-depth 
anthropological or environmental studies which. have focussed on 
micro-scale case studies (Baldwin, 1957; Hill, 1970). Rarely has the 
former informed the latter and vice-versa. 
A major criticism which can be levelled against much theoretical work 
concerned with the development process is that it is highly abstracted, 
making few references to actual examples of policy making and 
implementation in the field. It, therefore, lacks adequate empirical 
evidence (Conyers, 1986) and suggests the need to pay attention to more 
practical orientated studies. Higgott (1983) "argues that: 
"Since World War 2, all theorising about political development, be it 
positivist or Marxist, has in many ways emphasized 'thought' at the 
expense of material life." (p1). 
While development studies has developed some invaluable explanatory 
theses, including the identification of inequality and structural 
imbalance in post-colonial society, it has generally failed to provide 
realistic solutions for overcoming the complex network of constraints 
which confront development practitioners (Higgott, 1983). The 
over-abstract economistic theories characteristic of both the 
modernisation school (Rostow, 1960) and radical school (Wallerstein, 
1979), developed in the post-war period, have failed to take sufficient 
account of the particular contingent factors which characterise specific 
Third World regions and states, particularly at the sub-national level 
and of particular policies, and in so doing have failed to provide 
guidelines for the development practitioner, or solutions to the 
challenge of development (Conyers, 1986; Higgott, 19B3). With reference 
to theoretical work: 
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" .•• most analyses of the state and class formation have tended to be 
largely sociological in character and have made little or no effort 
actually to invest.igate specific cases of decision-making and policy 
implementation." (Higgott, 1983:p84) 
Radical political economy (Gutkind & Wallerstein, 1976; Gutkind & 
Waterman, 1977), in particular, lacks empirical evidence and, moreover, 
fails to provide solutions to the problems that it identifies. This can 
be contrasted to the approach of the modernisation school which while 
asking fewer questions, provides prescriptions to the policy makers 
which are more readily accepted (Higgott, 1983). 
By contrast, studies concerned with specific technical and 
administrative issues relating to the design and implementation of 
policy tend to be based on weak theoretical notions. Such studies, in 
particular, tend to overlook the influence exerted by structural forces 
and more especially by the central state as a major agent of change 
(Higgott, 1983). In the case of most of the literature which addresses 
the technical and administrative problems of policy implementation in 
the Decade, for example, this criticism holds true. The literature does" 
not address the sort of questions' which seek to explain why communities 
are unable or unwilling to participate with the state in development 
programmes, or why the state is not prepared to share responsibility for 
policy making with client or recipient groups, and why certain sectors 
of the economy receive greater state support than others. These issues 
must be discussed in order to evaluate why certain policies are" adopted 
and how objectives are achieved. 
However, the practical issues that they do address are real and 
important, and it would be unrealistic to expect a working report to 
provide a thoroughly researched "explanation for the underlying causes of 
the constraints that they have identified. This is not, after all, 
their responsibility. 
Theoretical studies can be more meaningful and provide a basis for 
practical applications lf they are supported by case studies of policy 
in action. At the same time, practical evaluations can be more 
accurately presented if there is a background of more theoretically 
informed research. The two approaches can, therefore, be of benefit to 
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each other (Conyers, 1986). It is, consequent ly, all the more important 
to use a framework of·analysis which is based on a wide range of 
theoretical and practical disciplines. The framework of analysis for 
this thesis drawn from a wide body of theoretical literature of a 
political, economic and sociological nature can be used to complement an 
investigation, based on fieldwork, of the practical constraints to the 
realisation of particular development policies. 
In trying to provide explanations for the limited success of the Decade, 
existing literature has concentrated on providing technical and 
managerial explanations for implementation in the field. It has not, 
generally, considered the influence of political, economic, social, 
cultural and environmental factors which determine the context in which 
these projects are implemented. This is because such evaluations are 
not based on a theoretical argument. which can assess the likely 
influence of these contextual factors. As a result, explanations for 
the constraints experienced in policy implementation remain incomplete. 
In addressing the issue of institution-building, for example, inadequate 
attention is paid to the influence of political motives in determining 
how far a host country is prepared to decentralise decision-making as 
policy prescriptions recommend. 
A DEFINITION OF TERMS: 
In this thesis, reference is made to a number of terms and concepts 
which represent key units of analysis. These need to be defined at this 
stage, at least on a preliminary basis. At 1a.ter stages, some of these 
definitions are further discussed and refined. 
The Developing Country. 
In using this term, reference is made to the majority of Latin American, 
African and Asian countries which do not belong to the groups of western 
capitalist economies, the eastern communist states or the Oil Producing 
and Exporting countries. While the term is a general one which obscures 
the reality of wide socio-economic, political, cultural and 
environmental variation, it also underlines a common political and 
economic status which these nations share at the global level. 
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Fundamentally, one is referring to the poor, non-industrialised world of 
post-colonial societies. They are equally referred to as Third World, 
less-developed, underdeveloped or just poor nations. With the rise of 
more economically prosperous nations within this broad category, new 
methods of differentiation have, however, been adopted. The World Bank, 
for example, differentiates between low, medium and high income 
countries, while a special category of Newly Industrialised Countries 
has been used to refer to the rapidly expanding economies of countries 
such as South Korea. 
The State. 
The state is understood in terms of the political, judicial and 
administrative components of central government which have been granted 
the responsibility for governing a political unit. In this thesis, the 
relevant political units discussed include the colonial territory and 
the post-col onia 1 i nde-pendent country. 
Institution. 
The term institution is used to refer to specific organsations which 
have been given a responsibility for representing a section of society 
in the formulation and implementation of policy. These can be 
differentiated according to whether they are governmental or 
non-governmental, and according to their scale of operation from-the 
international to the village level. Institutions at the local 
governme_ntand community levels are examined in particular. 
Local goverment. 
In defining local government, reference is made to a system of 
administration with portfolio responsibi'lities and in instances 
political rights too, which operates at the sub-national level on behalf 
of a district or region. The different forms of local government which 
can exist are examined in later sections. 
1 3 
Commun ity. 
'In defining community. there is a particular risk of ambiguity and 
misinterpretation. According to the United Nations (1971). a community 
is defined as an organic and physical entity. Members are in regular 
face to face contact with each other. share common values and objectives 
and share a basic harmony of interest and aspirations. It is suggested 
that in rural Botswana. the spatial and social organisation of society 
is such that the concept of community can be used synonymously with the 
concept of village. The rural village is. therefore. the unit of 
differentiation used to define a community. This is becau'se it provides 
a defined geographical area within which a high level of social 
interaction occurs while village members share common tribal. language 
and cultural characteristics. Indeed. one finds that community 
institutions in Botswana are organised on a village basis. However. 
there is evidence that community members do not necessarily share common 
interests and aspirations. This issue is discussed throughout the 
thesis and is considered a major factor in explaining the constraints to 
community participation in development. 
Community Participation. 
The concept of community participation is frequently associated with 
rural development. by governments. aid agencies. fieldworkers and 
consultants. Community participation can provide a key input to a range-
of policy interventions ranging from small scale infrastructure projects 
to regional agricultural programmes (Conyers. 19B2). It is most 
commonly associated with the sort of projects which seek to achieve 
behavioural change and which depend on the cooperation of the recipient 
in order to achieve policy objectives. Community participation is 
recommended under these circumstances to achieve a number of benefits 
ranging from the reduction of costs to government. to ensuring proper 
use of technology or of achieving behavioural or attitudinal change. 
Therefore. one finds community participation associated with Primary 
Health Care Strategies and in projects associated with the Decade where 
it has assumed a central importance (Whyte. 1984). 
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The importance of community participation as an integral part of rural 
development was acknowledged in 1971 by the United Nations which defined 
the concept as a combination of 90vernment intervention and community· 
self-help to achieve improvements to local conditions and to contribute 
to national development (United Nations, 1971). Therefore, the major 
features of community participation are that participants must provide 
self-help contributions while government must provide technical and 
financial assistance (Conyers, 1982). Beyond this pOint, definitions of 
community participation are ambiguous regarding the extent to which it 
.should involve decision-making or just implementation. 
Moreover, while there appears to be a consensus 'over the need and 
desirability to encourage community participation, insufficent attention 
has been paid to defining what it actually means (Whyte, 1984). Many 
attempts have been made to categorise the concept according to means 
used and ends sought (White, 1981) while there is more general consensus 
that it is not possible nor. appropriate to reduce the concept to a 
single definition (Oakley & Marsden, 1984; Whyte, 1984). Here, the 
concern is to provide a definition which is relevant to the role of the 
community in rural policy formulation and implementation. 
The definition used differentiates between community participation as an 
input or 'injection' into a specific development project or as a broader 
process of empowering the community to determine policy itself (Oakley& 
Marsden, 1984). In the former, community participation is restricted to 
implementation, while in the latter, it involves decision-making. The 
extent to which one or other approach is used depends on the policy 
objectives of the state (Gilbert & Ward, 1985). 
The Household. 
In usfng the term, "household", reference is made to the concept of the 
extended family based upon the household plot, as the physical unit of 
differentiation. Yet while many households are .indeed symbolised by 
distinct homesteads, it is recognised that members of the extended 
family may have their own temporary or permanent place of residence, 
within the same village, or elsewhere, but still contribute to the 
social and economic well-being of the principal homestead (MFDP/CSO, 
1982). These interrelationships can of course create problems when it 
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comes to analysing socio-economic characteristics of rural families. 
There is the risk that by focuSSing on the plot as the unit of 
differentiation, that sources of household income or labour,for 
example, may be under-estimated, or over-estimated. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, the decision was taken to use the household as unit 
of differentiation in accordance· with standard methodology used in 
Botswana for the collection and analysis of socio-economic data (see 
MFDP /CSO, 1976). 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
It has been increasingly recognised that in order to explain the process 
of policy formulation and implementation in the developing world 
context, an examination of the state is indispensible (Gilbert & Ward, 
1982; Grindle, 1980; Higgott, 1983). The state has primary 
responsibility for creating the institutions and mechanisms for policy 
formulation and implementation. It determines which institutions can 
influence policy and in what capacity. It also responsible determines 
national development objectives such as policy towards economic 
generation, and the provision of social welfare and economic 
infrastructure such as health, education, roads and communications 
.(Conyers,1982). As such, the central state can represent the principal 
agent of change in post-colonial society. 
In most of post-colonial Africa, the state is particularly powerful 
because it has considerable access to available resources, manpower and 
information, which enables it to control the definition of needs and 
policy objectives (Mawhood, 1983). Moreover, it is not challenged by 
any serious non-government economic, political or religious lobby 
groups. One can note the general absence of alternative lobby groups 
such as trades unions, business interests and farmers unions especially 
in rural areas. The majority of the population are politically and 
economically weak and, therefore, lack adequate lobbying power (Tendler, 
1982). In particular, they lack access to information and tend, 
moreover, to be socially and culturally alienated from modern state 
institutions (Mawhood, 1983). 
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It has been argued, therefore, that the central state enjoys significant 
political power (Sandbrook, 1986). It does not need to be accountable 
to broader society if these other interest groups cannot effectively 
challenge its authority. In such circumstances, the state is 
autonomous. This relationship between state and society in the· 
post~colonial situation provides the basis for examining the role of the 
state and non-state institutions in rural policy formulation and 
implementation (Grindle, 1980). In this context, the state, uniquely, 
has the power to determine the allocation and management of resources· in 
a way that no other institution can (Gilbert & Ward, 1982). In its 
capacity as the major policy maker, the state is able to determine the 
extent to which policy formulation and implementation can be delegated 
to institutions at the local government and community levels. It is, 
therefore, in a position to determine how far a top-down or bottom-up 
delivery system should be used in rural development. 
However, the power of the state to determine policy objectives and the 
methods used to achieve those objectives, do not necessarily mean it can 
ensure the effective implementation of policy. There is evidence that 
the achievement of policy objectives can be constrained by partiCipants 
who may be excluded from the decision-making process, but. who can 
influence the implementation of policy. Indeed, it is possible to· 
contrast the relative strength of the state's decision-making capacities 
to the relative weakness of its implementation capacity (Higgott, 1983). 
It is argued, for example, that the 'peasantry' can as a group frustrate 
state ambitions, by chOOSing to opt out from pol icies designed to 
transform their way of life (Hyden, 1980). In another context, the 
political objectives of the modern state are frustrated by continued· 
political activity of traditional leaders (Picard, 19}9). Therefore, 
the ambitions of the state ·to extend its influence over peripheral rural 
SOCiety through development programmes may face obstacles against which 
the state can find itself powerless. In such circumstances, a climate 
of political over-control and economic under-control tends to pervade 
(Sandbrook, 1986). In its search for legitimacy, the state finds it 
easier to achieve control of the political arena than control over the 
management of the economy. In this way, the state may resort to a 
policy of "coerced compl iance" to ensure that· policy objectives are met 
(Sandbrook, 1986). The context of policy formulation and implementation 
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and the respective role of institutions must, therefore, be examined in 
relation to the role of the state in post-colonial developing countries. 
THE RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH: 
In order to identify the factors which influence state policy towards 
rural development formulation and implementation, the motives of the 
state and the interests that it supports must be identified. The 
approach which may best suit this type of analysis is that of radical 
political economy. In this, political economy is understood as a method 
for explaining the structure of society and the organisation of 
political and economic power in term$ of an underlying struggle for 
power between economic interests, the effects of which can be traced 
over time. This approach is used because it recognises the importance 
of political and economic factors in determining the behaviour of the 
state in relation to wider society. The state, according to this 
approach is a tool serving specific interests with the power to dominate 
(Pettman, 1979), or to further class interests of those who are able to 
use a variety of mechanisms to affect policy formulation and 
implementation (MacPherson, 1982). 
While the political economy approach has sometimes placed too much 
emphasis on the state as an agent of change, the approach can be 
contrasted to the modernisation school which has generally overlooked 
the role of the state in development altogether (see Part 2). More 
recently, adaptations of modernisation theory have acknowledged the key 
role played by the state in determining resource allocation (Higgott, 
1983). Yet, their power of explanation is poor and, consequently, they 
provide inadequate interpretations of the state in the- post-colonial 
context. This is because their analysis is based upon normative -
assumptions which have been influenced by Western experience of state 
institutional behaviour (Gilbert & Ward, 1982). Little attempt is made 
to examine power relationships within the state and between the state 
and other interest groups in specific political, cultural and historical 
circumstances. It is assumed that the state inevitably defends the 
interests of all groups and as such overvalues the influence and good-
faith of the state assuming it to be autonomous, efficient and just. 
It, therefore, perceives of the state in, " .•. the pluralist sense of 
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'neutral arbiter'~' (Higgott, 1983:p78). While this definition may 
characterise ~he state in,Western democracies, where notions of 
representativeness and' political pluralism are more of a reality, this 
is not on the whole the case in the developing world context (Gilbert & 
Ward, 1982). 
By contrast, explanations of the state provided by the radical political 
economy literature are more far-reaching, based on the structural 
examination of the interaction of political and economic forces over 
time and of their effect on the organisation of society and the 
distribution of power. It is on this body of literature that,the 
theoretical analysis of policy formulation and implementation in this 
thesis is based. 
Of particular importance in this approach, is the emphasis placed on the 
historical dimension in explaining contemporary issues. In order to 
explain post-colonial state and society, it is necessary'to examine the 
history of the colonial period to provide explanations for the behaviour 
of the state and its relations to wider society. Political economy 
demonstrates how the particular features of the post-colonial state and 
society have been influenced by the specific history of colonial rule. 
Contemporary institutions and the structure of the rural economy have 
resulted from the impact of colonial policy and by the responses made by 
the indigenous society. The specificity of historical events is, 
therefore, responsible for the great variation that exists in the nature 
and relationship of the sta~e and society in the post-colonial period. 
Definitions of the 'state in post-colonial society have increased in 
sophistication and refinement since the subject was first addressed 
during the 1960's by the dependency school (Frank, 1969) (see ch 4). 
This has reflected an increased awareness of the great complexity of, 
and variation in the characteristics of post-colonial states and society 
in Africa, South America and Asia. It has had to be acknowledged that 
no single definition of the state can be provided and that the earlier 
definitions provided by the dependency school which focussed on the role 
of the state in exchange relations between 'core' and 'periphery' 
nations, have had to be rejected (Alavi, 1970; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
It defined the state solely in terms of international relations paying 
scant attention to the role of indigenous society in determining change 
(Bell, 1986). At the same time, a number of common political and 
economic characteristics are shared by developing countries at the 
macro-scale and these can be contrasted to the major features of the 
developed world countries (Horowitz, 1966). They tend to be primary 
commodity producers, oil importers,-aid recipients, financial debtors, 
have weak political and economic institutions and display high levels of 
socio-economic inequality. It is in this respect that the concept of 
"North-South" is relevant (Brandt, 1980). However, a more in-depth 
investigation of a particular developing country or region and of its 
links to the developed world shows clearly the limits of using a single 
ubiquitous definition of ihe state. -Case studies are, therefore, 
required to identify the specific features of individual countries. 
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RURAL POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION - THE ROLE OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNITY: 
It is now possible to consider the policy of the state towards rural 
development and sub-national institution-building. The manner in which 
the state distributes decision-making and implementation responsibility 
to sub-national institutions depends on the particular relationship that 
exists between the state and society. This relationship will vary 
according to the characteristics of a country's political economy. 
Hence, it is important to examine the colonial period in order to 
explain the contemporary structure of society. 
In circumstances where interest groups outside of the state are weak, as 
is normally the case, the state is able to determine how far policy 
formulation and implementation should involve sub-national institutions. 
It is possible to identify five approaches to the organisation of 
institutional participation in rural development (Vengroff, 1977). 
Where the state seeks to maximise control over resource management, a 
top-down approach is used under which decision-making and implementation 
remains centralised. This scenario is most likely to be adopted by 
authoritarian regimes. In contrast, where the state seeks to share 
control over resource management, a bottom-up approach is used in which 
decision-making and implementation is devolved to local government and 
community institutions. Such a scenario is more likely to be supperted 
by secialist er revolutionary gevernments, which advecate pepulist mass 
mobilisatien, er by gevernments which are cenfident .of their autherity 
and support at the 1 eca 1 1 eve 1. 
Between these extremes are three moderate scenarias in which a degree .of 
decisien-making and implementatian respansibility is shared by central, 
government with sub-natienalinstitutians. This limited devalutian .of 
respensibility can be exercised through modern lacal gavernment 
institutians which represent central government, thraugh madern lacal 
gavernment institutians which represent sub-natianal interests, er 
through existing institutions which are based en a cempeting pelitical 
culture such as the tribe. The key issue is ta determine haw far 
decisien-making rather than implementation respensibility has been 
devalved te institutiens which represent sub'-natianal interests rather 
than these .of the state. 
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To achieve this, a framework of analysis which can measure how far 
decision-making responsibility is devolved from the centre, is required. 
The framework used here is based on the concepts of "Deconcentration -
Decentralisation" (Mawhood, 1983). In adopting this approach, it is 
recognised that the level of devolution authorised is influenced by the 
nature of the state in relation to the interests that it defends and the 
objectives it pursues. The approach addresses two fundamental issues: 
- to what extent is local government an autonomous decision-maker? 
- how far have community institutions influence over the decision making 
process ? 
This investigation of decentralisation in rural development is pertinent 
to an investigation of the constraints to the implementation of Decade 
prescriptions in a particular country. Prescriptions based on technical 
and managerial criteria,have recommended the decentralisation of 
decision-making to local government and community institutions as the 
best means of achieving policy objectives. However, the analysis of 
decentralisatiori in post~colonial societies suggests that it is 
primarily political factors which dictate the extent to which 
decision-making is decentralised. It, therefore, explains why the 
context of rural development in which Decade projects are implemented 
may not be suitable for supporting bottom-up delivery. Local political 
considerations, therefore, override managerial ones resulting in the 
outright rejection or modification of prescriptions. The investigation 
of decentralisation can also be used as the basis for explaining why in 
the circumstances where a token cOl1l11itment to bottom-up delivery has 
been made, objectives are not met, when, in reality, the bottom-up 
approach is restricted to the implementation of policy. Where 
decision-making remains centralised, the implementation capacity of 
sub-national institutions remains restricted and this will be reflected 
in the performance of the projects. An examination, therefore, of the 
politics of rural development in a particular country is necessary to 
complement an explanation of the constraints to the implementation of 
specific projects. 
A "Deconcentrated" Policy Arena: 
Where the policy arena is "deconcentrated", decision making is 
controlled by central government or by representatives of central 
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·government at the district level. By contrast, local government and 
community institutions are only responsible for the implementation of 
policy which has been determined from the top down and have only 
restricted access to the decision making process. "Deconcentration" is 
a system designed to decongest administration at the centre and to 
maintain closer supervision of activities taking place away from the 
centre (Mawhood, 19B3). The emphasis is, therefore, on extending 
implementation capacity away from the centre while retaining 
decision-making authority at the centre. 
I n a "de concentrated" system, loca 1 government represent s an extension 
of central government administration into the districts (Mawhood, 1983). 
Resources are allocated to local government according to policy 
dec is ions taken at the centre. The "deconcent ra ted" bureaucracy is, 
moreover, accountable to the centre. As such, the 'political' 
constituency is the nation rather than the district. In this way, it 
does not represent local political interests but is rather bound to the 
directives of central government. 
In such a system, community participation ~epresents an input used to 
achieve specific policy objectives (Oakley & Marsden, 19B4). It is used 
to support the implementation of specific development projects though in 
certain instances, a degree of decision-making in project design may 
exist. It is normally associated with self-help projects ·through the 
provision of cash, labour and materials for small-scale infrastructure 
projects. It can also be used as a way of building up a village 
implementation capacity to promote and support government sponsored 
development projects more widely. Yet the major feature is that central 
government remains the principal decision-maker, while the community is 
restricted to supporting the implementation of policy. 
This form of community participation is encouraged for political as well 
as pragmatic reasons. The state can, for example, use community 
participation to legitimise itself in remote areas by being seen to 
cooperate in development (Gilbert & Ward, 19B5). More importantly, 
community participation serves as a means to an end. As such, it 
represents one of several inputs to facilitate the attainment of policy 
objectives by ensuring that the project ·is cheap, accessible and 
socially and technically acceptable. 
Community participation is, therefore, defined and organised by the 
state. . It represents bottom-up development imposed from above (Gi lbert 
& Ward, 1985). It is for this reason that it can be defined as a tool 
for social control notwithstanding the material benefits which a 
particular project can provide (De Kadt, 1983; White, 1981). 
A "Decentralised" Policy Arena: 
Where the policy arena is "decentralised", decision making authority as 
well as implementation authority is devolved to local government and 
community institutions. As such, power is shared between central 
government and sUb-national institutions which can influence rural 
policy formulation. "Decentralisation" is, therefore, as much a 
political as an administrative approach. 
In a "decentralised" system, local government represents an autonomous 
decision-making body which is accountable to the local constituency, and 
which is responsible for policy decision-making and administration on 
behalf of that constituency only. It has been granted decision-making 
rights by law, which includes control over investment and manpower 
allocations (Conyers, 1982; Mawhood. 1983) .. Therefore, it is a 
political as well as an administrative system which provides the 
district with a degree of autonomy within the nation-state. As such, 
central government control over district·affairs is substantially 
reduced. Power is devolved away from the centre. 
In a "decentralised" system, community participation represents an 
objective in itself (Oakley & Marsden, 1984). It represents a more 
extensive development process which empowers communities to be involved 
in participatory planning in order to be able make decisions concerning 
development in their community and more generally, too. Therefore, 
community participation goes well beyond simply providing an input to 
the implementation of specific projects. It is a politic~l process 
designed to extend decision-making authority away from the centre. The 
achievement of a planning mechanism which permits devolved 
decision-making represents an end in itself. 
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Community participation represents a long-term process of empowering and 
raising the consciousness of the.rural·community through local 
institution-building and education rather than representing a short-term 
input to a specific project (Oakley & Marsden, 1984). The primary 
objective is to provide a degree of economic and political power so that 
the community may be in a position to determine and control its own 
development. Emphasis is placed on increasing partiCipation in the 
decision-making process over the allocation of resources as well as 
encouraging participation in implementation of policy. Such a concept 
suggests that development is far more than economic growth, but stands 
in addition for political determination, equity and 
the quality of life (Seers, 1969). 
an improvement in 
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Accord ing to these def init ions, a "deconcentrated-" pol iCy arena is one 
which extends implementation responsibilities alone to sub-national 
institutions while decision-making continues to be organised in a 
top-down fashion. A "decentralised" policy arena is one which extends 
decision-making responsibility to these sub-national institutions so 
that planning is influenced from the bottom-up. The degree to which the 
policy arena approximates to either a system of decentralisation, or of 
deconcentration is determined by the political objectives of the state 
and of the relationship between state and society. 
The analytical approach reviewed here is, therefore, used to examine the 
policy of the state in Botswana towards rural development policy. This 
theoretical analysis is complemented by field investigation and by 
direct participation in the rural water supply and sanitation 
programmes. The fieldwork examines the respective delivery systems, 
used by the two programmes, and considers in detail the experience of 
each in the implementation of policy. Fieldwork methodology is reviewed 
in chapter 5. 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS: 
Chapters 2 & 3: 
These chapters provide the background to the analysis of water supply 
and sanitation provision in Botswana. They introduce the major 
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components of rural development relevant to the investigation of the 
delivery systems used and of the constraints experienced in 
implementation. On· the basis of primary and secondary documented 
sources, policy and the effects of policy on social infrastructure 
provision, institution-building and socio-economic development are 
considered. Each aspect of policy is investigated separately after a 
broader review of colonial and post-colonial rural development policy. 
Political economy is used to demonstrate how comtemporary policy and 
resultant features of the rural economy have been influenced by earlier 
colonial policy and the responses made by indigenous society. The 
chapters, therefore, introduce the major units of analysis used in the· 
examination of rural development in Botswana which support· the field 
investigation of specific project implementation. 
Chapters 4 & 5: 
These chapters examine the Village Water Supply Programme (VWSP) and the 
Self-Help Environmental Sanitation Project (SHESP) against the 
background of the United Nations' Water Decade. First, the Decade is 
introduced. The major elements of development theory and practice which 
have influenced the thinking and ambitions behind the Decade are 
discussed. Attention then focusses on the major objecti.ves and policy 
recommendations of the Decade with particular reference to the delivery 
systems prescribed. It explains why decentralisation and community 
participation are recommended to achieve the long term health benefits 
sought. Results to date at the mid-point are then examined and 
tentative explanations of the non-achievement of policy objectives are 
considered. 
Second, the VWSP and SHESP programmes are examined. Fieldwork 
methodology used in the investigation of these programmes is discussed. 
An outline of the major objectives of each programme and of the delivery 
system used is presented. Then, the role of central government, local 
government and community institutions in the formulation and 
implementation of each programme are described. The final section 
considers the relative importance of internal factors .relating to rural 
development and external factors, reflecting the international aid 
community, in influencing the delivery systems used in each programme. 
2G 
In so dOing, it is possible to assess how far the Decade has been able 
to influence rural water supply and sanitation provision in Botswana. 
Chapters 6 & 7: 
These chapters examine the performance of the institutions involved in 
the implementation of the two programmes and considers what factors have 
determined their effectiveness in supporting the delivery systems used. 
This is based upon fieldwork which focus sed on the implementation record 
of local government and community institutions in the two programmes. 
Evidence from the field is then compared to the record of the 
implementation capacity of those same institutions in rural development 
more generally.' 
Constraints to implementation can be explained by examining how far the 
institutions involved in implementation have access to decision-making 
and to the control of resources in rural policy formulation. Therefore, 
the system of rural policy formulation directed through the preparation 
of a district development plan is examined. The extent to which 
mechanisms have been created to support decentralised decision-making is 
considered .. Using the concept of "deconcentration-decentralisation" the 
analysis considers how far local representatives have been empowered to 
participate in rural policy formulation. and how far decisions reached 
can influence resource allocation at the centre. On the basis of 
con"clusions reached, the implications for the implementation capacity of 
sub-national institutions involved in rural development and the water 
and sanitation programmes are considered. 
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A GEOGRAPHICAL PROFILE OF BOTSWANA. 
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT; 
Physical Geography; 
Botswana is a landlocked country located on the Southern African 
plateau, bordered by Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia (see Map 
1). With a Surface area of 582,000 Square kilometres, it straddles the 
Tropic of Capricorn, extending northwards to latitude 17 degrees south, 
southwards to latitude 27 degrees south, eastwards to longitude 20 
degrees east and westwards to longitude 29 degrees east. 
The country has an arid to semi-arid climate. Rainfall is low and highly 
variable, both temporally and spatially, with an average of 475 mm per 
annum, almost all of which falls between the summer months of October 
and April. Temperatures are high throughout the year but there are 
important seasonal and diurnal variations. In the summer months, from 
October to April, temperatures can reach in excess of 40 degrees 
centigrade, while in the dry winter months, clear skies ensure 
moderately warm day time temperatures of up to 25 degrees centigrade and 
cold nights with temperatures which can drop as low as 5 degrees 
centigrade. 
The country which is at an elevation of 1000 meters above sea level, is 
almost totally flat with only a few rocky outcrops rising from the 
plateau in the south east corner. Within this vast plateau, three 
distinct ecological zones can be identified. Along the eastern portion 
of the country which borders South Africa', is the rocky hardveld which 
supports a mix of tree and shrub savanna, and which possesses most of 
the country's perennial and ephemeral rivers - notably the Limpopo and 
the Molopo. To the north is a wetter and more forested region which 
supports large areas of game, two major water ways - the·Chobe and 
Okovango rivers, and the Okovango swamps. The remaining two thirds of 
the country, comprising the central and western areas, is accounted for 
by the Kgalagadi desert. Within this vast area, sub-surface layers of 
sand can be up to 120 meters deep. The area supports scant shrub savanna 
while there is almost no surface water at all. 
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The Human Geography; 
Botswana is an independent republic based on a multi-party democratic 
system with a President and a National Assembly. The country has a 
population of approximately 1 million giving it one of the lowest 
population densities in the world. However, BO% of the population is 
concentrated in the eastern hardveld area where the population density 
is much higher. 82% of the population is rural-based living in 
settlements which range in size from small hamlets of just a few 
households to major villages with over 20,000 inhabitants. The majority 
of the population, however, continues to reside in settlements of under 
1000 inhabitants. The capital, Gaborone, has a population of 75,000 and 
has recently been designated the status of a city. The annual rate of 
national population growth is 3.4 %, while there is a high level of 
rural to urban migration, causing rapid urbanisation. 
The population is comprised of the Tswana people, who constitute the 
majority of the population and who can be divided into eight sub-tribes. 
There are also a number of minority tribes such as the Kalanga, Sarwa 
and Herero who live in the border areas and who have retained their own 
culture and language. There are also small groups of Europeans who have 
settled as farmers and ranchers, or who have come as expatriate workers, 
and a small Asian community too. The first language of the country is 
Setswana though English is normally used for official business outside 
of the districts. 
Botswana has become the fourth wea lthiest country in Africa south cif the 
Sahara, with a GNP per head of $960. The economy depends on revenues 
earned from the export of diamonds and livestock. Revenue is required to 
cover the importation of most basic hard and soft commodities. Only 5 % 
of the total land area is suitable for cultivation, while 20 % is used 
for livestock grazing. The formal sector of the economy provides less 
than 20 % .of employment needs and these are located in the urban and 
mining sectors. Employment in the South African mines continues to 
present an important alternative source of employment. 
KWENENG DISTRICT: 
Kweneng district is located in the south-eastern part of the country but 
straddles both the hardveld in the east, and the sandveld in the west 
(see Map 2) .. It is, therefore, a large district covering an area of 
3B,OOO square kilometres and has a dispersed and low density population. 
The vegetation in the district displays both the features of the 
hardveld and the sandveld, while it supports only one major perennial 
river - the Metsemotlhabe. 
The district has a population of BB,OOO inhabitants settled in 31 major 
localities and several hundred smaller localities. However, 75 % of the 
population is concentrated in the more fertile part of the district in 
the south-east while a further 17 % is located in the grazing areas of 
the north east around Lephepe. Therefore, only 6 % of the district's 
population live in the vast expanse of the Kgalagadi, west of 
Letlhakeng. The district capital is Molepolole where 2B % of the 
district population reside. The Bakwena represent the major tribal group 
in Kweneng, with smaller representations of Bakgalagadi and Basarwa in 
the west, and of Bakgatla, Bangwato and Bangwaketse in the east. 
KGATLENG DISTRICT: 
Kgatleng district is located in the eastern hardveld, bordering South 
Africa to the east, Central district to the north, Kweneng district to 
the west and South-East district to the south (see Map 3). It covers an 
area of just 7,5BO square kilometres making it one Of. the smallest 
districts in the country, and supports a mix of tree savanna and shrub 
grassland. It has two rivers - the Limpopo which provides the frontier 
with the Transvaal, and the Notwane which transects the district, 
The district has a population of 45,000 inhabitants who are settled in 
20 villages and numerous smaller settlements. However, 90 % of the 
population are located in the southern most portion of the district 
which covers only 25 % of the surface area, but BD % of the district's 
cultivable land. 41 % of the population live in ~he district capital, 
Map 2 : KVleneng District . The Survey Villages . 
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Mochudi. The Kgatla people represent the majority of the .population but 
there are smaller groups of Bangwato, Bakwena, Batlokwa and Basawra too. 
There are few.formal sector employment opportunities within the district 
and those that do exist are almost exclusively found in Mochudi. While 
the rural sector continues to provide the main source of livelihood, 
over 25% of the working age population is employed outside of the 
district in Gaborone or South Africa. 
(see the appendices for a description of the survey villages:) 
Sources consulted: AED, 1986; CSO/MFDP; 1984; GOB, 1985. 
NOTE: 
Citizens of Botswana are Batswana and an individual citizen is a 
Motswana. When reference is made to individual Tswana tribes or to 
members of a Tswana tribe, rather than to citizens of Botswana, the 
prefix is not used. 
The currency used in Botswana is the Pula. During the period of research 
in 1984/5, £ 1. 00 = Pula 1. 70 ,. With the more recent devaluation 6f 
the South African rand, the value has dropped considerably to a present 
exchange rate of Pula 2. 98. 
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Chapter 2: RURAL DEVELOPMENT - HISTORICAL ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY POLICY. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE COLONIAL LEGACY: 
This section provides an historical review of the major features of 
colonial policy in Southern Africa and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
It examines features of Tswana society, the colonial state and major 
colonial policies based upon the concept of the interaction of modes of 
production (Taylor, 1979). A mode of production is understood as a 
specific set of social, economic and political relations organised to 
produce and reproduce a particular society. Moreover, modes of 
production are organised according to distinct soc·ial relations of 
production - the relations of those who produce and those who control 
the means of production - and productive forces - resources, workforce 
and technology level (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976). 
When different modes of production interact, a process of transformation 
occurs whereby the more powerful system comes to dominate, but does not 
necessarily destroy, the weaker system completely (Taylor, 1979). 
Rather, a state of 'conservation-dissolution' (Bettleheim, 1972) is 
achieved in that specific features of the subordinate mode of production 
required to support the development of the dominant mode of production 
are maintained. The interaction of modes of production necessarily 
leads to a destabilisation of previous socio-economic and political 
relations and the creation of transformed relations. 
In the African context, the features of the post-colonial state can be 
understood by -examining the impact of colonialism on indigenous African 
societies. Colonial experience varied from region to region according 
to the characteristics and ambitions of the coloniSing power and the 
characteristics of the colonised societies. Therefore, the features of 
particular post-colonial societies reflect the form of interaction and 
transformation experienced during the colonial period jn that particular 
place (Brett, 1973). 
"Under the aegis of the colonial state, African societies were subjected 
to contradictory patterns of transformation, destruction and 
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_ preservation of their internal structures which resulted in a wide 
variety of intermediate and hybrid forms." (p166) "The resulting 
variations emerged from the particular forms of external capitalist 
penetration, the heterogenous structures and responses of the indigenous 
societies, and the diversity of local ecology and resource 
endowments." (Berman, 1984, p 166) 
While the colonial experience was common to most African societies and 
while many shared the similar effects of political, economic and social 
dislocation, the structural transformation that resulted from the 
interaction of these social systems was different in each situation. 
The- political economy inherited at independence in Botswana reflects the 
process of "conservation-dissolution" manifested in the spheres of 
economic, social and political life. This political economy is the 
product of the interaction of modes of production resulting from 
colonial penetration during the 18th and 19th centuries. Tswana tribal 
states were subjected to the force of British colonial interests in the 
region expressed in terms of the development of a capitalist economy 
based on the mining sector in South Africa, and the establishment of 
Protectorate rule over the Tswana tribal states. Societal 
transformation of the Tswana can, therefore, only be examined in the 
wider context of the Southern African region. 
It is, therefore, necessary to examine how policies implemented during 
the colonial period have influenced the policy options available and the 
choices made in the post-colonial period. Interaction between the 
indigenous- society and the colonial administration created new 
political, economic and social relations which were inherited at 
independence. These included a series of policies and institutions in 
rural Botswana which have influenced development strategy since 
independence. This examination is followed by a presentation of the 
major features of rural development policy in the contemporary period 
illustrating how it has been conditioned by the colonial period. 
COLONIAL HISTORY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
The penetration of Africa by the major European colonising powers during 
the course of the 17th, 18th and more especially 19th centuries 
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gradually introduced features of the capitalist mode of production and 
of European culture, to a continent characterised by various forms of 
tribal-based modes of production. Amin (1977) suggests that colonial 
penetration took three dominant forms, each of which was established in 
different parts of the African continent. These were; 
the colonial trade economies of west Africa. 
the concession-owning company economies of central-equatorial Africa. 
the labour reserve and settler economies of eastern and southern 
Africa. 
Colonial interest in southern Africa was aroused relatively late 
compared to the other regions of Africa. It was the discovery of 
diamonds at Kimberley, South Africa in 1867, and the settlement of 
European farmers in the fertile plains of the Rhodesias which heralded 
the penetration of European capitalism into this part of Africa. 
While the Portuguese had established coastal contact with Africa, in 
Mozambique by 1600, the establishment of the Cape Colony in 1652 marked 
the first stage of European penetration into the region. However, it 
was not until the mid-18th century that these Boer settlers started to 
migrate northwards, and in their path came into conflict with a number· 
of Bantu tribes migrating southwards from eastern and central parts of 
the continent. Britain's decision to take possession of the Cape 
Colony, and their bid to outlaw slavery in 1B06 then prompted the famous 
'great trek' by the Boers, who sought to establish a new homeland in 
Natal. Again they came into contact with a number of Bantu tribes who 
this time were fleeing northwards from the might of the Zulu kingdom. 
By 1854, the Boer farmers had migrated further inland and established 
two new territories, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal,.while the 
British extended their control over Natal. They did not, however, try 
to annex the new Boer provinces on this occasion. During this period,· 
contact between Europeans and African tribes had amounted to no more 
than a number of conflicts over the possession of land and the th~ft of 
livestock. While traders, explorers, hunters and missionaries began to 
make contact with a number of tribes, the respective social systems of 
both the African tribes and the Boer settlers remained unchanged. It 
was only in 1867, with the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley and the 
subsequent extension of the Cape Colony northwards, prompted also by the 
discovery of Gold, that colonial capitalist penetration into the region 
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began. Soon afterwards, British capital and immi9rant workers poured 
into South Africa, while others followed Cecil Rhodes to establish a new 
colony in the Rhodesias (McEvedy, 1980). This period marked the birth 
of the South African peripheral capitalist economic system. 
Early Tswana contact with Europeans can be exami ned in a 1 ittl.e more 
detail. Sotho-Tswana tribes arrived in southern Africa during the 16th 
century, though it is argued that as early as 500 AD, the region which 
is presently Botswana, had been settled by Bantu herdsmen (Picard, 
1985). However, the three major Tswaria tribal groups, the BaRolong, the 
BaKwena and the BaKgatla, migrated into the region during the 18th and 
19th centuries (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980; Picard, 1985). Migrat·ion 
from the Transvaal veld, into the Kgalagadi region was prompted by 
sporadic confrontations between the Tswana, and both the Boers, who as 
noted above had begun their northward trek to escape British domination, 
and the Ndebele tribe. The first reported clash with the Boers was 
apparently in 1852 (Picard, 1985). In fact, the BaKgatla only crossed 
the Limpopo in 1871, at the invitation of the BaKwena, to settle at 
Mochudi, some twenty years after the creation of the Transvaal province 
(Schapera, 1980). However, a considerable portion of the tribe remained 
in the Transvaal region where they were· subsequently subjected to Boer 
rule. In 1880, a formal agreement was reached concerning the 
delineation of the frontier between the Transvaal and the Kwena 
territory where the BaKgatla had settled (Schapera, 1980). 
Subsequently, through a process of political fission, the BaNgwato and 
BaTawana tribes split away from the BaKwena and established their own 
tribal territories (Parson, 1984; Parsons, 1977). 
It was then in 1884 that the British proclaimed a Protectorate over an 
area extending north from Kimberley to the Molopo river (see Map 4). A 
year later, the Bechuanaland Protectorate was extended further north as 
far as the Chobe river, to include all the major Tswana tribes - the 
BaKwena, BaKgatla, BaNgwaketse and BaNgwato. This action followed 
negotiations with Tswana chiefs who.invited the British to extend 
protection over their territory, fearing intimidation and likely 
annexation by the Boers should they be left alone (Schapera, 1980). 
Therefore, the Protectorate was created as a means of blocking the 
northward·migration of the Boers and, at the same time, of keeping the 
trade routes open between Cape Province in the south, and the Rhodesias 
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to the north (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980; Parson, 1984). As such, there 
were no plans for economic resource exploitation nor for settlement by 
British farmers, though economic~motives were not totally absent. The 
potential for investment in communications infrastructure and in the 
development of a livestock sector to service the Kimberley mining 
township did not go un-noticed (Parsons, 1985). At the same time, 
Britain's long term commitment to the Protectorate was uncertain. While 
political sovereignty over the Protectorate was established by 1891 
(Parsons, 1977), in 1895, the southern half was handed to the British 
South Africa Company and it was only a trip to London by a delegation of 
Tswana chiefs to protest at the possibility of complete annexation, that 
the northern half of the Protectorate rema i ned under British protect i on 
until independence in 1966 (Picard, 1985; Schapera, 1970). 
The history of colonial policy in Bechuanaland in reality only began 
after 1895, by whiCh time administrative contol had been extended over 
all the Tswana tribal reserves by statute (Schapera, 1980). Although 
the intention had been to limit interference in internal Tswana affairs, 
colonial policy towards the economic development of the Protectorate, 
while modest, inevitably led to the transformation of Tswana tribal 
society (Picard. 1985). By contrast, while Tswana society had come into 
contact with Europeans since the mid-19th century, through missionaries, 
traders, explorers 'and hunters, this contact had not undermined the 
integrity of the Tswana polity. As such, the social relations of 
production which characterised Tswana society remained un-altered 
(Parson, 1985). 
TSWANA SOCIETY: 
In order to explain how colonial policy transformed Tswana society, the 
major features of the Tswana mode of production are examined. The 
specific features of Tswana social organisation in the pre-colonial 
period can be examined in relation to the major features of what has 
been termed the African mode of production (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976, 
1977). 
The Batswana represent the major tribal group inhabiting the region 
which is today Botswana. While the tribe comprises a number of 
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sub-tribes which were politically independent of each other prior to the 
creation of the Protectorate, they did share a common political economy. 
Of the eight Tswana· sub-tribes the most powerful have been the Kwena, 
Kgatla, Ngwato, Ngwaketse and Tawana (Picard, 1985; Schapera, 1970). 
Non-Tswana tribes include the Herero from Namibia, Kalanga from Zimbabwe 
and Sarwa (Bushmen) from the Kgalagadi region. 
The African mode of production is founded on a number of key practices 
bonded by a web of social, economic and political relations 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976). These practices are characterised by the 
customs of reciprocity and redistribution and by the prinCiple of 
communality over individualism. In this context, access to resources is 
of greater importance than is ownerShip. African tribal society can be 
understood to function as a collective unit which aims to satisfy the 
needs of tribal rather than individual social reproduction. 
Economic ·production is geared towards achieving community subsistence. 
This system of production is based on a satisfying rationale according 
to which emphasis is placed on ensuring the social reproduction of the 
tribe on the basis of self-sufficiency and·of risk aversion. This 
approach can, for example, be contrasted to the prinCiple of production 
maximisation where the production of a surplus for sale, rather than for 
subsistence, is the major incentive (Lipton, 1968). 
This economic system is bonded together by a socio-political tradition 
based on kinship. However, while the principles of private property, 
rent, landlordism and production for market may not be relevant, as in 
the case of a feudal mode of production, the system of kinship is by no 
means egalitarian. There is a distinct social hierarchy dividing the 
tribe between nobility, commoners, settlers and serfs, and a distinct 
division of labour controlled by the nobility (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979), 
who are also responsible for controlling land allocation, tribute 
payments, seed and grain provision, organisation of labour, livestock 
distribution and trading. 
The basic means of production, land, water and .livestock are 
collectively held by the tribe though controlled by the nobility. While 
no individual property rights exist (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976), land is 
allocated to individual households according to their need. Normally 
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the nobility neither taxes, nor demands a surplus from the individual 
household, although individuals might be expected to provide labour to 
. work land that is collectively held by the tribe and tribute may also be 
paid for social events (Coquery-Vidrovich, 1976). At the same time, it 
is common for the nobility to distribute their own wealth (mainly food 
surpluses) amongst the commoners particularly during the period before 
harvest when food supplies are low. The nobility, however, accumulate 
personal wealth through trading relations and plunder with other tribes. 
This often involves livestock but also items of luxury and of status. 
These exchange relations between tribes do not, however, affect the form 
of production within the tribe, nor do they provide an investible 
surplus which might be used for providing economic or prestige 
infrastructure (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976, 1977). 
The Tswana social system was likewise divided between a nobility, which 
had hereditary rights and which governed by absolute decree, commoners 
and vassal groups. Authority was exercised through a hierarchy of 
relatives and officials down to the ward level. There was also a 
distinct division of labour, differentiated by age and by gender 
(Parson, 1984). 
In particularly marginal environments such as the semi-arid and arid 
tropics of the Sahara, Sahel and Kgalagadi regions, where pasture areas, 
land for cultivation and water sources may be seasonally scarce, this 
mode of production is a critical survival system, finely tuned to local 
environmental conditions. Tswana social and economic behaviour and 
customs have developed in relation to environmental constraints, 
particularly after the migration of the tribe away from the more fertile 
veld of the Transvaal, into the margins of the Kgalagadi. These 
characteristics represented a socio-cultural response to a harsh 
environment and a means of ensuring economic security and tribal harmony 
at times of conf 1 i ct (Mtetwa, 1982). 
COLONIAL POLICY IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE: 
The way in which Tswana society became transformed as a result of 
European penetration into the region can be traced to two major 
processes. First, European activity increasingly exposed Tswana society 
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to the money economy and to western goods and customs. Second, specific 
Protectorate policies directed towards the economic and political 
development of the territory and implemented in response to increasing 
economic activity within the Cape Province, focussed on the mining 
sector, served to destabilise the indigenous mode of production in a 
profound way. Both processes are reviewed. 
The Monetisation of the Economy: 
The regional economy of southern Africa had already begun to be 
monetised by the time the Protectorate was established in IBB4, but this 
process did not in itself transform existing social relations of 
production to any significant degree (Parson, 19B5). Already by 1830, 
traders and hunters had followed the path of missionaries and explorers 
who had ventured north from the Cape, introducing western goods, and in 
particular clothing, to the Tswana tribes. This growth in trading 
reflected the development of a flourishing mercantile economy in the 
Cape at this time (Parsons, 1977). Mine recruitment too, began to take 
place on a small scale (Picard, 1985; Schapera, 1970, 1980) while 
tribesmen had been selling cattle informally to traders in return for· 
western goods (Schapera, 1970). While these external relations with 
Europeans did not go so far as to transform the social organisation of 
production, they did serve to introduce new and luxury western goods, 
the principle of cash exchange, and the broader influences of the South 
African mining economy to the region. IncreaSingly, access to cash, Or 
to an equivalent form of exchange became· highly desirable. Indeed, with 
the. increase of movement between the Cape and the Rhodesias, after 1887, 
trade became an important component of the Tswana economy, with 
important sales of livestock, crops and wagons being made by the Tswana 
to the new settlers. 
The Impact of Protectorate Policy: 
The Tswana polity was rapidly destabilised in the period after 1884 as a 
result of both the rapid development of the South African economy and 
specific economic and political policies introduced by the Protectorate 
administration. These processes had a profound impact on the rationale 
of Tswana society affecting the organisation and interrelationship of 
social, economic and political life. 
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Progressively, the capitalist mode of production began to transform a 
society characterised by the African mode of production. In particular, 
colonial state policy served to destabilise the indigenous system by 
exposing it to a cash economy and to market forces. 
The effect of this process was to transform, rather than destroy, the 
organisation of Tswana society. The new social, economic and political 
relations which emerged reflected a process of 
'conservation-dissolution' (Bettleheim, 1972). In this respect, the 
capitalist mode of production maintained key features of the indigenous 
mode which could support the interests of the colonial state. Tswana 
society was, therefore, not fully transformed into a capitalist society 
though its existence became dependent on the South African capitalist 
peripheral economy (Parson, 1984). 
COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY: 
It was in particular, colonial economic policy which had the greatest 
impact on societal change and left the most marked legacy on the 
independent country. Economic policies created a new economic system 
which determined the policy options available to ·the post-colonial 
government for national and rural development. 
The economic legacy inherited by the post-colonial state represented the 
outcome of policies pursued by the colonial administration. A number of 
specific policies formed the basis of an economic strategy designed to 
support the broad ambitions identified for the territory by the colonial 
office. These policies are reviewed in order to demonstrate how 
contemporary policy has been influenced by the effects of colonial 
policy on the structural transformation of Tswana society. 
Aims of the Protectorate Administration: 
The colonial office in London had no clear ambition to exploit the 
Protectorate either for settlement, or for the extraction of raw 
materials. Bechuanaland would only serve to defend Britain's wider 
interests in the region - namely to safeguard the trade routes between 
the Cape Colony and the Rhodesias and to block Boer ambitions to 
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continue their northward migration (Colclough & McCa-rthy, 1980; Parson, 
1984). While an agreement had been reached with Tswana chiefs to 
provide protection over the area, the British were at no stage fully 
committed to supporting it over a long-term period. There was always 
the strong possibility that the territory would be conveniently annexed 
to South Africa. Consequently, economic ambitions were quite modest and 
of short-term duration. The major task facing the Protectorate 
administration was to ensure that the territory could be self-supporting 
and that it would do what ever possible to support British interests in 
the Southern African region as a whole (Parson, 1984). The economic 
strategy which followed was, therefore, based upon these limited 
colonial objectives. 
Economic Strategy: 
The strategy was based on four major policies which served to harness 
the indigenous economic system to the colonial political economy. It 
was based upon the exploitat ion of 1 ivestockand human resources and 
upon linking the economy to that of South Africa's .. In this way the 
indigenous economy became structurally dependent on a capitalist economy 
founded on the mining sector. At the same time, these policies ensured 
that the Protectorate would be self-financing. Within this strategy, 
there was little scope either for strengthening the internal economy of 
the Protectorate, nor of extending a range of basic infrastructure 
facilities to support and integrate this economy. 
The Commercialisation of the Livestock Sector: 
The commercialisation of the livestock sector offered the administration 
the best opportunity for exploiting the indigenous economy in order to 
earn sufficient revenue to cover administrative costs for protecting the· 
territory and for reducing dependence on the metropole (Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980; Roe, 1980). This decision was taken in the belief that 
local environmental conditions were inappropriate to permit the 
exploitation of the arable sector beyond subsistence levels and that the 
environment could better support the intensification of stock rearing. 
This attitude towards the livestock and arable sectors was reinforced by 
evidence of a functional relationship between cattle rearing and crop 
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cultivation in Tswana society. It was recognised that traditionally, 
grain shortfalls experienced in drought years would be balanced by the 
sale of livestock in exchange for imported grain. It was reported that 
by 1890, livestock had replaced hunting and trading as the main source 
of cash earnings (Schapera, 1970). However, this practice reflected the 
extent to wh ich cash exchange had already penetrated the· 1 oca 1 economy, 
since this form of exchange clearly did not pre-date the arrival of the 
Europeans. 'Therefore, the colonial administration decided to parallel 
this practice at the regional level by encouraging cattle sales so as to 
earn revenue which could then be used to pay for the importation of 
grai n. In thi s respect, the Protectorate admi ni stration presumed that 
there would always be a grain deficit (Roe; 1980). Such assumptions 
were turned into a reality as colonial policy served to marginalise crop 
cultivation. 
A policy to promote the commercialisation of cattle was pursued. It 
involved support in innovation, research and funding in to water 
provision (see later section), animal husbandry techniques and disease 
control. As early as 1905, a Veterinary department was set up. This 
was subsequently strengthened and expanded in 1925, with the addition of 
a dairy inspector and then in 1940, when new facilities were provided 
(Colclough& McCarthy, 1980). During the 193D's, the administration 
, ' 
introduced boreholes for commercial ranchers permitting the explo,itation 
of new'grazing land (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). During the 1950's" 
further facilities were built including the Lobatse abbatoir in 1955 
(Roe" 1980). By contrast, the arable sector was largely neglected. It 
was only in 1934 that an Agriculture department was set up, some 3D 
years after the veteri nary department (Roe, 1980). , Wh i 1 e further 
efforts were made to encourage the use of Euro'pean tools and farming 
techniques, the level of intervention in arable production remained 
- -limited and tended to be directed to a small number of European 
commercial farmers in the concession areas (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). 
For the vast majority of the rural' population, crop cultivation 
continued to be influenced by the Tswana chieftaincy (Schapera, 1970.).' 
The Introduction of Taxation: 
8etween 1899 and 1932, a number of laws introduced local taxation to the 
tribal reserves. This process began in 1899 with'the introduction of 
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the Hut Tax .(Colclough &·McCarthy, 1980). This had been accepted by the 
Tswana chiefdom as a form of compensation to the British for having 
decided against annexing the Protectorate to the British South Africa 
Company (Schapera, 1980). In 1919, a native tax was then introduced 
(Vengroff, 1977) as a means of generating revenue to support public. 
works programmes (for education, health and the livestock sector), and 
then in 1932; these two taxes were brought together as the "Afri can" tax 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 19BO). The purpose of taxation, it was .argued, 
was to support the financing of the Protectorate administration, which. 
could not alone be supported by the livestock sector, as well as to 
contribute to the social and economic development of the tribal reserves 
(Parson, 1984). 
By contrast the major impact of the imposition of these taxes was to 
increase the need of the household to have access to cash. In this way 
Protectorate policy institutionalised cash exchange in the local. 
economy. Under such circumstances, participation in the cash economy 
·was transformed from a discretionary activity into a mandatory one 
(Parson, 1984). 
The Encouragement of Mine Employment: 
Records of mi ne employment can be traced back as early as 1844 (Pi card, 
1985) and had spread to most parts of the Protectorate by 1885. 
However, mine recruitment only took off on a large scale after the turn 
of the century with increased overseas investments into the South 
African mining sector (Parson, 1985). In 1899, the Protectorate 
administration. encouraged recruitment to the mines by setting up mine 
recruitment agents in· the major centres or" settlement (Hesselberg, 1985; 
. Sch~pera, 1970). It was more than a coincidence that this occurred in 
the same year that the Hut tax was introduced. Indeed, the 
administration recognised that mine employment .could provide the 
Protectorate with a ready source of income, which could ensure tax· 
payment for local administration and the funding of local public works 
too (Schapera,. 1970). Therefore, the introduction of taxes supported 
both the colonial administration and the South African mine owners 
(Massey, 1978)'-
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The development of the mining sector depended on a plentiful supply of 
cheap labour. Labour could, however, only be released through policies 
to monetise the economy or through the use of political force. 
Accordingly, this could be aChieved by either appropriating land, 
imposing taxation, or through enslavement (Cliffe, 1977). In 
Bechuanaland this labour pool was made available through the inducement 
of the cash incentive. In this ,respect, policy towards cattle 
commercialisation, taxation and membership of the South African Customs 
Union (see below), provided these conditions by destabilising the 
indigenous mode of production and by creating a need to have cash 
(Parson, 1979). 
Increasingly, during the course of the 20th century, the importance of 
recruitment to the mining sector grew. By the 1930's, wage employment 
in the mines had become a major facet of the indigenous economy to the 
extent that the Protectorate could begin to be described as a 
"L'abour-Reserve" (Parsons, 1985). 
Participation in the Southern African Customs Union: 
In 1910, the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland 
entered into economic union with South Africa. This economic union 
paralleled the Act of ,Union of the same year wh,ich effectively made the 
Protectorate an appendage of South Africa, pol itically and 
administratively (Parson, 19B4; Parsons, 1977). The Customs Union had a 
significant impact on the Bechuanaland' economy by increasing the 
,marginal status of agriculture and by promoting' the cOliinerci,al isat ion of 
the livestock sector. It has been argued, moreover, that it served to 
institutionalise "depression" in the indigenous economy, thereby 
creating structural dependence on mine employment (Par'sons, 1977). 
Apart from the environmental conditions which favoured the development 
of the livestock sector, it,was the'opening up of unrestricted South 
African markets and also of markets in the Rhodesias, following the 
Union, .which provided the economic incentive to develop the sector 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 1980; Roe, 1980). Access to this larger economic 
system was essential since the market·within the Protectorate was' 
inadequate to sustain the expansion of the sector. At the same time, 
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the South African Customs Union provided South African traders and 
farmers the opportunity to exploit the Protectorate market at 
preferential rates. Western goods.which had already been arriving 
through small traders for over half a century began to flood the local 
economy •. ·By 1941, preferential tariffs for South African goods had 
managed to destroy the indigenous manufacturing economy consisting 
mainly of textiles,·wagon building and building materials. It was 
reported that by this time it was no longer possible to find even remote 
dwellers wearing Tswana clothing (Roe, 1980). The South African Customs 
Union, therefore, served to speed up the monetisation of the.Tswana 
economy to the extent that it became increasingly necessary as well as . 
desirable to have access to cash in order to purchase western goods and 
pay taxes. 
Summary: 
The implementation of these four economic policies had the effect of 
transforming the indigenous mode of production, rendering it 
. . 
increasingly dependent on the peripheral capitalist economy, based in 
South Africa. Under ·these.circumstances, a condition of 
underdevelopment.was created in which the indigenous economy· was 
rendered dependent on the ~apitalist sector, but in itself was unable to 
break ·away from a state of poverty (Palmer & Parsons, 1977; Parson, 
1984). The economic strategy outlined in this section had considerable 
bearing on specific poliCies towards social welfare provision, power 
sharing and decision-making, and the socio-economic development of the 
Batswa~a (see ch 3). 
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RURAL DEVELOPMENT: POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE: 
In this section, the way in which the legacy of co.lonial economic policy 
has constrained policy options for national and rural development is 
examined. Attention focusses on policy towards social infrastructure 
provision, institution-building and socio-economic development. 
THE SITUATION AT INDEPENDENCE: THE COLONIAL LEGACY: 
At independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest and 
least-economically developed countries in Africa. It could boast a GNP 
per head of only P50 (Stevens, 1981) which qualified it as one of the 
twenty least developed countries in the world. The economy was weak, 
unintegrated and dependent on the South Afdcan mining sector whi le the 
country's resource base was considered poor. The gross domestic product 
of the nation at the eve of independence was P32.8 million (Dahl, 1981) 
and the country was·dependent on budgetary support from Britain 
(Stevens, 1981). Over 65% of the labour force depended on subsistence 
arable production for their income. However, only 5% of the total land 
-
area of the country was suitable for crop cultivation (GOB, 1985), while 
there was evidence that yields from local arable p-roduct ion had been 
decl ining. As a result, 20% of the population found itself dependent on 
food aid to subsist. The South African mines provided jobs for about 
25% of the labour force (GOB, 1985) while the domestic formal sector 
could-provide employment for up to 12% of the labour force, primarily in 
the public sector (Parson, 1984). Internal manufacturing had to contend 
with fierce. competition from South Afr1can producers who were better 
able_ to exploit the terms of the Customs Union. The drought whjch 
lasted between 1961 and 1965 resulted in the loss of one third of the 
national cattle herd (Dahl, 1981). 
Physical and social infrastructure were almost non-existent, while the 
population was largely illiterate and unSkilled. There was anextreme 
shortage of economic and soc ia 1 i nfras tructure. The railway runni n9 
- north to south was the only major line of communication. Apart from the 
construction of the new capital at Gaborone, there was inadequate 
infrastructure to support the most basic industrial or commercial 
activity (Parson, 1984). Education and health facilities were also 
lackirig. There were only five private secondary schools which provided. 
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places to only 3% of school age children (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). 
While 50% of children were attending primary school, there was only a 
40% completion rate due to inadequate facilities and teachers (Colclougn 
& McCarthy, 1980). There were no vocational training institutions and a 
severe shortage of trained manpower (Stevens, 1981). Finally, there 
were seven hospitals in the urban centres but only 24 staffed 
dispensaries in the rural areas. Even within the urban sector, there, 
were severe manpower and financial shortages (Colclough & McCarthy, 
1980) . 
There was, therefore, serious undercapacity in all domains which 
threatened the very viability of this new country. Beyond this bleak 
internal political economy scenario, Botswana was born into a region 
characterised by political and economic instability ariSing from white 
minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. At the same time, it was' 
clear that these two states dominated the region'from an economic point 
of view,. forci ng the weaker new states to tie thei r economies to those 
of their powerful neighbours. Finally, Botswana inherited a hostile and 
harsh environment, symbolised by the onset of the worst-recorded drought 
at independence. 
Confronted with this poor inventory, the government was compelled to lay 
the foundations on which to develop a viable nation. The challenge was 
made harder by the political climate in the region and the debilitating 
effects of the drought, both of which would constrain options available 
to government. 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: 
The prospects for national development were not encouraging. In 
particular, the pre-conditions necessary for implementing a national 
development strategy were lacking. The government recognised that its 
, first priority had to be to create a financial and economic base in 
order to cover basic administrative running costs and to provide a 
platform from which further investments could be made. The 
implementation of a more broadly based development strategy was 
recognised to be premature until, these preconditions had been satisfied 
(Parson, 1984). Thus in the immediate years after independence" 
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government pol icy focussed on try; ng to generate as much revenue as 
possible by'exploiting the most productive sectors already in existence, 
while continuing to rely on financial support from the British 7 
government. I n the short-term, investment in constructive development 
would have to wait until the country was able to service its immediate 
running costs. 
In the first instance, revenue was earned from the productive sectors 
inherited from the colonial administration. By and large, this meant 
the commercialised part of the livestock sector (inspite of the great 
losses brought about by the drought), and remittances earned by migrant 
mine labourers in South Africa. The post-colonial government was, in 
this respect, obliged to accept an economic system which had been 
created to serve colonial interests, as the basis for establishing the 
economy of the independent state. 
Economic fortunes changed dramatically, however, at the end of the 
1960,'s when attractive diamond deposits were discovered. Subsequent 
prospecting around the country identified further deposits of diamonds 
and other exploitable minerals, especially copper and nickel. It was' 
quickly realised that these mineral deposits could provide an 
un-anticipated opportunity to generate rapid economic growth, through 
the investment in industrial plant, associated infrastructure, job 
creation and earnings from the export of the extracted deposits. The 
mining sector was, therefore, able to provide the foundations of a 
coherent economic development strategy and to transform expectations of 
what the country was capable of achieving. Policy,was, henceforth, 
directed, to ensuring that maximum support was prov.ided to this sector to 
serve as the principal engine of growth and source of national wealth. 
In the short-term, the discovery of diamonds and also the re-negotiation 
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which provided the smaller 
partners a greater share of aggregate revenue (GOB, 1985) meant that the 
government was able to achieve its primary objective of attaining 
financial self-sufficiency by 1973, well in advance of all expectations 
(Parson, 1984; Stevens, 1981); 
Botswana's drive towards socio-economic development was further boosted 
by wide-ranging offers of assistance from the international donor 
community. Aid agencies were encouraged to support her internal 
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development programme for several reasons. First, the dearth of 
infrastructure inherited.at independence had to be rectified in order to 
support the country's development strategy. Without adequate funds ~ 
available locally, external assistance from outside was indispensible. 
Donors were especially attracted to proposals to support the provision 
of economic infrastructure to the mining sector and associated 
townships. Second, donors were confident that resources would be well 
spent and that investments would be maintained, in view of the long-term 
forecasts of.economic bouyancy. Together with evidence that the 
government was committed to safeguarding democracy, donors saw Botswana 
as representing a sound investment opportunity. Third, ·financia1 
support to Botswana provided western aid agencies with a convenient way 
of displaying their support for Black African countries in the face of 
Apartheid and colonial rule in the region, without having to directly 
interfere with those rogue nat ions (Stevens, 19B1). 
Thus by 1970, the foundations of an economic development strategy, the 
impact of which would be felt for the next decade, had been laid. The 
mining sector would serve as a growth pole providing revenue and 
momentum for the rest of the economy. The livestock sector and SACU 
revenues would .continue to play an important part in boosting national 
income.· The revenue earned from these sectors could then be used in a 
number of ways - to be ploughed back into those same sectors to support 
further growth, to absorb the rising running costs of an expanding 
public sector, or to be deposited into a domestic development fund. 
This fund would be assisted by international contributions in order to 
support the provision of infrastructure, primarily in the urban sector 
but. increasingly in the rural sector too. 
The strategy had all the markings of a "Redistribution with Growth" 
approach. Indeed, the government stated that it sought to plough the 
. returns from the mining sector to those sectors which had not benefitted 
directly from this growth strategy:and that this would provide the basis 
for future economic activity (GoB, 19B5). The Botswana government sees 
its role as one of providing support to the private sector, through the 
. provision of basic economic infrastructure, of setting up and 
admi ni stering a lega 1, f i sca 1 and monetary framework and for bei ng 
responsible for· the education, training of manpower, as well as 
participating in all major economic ventures (GOB, 19B5). 
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Within this equation, the arable subsistence sector has been attributed 
only a minor role. The rural economy, at large, has not been included· 
as a major partner in this development strategy. At best, it has been 
targetted to receive the indirect benefits from the growth sectors in 
the form of infrastructure provision. At the same time, this strategy 
has increased dependence on South Africa for the provision of 
foodstuffs, manufactured goods and services, as rural production has 
declined in the face of competition and inadequate incentives. 
Moreover, mine and farm employment in South Africa has remained a major 
source of revenue both for the national exchequer and for the rural 
household. 
During the 1ate·196D's and early 1970's, a·high proportion of available 
resources were invested into the development of the mining sector. 
Diamond mines· were established .at Orapa and Let1akane, and a huge 
copper-nickel plant was built at Se1ibi-Pikwe. Private capital from 
South Africa accounted for most of the investment in associated plant, 
technology and manpower (Parson, 1984; Picard, 1985), while the. Botswana 
government provided supportive infrastructure in association with the 
donor community (Lewis, 1981). 
The importance of the mining sector to the growth of the economy cannot 
be underestimated. Between 1966-73,45% of all development expenditures 
were allocated to the copper-nickel complex alone. By contrast, only 
13% of expenditure was allocated to the agriculture, commercial, 
industrial and water sectors over. the same period (Parson, 1984). The 
project also provided a focal pOint for donors to concentrate their 
financial support and served as a· means of making an entrance to the 
Botswana economy. Canada, the·USA and the World Bank played major roles 
here. Similar levels of investment have also been made in relation to 
other mine projects at Orapa, Let1akane and more recently, Jwaneng. 
The impact of the mining sector on the national economy has been far 
reaching. Aside from the economic spin-offs that occurred primarily 
during the construction phase, the mines have transformed the financial 
status of the national economy. By 1984, the sector accounted for 30% 
of national revenue (Parson, 1984) and up to 70·% of export earnings 
(AED, 1985; GOB, 1985). Diamonds now account for 96% of mining-derived 
revenue (Picard, 1985), yet as recently as 1971, it only accounted for 
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$5.3 million in export value. By 1979, this figure had rocketted to 
$182.9 million (Parson, 1984). 
The indigenous mining sector has transformed Botswana from being one of 
the poorest countries in the world, facing an uncertain future, into a 
country which in 1985 could claim to have almost attained the status of 
a middle-income developing country. Between 1966 and 1983, GDP/capita 
increased-five times (GOB, 1985). It can now boast a GNP/capita of 
$900, ranking fifth in sub-Saharan Africa (AED, 1985). Between 1970-77, 
Botswana had the fastest growing economy in the world recording an 
average annual growth rate of 15.8% (AED, 1985). The development of 
these leading sectors has permitted the recurrent budget to increase 
from Pl0.3 million in 1966/7 (Dahl, 1981) to P424 million in 1985/6 
(GoB, 1985), while over the same period the development budget has 
increased from P3.7 million to P272 million (Dahl, 1981; GOB, 1985) (see 
Figs Al-A6). 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY: 
Before 1972, no explicit rural development strategy existed as the 
government lacked adequate resources to invest in the development of the-
rural sector at the same time as concentrating efforts on exploiting the 
urban sector. The only exception was -the commercial ised livestock 
sector based upon the production of beef for the Lobatse abbatoir, which 
continued to provide the government with a significant source of income. 
During the period of NDP 1 (1966-1970), while a large part of the 
development budget was allocated to infrastructure projects, the 
majority of these funds supported the deve lopment of product ive 
activities in the urban sector (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). 
A formal strategy for the rural sector only emerged in the mid-1970's, 
by which time mining revenues were on tap and donor organisations had 
negotiated assistance programmes with the government. However, the 
investments which began to be made to the "sector were dwarfed by the 
huge sums being directed to the mining sector from both-public and 
private sources. Consequently, in the immediate post-independence 
years, the rural sector did not experience any significant improvement 
in social and economic conditions. 
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The rural strategy was presented in two government papers in 1972 and 
1973 (GOB, 1972; 1973). It stressed the relationship between economic 
growth achieved through investment in the mining sector and 
redistribution and social justice, achieved through the re-investment of 
mi ni ng revenue 'i nto the rural sector. It also noted that rural 
development could not be undertaken without assistance from the donor 
cOl1lT1unity. 
The policy statement issued in 1972 (GOB, 1972) outlined the four major 
objectives of the rural strategy. These were to create the' 
opportunities for increasing rural incomes, to provide basic social 
'services, to promote social justice and to solve the problem of 
overgrazing in communal areas. The strategy addressed both issues of 
production and infrastructure provision, which would be supported by 
finance generated from the mining and livestock,sectors and from 
external donor sources (Picard, 1979). A major underlining theme was to 
redistribute national wealth from the urban to the rural sector. This 
objective would be achieved through a number of specific sectoral 
projects and programmes coordinated by central government and 
representative bodies at the district, level. It was felt that the newly 
created District Councils (see below) lacked the implementation capacity 
to supervise this strategy effectively. ' Government's decision to take 
full charge of'rural development reflected its awareness of the 
,political significance of being seen to be investing in the rural 
sector. A commitment to rural development was spelt out in no uncertdin 
terms; 
"We must make every effort to ensure that our strategy for development 
is based on social justice and this means that rural development must 
have a high priority." (PreSident S.Khama, quoted in GOB, 1972:p2) 
From within this strategy, the three major policy areas presented in the 
introduction can be identified. These concern: 
Social Infrastructure Provision: 
For the vast majority of the rural population, rural development has 
come to stand for the provision of social and physical infrastructure. 
A primary object i ve of government's rura 1 investment prog'ramme' has been 
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to use domestic revenue and donor funds to provide 
services in the most populated rural settlements. 
a range of basic 
These have included 
health dispensaries, primary schools, and domestic water supplies. Such 
services have been provided by and large without cost" to the recipients 
with government taking on the responsibility to fund both the provision 
and operation of such services. On the.whole, services have been 
provided on a hierarchical basis with higher levels of service being 
given to the larger and more important rural settlements. 
Production-related investment: 
By contrast, state intervention in the rural productive sector has been, 
until most recently, restricted to the livestock sector. Here, 
investment has remained relatively high, especially in the. period 
preceeding the mining boom. Benefits have accrued at the national level 
through the exportat ion of processed beef products; However, at the 
household level, benefits have been unevenly distributed reflecting the 
skewed distribution of livestock ownership. 
_ Support for the livestock sector has been symbolised by the Tribal 
Grazing Lands Project introduced in 1975. It was the only major 
production related rural project at the time aimed at establishing 
-colTlTlercial ranches outside of the cOlTlTlunal areas (Colclough 8. McCarthy, 
1980). The sector has also benefitted from a number of other projects, 
such as the upgrading of the Lobatse BMC slaughterhouse and processing 
-factory, the construction of a new vaccination centre and the provision 
of supportive infrastructure (Parson, 1984). 
The continued support for the livestock sector is based on the important 
contribution that it makes to the GDP through export earnings. In 1980, 
livestock sales accounted for 20% of total GDP (Picard, 1985), to-801 of 
agricultural GDP (GOB, 1985), while the processing of beef products 
accounts for over a third of maunfacturing's contribution to GDP (GOB, 
1980). Beef sales, however, _have depended heavi lyon the European 
Corrmon Market which is responsible for absorbing 80% of exports, and in 
particular on preferential tariffs agreed upon under the Lome Convention 
(Jones, 1981). The profitability of the livestock sector is, therefore, 
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dependent on the goodwill of the EEC and its policy·towards import levy 
rebates (Parson, 1979). 
By contrast, assistance to the arable sector, on which over 
three-quarters of the rural population depend in part for· their 
livelihood, has received little support. During NDP 4, for example, 
only 27% of the budget allocation to agriculture was allocated to the 
arable sector, with the remainder going principally to the livestock 
sector (GOB, 19BO; Parson, 1984). This policy has reinforced the bias 
away from arable production started during the colonial period. 
Moreover, the emphasis on livestock commercialisation has further 
marginalised crop cultivation'by further separating cultivators from the 
holders of livestock. By 1985, crop yields were only sufficient to 
cover 30% of domestic food needs, while the agriculture sector 
(excluding cattle) accounted for only 10% of total GDP (AED, 1985); By 
1985, 365,000 people were receiving' supplementary food rations due to 
the impact of drought on an increasingly marginalised sector (GOB, 
1985). Therefore, prior to 1978, there had been no major investment· 
programme to support the arable sector. For the majority of the rural 
population, the only tangible benefit of government'S rural policy had 
been the provision of social services. 
The Role of Sub-National Institutions in Rural Development: 
During this period, central government assumed a major responsibility 
for directing and implementing development policy. While investment was 
focussed on the urban sector, the district level institutions inherited 
and created at independence (see below) had almost no opportunity to 
influence policy. Following the establishment of a rural strategy, t.he 
role of these institutions in development became politically important. 
Whi.le central government continued to assume a major responsibil ity for 
policy formulation and implementation, some'attempts were made to extend 
participation to sub-national institutions, albeit in a limited 
capacity. 
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A RE-APPRAISAL OF POLICY OBJECTIVES: 
NDP 5 and 6 symbol.ised a significant change in government strategy to 
national development (GOB, 1980, 1985). A redirection of policy has 
been prompted by changing social, economic and political circumstances 
which made the existing strategy no longer suitable. To an extent, the 
need to redirect policy may be interpreted as evidence that the original 
objectives set out at independence .had been achieved. Of relevance 
here, is the new importance that has been attached to rural development 
in overall national development and, in particular, to the effect that 
this has had oh the balance between investment in social infrastructure 
and in production-related sectors, and on th'e role'of sUb-national 
institutions in policy formulation and implementation. 
The New'Strategy: 
Rural development has now become the major focus for national 
development. 'Its status has been elevated from that of a sector of 
secondary importance to a sector of prim~ry importance, 'thereby 
replacing the urban sector 'as the target for major investment (Parson, 
1984) • 
Within the new rural strategy, production rather than service proviSlon 
has been emphasised, with attention drawn to the need to encourage 
employment creation and income earning opportunities within the rural 
sector. Investments have' been directed to both the arable sector, in 
order to help the small subsistence producer, through the Arable Lands 
.Development Programme (ALDEP), and to the commercial sector in order to 
stlmulate non-arable production,. through the Financial 'Assistance Policy 
(FAP). Social'and physical infrastructure will increasingly be provided 
to those sectors which can provide production-related opportunities. 
Emphasis has been placed on spatial rather than sectoral planning as a 
means of shifting investment towards defined regions, as the focal point 
for economic generation. This policy has been introduced in terms of a 
Communal Area Development programme (CAD), and a broader National and 
. . . 
District Settlement Policy (GOB, 1980). By contrast, the relative' 
emphasis placed on. infrastructure provision has been reduced even though 
. in absolute 'terms, the resources available for all sectors under NDp· 5 
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increased threefold over NDP 4 (Parson, 1984). The new strategy has 
been accompanied by changes in the administration of rural pol icy 
formulation and implementation between central government, local 
government and the rural community. 
The Motives for Policy Change: 
By the end of the 1970's, it became clear to the government that the 
levels of economic growth e·njoyed during most of the decade could not be 
guaranteed for the future, while at the same time, demands on the 
economy were continuing to grow rapidly. It was realised that the 
mining sector could no longer sustain economic growth at the same rate, 
as the sector began to experience diminishing returns on the investments 
for mining infrastructure and as world diamond prices remained unstable. 
Demands on the economy were increasing from several directions and, 
consequently, were imposing considerable strain on it. 
First, public sector borrowing was increasing rapidly as government 
activity within the economy continued.to expand. Second, it was 
recognised that economic performance and the benefits of unprecedented 
growth. had benefitted too few and had done too little to activate the 
rural economy on which most of the population depended. Polarised 
development in modern growth centres and the parallel neglect of rural 
areas, apart from the provision of infrastructure, was creating 
characteristic Third World socio-economic conditions. The rural economy 
was depressed.offering few formal sector employment opportunities while· 
the arable sector remained marginalised. While primary education 
facilities were widely available, higher education was restricted to the 
townships and a few of the major villages. An increasingly young and 
literate rural population with high expectations was entering the labour 
market, especially in the urban sector, but here too, opportunities were 
few. Migration to the urban sector has also increased pressure on 
housing and service provision. Therefore, as the urban sector has 
continued to grow rapidly against the background of a high rate of 
population growth and rural out-migration, the government has recognised 
that in the future, the economy must be able to satisfy employment 
demands. Yet, under existing circumstances, the structure of the 
economy is inappropriately equipped to meet these challenges. 
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It is. therefore. viewed as imperatiVe that this urban drift be arrested 
by generating increased opportunities within the rural sector. This is 
recognised to be all the more important in light of the South African 
government '.s decision to reduce its annual intake of rural migrant 
workers (Lipton. 1978). The government would al so 1 ike to reduce "its 
dependence on the South African economy by becoming more self-reliant in 
_ food production and manufacturing. Stimulating these sectors is 
essential given that the rates of growth experienced during the mining 
boom are unlikely to be repeated (GOB, 1985). This new strategy must be 
pursued, therefore, in a climate of more modest _economic growth. 
Government has been forced to impose strict limits on recurrent spending 
and is, therefore, reticent to support investments which are not 
self-liquidating, or which demand high recurrent costs. This, 
particularly, concerns infrastructure projects which are non-productive 
while it is also hoped -that better standards of operation and 
maintenance of infrastruct~re can lead to a reduction in recurrent 
budget overheads. As a resu It, the government is more concerned to 
support existing assets and services rather than to invest in new 
ventures (GOB, 1985). 
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Chapter 3: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION, INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND 
SOCIO-ECON()IIC DEVELOPMENT: THREE ELEMENTS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT. 
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter'investigates colonial and post-colonial state policy 
towards the provision of social infrastructure, institution-building and 
socio-economic development in the rural sector. ,Contemporary policy 
objectives and the impact 'of policy on the rural economy are considered 
against a review of specific policy in these areas during the colonial 
period and against the review of rural development presented in chapter 
2. 
Social Infrastructure Provision: 
The provision of rural water supplies and sanitation constitute 
components of government's rural development programme. This programme 
is based upon a social infrastructure provision strategy for recognised 
rural settlements.' W{thin this strategy, a clear set of p01icy 
objectives and a distinct system of delivery has been developed. In 
order to explain which factors have determined the nature of water and 
sanitation proviSion, a wider review of social, infrastructure provision 
within rural and national development is required. This forms the basis 
for comparing Botswana's experience in water supply and sanitation 
provision with the prescriptions of the Oecade while contributing to the 
analysis of institutional capacity in policy implementation by 
illustrating the relationship between policy objectives and the means 
used to, obtain those objectives. 
Institution-Building: 
The prinCipal institutions at the local government and community levels 
which contribute to rural development are introduced as the basis for 
examining their role in the delivery of water supplies and sanitation. 
The characteristics of each institution and their responsibility towards 
the formulation and implementation of rural development is described. 
.' 
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This analysis provides a background to chapters 5, 6 and 7. The 
analysis of delivery systems in chapter 5 identifies how these 
institutions are involved in policy formulation and implementation. The 
constraints facing the individual institutions in executing policy are 
then examined in chapter 6. 
Socio-Economic Development: 
The rural household and the rural village represent both the recipients 
and participants in the water supply and. sanitation programmes. The 
analysis of the·socio-economic status of the rural household and 
community is, therefore, important in order to understand the capacity 
of the household as participant. The analysis below identifies who the 
recipients are and where they. live. This is necessary in order to 
understand what the programmes are tryi ng to ach ieve. More importantly .. 
the analysis of household socio-economic status helps to explain the 
constraints to community participation within project delivery. It is 
suggested that socio-economic status influences both the capacity and 
willingness of the household to participate directly through self-help 
contributions and indirectly through support for community development 
groups. 
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION: 
In the post-colonial period, the government has accepted the 
responsibility for providing non-productive infrastructure as a major 
element of its development strategy. Subsidised social infrastructure 
provision has formed the basis of rural development while in the urban 
sector, provision has been organised on a partially subsidised basis. 
This approach to infrastructure provision can be contrasted to that 
pursued during the colonial period. Policy was limited in absolute 
terms and was restricted to the urban sector and to those few productive 
sectors, while the rural sector was largely overlooked. Examples of 
primary education, health care, water ·supply and sanitation are provided 
to illustrate the features of policy in the two periods. 
COLONIAL POLICY: 
The colonial administration paid little attention to the proviSion of 
basic economic and social infrastructure. Provision that was made was 
restricted to the few townships were the European population lived and 
. to the few sectors of production such as livestock,which had been 
exploited. Responsibility f9r 'welfare' was left to the tribes 
themselves, or to the missions, while any public works that were 
undertaken by the administration were restrided to the urban areas. It 
was only after 1945, and more. especially in the decade prior to 
independence that a more concerted effort was made to provide the 
territory with the basic infrastructure that would be desperately needed 
to support the economy of the future independent country. 
Expenditure on Social Infrastructure: 
The lack of attention paid to the provision of social and economic 
infrastructure was reflected in the extremely low levels of investment 
allocated to such provision. Between 1911 and 1957, the. colonial office 
provided no funds at all to support the recurrent budget of the 
Protectorate administration. Expenditure had to be supported from 
revenue generated locally through the export of livestock and through 
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the taxation of the indigenous population. Yet most of the revenue 
earned this way was used to cover routine administrative overheads and -
was not invested in developmental_ activities (Colclough & McCarthy. --
1980). Between 1900 and 1925. almost 90% of government expenditure was 
accounted for by administrative needs - more especially to support the 
police force. Capital investment expenditure only began to be recorded 
after 1935, yet even during the period of more intensive investment in 
developmental projects. after 1955, still over half, of the 
Protectorate's total expenditure was accounted for by_ administrative and 
police recurrent costs (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). 
Indeed. it was only after 1955 that the colonial office agreed to extend 
financial support to the Protectorate. By 1964, the colonial office was 
responsible for providing half of the Protectorate's recurrent-needs, 
while it had also substantially increased its support to the territory's 
development programme (Colclough & McCarthy. 1980). Between 1954 and 
1965, a total of R 8.5'million was allocated exclusivelyfor productive 
development projects (Parson, 19B4), representing 25% of the total 
budget for the Protectorate. Previously, it had never surpassed 10% 
(Colclough & McCarthy. 1980).' However, this additional development 
finance was used primarily to support the livestock and urban sectors. 
Livestock-related investments, for example. accounted for 30% of such 
expend itures, wh i 1 e the cons truct i on of the new capita 1 at Gaborone 
accounted for 11% of the budget. ' At the same time, increased concern 
for improving education during this period was reflected in the 
allocation of 16% of the budget to this sector (Parson, 1984). 
So~ial Service Provision: Education and Health: 
Policies towards the provision'of social and economic infrastructure can 
be illustrated by- examining the education and health sectors ,during this 
peri od. 
The development of primary education relied almost entirely on the 
efforts of the tribal authorities and missionary societies. The 
colonial' administration only began to provide assistance aftei 1910 and 
in only the most indirect fashion. Between 1B75,and 1903. the missions 
were wholly responsible for providing elementary education to the 
indigenous population. The first missonary school had in fact been 
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established in 1847, at Kolobeng by Oavid Livingstone. 8y 1900, 
missionary zeal ensured that up to 1000 children were enrolled in 
mission schools (Colclough & McCarthy, i980j". After 1903, missions 
began to receive financial assistance through the 'native' tax system, 
and through contributions made by individual tribal leaders. The 
payment of official levies for such activities as education was 
formalised after 1919 with the establishment of the 'Native Fund'. 
Further funds were provided by the Tswana themselves after 1938 with the 
establishment of Tribal Treasuries. Yet, at no time did the 
Protectorate administration provide .financial assistance, even though 
·enrollment had increased to over 8000 pupils (Colclough & McCarthy, 
1980) • 
Colonial intervention was limited to the setting up of and participation 
in school committees. These were created in 1938 in order to prepare 
and monitor curricula"standards (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). This 
action reflected growing concern that attendance in missionary schools 
had started to decline rapidly (Schapera, 1980). The committees were 
designed to bring together representatives.of the administration, the 
missions and the tribes in the hope of establishing better policy. 
After 1955, the administration also began to increase financial support 
to primary schooling to the extent· that by 1964, its contributions 
matched those of the tribes'. Additionally, capital funds were provided 
by the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund to boost the investment 
programme (HMSO, 1965). 
Secondary education received still les"s attention from the 
administration and likewise depended on missionary and tribal 
contributions. In several of the larger tribal capitals and townships, 
a number of s~hools were built through the efforts of missionary 
societies and tribal leaders after 1930. 8y contrast, colonial support 
,was restricted to the supply of a limited number of teachers in the 
years before independence (Schapera, 1980). This action was prompted by 
the administration's realisation that. with the prospects of impending 
independence, it was_of some urgency to ensure that educated 8atswana 
would be ready to inherit localised administrative posts (HMSO, 1965). 
At the same time, no effort was made to set up either teacher-training, 
Or vocational establishments to support the education sector after 
independence. This lack of support for human resource development 
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during this period accounts in large part for.the contemporary problems 
facing the country in filling both public and private sector posts with 
well-qualified manpower and in developing a strong institutional 
capacity to support development in the rural sector. 
Policy towards health care provision during the cOlonial period very 
much mirrored the education sector. Although colonial state 
intervention began at an earlier date, support was almost exclusively 
directed to the urban sector. Before 1930, 'modern' health care 
depended on .the missions while indigenous medicine continued to be· 
widely used in tribal society (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). The 
missionaries were responsible for introducing modern medicine to the· 
Tswana and by 19·30 had established four hospitals in major village 
settlements. In 1924 the first nurse arrived in Mochudi, the capital of 
the Kgatla, and in 1927 the first doctor arrived (Schapera, 1980), 
After 1930, support from the administration increased. This was 
reflected in the construction of three hospitals in two townships and 
one major village. While almost all effort was concentrated on 
providing facilities to the urban sector, an attempt·was made to extend 
elementary services to rural communities through the provision of 
staffed and un-staffed clinics and dispensaries (Colclough & McCarthy, 
1980). While· expenditure on health almost· reached 10% of the recurrent 
budget by 1955, which was almost double that of education, it remained 
well below the allocations made to the veterinary department, the police 
department and the administration at large (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). 
Colonial Policy Towards Water Supply and Sanitation Provision: 
In line with colonial policy towards social infrastructure provision 
generally, water and sanitation provision was restricted to the 
·principal townships and productive·sectors. Domestic water consumers 
were better serviced in the urban sector, while in the rural sector, 
. livestock received a higher level of service than did ·the human 
population. On the whole sanitation received far less attention than 
did water supply. 
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. Water Supp ly: 
Contemporary policy towards rural water supply has been influenced by a 
number of important features of colonial policy towards this sector. 
- water resource management was focussed almost exclusively on the 
livestock sector representing a key part of the Protectorate's policy 
of encouraging cattle ranching as the mainstay of the economy. 
investment was based on the exploitation of underground water sources 
through the use of borehole technology, rather than of surface sources 
or of shallow wells. 
- the state assumed full responsibility for providing water supply 
facilities in this sector. 
The colonial administration became actively involved in water resource 
management during the 1930·'s. Prior to this date, intervention in this 
field was insignificant. Water resources were managed large·ly by the 
Tswana chiefs, according to tribal law (HMSO, 1965), who were 
responsible for building and maintaining wells and dams in their tribal 
·reserves (Schapera, 1980). Manpower was provided by members of the 
tribe according to customary practices - the age regiments - while money 
was obtained through the levying of local funds (Schapera, 1970). " By 
1930, dams had been built in the tribal centres of Molepolole, Kanye, 
and Serowe. However, these were built primarily for livestock watering 
although in all certainty, they were used for domestic purposes too. 
Although a ~ative Fund had been create"d in 1919 to support public works 
.programmes in the reserves, the administration was reticent to extend 
support to the sector. So, for example, in the Kgatla reserve, the 
administration only provided a small grant to support ,chief Isang's 
borehole drilling programme which involved the sinking of 16 boreholes· 
for human and livestock purposes. Additional funding was obtained from 
an i n"terna 1 levy on Kgat la tax payers amounting to £6 10s or an ox per 
taxable household (Schapera, 1980). As a result, seven successful 
boreholes were installed in and around the Kgatla capital, Mochudi. 
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After 1929, events changed dramatically. In response partly to Chief 
Isang's borehole programme, and partly out of concern for the fact that 
shallow wells were rapidly drying up through over-use and the effects of 
. drought, the Protectorate administration ·made a commitment to provide 
water for livestock through the exploitation of underground sources. 
Increasingly, the colonial state took full responsibility for providing 
water and in so doing introduced a new technology. Conversly, the 
·influence exerted by the Chief in managing water resources declined 
substantially. As reliance on borehole technology increased, the use of 
traditional wells and dams declined in those areas where new supplies 
were installed .. The new borehole technology also offered the 
opportunity for opening up hitherto inhospitable areas to human 
settlement and livestock rearing in the western sandveld. 
The new commitment to providing water supplies was based on the Pim 
report prepared in 1933 on behalf of the ·colonial administration. It 
.stated that the improvement of existing water supplies and the provision 
of new water supplies was essentia·l as the basis for livestock and 
-arable development, and for human health (Roe, 1980). 
The recommendations of this report were to influence policy for the 
following 35 years. By 1966, the colonial administration had fnstalled 
700 boreholes (Copperman, 1978). Yet, these we_re provided primari ly for 
the livestock sector rather than for human consumption. Already, by 
1940, 120 boreholes had been drilled. This rapid implementation 
reflected the .way in which borehole technology could transform the 
exploitation of water resources. Yet -it could only have been achieved 
at this.scale through the active intervention of the colonial state. 
In 1945, a major new groundwater investment programme was started with 
the financial assistance of the Commonwealth Oevelopment and Welfare 
Fund. As a- result, by 1955, a further 220 successful boreholes were 
installed while the private sector als9 provided a further 395 
-boreholes. Roe (1980) notes that these were provided almost exclusively 
_for livestock use, 
from this sector. 
Development Scheme 
dams •. 
reflecting the increased profits that were accruing 
A smaller grant was also allocated to a Surface Water 
to finance the construction of 65 stock watering 
./ 
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However, .it was between 1956 and independence that the Protectorate made 
its most concerted effort to provide water supplies. This increase in 
activity coincided with more wideranging' provision of basic 
infrastructure facilities in anticipation of independence. It 
introduced a new groundwater project in the Eastern hardveld and on the 
margins of the Western sandveld, funded through the Commonwealth 
Development and Welfare Fund. By 1960, a further 270 boreholes had been 
drilled by the administration, representing a substantial increase in 
the rate, of provision so that almost as many boreholes were'drilled 
between 1956-1960 as had been drilled between 1946-1955 (Roe, 1980). 
Again, the majority of these boreholes had been drilled for stock 
watering purposes. However, the programme had gained so much momentum 
and the cattle population had increased so ,alarmingly that by 1959 
concern began to be expressed about the possibility of, overgrazing in 
'Eastern communal areas. Consequently, in the immediate period leading 
to independence, support for the drilling programme was reduced 
'substantially. At the same time, efforts were made to encourage cattle 
'herders to sink their own private boreholes in the western sandveld were 
opportunities for opening up the land for grazing had beenidentified'-
The unprecedented exploitation of water resources in the period after 
1930 can be attributed to two factors. First, to the introduction of 
,borehole technology which provided the opportunity for exploiting vast 
reserves of groundwater throughout the Protectorate. As a result, 
settlement and ranching was no longer restricted to locations which had 
access to surface and sub-surface water sources. Second, to the 
.ulJstantial financial and 'political support provided to the programme by 
the Protectorate administration. The colonial state was instrumental, 
therefore, in orchestrating this programme of resource exploitation on a 
scale which had hitherto been impossible. The decision to pursue this 
policy reflected' the major economic objective of the Protectorate to 
develop the livestock sector as the basis of,the economy (Roe, 1980). 
By contrast, few boreholes had been sunk at the lands areas where 
cultivation was undertaken. In Kgatleng district, for example, by 1940, 
only one of forty boreholes was located at the lands. Inspite of the 
Pim report which had drawn attention to the need to provide water for 
human as well as livestock ,consumption, almost no attempt was made to 
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provide water specifically for'human consumption. While a number of 
dams were constructed for general use in the major villages, almost none 
were provided at the lands or in smaller village settlements. Rural 
residents continued to rely on traditional sources such as open wells 
and sand river wells. Domestic supplies were restricted. almost entirely 
to supplying government buildings and the residences of colonial 
officers (HMSO, 1965). More comprehensfve provision was also given to 
-the townships. The new capital, Gaborone, was supplied by a new earth 
dam while surface supplies were reticulated to Lobatse, Francistown and 
Mahalapye (HMSO, 1965). 
Sanitation: .< 
Colonial intervention in sanitation provision was modest and limited 
almost exclusively to the urban sector and to government buildings in 
the district centres. There was no coherent policy to provide 
sanitation facilities to the rural population until well ·after 
independence. Facilities that did exist resulted from private 
initiatives, but for the vast majority of the population, the bush 
remained the appropriate location for faecal disposal. 
Even until the 1960s, sanitation policy in the urban sector was on a 
small scale. However, when the British first arrived in the region 
during the 1880s, public health engineering and epidemiology were 
relatively new fields of action and enquiry in health care in the 
metropolitan countries so it was of no surprise to find that there was a 
lag between public health intervention in the metropoles and provision 
in the colonies (Watson, 1915). Furthermore, given the nature of 
colonial policy in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, it was unlikely that 
funds would be made available for public health engineering for a 
considerable time· unless it could directly benefit the administration or 
. production-related activities. It was, therefore, only in the decade 
prior to independence that an effort was made to provide basic 
water-borne sewerage to the main townships such as Gaborone (HMSO, 
1965). A public health unit was also established but was poorly funded 
and operated under the more powerful medical department (HMSO, 1965). 
Public health workers operated from regional teams located in Gaborone,. 
Lobatse, Francistown, Mahalapye, Maun and Serowe. These comprised a 
medical officer and two public health assistants. Most of their work 
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was restricted to these major settlements with only the occasional trip 
made to some of the outlying rural areas (HMSO, 1965). 
SUl1ll1ary: 
Social infrastructure provision was a low priority within the colonial 
administration's development strate9Y. It was left to missionary 
societies and to·the tribes to provide basic services. The 
administration only began to intervene in this sector in the decade 
prior to independence but then concentrated efforts on supporting the 
product i on and urban sectors. .The provi si on of economi c i nfrast ructure 
had also been limited. It was only after 1955 that any real effort was 
made.to provide elementary economic infrastructure. Besides the 
railway, built in the 1B90's to link the Rhodesias to the Cape Colony, 
little else was constructed apart from facilities for the administration 
and infrastructure for the livestock sector.· It was only the 1963-B 
develo~ment plan which set out a coherent infrastructure building 
strategy for the first time. This included a major investment package 
to 'support the construction of Gaborone, the new' capital, funds for 
providing major utilities and cOl1ll1imications in the main townships such 
as Francistown and funds for the construction of an un-metal led highway 
along the line of the railway (HMSO, 1965); 
Consequently, at independence, the inventory of existing social 
infrastructure was particularly poor, especially in the rural sector. 
Given the low level of investment in this sector. Botswana represented 
the least-developed ex-British colonial possession at independence 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 19BO). 
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CONTEMPORARY POLICY: 
Social infrastructure provision has formed the basis of rural 
development. A number of explanations have been offered to account for 
the bias towards the provision of social infrastructure and the 
comparative neglect of production-related investments. 
Government has argued that the provision of infrastruct~re is necessary 
to create ·the conditions for investing in productive activities. 
Because so little infrastructure had been provided by the colonial 
administration, it was imperative that government rectify this situation· 
by laying down the foundations of the rural economy as soon as resources 
were available. This argument formed the basis of the Accelerated Rural 
Development Programme undertaken in 1973 to boost investment in the 
rural sector (Chambers, 1977; GOB, 1972, 1973). Government has also 
argued that the proviSion of social services is the best way of 
redistributing income in favour of the rural poor, who have not 
benef.itted from economic growth in the urban sector· (GOB, 1985) and that 
such provision serves to maximise rural welfare (Parson, 1984). 
Accordingly, government has stressed that the provision of such 'Basic 
Needs' is a pre-conditio'n to ensuring he·alth .and human dignity (G08, 
1985). One can contrast this subsidised.approach with government's 
policy towards social provision in the urban sector where parastatals 
have been appoi~ted to administer public utilities (with the exception. 
of health and education) and where recipients are obliged to pay service 
charges. 
However, the emphasis on social infrastructure provision has been 
criticised for being politically-motivated, designed to divert attention 
away from· the fact that the government has done little to improve 
employment and income opportunities within the rural economy (Noppen, 
1982; Parson, 1984). It·is argued that increased attention only began 
to be paid to rural development when it became apparent that the rural 
electorate and political opponents were starting to criticise government 
for not extending the benefits of mining revenue to the rural majority 
of the population: For this majority, social and economic conditions 
had not changed appreciably since independence. From a political point 
of view, it was, therefore, expedient for government to invest a larger 
proportion of resources into the rural .economy in order to ensure 
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electoral support during the 1969 election (Picard, 1979). It can also 
be argued that but for the assistance provided by the donor community, 
the scale of service provision to the rural sector would have been far 
.more limited. It can be noted that a major part of the infrastructure 
programme has been funded by the Norwegian and Swedish aid agencies, 
both of which have emphasised their commitment to supporting exclusively 
the rural sector. 
The provision of social infrastructure has been ·directed through a 
number of sectoral and cross-sectoral development programmes. 
Investment in this area was greatly ·boosted by the Accelerated Rural 
Development Programme in 1973 and has more recently been included within 
the Village Development Programme (LGI7) the Communal Area Development 
programme (CAD) and the Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) (Egner, 
1981; Isaksen, 1980). 
The level of service provided in the rural sector is· determined by the 
status of particular settlements. A hierarchy of proviSion has, 
therefore, been developed according to which priority action and higher 
levels of service are provided to large settlements such as the major 
villages, or to smaller settlements which, however, support large 
catchment areas (G08, 1985; KgDC, 1984). By contrast, smaller and 
remoter villages receive simpler services and tend to be serviced last 
of all. This hierarchy can, however, be.superceded by priority 
provision under one of the multi-sector programmes such as CAD and RADP. 
The allocation of resources is also supposed to·be influenced by rural 
residents who can express their opinions in the preparation of the 
bistrict Development Plan (see ch 7). 
Priority has been given to extending primary schooling, health care and 
water supplies, but the programme also includes sanitation, postal 
service, radio or telephone communication, road improvements, police 
.force and extension services. 
Primary Education and Health Care: 
Enro 11 ment in pr imary and secondary educat ion has increased 
substantially since independence as a result of government investment in 
the sector. Enrollment in primary SChools increased from 71,546 in 1966 
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to 168,000 in 1982, while secondary school enrollment increased from 
1,531 to 18,000. However, secondary schooling has been concentrated in 
the major villages and townships. The effort to improve access to 
elementary education (and to the construction of a university) is 
reflected in the figures for investment. By 1977, education was 
absorbing 20% of the national recurrent budget while primary schooling 
in the districts has absorbed up to 50% of Councils' recurrent budgets 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 19BO). The building programme has been supported 
by the World Bank and by a number of bi-lateral agencies. However, the 
country still faces a major shortage of classrooms and an even greater 
shortage of qualified teachers for all levels of instruction. 
Until 1977, health care provision remained biased towards urban areas. 
Between 1968 and 1973, for example, only 10% of the health budget was 
allocated to the provision of rural health centres and clinics, whi'le 
the total budget for the sector remained low as a proportion of the 
total national recurrent and capital budget (Colclough & McCarthy, 
1980). More recently, policy objectives have been directed to the 
provision of a hierarchy" of health facil ities in the' rural sector as 
part of a Primary Health Care strategy. During this period, the rural 
sector has been receiving 60% of the capital budget. With assistance 
,from the Norwegian government, access to health care has been greatly 
improved. Nevertheless, successes in the,building programme have been 
counter-balanced by a continuing problem of staff and equipment 
shortages to service these facilities. 
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An Overview of Policy Towards Water Supply and Sanitation Provision: 
Water Supply: 
The government has accepted a major responsibility for the management of 
water resources in Botswana through the Ministry of Mineral Resources 
and Water Affairs. The management of this resource has, until recently, 
been discreetly divided between the urban and rural sectors and between 
domestic and production-orientated consumption. Against evidence of 
growing demand for water in all sectors for water, competition over 
access to such a scarce and often non-renewable resource has 
intensified. As a result, government has called for the preparation. of 
an integrated long-term plan of future water needs, which wi 11 cons.ider 
water demands in all sectors and the implications for future policy 
(GOB, 1985). While this thesis is concerned with domestic water 
consumption in the rural sector, an overview of urban and rural policy 
is presented h·ere, to contrast government's approach. 
- The Urban Sector -
Government is only indirectly responsible for providing water supplies 
to the urban sector. While it determines policy, the management of 
urban supplies has been delegated to a parastatal organisation, the 
Water Utilities Corporation (WUC). This corporation operates on a 
.commercial basis so that investments made must be self-liquidating. It 
is responsible for the installation, operation and maintenance of water 
supplies on behalf of the Town Councils for both domestic consumption 
(urban residents) and industrial consumption (commercial and mlnlng 
sectors). All users are charged tariffs in order to support the 
operation of this sector. 
Within the domestic sector, the level of service provision is 
commensurate to housing status. High and medium cost housing have 
individual on-site reticulation and levels of consumption are metered. 
Within the low cost and self-help housing areas, standpipe water is 
provided on the basis of one standpipe for every twenty plots. 
Residents contribute to the cost of this service through a general 
service charge which supports. a range of municipal urban services. 
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Residents do have the'opportunity to apply for on~site reticulation, but 
the service is expensive. 
The urban sector, compnslng the major townships (Gaborone, Francistown 
and Lobatse) and the mining sector (Jwaneng, Orapa, Selibe-Pikwe) 
accounts for the largest concentration of water demand. The domestic 
sector which comprises 190,000 residents, accounts for 11.6% of total 
demand, while the mining sector accounts for 12.6% (GOB, 1985). 
However, because the urban sector requires a more sophisticated and much 
more widely reticulated system, it has been ,allocated 61.1% of the total 
water sector budget under' NDP 6 (GOB, 1985). This investment is fully 
self-liquidating and, therefore, does not represent a government 
subsidy. 
While a number of water sources have been used to meet urban sector 
demand - notably, dams, boreholes and sand river wells - supplies have 
often been exhaused especially during drought years. Through 
legislation and increased tariffs, government hopes to discourage 
further migration into urban areas by rural residents and to encourage 
commerce and industry to locate in areas such as Pikwe and Francistown 
were water resources are more plentiful. During the NDP 5 period, the 
government was forced to channel, funds away from the rural sector ,in 
order to, support the raising of the Gaborone dam, as demand exceeded 
possible supply (GOB, 1985). 
- The Rural Sector -
This sector is discussed as a background to the Village Water Supply 
Programme (VWSP). Government has accepted the responsibil ity for 
providing water supplies for domestic consumers only through this 
programme. Non-domestic consumers must provide their own supplies~ 
Provision is based on the fully subsidised installation of communal 
standposts in rural settlements. Recipients are neither called to 
contribute to the installation of supplies nor to pay service charges. 
Consequently, the 27% share of the total water budget which this sector 
receives is not recoverable. Provision, therefore, represents a major 
concessional investment, all the more bec'ause this sector only accounts 
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for 5.1% of total demand, divided between a population of some 300,000 
inhabitants (GOB, -1985). 
By contrast, the arable and livestock sectors receive little state 
support and must, therefore, be self-financing. The low level of 
support is reflected in the budget allocation. While, in fact, the 
livestock sector represents the single largest, but most widely 
scattered consumer of water-, accounting for 35.6% of demand, it has only 
been granted 1.4% of the total water sector budget for the NDP 6 period. 
Owners of livestock must rely on their own resources and the services of 
private drilling contractors to install boreholes, though the government 
does provide a subsidised borehole cleaning service. 
The arable sector is a small water consumer, relying primarily on 
rain-fed cultivation techniques. Demand on water resources is low while 
government assistance is modest. Under the recent ALDEP programme, the 
Ministry of Agriculture has been directed to subsidise the improvement 
of water pOints at the landsthrough the Small Dams Unit (Classen, 
1980). This unit has been allocated a modest budget in order to build 
and improve dams, haffirs and underground catchment tanks, for both 
domestic and productive purposes. - Commercial farmers in the Tuli block 
and Barolong areas who rely on irrigated cultivation and depend 
primarily on abstraction from permanent rivers are also large water 
consumers, but receive no state support. 
The emphasis that has been placed on only subsidising the rural domestic 
consumer reflects government's national objective of providing services 
as a means of achieving greater equity and better resource distribution 
between the urban and rural sectors and between rich and poor. Domestic 
water supply proviSion, therefore, forms part of a more wideranging 
programme of "basic needs" provision to the rural -sector, while it is 
also argued that such provision is a pre-condition to providing other 
services and for generating economic activity (GOB, 1985). 
Sanitation: 
Government's policy towards sanitation proviSion has been undertaken on 
a far more modest scale. It has, moreover, been viewed primarily as an 
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engineering concern and has been only indirectly linked to the water 
sec.tor. Until the late 1970's attention focus sed almost exclusive.ly on 
the urban sector, although more recently, a more determined effort has 
been made to address the issue of sanitation in. rural areas too. 
- The Urban Sector -
Urban sanitation falls under the responsibility of the technical unit of 
the MLGL and the .individual Town Councils with whom they work. The post 
of senior public health engineer was only established during the 
mid-1970's and has been supported through the appointment of 
UN-sponsored expatriate personnel. The public health en9ineer has now 
assumed responsibility for overall management of sanitation policy, 
previously administered by the ministry's senior engineer. There is ·no 
formal working relationship between this ministry and the ministry 
responsible for water affairs, as one might expect,and as is found in 
some other countries, although they do contribute to joi nt committees. 
Sanitation is provided at several levels of sophistication in accordance· 
with user-needs and capacity to pay and with ·settlement characteristics. 
Water-borne trunk sewers linked to treatment ponds have been installed 
in the major townships where they service the industrial sector, the 
public sector and the high and medium cost housing sectors. Many of the 
systems are now over-burdened while some older settlements still rely on 
individual septic tanks! some of which have been, or in the future will 
be, linked into the mains sewer. 
For the vast majority of residents who live in low cost and seff-help 
housing, the pit latrine is the only available system~ At first, 
households Mere obliged to provide facilities for themselves. but since 
the early 1970's government has been undertaking to provide a standard 
high quality latrine facility to all such residents, with scope allowed 
for future up-grading. Double pit Ventilated Improved Pit fatrines 
(VIP) are now installed as standard in all new and up-graded residential 
areas, while earlier versions of aqua-privy and dry pit latrine have 
been phased out. In the self-help housing sector, government has been 
.responsible for providing the latrine substructure while residents dre 
under legal obligation to construct the superstructure, before they Cdn 
even begin to build their own living quarters. A loan scheme is 
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available to all self-help residents in order to purchase building 
materials, while the cost for installing the substructure and for 
emptying the pits is covered by the service charge which all residents 
must pay (DAG, 1983; GOB, 1985). 
- The Rural Sector -
Government concern for rural sanitation is a recent phenomenon dating 
back to 1979 and stemming from the experience of low-cost sanitation 
provision in the urban sector. Presently, government efforts to support 
rural sanitation are channe1ed through the Self-Help Environmental 
Sanitation Project (SHESP) which is joint-subsidised by the government, 
the rural participants and an international donor. Before the start of 
the project, only 25% of rural residents in the major rural settlements 
had access to some type of latrine, built either by themselves or by a 
contractor. Apart from such on-site facilities, sanitary systems have 
been provided in municipal buildings. Primary schools and health posts 
are provided with communal pit latrines while some local government 
buildings, hospitals and a few homes have water-borne sewerage. It is 
not likely that. rural settlements will ever be-able to enjoy 
comprehensive water-borne sewerage due to the chronic shortage of water 
and the high maintenance costs involved. 
Sanitation falls under the responsibility of the District Council's 
Public Health Departments. The inspection and emptying of latrines 
forms part of their environmental health duties, though installation is 
undertaken by building contractors or by individual residents. However, 
responsibility for the current self-help rural sanitation project has 
been distributed between central government, a district-based project 
team and extension workers at the community level. Once again, there 
has been. no· formal cooperation between those departments responsible for 
sanitation and those responsible for water supply. As an on-site 
facility, government.believes that sanitation provision should depend as 
much on efforts by the residents themselves as on government, especially 
when the pressing urgency to provide facilities from a public health 
point of view is less apparent than in the urban sector. 
76 
SUMMARY: 
This review of social infrastructure provision has illustrated how far 
the policy options available to the independent government have been 
determined by the effects of earlier colonial policy. The near total 
neglect of infrastructure provision demanded a reversal of policy at 
independence. At the same time, the urgency to make up for this lack of 
provision provided the government with a convenient means of 
demonstrating its concern for the welfare of the rural- population, while 
it ·continued to concentrate productive investment in the urban sector. 
It is against this backgroun-d that the provision of water and sanitation 
must be considered. 
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THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION: 
This section introduces the local government and community institutions 
which participate in the machinery of policy formulation and 
implementation, in rural development (see Fig 1). The discussion 
illustrates how contemporary local government and community institutions 
have evolved out of the interaction between the colonial state and 
indigenous society. The first section traces the history of 
institutional development while the following seCtion describes these 
institutions and the functions they perform in contemporary 
circumstances. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
The Pre-Colonial and Colonial Period: 
The discussion starts by focussing attention on the nature of power ,and 
decision-making responsibility within Tswana tribal society, the broad 
characteristics of which were introduced in chapter 2. It then traces 
the history of institutional development during the colonial period, 
identifying a struggle between tribal and state interests over the right 
to exercise .authority in political, economic and social affairs, 
,While the Kgotla provided an element of democracy in Tswana society, the 
behaviour, responsibilities and entitlements of individual members and 
households were governed by strict social laws based on ethnicity, age 
and sex, which were determined by the tribal chief and his headmen 
(Schapera, 1980). They were 'vested with absolute power which extended 
socially and spatially over ,the peoples and territory belonging to the 
recognised tribe. Whi le the paramount chief en'joyed power over the 
whole tribe, individual wards and smaller villages were governed by 
their own headman, accountable to the paramount chief. The chief or 
headman was the recognised decision-maker responsible for social, 
economic and political policy for his tribe and tribesmen. He 
determined and interpreted laws and, settled disputes, as well as 
enjoying complete authority over the use of natural resources and la~our 
power. The chief determined water and land rights, organised the 
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ploughing season and oversaw the distribution of livestock through the 
system of 'Mafisa' (Mtetwa, 1982) (see the next section for an 
exp 1 anat ion). He also determi ned .' forei gn' po 1 i cy in re 1 ati on to war 
and plunder while also presiding over social and, in particular, 
religious ceremonies. As such, the tribal leader was wholly responsible 
for the welfare of his tribe. At the same time, his subjects were 
dependent on him to provide access to cattle and to give food (Parson, 
1984) and for providing defense and guidance. 
The Early Period 1884 - 1930s: 
The establishment of the Protectorate marked the beginning of the 
transformation of indigenous political culture and the source of 
contemporary relations between tribal and modern state institutions. 
In theory, the limited political and economic ambitions that the 
colonial office had set for the Protectorate suggested that the tribal 
system of government would remain largely unchanged. To an extent, this 
proved to be true, yet it was inevitable that underlying tensions 
between the rationale of the colonial state and that of the tribal 
system would lead to a compromise in the status of the latter. 
The establishment of the Protectorate created a new spatial political 
unit - the colonial. state. This new geographical entity included the 
parallel institutions of the colonial state ·and those of tribal SOCiety. 
They were not wholly compatible. The Protectorate administration had 
sought to restrict its activities to foreign policy and the domestic· 
affafrs of the European population present in the region. According to 
the principle of 'parallel' rule, Tswana chiefs. would continue to 
administer over their own tribes, without interference from the ·colonial 
administration· {Parson, 1984). Yet interference in tribal life, 
economically and politically, inevitably followed (Picard, 1985a). As a 
result, a system of 'indirect' rule developed in which Tswana leaders 
became incorporated as junior civil servants within the Protectorate 
administration. Their traditional powers were subordinated to the 
authorities of the District and Resident Commissioner. Thus the 
colonial· state functioned through a political hierarchy descending from 
. the co loni a 1 off ice in London, through the Protectorate admi ni strat ion, 
to the Tswana chief. For the tribal leader, this new political context 
meant that their right to determine external policy was circumscrilied 
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while it appeared that their power over internal affairs remained 
i n'tact. 
Progr~ssively, colonial policy interfered in the internal politics of 
. tribal society in both direct and indirect ways. Since Tswana society 
was based upon a sensitively balanced interrelationship of social, 
economic and political life, changes to socio-economic life, imposed by 
capitalist economic forces and by colonial political forces, necessarily 
de-stabilised the foundations of indigenous political life. As such, 
the coherence of the fabric of Tswana political culture was undermined. 
This was achieved through a number of direct and indirect processes, 
which challenged the chief as the omnipotent decision-maker. 
Policies which Compromlsed Tribal Auth.ority: 
The only direct policy which sought to challenge the status of tribal 
authority was the decision to turn the chief into a junior civil 
servant, accountable to the district administration after 1934 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). The chief was also given responsibilities 
to collect tax from his tribesmen and to encourage employment in the 
South African mines. There were, however, several indirect policies 
which went further to compromise the traditional responsibilities of the 
chief. These included the impOSition of taxation and the active 
encouragement of mine labour, but also policy towards the 
commercialisation of the livestock sectors and policy towards social 
infrastructure provision. The role of the chief was changed in three 
important ways. 
First, and most importantly, these policies compromised the rationale of 
tribal authority. The whole issue of legitimacy was raised in the sense 
that the rationale which justified the power relationship between noble 
and commoner was weakened. This was evident at several levels. As a 
junior civil servant with specific responsibilities to undertake and in 
receipt of a salary, the chief was no longer solely accountable to his 
tribe but had to be answerable to his employer so that his a'llegiance 
had to be shared between the colonial state and his people (Vengroff, 
1977). Respect amongst his subjects suffered for this reason but also 
because it was a.ll too evident that the figure who represented the most 
esteemed individual in tribal society had become the most humble arid' 
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junior employee within the colonial administration. Indeed, the chief 
could be hired and fired by his employer in much the same manner as any 
other government officer. 
Furthermore, the control enjoyed by the chief over the determination of 
economic policy, and which formed the basis of his political strength 
was progressively lost. This had the effect of reducing his control 
over tribesmen as their dependence and reliance on the nobility waned. 
On the one hand, increased mine employment provided tribesmen with an 
independent source of income, while their absence from home reduced the 
chief's ability to direct their lives and determine their behaviour. On 
the other hand, the response of chiefs and nobility to the 
commercialisation of livestock, as documented earlier, compromised the 
customs of reciprocity and redistribution, especially with regard to 
livestock, which had formed the basis of the bond between nobility and 
commoner. Increases in personal wealth resulting from the salary now 
received, the commission earned from tax collection and revenue from 
livestock sales also served to distance the elite from their tribesmen. 
Additionally, some less scrupulous leaders imposed unauthorised levies 
on their tribes, while inSisting that tribute payments be paid in cash 
(Schapera, 1970). 
Second, and somewhat in contradiction with this .trend, tribal authority 
was given the opportunity to strengthen their decision-making· 
responsibilities in a number of ways (Vengroff, 1977). In. particular, 
the absence of any concerted effort by the administration to provide 
social infrastructure to the tribes, presented the tribal leaders with 
the chance to play a leading role, together with the missions, in this 
domain. Furthermore, the tribal leaders were able to increase their 
standing amongst their tribesmen by opposing colonial policies which 
they considered to be harmful to their tribe. As such, the apparent 
dissolution of traditional political authority should not be 
over-exaggerated. Indeed, in chapter 6, attention is drawn to the 
continued support traditional political authority still enjoys in 
contemporary Botswana. So, while in certain instances, elites abused 
their new political and economic power and while respect for traditional 
leaders waned in some places, in others traditional leaders maintained 
strong relations with their tribe (Schapera, 1970). 
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Certain chiefs, including Isang of the BaKgatla were instrumental in 
promoting social and economic develo·pment within their tribe (see 
sect ion on soc i a 1 serv ices), while at the same time tryi ng to preserve 
Tswana ·culture (Schapera, 1970, 1980). Indeed, many chiefs were 
innovators responsible for organising economic development programmes 
(Schapera, 1970). Moreover, tribal authority was concerned to ensure 
that the cash economy did not unduly exploit their subjects, though they 
were eager to encourage migration to the South African mines. Schapera 
(1970) provides examples of a law limiting. the sale of cattle in 
exchange for western goods considered frivolous and of a law restricting 
the sale of crops during periods of drought when foodstocks were down. 
Third, while the political strength of the tribal elite was in cases 
weakened considerably, their individual economic power was strengthed. 
New found wealth was derived from the commission earned from tax 
collection, the receipt of a salary after 1934, and the sale of 
1 i vestock. 
In these respects, 
in Tswana society. 
colonial state policy redefined the role of the chief 
While no concerted effort was made by the 
administration to destroy the basis of Tswana society and while indeed 
. individual chiefs and headmen benefitted under colonial rule, it was 
apparent that the decision-making responsibilities of tribal authority 
over the affairs of its tribe and territory had been both transformed 
and weakened. 
The Later Period 1930s - 1966: 
This period witnessed the emergence of a new interest group which came 
to threaten the relatively stable relationship built up between the 
British colonial administrator and the Tswana tribal Chief. The new 
interest group was the indigenous educated nationalist elite. After 
1920, a rift began to develop between tribal and national elite 
interests which would have serious repercussions in the distribution of 
power in the future independent state •. On the one hand, were the senior 
tribal leaders who had accepted subordination to colonial rule but who 
had energetically defended the right to rule over their own tribes. On 
the other hand, were the younger members of the Tswana nobility who had 
been educated and drawn into the colonial administration as junior civil 
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servants, or teachers, or who had engaged in modern commercial 
activities, as far as this was permitted (Parson, 1984). While they 
owed their existence to the colonial state, they were. committed to 
achieving independence. More articulate and aware of the structural 
barriers imposed by the colonial state to their further emancipation 
(Parson, 1979), they aspired to build a future independent state which 
would be mOdelled on a western style parliamentary system and which 
would not necessarily accomodate Tswana political institutions. The 
rise of Tswana nationalism in the post-1945 period of global 
decolonisation must be attributed to this new middle class (Parson, 
1984) . 
This new force presented a challenge to the legitimacy of colonial rule 
on a national basis rather than on a tribal basis. The nationalist 
cause accepted the modern .nation-state as a legitimate geo-pol itical 
unit on which to fight. The issue it defended was the right for 
Batswana to rule this po1i.tical.unit and to disband the colonial state. 
The nationalists.argued that within an independent nation administered 
by Batswana, there would be no room for a system of 'indirect' rule: As 
suCh, they were committed to weakening the authority of the Tswana 
chiefdom (Picard, 1985). ~i:cordingly, the tribal elite would have to 
face a 'challenge from fellow Batswana, who would seek to go further than 
the British had ever risked going, in dismantling the system and culture 
·of tribal authority. 
By contrast, the traditional Tswana leaders were less committed to 
obtaining independence; being concerned rather to' defend their 
traditional right to rule over their tribe (Parson, 1984). Therefore, 
in the post-war pe~iod, this group lost the political initiative to the 
younger and more articulate nationalists. By contrast; the majority of 
the rural population who in effect had been the victims of colonial rule 
and who, therefore, had a justifiable motive to counter the colonial 
state, remained to the periphery of this nationalist struggle lacking 
the means to articulate a common political stance in a coherent manner 
(Parson, 1984).' However, their affinity to traditional Tswana political 
authority remained strong. 
During the 1950's, the new middle class continued to assert itself as 
the defender of the national ist cause' (Picard, 1985). The result was 
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the creation of the African Advisory Council which provided a forum for 
expressing Tswana opinions on a national basis. As the colonial 
administration increasingly came to accept the inevitability of 
independence, eSp'ecially after the colonial office had refused a South 
Afri can request to annex the territory, the admi ni strat i on began to 
. prepare for the eventual transfer of power by enlisting the support of 
the indigenous middle class in an interim government based on a 
counter-part system, as it was recognised that it was from this new 
middle .class that the future independent government would be comprised 
{Picard, 1985}. A Legislative Council was created which provided a 
forum for grooming the future leaders {Vengroff, 1977}. At the same 
time; more radical young nationalists formed the 80tswana Peoples Party 
{BPP} to try to hurry along the pace of transition fearing that the new 
Council was a stalling device designed to delay independence {Vengroff, 
1977}. However, the party was too. volatile and lost coherence due to 
internal disputes .. Its disarray prompted the formation of an 
alternative and more moderate party, the Botswana Democratic Party. 
This party was founded by some of the key members of the Legislative 
Council and, therefore, had the backing of the COlonial administration .. 
When elections were held in 1965, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 
won with an impressive majority, taking 28 of the 31 contested seats 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). The near unanimous victory of the BDP can 
be attributed to a number of key factors which go far to explaining the· 
socio-political complexion of the post-colonial state. 
First, :and most fundamentally, the BDP reflected the political 
aspirations of both the young nationalists and the older generation 
tribal leaders. As such, it was able to obtain the support of a broad 
spectrum.of political and economic interests. While it advocated 
nationalist. poliCies, it did not at the same time condemn Tswana 
. political culture. There was no .direct talk about doing away with the 
tribal system altogether, as had been promised by the BPP. In this way. 
the party was able to enlist the support of the traditional·elite and in 
so doing, the support of the vast majority of Batswana whose political 
behaviour imitated that of their tribal leaders. To them, the BDp· 
appeared to represent a modern party which although based on an alien 
political system, was firmly entrenched in the traditional political 
culture with which they were conversant (Parson, 1984). Indeed, a 
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majority of top party members were related to traditional noble 
families. 
Second, the BDP remained sufficently radical to satisfy the aspirations 
of the young middle class radicals, but at the same time, sufficently 
pragmatic and conciliatory to win the support of the Asian and European 
expatriate communities, who wished to safeguard their business and 
commercial interests (Parson, 1984). 
The characteristics of the BDP were crystallised in the personality of 
the party leader, Seretse Khama. (Vengroff, 1977). He was a young 
nationalist who had been educated in England and who, futhermore, 
married an English woman ( much to the embarrassment of the British and 
the outrage of the South Africans). However, he was also the legitimate 
heir to the BaNgwato tribe (Picard, 1985). He, therefore, symbolised 
the alliance between the old - Tswana political culture - and the new -
the educated modern state elite with nationalist and commercial 
aspirations. 
The BPP by contrast was made up almost uniquely of young nationalists 
who sought more far-reaching radical policies. However, they lacked a 
broad political base, appealing only to other young elites and a small 
number of urban workers. It had no roots in traditional political 
·culture - moreover, it sought to dismantle tribal political structures -
while it advocated economic policies which threatened the expatriate 
business community (Picard, 1985). Furthermore, there was a significdnt 
divergence of views expressed within the party which failed to be 
reconciled and which led to its eventual downfall and to the creation of 
the BDP by its more moderate members. 
At independence, the BDP took office. It reflected a coalition of 
interests which had emerged out of the specific history of colonial 
penetration and the articulation of modes.of production. It supported 
economic and political modernisation based on a capitalist model of 
change and on western' political institutions, but at the same time 
respected the tribal system which 'for the majority of the population 
remained the legitimate and recognisable system of authority. Indeed, a 
majority of BDP candidates and party workers had and continue to have 
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high traditional status, as we.ll as being educated and commercially 
active (Parson, 1984). 
Given the apparent consensus of opinion which seemed to exist ·between 
the nationalist and tribal elite, what were the implications going to be 
for the distribution of power and decision-making in the 
post-independence period? It is evident that a clear policy has been 
pursued to weaken the relevance of tribal authority while,at the same 
time providing it with token status at the national and district levels. 
The Post-Colonial Period: 
Modern state institutions, born out of the colonial administrative 
structure, and blue-prints imported from Britain, have been used to 
manage ~he new state. At the central government level, tribal authority 
plays no effective part at all. Its presence marked by the House of 
Chiefs, the second chamber of parliament, is largely symbolic although 
its opinions are not totally ignored. While there has been no 
legitimate challenge made by tribal authorities to .extend their 
influence at this level, reflecting a certain incongruity between the 
demands for managing a modern state and the culture of tribal-based 
political authodty, a more serious challenge has been waged at the 
. sub-national level. It is here that a conflict has been focussed 
between the forces of the modern state and tribal authority. 
The degree of authority enjoyed by tribal leaders under the Protectordte 
was challenged by the new government whiCh sought to extend its own 
influence directly into the rural periphery and in so dOing, to render 
the tribal system of authority redundant. This was seen by government 
as a necessary part of nation~building. It was concerned to ensure that 
it represented. the sole legitimate power base in the country, in a way 
that the colonial administration never was. The dual system of colonial 
and tribal authority had to be replaced by a single one which extended 
all the way to the grass roots level. This objective was achieved 
through the· reform of the local government system and through 
legislation. 
District administration was, therefore, reformed comprehensively. Both 
the Tribal and District Adminstrations were.weakened by the 
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establ ishment of the District Council. The new system served to 
transfer authority and decision-making power from tribal authority to 
, the modern state, and in so dOing, to strengthen the bond between the 
modern state and tribal society by creating a national identity and by 
integrating the rural periphery into the new nation (Picard, 1979b,' 
1979c). As a political institution, the District Council was designed 
to provide representation for the rural population through the 'election 
of councillors, who could lobby district opinion through the Council and 
in turn to central government. The Councils were also given certain 
responsibilties for decision-making in district affairs. A direct 
attack had, therefore, been made by the new political leaders on the 
indigenous tribal system. 
This objective could have been achieved through the District 
Administration'but the colonial links with this institution as the 
bastion of indirect rule made it unsuitable. Moreover, it could not 
symbolise genuine representation of district interests since it was 
directly accouritable to central 'government. At the same time, it was 
not completely disbanded. Rather, the District Administration was' 
re-const ituted to serve as a major component of the local government 
system together with the District Counci 1, though with considerably 
'reduced powers. 
It was, without doubt, the tribal administration which had the most to 
lose and which lost the most. As a result of legislation, the effective 
,powers of tribal authority were transferred to the District Council 
while in compensation it was granted a glorified symbolic place within 
the local government system. The new tribal administration is notable 
for its exclusion from all the major decision-making fora, except in an 
ex-officio capacity., Consequently, its ability to determine policy over 
tribal affairs in an official capacity' has been destroyed. 
It is only'at the village level that the rights and responsibilities-of 
tribal ,authority have been respected. While no serious effort has been 
made to dislodge the Kgotla, the modern state has endeavored to extend 
its influence at the grassroots levels through a number of institutions. 
While it has been unable and unwilling to establish a local party 
system, it has sought to transfer decision-making responsibilities 'such 
as for development programmes to modern institutions such as the Village 
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Development Committee and Village Extension Team. At the same time, it 
has accepted that the Kgotla still enjoys wideranging support at the 
community level and has, therefore, tried to exploit this popularity by--
appealing to tribal leaders both to support the modern state politically 
and the modern institutions which it has introduced (Noppen, 19P'). 
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INSTITUTIONS IN THE.CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: 
This section profiles the·major local government and community 
institutions involved in rural development by describing their 
. organisation and major responsibilities (see Fig 1). Government policy 
towards the devolution of decision-making· and implementation authority 
is then reviewed as an introduction to the analysis of District 
Development Planning in chapter 7. 
Modern State ·Institutions - The Local Authority Level: 
The local authority system funct ions around three modern state 
institutions: the District Council, the District Administration and the 
Land Board. (The Land Board is not relevant to this thesis and is, 
therefore, not discussed). The role of these institutions in 
development planning is focussed through the District Development 
Committee. The local authority system is also represented by the Tribal 
Administration (discussed in the following section on tribal 
institutions). 
The District Council: 
Nine District Counci ls were created in Botswana at indepedence. Each 
Council is responsible for an administrativt district, based on the 
ethnic and spatial boundaries of the major sub-tribes. In the larger 
districts such as those of Central and North West, sub-districts have 
been created with their independent administration centres. The 
Councils have both political. and administrative responsibilities. 
As a political institution, the District Council provides a forum for 
decision-making over district affairs through locally elected 
councillors. The political wing of the Council comprises three 
elements; i) elected councillors, ii) nominated councillors, iii) the 
paramount chief, as well as the Council Secretary. Nominated 
councillors are important because they can allow the government to 
ensure· a favourable political bias within the Council. At the same 
time, Councils can serve as useful platforms for criticism of government 
policy at the national level (Picard, 1979b). As the forum for local 
political discussion and decision-making, the District Council has the. 
House 
Chiefsr--: 
Netionel 
Assembly 
The President. 
C'Jbi ne I. 
I l'lLGL I ~ Line l'lini,;t.rq I -
.- -, 
1-- - -- - ----- -I I I -{ DDe 1 ...... ~/ -, 
Tribel Lend Dist.rict District 
Admi n Bo~rd Council Adrni n 
- -- -- --.----
I' I -,,~ot.IO l COlJnci I L ___ Steff .- -, -{ v'C'c '1--, , 
'- .' 
"/ET 
L'j n€'s of AuU-l(tr~i tl~ 
Fi g 1: Orgllni sat i on Chart of Mai n I nst i tu ti ons. 
C,)rnmun i I: ij f. i on 
(After Rei Ily, 1983) 
CENTRAL 
DISTRICT 
VILLAGE 
cc 
CJJ 
., 
89 
final vote in proposing and approving district policy such as the 
District Development Plan (Wheeler, 1979). 
The Council is also responsible for the implementation and 
administration of statutory duties prescribed by. government. These 
are; primary health care, primary education, water supply maintenance, 
rural roads and community & social development (GDB, 1985; Wheeler, 
1979). Councils have also become responsible for wider duties such as 
non-formal education, physical planning and public health. 
The Councils are, in particular, responsible for the preparation and 
final ratification of the District Development Plan. The preparation of 
this Plan is shared with the District Administration, under the auspices 
of the District Development Committee (see ch 7). 
The .District Administration: 
The District Administration can be described as an extension of central 
government into the districts. Its role is to interpret and implement· 
all government policy within the districts, which lies outside of 
Council's statutory responsibilities. Responsibilities include 
agriculture, drought relief, lan·d-use and industrial planning.· It also 
has a judicial responsibility with the District Commissioner acting as 
local magistrate.· The District Administration does not normally 
formulate policy itself. However, the District Officers responsible for 
district development and land use planning who work for the District 
Administration, do play a central part in the preparation of .the 
District Development ·Plan. Otherwise, its role is very much one of. 
fulfilling certain administrative and judicial routines (Picard, 1979c). 
The responsibilities of the District Commissioner (DC), who is the most 
.senior individual in local government, are, however, more extensive, 
though considerably reduced since independence. First, the District 
Comm.issioner oversees the Tribal Administration and has judicial power 
over it. He has the right to reprimand or dismiss tribal 
representatives, but would rarely do so. It is suggested that the DC 
monitors political activity of opposition groups in the district and 
·particularly of traditional adversaries, on behalf of the government 
(Picard, 1985b). At the same time, the DC recognises that he is obl iged 
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to consult the Tribal Administration in order to address the tribal 
assembly, the 'Kgotla' on any particular issue. Second, the DC 
maintains a formal link with the District Councils in an advisory' 
capacity although this relationship has caused ill-feeling (Picard, 
1977, 1979c). Third, the DC is secretary of the District Development 
Committee (DDC) and, therefore, can substantially influence decisions 
taken by it concerning District Council affairs. The role of the DC 
remains central to district level politics despite significant 
reductions in overall duties since independence. Formal power remains 
only in the areas of legal, judicial and administrative responsibility 
(Reilly, 1981). 
The District Development Committee (DDC): 
The DDC was set up' in 1971 to support the District Council in the 
implementation of its statutory responsibilities. Presently, the 
. District Development Committee (DDC) is a technical advisory group 
(Noppen, 1982), responsible for formulating and coordinating pol icy, 
particularly with respect to the drafting and implementation of the 
District Development Plan. District-based projects. involving various 
Council departments and other ministries are reviewed in this forum on a 
quarterly basis. While the 'development plan is drafted by the DDC before 
being submitted to a full Council meeting for ratification. It is, 
therefore, primarily responsible for district development planning and 
for the implementation of government rural development programmes. The 
DDC comprises the following personnel; 
- District Commissioner; Secretary of the DDC and joint manager of the 
District development Plan (DDP). 
- Council Secretary; Joint manager of the DDP and senior officer in the 
Counci 1. 
- District Officer (Development); Technical advisor to the District 
Commissioner and joint planner and coordinator of the Annual pla'n and 
DDP. Member of the District Extension Team. 
- Council ~lanning Officer; Technical planning advisor to the Council 
Secretary, responsible for coordinating all Council statutory duties 
and joint coordinator, with the DO(D) of the Annual plan and DDP. 
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Modern State Institutions at the Community Level: 
The modern state is supported and represented by a number of 
institutions at the community level. A number of important 
non-governmental institutions also operate at this 'level. This section 
pays attention to those modern institutions which have most directly 
influenced the course of community participation in rural development. 
A vast array of modern community groups can be found working in 
settlements throughout rural Botswana. Obviously, they are not all 
represented in every settlement. In the smallest communities, there may 
be no groups at all, while in the largest villages, a full spectrum 
might be found. Such community groups can be divided into a number of 
categories, according to their status and responsibilities. These. 
include government'sanctioned committees such as the Village Development 
Committee, charity-supported associations such as the Red Cross, school 
groups such as the PTA and 48 club, and a number of church-affiliated 
groups (Brown et aI, 19B2). Most of these groups function on a 
. voluntary basis though some receive support from a central coordinating 
body such as 'the Botswana Counci I of Women, or the Red Cross. 
This section focusses on the Village Development Committee, an 
institution created by the modern state for the purpose of promoting 
small-scale village development activities.and which has been directly 
involved in the water and sanitation programmes. This committee merits 
more detailed examination because its official status as a forum for 
community decision-making has served to challenge the traditional 
responsibi lities of tribal authority. Moreover, it is the most widely 
supported village voluntary group and can be found in the largest number 
of villages. 
The Village Development Committee (VDC): 
The VDC functions as a sub-committee of the Kgotla (see definition 
below). Committee members, of which there are normally ten, must be 
elected at the Kgotla by the community. Elections are usually held 
every 2 years. The link to this tribal institution serves to provide it 
with customary legitimacy (Noppen, 19B2). Moreover, the headman is 
normally appointed as an ex-officio member of the committee. Other 
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ex-officio committee members include the local councillor and Assistant 
COlll11unity Development Officer (ACDO) (Brown ,et al, 1982). In turn, the 
VDC is composed of a number of sub-committees such as the Village Healt~ 
COlll11ittee(VHC). The VDC is the only village institution which is 
linked to the district planning process or which has access to central 
government funds. However, it remains a non-statutory, non-political 
voluntary committee without legally enforceable powers to raise funds or 
to invoke sanction (Fortmann, 1983). 
The first VDCs were established by the Protectorate administration as a 
measure to overcome the crippling effects of drought in the early 
1960's. They were set up to organise cOlll11unity self-help schemes on 
behalf of the District Administration, on the basis of a "Food For Work" 
scheme whereby food aid was provided in return for labour undertaken on 
designated' public works. Since independence, supervision of the VDC has 
been transferred to the Social & Community Welfare Department of the 
District Council and to the village extension team at the village level. 
In 'normal' non-drought years, the VDC is expected to promote more 
extensive development initiatives in the area of social infrastructure, 
based on the principle of COlll11unity participation or 'Self-Help'. The 
independent government, therefore, set out to encourage a spirit of 
self-help to contribute to collective nation~building (Noppen, 1982). 
During the mid-1970's, a,special fund was created by government in 
association with NORAD, the Norwegian aid agency, to stimulate greater 
self-reliance and development in the remoter communities and to reduce 
dependence on central government and the District Councils which were 
handicapped by an inadequate implementation capacity. With the 
introduction of district development planning in 1977, a new role was 
assigned to the VDC (see ch 7). It became a forum for decision-making 
on ,issues concerning village development and, more significantly, 
district development (Noppen, 1982)~ 
Therefore, the role of the VDC was transformed from that of a low-key 
village cOlll11ittee responSible for the implementation of small-scale 
infrastructure projects, to that of a decision-making body responsible 
for lobbying resources from the district development budget within a 
broader planning process. This has had implications both in terms of 
the techni ca 1 and manager'i a 1 requ i rement s of the committee to operate 
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effectively and in terms'of the balance of political decision-making at 
the community level between itself and traditional authority. 
Nevertheless, it continues to be a voluntary organisation which depend Sc_ 
on the participation and cooperation of the village community and in, 
particular of the Kgotla for its success. 
The Village Extension Team: 
The other major government institution responsible for promoting 
corrmunity participation is th'e Village Extension Team (VET). _ In 
contrast to the traditional and modern village institutions, village 
extension workers are full-time government employees, who represent 
particular line mini~tries at the community level. Their status is, 
therefore, -fundamenta lly different, though they prov ide an important 
input to village decision-making on development matters. The major'ity-
of extension workers are Junior Certificate or Cambridge school 
certificate graduates, employed and trained by government to serve ,in 
rural areas. They are neither volunteers, nor necessarily native to the 
communities in which they work. They are employed by the government's 
recruitment department' as local government officers but are primarily 
accountable to the line ministry which they represent. 
The extension worker is responsible for servicing community development 
groups by providing technical and administrative advice. Moreover, they 
supervise the implementation of government projects at the community 
level, as well as vocalising community needs and demands, at the 
di stri ct 1 eve 1. The extens i on worker, therefore, represents, the 
principal link between the community and-state institutions in the 
design and implementation of community-based projects. In this respect, 
the behaviour and attitude of the extension worker towards different 
community groups and, in particular, the support s/he extends to either 
the traditional or modern institutions can influence the level of 
cooperation that might be achieved within the community (Noppen, 1982). 
However, many villages have to share extension workers who ,must 
circulate between three or four villages. In remoter areas, some 
communities are not serviced at all by extension workers while in larger 
communities, access is considerably better. The most important 
extension workers are as follows; 
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- Assistant Community Development Officer (ACDO) -' 
The ACDO is responsible for general aspects of community development anQ 
we.ll-being. Responsibilities include the provision of technical and 
administrative support to the VDC in the drafting of project proposals 
and in project implementation, participation in the plan consultation 
process, the provision of a formal channel of communication between the 
community and the District Council and the care of destitutes. An ACDO 
is normally responsible for several villages,within a district but is 
not usually locally recruited. Smaller villages may have a junior 
officer such as the Community Development Officer (COO) who supports the 
ACDO. ACDO's receive a 2 year training course at the Sebel.i 
agricultural college on community development and participation before 
being sent to'the field. 
- Family Welfare Educator (FWE) ,-
The FWE is responsible for encouraging community health and Primary 
Health Care. 'She services the village health committee (a sub-committee 
of the VDC) where one has been set up and also provides support to the 
nursing staff at the clinic or health post. She is accountable to the 
Ministry of Health and the Public Health Nurse in the District Council. 
Unlike the ACDO, she is normally employed from the community in which 
she works and only receives an 11 week training course. She is supposed 
to spend at least half the day carrying out house to 'house visits 
adviSing the household on health and hygiene matters, while in the 
afternoons she is expected to administer simple medical treatment at, the 
clinic or health post. More recently, these duties have been over taken 
by the need to distribute and prepare drought relief food. The FWE, who 
is the best known and most widely found extension worker, tends to have 
closer links with the community in which she works, while also having 
access to more ,qualified health personnel, at the village health 
facil ity. 
- Agricultural Demonstrator (AD) -
The AD is responsible for providing technical advice on ways of 
improving agriculture and horticulture in the village and at the lands. 
He normally provides assistance to farmers' committees, particularly In 
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relation to government's arable development programmes such as ALDEP. 
The AD is accountable to the Ministry of Agriculture, through the 
Agricultural Officer who is stationed at the district level. 
Together with the local primary school headteacher, who probably carries 
the highest status at the village level (Noppen, 1982) these extension 
workers are supposed to opcrate as the Village Extension Team (VET) 
(Wheeler, 1979). This organisation is non-statutory but was created to 
overcome sectoral divisions between ministries and to operate on a 
community basis (Hoppen, 1982). As such, the VET is supposed to provide 
an input to district development planning by working with community 
groups in identifying problem areas and priority needs. The VET has the 
potential to play an important role in plan consultation, by mobilising 
village community groups, and by providing a communications link with 
the District Council (Hoppen, 1982). 
Tribal Institutions: 
Tribal authority has only been able to retain its influence at the 
village level. The post~independence period has witnessed a process 
whereby the modern state has attempted to reconcile Tswana political 
culture, expressed through tribal institutions to the context and 
demands of the modern state. In the contemporary context, tribal 
authority is represented through the following institutions at the local 
government and community levels. However, tribal authority does not fit 
neatly into the modern functional divide between district and community 
level jurisdiction. The system of tribal administration straddles the 
two levels as part of a larger hierarchy of tribal authority. 
Institutions at the Local Authority Level: 
A Tribal Administration was set up to institutionalise traditional 
authority at the district level. It represents the fourth institution 
in the local government system. However, the extent of its influence is 
limited and does not include participation in development planning nor 
in district political affairs to any significant degree (Odell, 1985). 
At the same time, it has been provided with its own administration and 
budget and operates under the leadership of the paramount chief. Its 
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statutory responsibi'lities are limited to the administration of justice 
in the customary courts, to community law enforcement through the tribal 
police force, to the settlement of land disputes and organisation of 
ceremonies. While it is represented on the DDC by an ex-officio member, 
it has no decision-making authority. 
Institutions at the Community Level: 
Traditionally, the village headman was the most senior individual within 
a community representing a particular ward or sub-tribal group of a 
village. His position was inherited within a class of noble households 
to which the rest of the community 'commoners' were bound. The village 
headman holds the most junior position in a hierarchy of chiefs which 
culminates in the tribal Paramount chief. Traditionally, any decision 
of a political", economic or social nature, concerning the tribe, 
sub-tribe or ward would be taken by the chiefdom. 
Today, each recognised village is entitled to a tribal representative, 
in the form of a headman. These representatives are appointed according 
to either traditional procedures - based"on hereditary lineage - or in 
the case where a new village has been formed, a decision taken by the 
Tribal Administration. However, in most cases, the headman is, today, a 
salaried employee of local government and can be, therefore, 
r"eprimanded, or even dismi ssed by the state. The headman has 
jurisdiction over his village or ward and over the lands areas and 
grazing areas belonging to his community. In many remoter settlements, 
the headman remain"the only symbol of authority and commands the respect 
of the whole community. However, the level of respect for the headman 
tends to be less clear in those communities where the headman has been 
appointed, rather than elected according to traditional custom. More 
generally, the status of the headman has suffered as a result of his 
inclusion within the local government service and the recognition that 
many of his traditional responsibilities such as land allocation, have 
been taken over by the modern government (Brown et al, 19B2). 
The 'Kgotla' is the traditional assembly or council where the presiding 
headman and village elders meet to discuss community issues and to 
preside over legal disputes. Such community issues range from 
discussion over the allocation of land and water rights, participation' 
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in government projects, the election of committee members, or legal 
cases over the theft of cattle, crop damage or personal assault (Noppen, 
1982). Each village, or ward in a larger village, has its own Kgotla, 
while in the district capital, the Tribal Administration headed by the 
Paramount chief, has its own supreme Kgotla. Speeches, notifications 
and public statements are also delivered at this meeting place. 
Normally, any government official,or any outsider who wishes to work in 
the village must be introduced at the Kgotla. It is customary for all 
members of the village to attend a kgotla debate and people are 
encouraged to make their own point of view heard. However, strict 
social rules govern behaviour at these meetings. As a general rule, it 
is the senior male population who are the decision-makers and who speak 
first, while the young, the women and Basarwa (Bushmen) 9roups normally 
assume a subordinate position and may only speak when invited to (Brown 
et al, 1982; Vengroff. 1977). Therefore, the Kgotla is the 'government' 
of the community. It is a forum with distinct social rules which are 
embedded in the history and culture of Tswana society. In this sense, 
it is truly indigenous (Odell, 1985). 
The DDC and District Council Autonomy: 
Since independence, the status of local government and community 
institutions in relation to the formulation and implementation of rural 
policy has been changing, varying between degrees of centralisation and 
decentralisation. These changes ·have been determined by the state 
according to the changing political importance that it has attached to 
rural development. 
In the immediate years after independence, the state paid little 
attention to institutional development at the sub-national level as 
rural development generally was treated as a low priority sector. 
(Picard, 1979). Greater attention began to be paid after 1972 when 
government introduced its rural development strategy. Recognising the 
low implementation capacity of the District Counci I. in relation to its 
statutory duties, and aware of the polJtical significance of 
. orchestrating its rural strategy successfully, government sought to both 
strengthen.the local government system and increase its influence over 
it, by establishing the DDC (Picard, 1979c). The District Councils had 
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been facing acute manpower problems. Colonial expatriate staff were 
leaving and were being replaced by poorly trained Batswana of low 
calibre who had been transferred from the old Tribal Administration (any 
high calibre Batswana were immediately transferred to central 
government). Furthermore, there were serious financial constraints. It 
was recognised that Councils could not generate their own revenue as had 
been envisaged, due, in particular, to the absence of a local taxable 
base. 
Of perhaps equal importance was the political pressure that was being 
applied by the. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) on 
the Ministry of Local Government & Lands (MLGL), to recentralise rural 
policy formulation and implementation. While MFDP was the most powerful 
ministry, it was poorly represented at the local government level and, 
therefore, sought to increase it,s influence over district affairs 
through centralisation (Picard, 1977, 1979c). The creation of the DDC, 
therefore, ser.ved to sat i sfy these manageri a 1 and po 1 it i ca 1 
considerations. The decision to do so was based on the findings of two 
separate reports, commissioned in the 1970 by the two ministries 
(Picard, 1979). Both reports recommended the establ ishment of the DDC 
to coordinate rural development policy. In the long term, MFDP hoped 
that the· DDC would lead to the creation of a prefectural system within 
which the power of central government would increase, while the Councils 
would be dissolved (Picard, 1979). The MLGL, by contrast, firmly 
supported decentralisation on the basis of the existing District Council 
structure and .felt that the creation of the DDC should serve to bolster 
up the fragile Councils until they could be more suitably staffed by 
trained Batswana. In this respect, the MLGL ~roposed a 'Scaffolding' 
system, to be provided by the District Administration, but which would 
be dismantled progressively as the Councils gained strength (Picard, 
1979c) . 
In practice, the creation of the DDC became a source of conflict between 
the District Administration and the District Council which feared that 
its' autonomy had been seriously threatened by the DDC. In particular, 
attention was ·drawn to the fact that the District Commissioner had been 
placed in charge and that the DDC had been provided with higher calibre 
manpower who remained accountable to central government (Picard, 1977; 
Picard, 1979c). At the same time, the MLGL sought to improve the 
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institutional capacity of the District Councils. The problem of 
manpower was addressed by establishing a centralised Unified Local 
Government Service, which was designed to remove the tribal basis of 
recruitment, offe'r higher salaries and base promotion on merit. The 
problem of finance was addressed by providing districts with direct 
grants from central government. Yet, in its bid to strengthen District 
Councils and to secure their future as autonomous institutions, MLGL 
effectively centralised control over district resources through these 
measures. These actions have had far-reaching political implications 
for the status of the District Council as an autonomous decision-maker, 
which are further discussed' in chapter 7. 
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THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL HOUSEHOLD: 
This section examines the rural household within contemporary rural 
Botswana. First, the impact of colonial and post-colonial economic 
policy on the coherence of the Tswana mode of production is examined. 
The analysis focusses on the effects of this transformation on the 
socio-economic and welfare status of the rural household. Major 
socio-economic and spatial characteristics in contemporary circumstances 
are then described as a basis for examining the. capacity and willingness 
of the household to support community participation. 
THE IMPACT OF COLONIAL AND POST COLONIAL POLICY ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
TRAN SF ORMA TI ON : 
Socio~economic relations in pre-colonial Tswana society: 
The economic security of the Tswana commoner was guaranteed by the 
interrelationship of social; economic and political life according to 
the principles of the "African" mode of production (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
1977). While there was unequal ownership of.resources such as 
livestock, reciprocity and redistribution ensured that access to such 
resources was available to the whole community. Access to resources was 
of greater importance than was their ownership. Indeed, the tribal 
elite had a responsibility to guarantee ·the welfare of their subjects, 
in terms of food security. The commoner, therefore, depended on the 
tribal elite to provide access to resources, especially land, water and 
. livestock as well as leadership and defense~ 
Tribal subjects enjoyed a natural right of access to land and 
environmental resources. Natural water sources could not be privately 
owned for example (Schapera, 1970). Access to grazing land was 
unrestricted, though the construction of a cattle post required the 
approval of the chief (Schapera, 1970). Land was allocated to 
individual households by·the chief according to their subsistence needs. 
In this respect, entitlement to land was an inalienable right. In 
addition, certain areas of land were set aside for communal farming 
whereby commoners provided free labour in exchange for seed and other 
inputs supplied by the chief (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). However, a 
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degree of economic differentiation was created by patterns of cattle 
ownership. While ownership varied little between commoners, the 
nobility owned large herds. Indeed, cattle ownership was the 
traditional symbol of the Tswana aristocracy. Social status was 
measured in terms of herd size. Herds were often built up as a result 
of the appropriation of strays and plundering during war (Cliffe & 
Moorsom, 1979; Schapera, 1980). As a result, it was not uncommon for 
chiefs to own many thousand head of cattle (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). 
The system of 'Mafisa', in particular, permitted commoners who owned few.' 
cattle to hire cattle belonging to the nobility. In return for looking 
after them, the cattle could be used for ploughing, while a form of 
payment in kind may also have been made to the commoner (Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980). According to Mtetwa (1982), this pract ice provided the 
opportunity of extending the benefits of livestock to a maximum number 
of people within these social relations of production. Vassal groups 
could, for example, learn skills for livestock rearing and could slowly 
build up their own herds. It is argued that the practice of 'Mafisa' 
served as the basis of political relations between the nobility and 
commoners. The Tswana state structure reflected this particular 
relationship based on access to cattle (Parsons, 1977). The system of 
'Majako' was another example of. reciprocity. It offered payment in kind 
(usually food), in return for labour provided during the ploughing and 
harvest season, especially for women (Vierich & Sheppard, 1980). It was 
also common for large cattle'owners to lend livestock during the 
ploughing season. The elite would also distribute food from their 
private reserves during periods of hardship. 
Spatial characteristics: 
Tswana society was characterised by a distinct spatial pattern of 
settlement which reflected the social, economic and political features 
of that society. It was divided between three interrelated tiers of 
sett lement: the permanent vi n age, the 1 ands and the cattl e post. 
- The Permanent Village -
The village was the focal point of the tribe. It served as a place of 
permanent residence with each household entitled to its own plot., It 
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was located close to a source of reliable water supply (Hitchcock & 
Smith, 1982) but also had to be strategically located for purposes of 
defense (Hesselberg, 1985). Normally, the winter months were spent in 
_the vill-age. It also served as the political and social centre for the 
tribe with the chief and nobility having their residences at the centre 
of the village. The traditional tribal assembly - the Kgotla - was also 
located at the village centre. During the six months of residence in 
the village, major political and social issues could be discussed. 
Above all else, the village served as a place of residence and a symbol 
of tribal cohesion, rather than a place of work. 
Once the Tswana had settled permanently in the region. which became 
8echuanaland and -after the establishment of Protectorate rule, the 
individual Tswana sub-tribes achieved a significant level of social and 
spatial permanency .. This was reinforced by administrative legislation 
.which created tribal reserve boundaries and_ later District boundaries 
according to the territorial claims of the different tribes (Schapera, 
- -
1980). At the same time, within each tribe,_significant change 
occurred. Increasingly.- the major tribes which had migrated as a Single 
unit in order to maintain strategic and political coherence, became 
disbursed as groups broke away to establish their own settlements away 
from the tribal capital. These moves were prompted.both by. political 
and economic motives (Palmer & Parsons, 1977; Parson, 1984; Schapera; 
1980) though in most cases, allegiance to the paramount chief was 
maintained. 
- The lands 
The lands were the farming areas located outside of ·the village. Each 
tribe had access to communal land partitioned between village 
households. Plots were allocated commensurate to household subsistence 
needs. The lands could be located as few as 5km or as much as 50km away 
from the permanent village, according to the availability of good soils 
and population density. It was common for households to build a· 
secondary dwelling at their lands since they would spend up to five 
months of the year residing there, cultivating the land and harvesting 
the crops. During this period, the permanent village was abandoned, 
except for the .old and very young who would stay, and all political and 
social events would be suspended, or transferred to the lands. 
103 
. - The Cattle Post -
The Cattle Post served as a base for tending livestock. Either 
individual households or groups of households would share a Cattle Post. 
Normally its location was governed by the following factors; access to 
water, access to good grazing land (normally ·land ·that is was not 
suitable for cultivation)'and distance from the lands (in order to 
prevent cattle from damaging crops). Cattle posts, therefore, could be 
over 100 km away from the village. Usually, cattle were kept in the 
viCinity of the cattle post all the year round. They were tended by 
male members of the household or by Basarwa serfs and trekked between 
water pOints during the dry season. During the ploughing season, they 
would be brought .to the .lands. 
It was common, therefore; for a household to have three residences. As 
: such, the tribe must be understood to extend beyond the permanent 
village to encompass a socio-spatial system which included distinct 
lands and cattle post areas. 
Socio-Economic Transformation During the Colonial Period: 
Colonial economic policies had a profound impact on the coherence of the 
Tswanaeconomic system throwing it into a state of disequilibrium. 
While the administration did not interfere directly with land and water 
, . 
,resources within the communal areas, it destabilised the balanced 
, 
relationship between·arable production, livestock rearing and labour, 
which together formed the basis of the indigenous subsistence system. 
The introduction of market forces to the Tswana economy exposed it to 
the competition of the South African.market and encouraged tribesmen to 
seek their fortune in employment outside of the boundaries of their 
tribal society. IncreaSingly. the Tswana were drawn into the cash 
economy and into the sphere of influence of the South African economy. 
The major impact of colonial economic policy on the household was to 
create a need to earn cash and to destroy. the reciprocal relationship 
between cattle and crop production as the basis of subsistence. In 
order to explain how this was achieved, the relationship between 
livestock rearing and crop cultivation must be'examined. 
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It is calculated that a household must cultivate at least 6 hectares of 
la"nd in order to meet basic subsistence needs. To plough such an area, 
a team of at least 12 oxen is required. In order to reproduce such a 
team, a cattle herd of around 40 is recolTlT1ended. An arable producer can 
then expect to be self-sufficient in terms of inputs and, therefore, not 
have to depend on external support. As a result, fewer costs are 
incurred, while ploughing can take place without delay when the rains 
arrive. In the event of drought, cattle can be sold off without 
endangering the productive capacity of this farming method (Vierich & 
Sheppard, 1980). 
Colonial economic policy exerted a number of pressures on the 
subsistence economy which prompted different responses from elite and 
cOlTlT1oner groups. The two major pressures were the i"mpos ition of 
taxation and the commercialisation of livestock production. Taxes could 
be paid in three possible ways - throu"gh sale of livestock, through the 
sale or exchange of agricultural products," or through mine labour. The 
first choice appealed mostly to the elite while the third choice was the 
only realistic option for the vast majority of commoners, sale of 
agricultural products did not represent a viable alternative. 
Arable subsistence production depended on access to livestock and 
labour. "In good years, it was possible that a small surplus could be 
earned but even under" ideal conditions, agricultural production could 
never provide"sufficient income to pay taxes. In practice, the sector 
faced 1 ess than idea 1 cond it ions. I ncreas i ngly, the major resources 
which supported it - livestock and labour - and which had been 
guaranteed by customs of reciprocity were removed. 
Policy towards the livestock sector attracted elite groups to sell 
cattle on a cOlTlT1ercial basis. While such elites were able make personal 
financial gains, the practice had a profound effect on the viability of 
the arable sector and in turn on the livelihood of the commoner. 
Increasingly, cattle owners adopted a profit-maximising rationale and in 
so doing distanced themselves from their traditional obligations to the 
subsistence economy (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). The practice of "Mafisa" 
became less popular as cattle owners preferred to slaughter cattle for 
cash rather than to lend their herds for draught work in the fields. 
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Moreover, incomes from cattle sales tended to be used for the further 
.accumulation of livestock and was not generally fed back into the arable 
sector (Roe, 1980). Income for cattle sales could also be used for 
investing in commercial activities or for buying education in South 
Africa (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979), or could simply be invested in 
conspicuous consumption. 
The'effect of this trend was to compromise the fundamental traditions of 
redistribution and reciprocity. Ownership of assets such as livestock 
became more critical to subsistence than simply having access to them. 
Yet, without access to livestock guaranteed, ploughing could not· be 
undertaken at the appropriate time and this meant that yields could not 
be maximised. Even those households which owned a few head of cattle 
were often obliged to sell them in order to pay taxes or to cover other 
financial obligations. Arable production was further compromised by a 
lack.of support from the administration for arable research, while the 
Customs Union exposed indigenous producers to the more efficiently and 
cheaper produced South African goods. Under these circumstances, crop 
cultivation became an increasingly marginalised activity which offered 
low returns on labour. At the same time, the rural household had to 
confront an increasing number of financial obligations. For example, 
traditional marriage payments increasingly involved money exchanges. 
while the practice of mutual labour exchange was replaced by hiring 
relationships (Mtetwa, 1982). Increasingly cattle could only be 
obtained in return for cash as the local economy was monetised. This 
process increased pressure on households to seek wage employment. 
Faced with the compulsion to pay taxes and increasingly dependent on 
cash for the exchange of goods and services and with restricted access 
to cattle, and few alternative employment opportunities, the rural 
commoner was attracted to mine employment. This was, moreover, actively 
encouraged by the Protectorate administration, the mining companies and 
some tribal elites too. Migration to the mines further reduced the 
viability of crop cultivation. First, the loss of male labour had a 
serious effect as labour was unavailable at key periods of the 
agricultural season and unavailable to tend to the task of ploughing -
traditionally a male responsibility. Second, wages earned in the mines 
were rarely re-invested in the arable sector, but were rather used to 
purchase' cattle or consumer goods. As. a result, during the colonial 
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period, crop yields hardly improved save for a short period during the 
1950's (Roe, 1980). Even the sale of cattle could not cover all 
financial needs. Livestock sales were restricted by both environmental 
constraints - drought and a devastating rinderpest epidemic - and 
political constraints - after 1924, restrictions were placed on 
livestock sales to South Africa, for African traders (Parson, 1984). 
Progressively, the fabric of Tswana socio-economic relations were torn 
apart as rural commoners were drawn into the capitalist economy in South 
Africa where they became part of a larger southern African 
labour-reserve (Pa1mer & Parsons, ·1977), while the rural elite grew 
richer on the proceeds of the livestock sector. 
Dependence on mine employment was intensified during drought periOds 
when the subsistence economy was no longer able to protect the rural 
producer (C1iffe & Moorsom, 1979; Roe, 1980). Under such conditions, 
two responses could be made. For the majority of households who might 
have managed to accumulate a few head of cattle, the drought would 
probably destroy the herd, or force the sale of cattle in order to 
purchase cereals and other foodstuffs. They too, would then be forced 
to seek employment in the mines. Certainly, any modest accumulation of 
cattle would have been lost during the severe droughts of the 1930's and 
1960's (Roe, 1980). By contrast, those better-off sections of the 
community - particularly the tribal nobility - who already owned large 
herds, were in a position to survive the drought and in fact to increase 
the size of their herds. This was because cattle could be sold in order 
to invest in boreho1es and hence to exploit new grazing land. Without 
access to water, these areas could not be used for grazing and more 
cattle would have perished. However, boreho1e technology was expensive. 
In this respect, these owners of large herds were subsidised by the 
administration's boreho1e exploitation programme. In this way, drought 
served to exacerbate the increasingly skewed distribution of cattle 
ownership and forced further migration to the South African mines. 
While mine labourers were able to earn incomes which were far higher 
than the returns that could be obtained from crop cultivation alone, 
security of tenure was not assured while wage rates remained inadequate 
to cover the critical subistence needs of their ·fami1ies (Parsons, 
1985). Alternative employment in the rural sector was still necessary 
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inspite of the constraints that the arable sector now faced. In this 
way, the arable subsistence sector subsidised the mining sector by being 
responsible for the social reproduction of mine labour. A state of 
mutual dependence was created between the rural subsistence sector and 
the mining sector, which provided the. mining industry wit~ the 
opportunity to earn super-profits (Parson, 1984). The indigenous 
subsistence economy was transformed into a sub-subsistence sector 
(Hesselberg, 1985). The transformed indigenous mode of production was, 
therefore, characterised by the following features; 
- a commercialised livestock sector, the benefits of which were enjoyed 
by a small minority of cattle owners. 
- an arable sector relegated into a sub-subsistence activity which faced. 
major· economic constraints. 
- households dependent on mine employment in South Africa and on arable 
production in order to achieve basic subsistence and to cover tax 
ob 1 i gat ions .. 
Socio-Economic'Transformation during the Post-Colonial Period: 
The development strategy pursued by the government since independence. 
has reinforced rural poverty and inequal ity and structural dependence on 
the mining sector while supporting the commercial interests of the 
cattle-owning elite. The impact of national and rural development 
policy on the rural household is reflected in socio-economic data which 
portrays an increasingly skewed distribution of livestock ownership, 
continued marginalised crop production, continuing household dependence 
on formal sector employment outside of the rural economy and a general 
trend of rural out-migration. 
Inequalities in livestock ownership in pre-colonial Tswana society, 
increased progressively during the period of colonial rule and continued 
to rise after independence. This trend has been intensified by 
prolonged periods of drought during the 1960's. 
Since-the beginning of colonial rule, ownership of cattle has become 
progressively oligopolistic. A growing .proportion of rural households 
no longer own cattle while a small number of wealthy households have 
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accumulated large herds. During the 1940's, no more than 10% of rural 
households had no cattle, yet by 1979, this proportion had increased to 
·45% (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). Within the group of survey villages 
investigated for this thesis, almost half of the households interviewed 
claimed that they did not own cattle (see Tables 1 & 2). ·Of those 
households which own cattle, herd size varies substantially. Only 45%. 
actually own over 5 head of cattle (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). It has 
been calculated that 15% of rural households own 75% of the national-
herd, while 40% divide between themselves, the remaining 25% (Colclough 
& McCarthy, 1980). According to Hesselberg (1985), 6% of the national 
herd can be traced to just 19 farms where the average herd size is 
10,000 head. It has been calculated, therefore, that 40% of all cattle 
are owned by 5.1% of all cattle owners (ail having atleast 100 head), 
while a further 1.7% own 13% of the national herd (all having atleast 
400 head) (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979). 
Arable agriculture has become progressively marginalised. Crop 
culti.vation has become a low return but nevertheless essential activity 
for the 45% of households which do not own cattle and the 40% who own no 
more than five head of cattle. Cattle production can only be profitable 
with herds of over 50 head. Yet only 15% of rural households have this 
number. While 85% of rural households engage in some form of 
cultivation, agriculture only contributes to 4% of GDP (Brown, 1983). 
The relative contribution to GDP has continued to decline since 
independence against the growth in importance of the mining and 
livestock sectors. While in 1968/9, arable production accounfed for 
45.3% of GDP, by 1978/9, its contribution was .only 15.5% (MFDP/CSO, 
1980). For the majority of households, crop cultivation has become a 
secondary activity but a critical source of income subsidised by incomes 
from other sources (Hesselberg, 19B5). 
Alternative employment has, therefore, been sought in the urban formal 
sector, primarily in mining and public service (Hesselberg, 1985). Mine 
employment has grown in importance since the mid-nineteenth century, but 
more especially after the introduction of taxation. Up until the 
·1970's, South Africa provided the only major source of wage employment 
although the Protectorate administration did employ some 20,000 
Batswana. Yet since independence, increased opportunities have been 
created in Botswana, especially in the public sector but also in its·own 
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mining sector (Hesselberg, 1985). At the same time, South Africa has 
reduced its intake of migrant mine workers although some additional 
opportunities have been created in the commercial farming sector. 
Nevertheless, the creation of jobs domestically has orily served to 
offset the loss of recruitment in South Africa. Despite these 
circumstances and also evidence that real wages from mine employment 
have been declining (Palmer & Parsons, 1977), employment in South·Africa 
has remained a more attractive proposition than crop cultivation at 
home. 
During the Protectorate, mine recruitment to South AfriCa increased from· 
4,000 in 1930, to 18,000 by 1940 (Parson, 1984). By 1960, 50,000 
Batswana were employed in the sector out of a total population of little 
more than 400,000 (MoOD, 1965). By 1970, this number had increased to 
70,000. Formal sector employment in the region reached a peak in 1976, 
of over 90,000, with the growth of opportunities in Botswana. Still 
half were employed in South African mines. In 1976, 23% of the rural 
populution was engaged in mine work (Brown, 1983). By 1981, South 
African recruitment had been. cut to only 20,000 workers (Picard, 1985). 
These figures can be compared to opportunities available for alternative 
formal.sector employment in Botswana. In 1964, prior to independence, 
the formal sector provided only 20,000 jobs (or 8% of labour force 
demand). With rapid growth in economic activity, this figure rapidly 
increased so that by 1977, it accounted for 62,000 jobs (or nearly 19% 
of labour force demand), mostly in the public sector (Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980; Hesselberg, 1985) and over 100,000 in 1983 (GOB, 1985). 
In fact, government 
formal sector jobs. 
African recruitment 
has been responsible for providing over 50% of 
This growth occurred, however, at a time when South 
was declining so that the growth in the domestic 
1 abour market served only to offset reduct ions' in recruitment to the 
South African mines. As such, total formal sector employment 
opportunities in the region for Batswana reached a peak in 1976, when it 
was able to provide jobs to 25% of the labour force (GOB, 1980). The 
rem~inder have had to look to the informal sector to supplement their 
household incomes. 
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CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
This section examines the ways in which the rural household achieves 
subsistence and discusses levels of socio-economic differentiation 
between households and between rural villages. Attention focusses on 
access to employment opportunities in both the rural and urban formal 
and informal sectors and considers the relative importance of different 
sources of employment on household income. The impact of colonial and 
post-colonial economic policy has obliged:the rural household, formerly 
part of tribal society, to adjust to·an economic system based on the 
modern state and the wider regional political economy of Southern 
Africa. These policies have transformed the rural household in the 
following manner: 
- increased socio-economicdifferentiation at the household level within 
and between rural· settlements .. 
- reduced household capacity to achieve subsistence from the arable 
sector, while stimulating few alternafive employment opportunities. 
This has created dependence on formal sector wage employment,·· 
especially in the mines, outside of the rural economy. 
- transformed.village settlements into transitory meeting places 
for various household income earners, while the rural village has 
experienced the effects of rural out-migration. The traditional 
status of village, lands and cattle post has, therefore, been 
transformed as well. 
As such, the effect of state policy and of the responses made by rural 
communities has been to create a transitory socio-economic formation. 
Salient features of this formation, of direct relevance to an evaluation 
of. community participation are reviewed. 
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A Transitory. Socio-Economic Formation: 
The "Multi-Active" Peasant Household: 
The majority of rural households must seek employment outside the rural 
economy in order to satisfy basic subsistence needs. Households have, 
therefore, come to depend on a number of different income sources 
derived from both the rural and urban economies. Most households have 
at least one family member who is working outside the rural economy. As 
a result, the household has become a transformed and destabilised unit 
of production and consumption. With the able-bodied mostly/working 
away, it is only the old, the very. young and the infirm who reside in 
the village homestead on a permanent basis. It is, therefore, 
appropri ate to cons i der the househol d as the meet i ng· poi nt of severa 1 
income sources (Kerven, 1981). 
The rura 1 household has become s tructura lly dependent on the cash 
economy·for its livelihood and t~is dependence extends geographically 
across tribal and national boundaries. While the rural household 
provides .a market for cash goods and commodities, it also serves as a 
source of cheap labour to the mining and commercial arable sectors in 
Botswana and South Africa. However, incomes earned in wage employment 
only go some of the way to achieving household subsistence. Alternative 
source of income must be sought to supplement remittances from wage 
employment while crop cultivation is inadequate (Colclough & McCarthy,· 
1980; Hesselberg, 1985; Parson, 1984). The majority of rural households 
depend on more than one source of income. However '. the form and number 
of income sources that a household has access to varies spatially 
between settlements and between socio-ecbnomic groups within rural 
society. 
At least 33% of rural households depend on three sources of income; the 
sale of cattle, crop cultivation and wage employment. Moreover, 66% of 
all households receive support from at least one wage earner (Kerven, 
1981) •. By contrast, no more than 25% of rural households depend wholly 
on arable production for subsistence needs (MFDP/CSO, 1982). Some of 
the poorest households depend on handouts, gathering and informal work 
such as beer brewing, in order to survive. 
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It is estimated that in the multi-active household, the arable and 
mining .sectors combined, contribute up to a third of household income 
each (Cliffe & Moorsom, 1979; Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). Each source 
is, therefore, in itself inadequate to provide full subsistence and this 
fact thereby reinforces the dependence of the one source on the other. 
The employment of the able-bodied in the mines, for example, restricts. 
access to labour for farm work (Hesselberg, 1985) and this can lead to 
reduced yields. However, in the long-term, income earnt from mine 
employment can be used to purchase cattle for draught power (Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980). However, the wage rates in the mining sector are set 
at such a level as to provide the subsistence needs of the wage earner, 
but not of his family. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that only 
a third of wages earned are remitted to the household (Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980). The difference must be made up from crop cultivation 
and other· formal and informal incomes that might be obtained. As such, 
structural dependence of this. kind has created a "low level equilibrium 
trap" (Brown, 1983). By contrast, a minority of very wealthy cattle 
owners who have invested their wealth in the private commercial sector 
are no longer engaged in crop cultivation at all (Colclough & McCarthy; 
1980), although they may well continue to. reside in the rural sector. 
The features of the multi-active household can be best portrayed by 
examining table 3 which illustrates the socio-economic status of rural 
households according to sources and levels of income. 
Rural Inequality and Poverty: 
In 1974, an attempt was made to assess the impact of socio-economic 
differentiation on levels of relative and absolute poverty and on the 
ability of different socio-economic groups to satisfy basic subsistence 
needs (MFDP/CSO, 1976). A poverty datum line was established, based on 
the calculation of likely monthly expenditure for a five member 
household, to cover subsistence needs. This was set at P555. It is 
noted, however, that 45% of households have incomes which fall below 
this level. A median annual rural income of P630 was calculated 
. (MFDP/CSO; 1976). More recently, this measure of poverty was revised 
upwards to take account of inflation and new consumer tastes. However, 
in 1981, it was calculated that still 33% of rural households had 
incomes below this level (Hesselberg, 1985). 
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Income is also very unevenly distributed. A Gini coefficient of 0.52 
was calculated in 1975, suggesting a high level of rural household 
inequality (Colclough & McCarthy, i980; Hesselberg, 1985). While the 
richest 20% 'of households account for 58% of rural income, the poorest 
40% account for no more than 12% of rural income (Colclough and 
McCarthy, 1980). Within the rural economy, the poorest 5% of households 
earn less than P182 per annum, while the richest 5% earn in excess of 
P3,163 (G08, 1980). It may be noted by comparison that the lowest wage 
rate within government services is over P700 (GOB, 1980). 
Poorest members of the community depend usu'ally on only a Single source 
of income which is outside' of the formal, sector. This might involve 
beer brewing, gathering or casual agricultural labouring (Hesselberg, 
1985; NMS, 1982). By contrast, the more well-off households depend on a 
combination of incomes which comprise wage employment, crop cultivation 
and the tending of some cattle (Hesselberg, 1985). The wealthiest 
depend almost exclusively on the sales of livestock. 
Female-Headed Households: 
Hie process of rural transformation has produced a new and distinct 
socio-economic phenomenon -, the Female-Headed household (FHH). These 
are households headed by an adult female either on a temporary'or 
permanent basis. Such households are found where the senior able-bodied 
male member is absent working in the urban sector, or where the female 
is un-married, widowed or divorced (Kossoudji & Mueller, 1983). 
These households have emerged as a common feature of the rural village, 
primarily as a resu'1t of the labour migration system, and to the 
progressive marginalisation of the rural economy. The FHH represents a 
disadvantaged group within the rural community representing amongst the 
poorest households to be found with incomes 'at least 25% lower than 
those of households headed by male members (Hesselberg, 1985; Kossoudji 
& Mueller, 1983). The authors own survey data supports this evidence of 
the growing importance of the Female-Headed household in the rural 
sector '(see Tables 4 & 5). 
Female-Headed households face a number of constraints in trying to 
obtain a ,subsistence income and must rely on, the informal sector, in 
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order to earn cash. Opportunities within the rural sector; 'especially 
for the unmarried, the divorced or the widowed are bleak. The arable 
sector is unattractive. For the FHH, the capacity to subsist from 
cultivation is constrained by Tswana custom and economic circumstances 
which restrict their access to livestock and labour power. The 
able-bodied male household members traditionally ·responsible for 
ploughing and tending livestock are absent, either at the mines, or in 
the domestic formal sector. Labour may, therefore, be absent at 
critical periods during the crop season and ploughing may indeed have to 
be abandoned. Alternatively, labour and cattle can be sought from other 
households withi"n the community. However, with the breakdown of customs 
of reciprocity, cash is increasingly required to pay for such services. 
Crop yields are, therefore, likely to be poorer than average and provide 
no ·opportunities for selling surplus. Cattle· could be used to obtain 
loans and cash through sales in exchange for goods and services. Yet, 
Tswana custom restricts womens' access to cattle by denying them the 
right to own and tend livestock, although this custom is no longer 
observed with such di 1 igence. 
Access to cash is indispensible yet opportunities to earn a·cash income, 
either in the rural or urban sector are few. While some women receive 
remittances from relatives employed in the mining sector, these payments 
tend to be irregular and insufficient to cover household needs 
(Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). Often, remittances from male migrants are 
not sent back. to the household, but are rather sent to the migrant's own 
family or spent by the migrant himself (Brown, 1983). For those 
households which are not supported by a male member at all, the problem 
is all the more serious. Alternative employment must be sought in the 
urban sector where there is stiff competition for too few jobs. At 
best, domestic work provides a regular if small income. Increasingly, 
women must resort to the informal sector (Hesselberg, 1985) and often 
are forced to abandon arable production altogether. Yet to do so 
reinforces their dependence on wage employment as the sole means of 
satisfying subsistence needs. 
At the same time, Female-Headed households are faced with a number of 
social responsibilities linked to Tswana culture, which compound the 
need to have money but at the same time constrain them from being. able 
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to earn an income. They are often responsible for maintaining a three 
generation household without the support of a male member. They are, 
moreover, responsible for paying school ,fees, and purchasing school 
uniforms for school children, caring for elderly parents who may be 
destitute, and for illegitimate children belonging to un-married 
relatives. The increasing incidence of illegitimacy has been linked 
directly to instability in rural communities and in particular to the 
breakdown of traditional customs relating to marriage, resulting from 
the migrant labour system (Brown, 1983). Such households are also 
faced with a series of household and social expenses which prevent the 
opportunity to save or invest in any other area. More than any other 
socio-economic group, the Female-Headed household has been caught in a 
poverty trap and is 'most vulnerable to changing social and economic 
ci rcumstances. 
Spatial Transformation: 
Socio-economic transformation have been accompanied by significant 
changes in patterns of settlement. While'the Tswana hierarchy of 
settlement can'still be detected ,today, its functional importance within 
the post-colonial state has changed considerably. This change reflects 
the emergence of new forms of settlement and land use such as the modern 
township, the mining township and the commercial farm. The importance 
of the link between village, lands and cattle post has declined as a 
direct result of colonial and post-colonial state policies which have; 
in particular, encourag~d internal migration to the urban sector and 
international migration to the mining sector. Changes in the spatial 
pattern of Tswana society, therefore, reflect the broader socio-economic 
processes of societal transformation. 
The Rural Village: 
,The rural village has retained its function as the social and political 
centre of a particular tribe, sub-tribe, or ward. Households belonging 
to one of these tribal sub-categories normally have a permanent 
residence in their respective village. The village represents home to 
individual households while symbolising the centre of Tswana culture 
where tribal authority can exercise its'influence over its people. 
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On the whole, there is little in-m-igration to these villages_with the 
exception of government officers such as teachers and extension workers 
and households whiCh have abandoned the lands altogether. As a result, 
villages maintain a tribal identity. However, many such villages have 
experi enced out-mi grat ion by the ab 1 e-bodi ed on both a- temporary and 
permanent basis. Migration reflects the shortage of economic 
opportunities within the village and the rural economy at large. Within 
the average village, the only evidence of formal sector activity is the 
general store, the bottle store and the bar (MFDP/CSO, 1984). Apart 
from occasional employment opportunitie~ within the informal sector, 
formal sector employment must be sought outside the rural economy. The 
able-bodied have, therefore, migrated to -the urban sectors in Sout-h-
- Africa and Botswana townships in search of work. The marginalisation of 
arable cultivation has also hastened the pace of out-migration from the 
village as the incentive to stay within the rural economy has declined-. 
This has resulted in the breakdown of seasonal patterns of migration 
between the village, the lands and the cattle post. Out-migration also 
reflects the absence_ of secondary school opportunities in- most villages. 
Indeed primary school leavers are forced to leave their village to 
attend secondary school either in their district capital, or in the 
townships, or occasionally in the few village-based community secondary 
SChools. 
The only -benefits that are provided by the village are an assortment of 
social services - primary schools, health centres, clean water supplies 
and extension workers. The irony _is that these services are Provided to 
villages which have become increaSingly abandoned as a result of the 
absence of economic opportunities. This is most apparent during the wet 
season when resident households which still cultivate migrate to the 
lands for up to six months. At such times, villages appear abandoned. 
For most of the year, the village is represented by the elderly, the 
young, the infirm and the poorest Female-Headed households. As such the 
village has been reduced to a meeting place and residential base for the 
multi-active peasant household. 
The only villages to have experienced a degree of economic growth and 
which have attained a new social and political importance are the 
"major"-villages. The status of these former tribal capitals has been 
reinforCed by the location of local authority headquarters in these 
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villages. They have also received a more generous allocation of 
resources for infrastructure projects and most,can boast,a secondary 
school, a post office, a tarred road and telephone connections 
(Chambers, 1977). There is also wider economic diversity, with a 
greater number of stores, services, engineering, construction and 
manufacturing concerns, and usually a mine recruitment centre too (KDC, 
1984; KgDC, 1984). The public sector also represents a new source of ' 
formal sector employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories. 
By contrast, skilled jobs are usually filled by government officers 
recruited from other districts. Nevertheless, formal sector employment 
opportunities are limited. While the small formal sector which does 
exist goes some way to absorb local labour demands, there 'remains a 
strong incentive to seek more rewarding employment in the urban sector, 
all the more that the competition for the few jobs that are available 
locally, is so intensive. The major village population, therefore, 
comprises the indigenous population, migrants from smaller settlements 
and public sector employees. 
The Lands: 
The role of the lands has also changed as a result of the breakdown of 
customary land use practices. Today, there is evidence of bo:than 
increase in permanent settlement at the lands and also an increase in 
the abandonment of lands areas altogether. It has been argued that a 
process of permanent settlement at the lands and of village abandonment 
has been taking place in Eastern Botswana since independence (Hitchcock 
& Smith, 1982). Others have argued that no such trend can be identified 
nationally but that important regional distinctions can be found 
(Hesselberg, 1985). There is also evidence that migration from the 
lands to the village has also been increasing (Hesselberg, 1985). A' 
number of explanations_ have been provided to interpret these 
contradictory trends. It is argued that migration from the lands has 
been prompted by two major processes. First, the marginalisation of 
arable production and the breakdown of Tswana custom has forced certain 
socio-economic groups such as the Female-Headed household to opt out of 
arable production altogether and to seek alternative employment in the 
village informal sector or in the urban sector (Fortmann & Roe, 1982; 
Hesse 1 berg, 19-85). Second, state po 1 i cy towards rural infrastructure 
provision and the stabilisation of rural settlements has enticed 
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households to establish a permanent dwelling in the village. Indeed, 
many lands areas have grown into recognised villages as a result of this 
process. It has been, in earticular, the provision of domestic water 
supply, health care and primary education which has stimulated this 
trend of settlement stabilisation (Fortmann & Roe, 1982). 
This trend is intensified during periods of drought as crop yields 
decline and ensuring access to a reliable source of water beComes a 
-priority concern. At the same time, some households have been moving to 
the lands to settle permanently, while other households have been 
permanent lands dwellers for a long time. Explanations are also offered 
as-to why this should be so. First, households owning only a few head 
of cattle cannot afford to maintain a cattle post and, therefore, keep 
livestock at· the lands. As a result, continual supervision is required 
to ensure that crops are not trampled. There is, therefore, an 
incentive to settle permanently at the lands and to combine residential, 
arable and livestock activities in a single location (Fortmann & Roe, 
1982; Hesse 1 berg, 1982). Simil arly ,1 abour-short households such as 
Female-Headed households cannot afford to maintain a cattle post and 
likewi-se are motivated to combine activities in a single location 
(Hesselberg, 1982), Second, in areas where population pressure has 
exhausted available land for cultivation, lands areas have been sought 
farther afield. Households have been prepared to abandon their home 
village in order to settle permanently at these ,new locations, all the 
mOre now that the power of tribal authorities over individual households 
and land allocation has been reduced (Hesselberg, 1982). As a result, 
the structure of land allocation which would reflect social status has 
progressively broken down as households have sought less concentrated 
plots to the periphery of the village (Silitshena, 1982). 
Third, more recently, government has been encouraging households to 
settle at the lands on a permanent basis, by providing economic and 
social incentives, in order to stimulate food production on a national 
scale. Generally, the wealthier and more progressive farmers have been 
the first to settle at the lands, in order to exploit government 
incentives (Fortmann & Roe, 1982; Silitshena, 1982). Consequently, care 
must be taken in assessing the socio-economic status of households 
permanently settled at the lands and. of those which reside in the 
village. It is argued that the village contains both the poorest and 
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wealthiest members of the community while the lands contain-often the 
middle income groups (Fortmann and Roe, 1982; -Hesselberg, 1985). 
Spatial remoteness does not necessarily correlate with low economic 
-status, though incomes in major villages are on average higher than 
those in smaller ones (MFDP/CSO, 1976). 
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.Catt le Posts: 
As the distribution of livestock ownership has become increasingly 
skewed, the cattle post has .become a far les·s common component of the 
Tswana settlement hierarchy. As indicated above, those households which 
only own a few head of cattle have combined their·cattle posts and 
lands, while others have arranged to jointly manage a cattle post. This 
arrangement has become attractive as a means of affording a borehole to 
water livestock. Within communal areas, many cattle posts are located 
around syndicated boreholes .. Within the commercial areas, livestock is 
tended exclusively around private boreholes particularly in the Western 
Sandveld areas. Increasingly, those owning cattle employ herders, often 
Bushmen, instead of children who are sent to school and the· able-bodied 
who are employed in the urban sector. 
Summary: 
Rural society is characterised by the multi-active household which 
dep·ends on several sources of income, obtained in both the formal and 
informal sectors, to subsist. This system has developed as a means of 
overcoming rural economic stagnation characterised by widespread 
absolute poverty. Yet while a majority of rural households· live at a 
standard which cannot satisfy basic needs, a small minority have enjoyed 
considerable wealth. The contrast in incomes between the poorest such" 
as the Female-Headed household and the richest such as the commercial" 
cattle rancher is reflected in a high Gini coefficient. " 
For the vast majority of the rural population, opportunities for 
ensuring subsistence and food security have been reduced. This "has been 
particluarly serious in the ·face of near endemic drought conditions. It 
has been recently recorded that up to 60% of the rural population has 
had to depend on government drought relief support (AED, 1985). 
Moreover, the rural household must face additional consumer expenses for 
comparative luxuries and for public service expenses such as school fees 
and transport. Therefore, inspite of the significant national economic"· 
growth recorded since independence, the majority of the rural population 
has not benefitted and has grown increasingly dependent on state 
assistance. 
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Household welfare has been improved through the provision of "basic 
needs" such as health, education and water supply, but reduced in terms 
of income and food security. The provision of social services, as a 
component of "basic needs" has been non-discriminatory - the vast 
majority of the rural population have indeed benefitted. By contrast, 
the support for production-related investments has been highly 
selective, benefitting only a minority. 
Features of rural settlement are also in a process of transformation 
reflecting broader. socio-economic change. The tribal hierarchy of 
village, lands and cattle. post has been subordinated to a larger 
settlement hierarchy based on the modern state. The village is of most 
relevance to this thesis. This is because in both the rural water 
supply and sanitation programmes, the village has been used for 
targetting resource allocation. 
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Chapter 4: THE UNITED NATIONS' INTERNATIONAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION DECADE. 
This chapter discusses the United Nations' International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade (UNIDWSSD). It examines the background to 
the establishment of the Decade identifying the theories and practical 
experiences which stimulated its promotion. Against this background, 
the major principles and objectives of the Decade are discussed and the 
major policy prescriptions are identified. The success of the Decade at 
its mid-point is considered while major constraints to policy 
implementation are discussed. 
THE DECADE: 
The concept of an international water and sanitation decade was proposed 
at the World Water Conference, convened by the United Nations in 1977. 
Possible ways of reducing the level of infant mortality, the risk of 
disease epidemics and social drudgery associated with the use of 
polluted and inconvenient sources of water as well as the indiscriminate 
disposal of human wastes, were discussed (Bourne, 1984). This 
conference was inspired by an earlier United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlement (HABITAT), held in 1976, _which drew attention to the 
interrelationship between health, wealth and welfare (80urne, 1984). 
At the World Water Conference, an agreement was reached to work towards 
a concerted world-wide effort to manage water resources and as a 
priority for action, the provision of water for domestic consumption 
accompanied by sanitation provision was highlighted.· Arising from this 
conference, a decision was taken to establish the United Nations 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (UNIDWSSD) for 
the period 1981-1990. In the spirit of "Basic Needs", and Primary 
Health Care, it was launched with the aim of achieving; "water and 
sanitation for a 11 by 1990" (Bourne, 1984). 
The major objective of the Decade is to mobilise awareness of the 
importance of water and sanitation provision in co-ntributing to the 
achievement of both improved health and economic productivity, and to 
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dispel the idea that provision of these services should be viewed as a 
uniquely technocratic or engineering challenge (Bourne, 1984). In this 
way, the Decade can be understood as symbolising the new approach to 
development in the 1970's, w~ich recognised that the provision of social 
welfare facilities, or of "basic needs", is as important a component of 
development, as is economic growth. It has also sought to provide 
technical and manpower support and, in particular, to provide 
recommendations for effective project delivery. Member countries have 
been urged to provide strong support for the goal of the Decade by 
giving high status to water and sanitation provision in their individual 
development programmes (The Courier, 1986). To date, 90 countries have 
committed themselves to the Decade by providing their own 10 year Action 
Plans and by establishing National Action Committees (Bourne, 1984). 
International aid agencies ~ multilaterals such as UNDP, UNICEF and WHO, 
bilaterals such as SIDA, USAID, and CIDA - as well as numerous 
non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and WaterAid, have become 
both directly and indirectly involved in the Decade, to assist member 
countries. 
BACKGROUND TO THE WATER AND SANITATION DECADE: 
During the 1970's, increased attention began to be focus sed on the need 
to provide basic levels' ·of domestic water supply and sanitation 
facilities for the urban and rural populations of Third World countries. 
The attention given to water and sanitation provision represented one 
manifestation of broader changes which had been taking place during that 
decade in attitudes towards development policy and theory. This change 
of att itude arose out of a growi ng concern over the failure of 
development str.ategies to address the major socio-economic problems 
ansociated with extreme levels of poverty and inequality. Evidence of 
practical failures in the field was linked to a growing rejection of the 
Western model of development as being necessarily appropriate for Third 
World Countries, and to the emergence of alternative strategies. It is 
against this background that the promotion of domestic water supply and 
sanitation provision in the 1980's within the United Nations' 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade can be 
examined. A review of the major ideas and events which· have influenced 
policy and theory during this period are considered below. 
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From 1945 to at least the mid-1970's, development policy, as advocated 
predominantly by experts from the western world, and broadly supported 
by Third World government leaders, was influenced ,almost exclusively by 
modernisation theory as propounded by neo-classical economists. It was 
also true that a number of Third world government leaders looked to the 
communist world for prescriptions based on Marxist or Soviet economic 
theory. 
Neo-classical economists argued that the development process represented 
an economic challenge, and it was, therefore, contended that economic 
theories of growth should form the basis of development policy which in 
turn would stimulate other aspects of socio-economic change (Mabogunje, 
1980). In this sense, the benefits of economic growth were believed to 
trickle down through the fabric'of society by creating a number of 
spin-off effects. The primary objective was to achieve a high and 
sustainable level of growth based ori increasing output and productivity 
, (Mabogunje, 1980). This model of development, influenced by the works 
of Rostow (1960) and Lewis (1955) and even by the Soviet model of 
industrial-led development, assumed that development represented a 
unique but ubiquitous process which moved in a unilinear fashion through 
a number of key stages of transformation. A particular emphasis was 
placed on the need to transform the base of the economy from an ' 
agricultural one to an industrial one, by means of transferring labour 
from the traditional agricultural sector to the modern industrial 
sector. This model of development was founded on Western Europe's own 
experience of massive industrial expansion during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. However, it was widely assumed, especially by 
economists ,such' as Rostow (1960), that inspite of the fact that this 
experience had occurred ,in a specific social and environmental climate, 
the model was applicable under any drcumstance. Development was 
understood as a one-way process of economic change from a state of 
,poverty and backwardness to one of prosperity and sophistication. By 
implication, it was argued that the developing world could aChieve the 
material standards of the West by pursuing development strategies 
founded on the principle of economic growth (Harrison, 1979; Mabogunje, 
1980). ' Furthermore, the notion of modernisation implicitly accepted the 
adoption of a western lifestyle and culture. 
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Since the 1950's, development policy in the Third World has been largely 
inspired by this theory of growth and modernisation. Emphasis was 
placed on directing investment into large scale agricultural 
modernisation, industrialisation and urban growth.' Attention was 
focussed on stimulating the development of growth centres, or growth 
poles to serve as catalysts for more widespread economic activity 
(Appalraju et al, 1976). This process depended on the importation of 
sophisti,cated western technology which was highly capital-intensive, and 
of technical advisors to install and operate this hardware. National 
development programes were biased towards the explOitation of natural 
resources for exportation in order to. pay for these inputs tO,fuel rapid 
economic growth (Conyers, 1982). Rural development was given a 
subordinate position in national development and. investments that were 
made into that sector were designed to serve the needs of the urban 
sector (Lipton, 1977). Pricing policies, for example, were designed to 
encourage the production of cheap food for the urban population (Berman, 
1984). 8y contrast, attempts to strengthen the rural economy and to 
stimulate greater economic cohesion between regions were rare. 
Investments into SOCial infrastructure and welfare provisions were 
biased in favour of the urban sector and were' again modelled on the 
,latest western technologies (Conyers, 1982). Health care policy was, 
for example, based upon curative techniques, with the construction of 
sophisticated hospital facilities in the urban areas, the training of 
doctors according to the medical needs of the West and the importation 
of expensive pharmaceuticals (Harrison, 1979). Similarly, in relation 
to environmental health and water and sani,tation 'provision, the methods 
used were based on the experience of the temperate western countries. 
There was, therefore, an emphasis on providing sophisticated water 
reticulation and water-borne sewerage systems for the urban sector to 
the general exc.lusion of the rural. sector (Bradley, 1978). The Western 
model of economic growth, therefore, formed part of a wider invasion of 
western political, technological, engineering and socio-cultural 
, prinCiples. 
However, during this period, increasing evidence suggested that the 
prescriptions for development advocated by the modernisation school were 
not achi ev ing thei r intended objecti ves. A number of factors poi nted to 
the fact that growth-led development based on western technology and 
values was inappropriate in the political, economic and social climates 
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of Third World countries. In particular, a number of serious 
socio-economic imbalances arising from this concerted effort to model 
development on western experience were emerging. These included; 
- low levels of growth accompanied by increasing inequality and 
absolute poverty. 
- polarised development in the urban·sector accompanied by rural 
stagnation. 
- high levels of population growth, rural out-migration and urban 
growth. 
- sectoral imbalances between agriculture, extractive and manufacturing 
industrial sectors. 
- increased dependence on external assistance and rising indebtedness. 
- high failure rates in policy implementation and poor records of 
operation and maintenance. 
political and social instability. 
The pattern of development which had been experienced by the West was 
not being repeated in most of the developing world. Increasingly, the 
assumed transferability of the Western model of development was brought 
into question. Criticisms were levelled at several aspects of the 
modernisation model from both a practical and theoretical point of view. 
Two major criticisms are pertinent. to this thesis. 
Development was unbalanced and was· in particular biased towards the 
urban and indu~trial sectors at the expense of rural areas~ . Therefore, 
the benefits of development were being enjoyed by only a small sector of 
society, while living conditions for the majority of the population 
which was rural based were deteriorating (Lipton, 1977). Growth poles 
were in fact intensifying inequality and marginalising the rural 
economy, rather than stimulating economic activity according to the 
principles of spin-offs and spread effects (Appalraju et al, 1976; 
Mount joy , 1971; Smith, 1977). 
Development policy was based on eurocentric assumptions which did not 
consider the appropriaten'essof policy prescriptions from a sociological 
and indeed environmental perspective, in specific Third World settings. 
Planners tended to overlook or indeed neglect consideration of what has 
become to be termed; "human factors" in policy design (Conyers, 1982). 
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Countless development initiatives which have often depended on external 
aid agency intervention have fallen· short of achieving policy 
objectives. This has pointed to the contextual inappropriateness of 
projects,an emphasis on technical top-down planning, and a 
pre-occupation with macro-economic and engineering challenges than with 
sociological or political issues (Briggs, 1978; Hilton, 1967). There 
has been, therefore, a tendency to ignore non-economic variables in·the 
belief that these should not affect the implementation of policies based 
upon sound and 'rational' economic theory. However, the history of the 
Green Revolution has shown clearly that the design of technology 
represents only one aspect of development. It cannot ensure that the 
technology is socially or culturally'acceptable, nor can it ensure that 
improvements in productivity can lead to better distribution of 
resources within society (King, 1973). 
Similarly, there was a growing awareness of the inappropriateness of 
western-style health ·care in the Third World context. It was recognised 
that major health problems were related. to environmental diseases 
stimulated by poor living conditions and general poverty. Major victims 
were children who succumbed to illness which could quite easily and 
cheap ly be prevented. However, ex i s t i ng hea lth care systems were geared 
to curative treatment and were located in the modern urban sectors where 
they were only aGcessible to the wealthy (Bennett, 1979). It was clear 
that this form of health care was neither addressing the most pressing 
health problems, nor the target groups most at risk, while it remained 
very expensive (Harrison, 1979, 1980) 
As a result, during the 1960's and 1970's, criticisms of the 
modernisation school increased in number. While several alternative 
schools of thought emerged which were inspired by different intellectual. 
traditions and practical experiences, some criticisms were commonly 
accepted. Probably the most commonly shared idea was that the 
modernisation model of development had. to be rejected as the sole 
legitimate model of change. More importantly, it was recognised that 
development could no longer be understood solely in terms of economic 
growth (Mabogunje, 1980). Questions of distribution were now considered 
to be as important as growth in itself. Increasingly, experts were 
asking the question, development for what and for whom? (Seers, 1969). 
Development was recognised to be a subjective concept which concerned 
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qualitative issues as well as quantitative ones (Buchanan, 1977; Smith, 
1977). Consequently, development could not be understood simply in 
terms of economic criteria but had to include due consideration of 
political and social concerns. The belief in a single model of 
development based on Western economic principles had to be rejected. 
Greater attention had to be pa'id to social planning and to conceiving of 
development in a broader sense. Growth in itself was but one aspect of 
development. Of equal importance were issues concerning social and 
economic inequalities, the distribution of resources and the promotion 
of justice (Conyers, 1982). This recognition provided the opportunity 
to extend development studies to a far wider range of disciplines. 
Emphasis was placed on undertaking multi-disciplinary studies in 
recognition of this fact (Lipton, 1970). 
The major challenges to the modernisation paradigm have been derived 
from two perspectives. On the one hand, the radical Marxist' and 
political economy school emerged which sought to provide an alternative 
theoretical explanation of the development process and, on the other 
hand, the liberal and eclectic "Basic Needs" school which sought to 
provide alternative practical prescriptions for development. It is 
argued that while the latter has provided the framework within which 
water and sanitation for health has been advocated, the former provided 
the intellectual stimulus to part company with the modernisation model 
and to seek alternative strategies of development and to explain the 
causes of underdevelopment (Gutkind & Wallerstein, 1976). 
The radical alternative focusses principally on structural constraints 
to development operating at the global level and on the relationship 
between political and economic power. It is argued that development in 
the Third world is constrained primarily by economic forces imposed by 
the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1976, 1979). In this sense, 
underdevelopment in the Third World is created by capitalist forces, 
exerted by the developed countries and supported by discreet political 
interests (Frank, 1969). States are interpreted as being structurally 
linked in a re'lationship of 'core' and 'periphery' (Wallerstein, 1976). 
The periphery is forced into a condition of political, economic and 
cultural dependency. This structural relationship can only be 
understood historically by taking account of the impact of colonial and 
capitalist expansion on the peripheral areas (Gutkind & Wallerstein, 
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1976). The major contribution of this approach to the study of 
development is that it recognises the interr~lationship of political and 
economic forces operating at an international scale.' It is, therefore, 
holistic, global and historical (Buchanan, 1977; Wallerstein, 1979). 
This can be contrasted to the modernisation approach which ne9lects 
these linkages and, therefore, overlooks the structural constraints to 
development. Moreover, it fails to recognise the influence of power as 
a determinant variable in directing development (Todaro, 19B2). As 
such, it cannot consider the question of development for what and for 
whom (Brookfield, 1973; Slater, 1974). The impact of this radical 
persp'ective on development theory has been to promote the debate to a 
new level of sophistication. In this respect, it has inspired other 
challenges to the modernisat ion paradigm, such as the "Basic Needs" 
school, while exposing the basic limitations of the modernisation 
approach. It has, moreover, exposed the need to consider questions of 
distribution, social justice and inequality (Conyers, 1982). 
"Bas ic Needs" can be understood as a 1 i bera 1 response to the pract i ca 1 
and ideological inadequacies of the modernisation approach. It is 
primar ily concerned to provi de prescri pt ions for development rather than 
to develop an explanatory theory. While it represents a somewhat broad 
based alternative development philosophy which has been criticised for 
its eclecticism (Ghai, 1978), it is recognised to represent part of the 
general intellectual rejection of the modernisation paradigm (Green, 
1978). The concern for water and sanitation provision ,and Primary 
Health Care more generally has developed within this school of thought; 
The "Basic Needs" philosphy argues that development is a subjective and 
mu It ifarious concept and, therefore, rejects the pdmacy of growth and 
of economics as the basis of ,development policy. It rejects the 
neo-classical model of modernisation with its measurement of development 
in terms of gross national product. By contrast, its focus of attention 
is the community and the provision of socio-economic needs that the 
community has identified (Green, 1978). In this respect, it _r9ues that 
development policy should aim,to reduce levels'of absolute and relative 
poverty, by reaching the poor first, while contributing to the overall 
improvement in the quality of life for the majority of the population 
(Singer, 1977). It, therefore, goes beyond concern for economic growth 
to champion the causes of human rights, self-reliant development and 
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social welfare (Conyers,1982; Ghai, 1978; Green, 1978). However, while 
it supports the concept of development from below, and in its most 
radica 1 form encourages community part ic ip"at ion as a means of empoweri ng 
the poor, it also calls for a high level of government intervention in 
the provision of social infrastructure and welfare facilities (Dore, 
1978). It, therefore, explicitly calls for the satisfaction of the 
following basic needs; shelter, education, employment, health and 
security (Bhalla, 1979; Evans, 1979; Jecquier, 1976; Robinson, 1979). 
Within the health sector, the "Basic Needs" approach argues for the need 
to move away from centralised curative forms of treatment, symbolised by 
"the sophisticated modern hospital, to decentralised preventative forms 
of treatment, based upon community-based health care facilities and 
extension and upon public health investments in 
sanitation improvements (Harrison, 1979, 1980). 
water supply and" 
Combi ned with 
immunisation, family planning and nutrition programmes, these approaches 
form what is known as Primary Health Care (UNICEF, 1985). The major 
goal of this approach is to reach down to the community level and to 
provide access to basic preventative health care to as wide a popu1atlon 
as cheaply and in as acceptable a form as possible (WHO, 1978). The 
apprqach "recognises that western forms of health care are inappropriate 
in the social and environmental context of developing countries where 
the majority of the population is poor and "lives in scattered rural 
settlements or. over-crowded urban squatter settlements, where they are 
at risk to water and excreta-related disease. 
The general support for increased community participation in the 
formulation and implementation of policy as a means to achieving 
indigenous and self-reliant development and the satisfaction of "Basic 
Needs", has been associated with a growing concern to link development 
with the provision of appropriate technology. Against evidence of the 
high failure rate of development projects, due largely to the 
inappropriate application of technology, which has bee"n unsuitable from 
both a socio-cultura1 and environmental pOint of view (Lipton", 1970; 
Macphearson & "Jackson, 1975), it was i ncreas ing1y argued that 
appropriate technology should be developed, to suit and take advantage 
of local skills, materials and finance, to be compatible with local 
culture and practices,"and to be designed to satisfy local needs and 
aspirations (Dunn, 1978). 
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Proponents of the Appropriate Technology school of thought argue that 
technology choice is a major component of any development strategy. It 
is recognised that alternative technology options are available for 
achieving any particular policy objective and that the choice of 
technology made is determined according to the developmental goals that 
are being sought (Stewart, 1977). So, for example, the choice between 
opting for a capital-intensive or labour-intensive technology depends on 
the objectives of the policy to which it is being applied - whether the 
goal is to maximise economic growth, or to maximise employment· creation. 
As such, technology, as an input to development cannot be understood as 
an objective .science. Rather, technology choice is subjective and 
cannot be based purely on an assumed objective technocratic rationale. 
Alternative options exist which reflect broader political 
interpretations of development. Therefore, the assumption that 
development requires the exploitation of the most sophisticated 
technology available,by definition, has to be rejected (Evans, 1979). 
It is recognised by contrast that different technology options exist 
according to specific circumstances and the form of development that is 
sought. Therefore, the Western model can be seen to no longer represent 
the only and inevitable model of change which must be emulated. In this 
respect, the Appropriate Technology philosophy can be seen to mirror the 
arguments put forward by the Basic Needs school in terms of their attack 
on the eurocentric model of development and its obsession with growth. 
Both schools of thought reject the explicit assumptions held within the 
modernisation school that the Western model of economic- and high 
technology-led growth is inevitable in the context of Third World 
countries. 
The Appropriate Technology philosophy has been inspired by a school of 
thought which argues that fundamental changes in the way that 
development is understood by both the developed and developing world are 
necessary in order to avert social and ecological disequilibrium. 
Schumacher's "Small is Beautiful" (1973) symbolises this alternative 
perception. It argues that not only is the Western model inappropriate 
for the developing world, but that its obsession with growth and 
materialism will bring about the demise of western·civilisation too. 
This argument was shared by other academics and politicians who argued 
that present levels of growth and resource depletion were unsustainable 
in the developed world, let alone in the developing world (Meadows et 
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al, 1972). It was proposed that alternative or intermediate.technology 
options, reflecting non-growth orientated development models should be 
encouraged particularly for the developing world (Dunn, 1978). From 
another perspective, a number. of developme~t economists argued that 
western technology was inappropriate to the Third World context, in 
terms of the factor endowments characteristic of developing economies 
(Jequier, 1976; Robinson, 1979; Singer, 1977). 
The attack which was fostered on the modernisation paradigm by these 
schools of thought stimulated and was indeed informed by increaSing 
·research interest in identifying appropriate forms of indigenous 
development. Attention focussed on trying to understand how indigenous 
rural. societies in different parts of the Third World functioned and to 
identify indigenous perceptions of the meaning of development and of 
their aspirations for change. A major concern, implicit in this 
·research, was to dispel myths of rural backwardness which had been 
perpetrated by the eurocentric modernisation paradigm. A growing call 
for multidisciplinary studies was made to include macro-scale economic 
and micro-scale anthropological studies (Lipton, 1970). These were 
necessary .in order to dispel myths of peasant irrationality, for example 
(Hill, 1968; Hutton & Cohen, 1975; Ilbery, 1978), and to recognise the 
interrelationship of economic, social and political factors (Epstein, 
1975). It was only in this way that development planning could become 
aware of needs and conditions at·the.community level and so be able to 
tailor development policies to local circumstances. 
These changing opinions concerning the meaning of development and the 
presentation of alternative models of change were informed by experience 
from the field and in turn served to bring about change in policy 
rhetoric. In particular., during the second development decade of the 
1970's, most of the major multilateral and bilateral public and private 
institutions involved in some way in the promotion of development, 
acknowledged the relevance and insight of these new ideas and Joined in 
the criticism of the modernisation paradigm, seeking to absorb the new 
concepts into their own policy statements (Harrison, 1979, 1980). 
Moreover, a number of new research institutes serving as lobby groups, 
such as the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), were set 
up to promote and implement these new ideas. 
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By the mid-1970's it was clear that the major multilateral donors had 
taken note of these changes in development thinking and had gone so far 
as to make public statements confirming their commitment to make greater 
efforts to promote development which aimed to reduce inequality and 
encourage rural development. In 1973, the World Bank, pronounced its 
'Alternative Development Strategy' which recommended the tying together 
of growth objectives and redistribution objectives (Chenery et al, 
1974). This resulted from the personal convictions of its president, 
McNamara, who had been instrumental in changing the image and philosophy 
of the Bank away from the growth-orientated ideals of the 1960's (Ayres, 
19B3). In 1974 the Cocoyoc Declaration represented an across the board 
affirmation of the United Nations' commitment to Appropriate Technology, 
"Basic Needs" and Self-Reliance (Harrison, 19BO; UNCTAD, 197B). This 
pronouncement was followed by individual commitments made by the FAO, 
IlO and WHO (UNESCO, 1980). Thus, in 1976, for example, the IlO made an 
explicit commitment to supporting the prinCiples of "Basic Needs" at the 
World Employment Conference (Green, 1978; IlO, 1976). The EEC also 
moved in this direction in the planning of its aid programme. By the 
mid-1970's it had created a micro-project programme and had increased 
investment allocations for rural development, with the expressed aim of 
achiev'ing the goals set down by the Basic Needs school (EEC, 1979; 
Rajana, 1982). 
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WATER AND SANITATION AS BASIC NEEDS: 
The growing attention given to the promotion of domestic water supply 
and sanitation provision, symbolised by the United Nations' 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (UNIOWSSO), 
can be attributed to a revolution in attitudes and policy towards health 
and health care provision. Domestic water supply and sanitation are 
seen as major components of Primary Health Care - a strategy which has 
been inspired by the concepts and prescriptions of "Basic Needs", 
Appropriate Technology and Community Participation. The linking of 
water supply provision and sanitation to Primary Health Care during the 
1970's, therefore, occurred against the background of a more profound 
re-orientation of development theory and practice; 
Research on health in the tropics had identified the extent to which 
major diseases responsible for infant mortality and debility were 
related to improper water supply and excreta disposal (Bradley, 1978). 
The provision of improved water supplies and sanitation facilities was 
identified as an appropriate contribution to a health strategy which 
sought to prevent rather than just cure disease. Thus, within the 
framework 'of Primary Health Care, water supply provision was linked to' 
public health and sanitation as a major component of the strategy. The 
approach to project delivery in water and sanitation was strongly 
influenced by the princfples of Primary Health Care rooted in the 
concept of appropriate technology and community participation: As such 
both the water supply and public health sectors were compelled to adapt 
to this new approach. 
By contrast, up until this period, water supply and public health were 
treated very much as mutually'exclusive sectors. Water supply was 
largely associated with production-related projects. Water resource 
provision was perceived, therefore, as part of basic economic 
infrastructure provision, essential for supporting the modernisation of 
agriculture (Bourne, 1984). Emphasis was placed on irrigation and on 
livestock watering, rather than on a concern .for domestic water 
consumption and on improvements to health, except in major urban centres 
where municipal sewerage and water supply systems were installed 
(Bradley, 1978). In this context, the United Nations established the 
International Hydrological Decade in 1970, to encourage member countries 
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to consider broad aspects of water resource management (Bourne, 19B4). 
On the whole, sanitation received scant attention, except in selected 
urban areas. The rural sector was largely ignored in the belief that 
environmental health in rural areas was not a sufficiently serious nor 
visible problem to merit special , attention (Bradley, 197B). 
Public health and sanitation had, however, played a key role in opening 
up the tropics to European exploitation and settlement. In the first 
quarter of the twentieth century,the building of the Panama canal, the 
creation of the Malay rubber planations and the establishment of the 
Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia had all depended on public health 
intervention to clear the region of disease (Bradley, 1978; Watson, 
1915, 1953). It was recognised that economic profit depended on 
ensuring the good health of the labour force which had to confront a 
number of serious diseases such as malaria, typhoid, cholera and 
dysentry (Watson, 1915, 1953). Consequently, private companies rather 
than the colonial administrations were prepared to invest heavily in 
public health measures in order to improve the health of the labour 
force. It was common, therefore, to find that the townships associated 
with mining and plantation concerns were best endowed with clean water 
supplies, sewerage disposal and drained swamps. The eradication of 
malaria, however, received priority attention. It is suggested, for 
example, that the establishment of a sanitation department within the 
medical division of the administration in Panama signalled a new 
official attitude to disease with the 'recognition of the importance of 
preventative public health intervention (Watson, 1915). This period of 
activity, moreover, prov'ided an opportunity.to carry out research on 
disease which would influence future 'pol iCy on water supply and 
sanitation provision. 
However, after 1945, attention moved away from sanitation in the form of 
-
public health engineering with the' discovery of insecticides and 
vaccinations 'which could more efficiently eradicate or stem the spread 
of environmental diseases (Bradley, 1978). Water supply and sanitation 
provision was restricted to urban centres or to the productive sectors 
of the economy (Cairncross, 1986). At the same time, these new 
discoveries were not available to the people, the·majority of whom were 
rural based. By the 1960s environmental health had been relegated to a 
low position on the policy agenda (Bradley, 1978) at a time when 
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increasing interest was being directed to the use of modern curative 
forms' of medical care. Primary Health Care in the 1970s, therefore, 
provided a new opportunity for public health engineering to reassert 
itself. 
GOALS OF THE DECADE: 
It has been recognised that a 'strong link exists between the incidence 
of environmental diseases such as cholera, typhoid, hepatitis and 
shistosomiasis, and inadequate and polluted water supply and sanitation 
facilities (Feachem,' 1984)., This is particularly so in areas of high 
~ensity settlement. The provision or up-grading of such facilities can 
contribute to reductions in infant mortality and levels of morbidity by 
breaking the life cycle of water-related and excreta-related infections,' 
which are the major infant and child killers. However, these 
preventative actions can only have a substantial impact on the control 
of such di seases, if they are accompan ied by other pub 1 i c health and 
Primary Health Care interventions. These include the alleviation of 
malnutrition, the improvement of personal hygiene, .the provision of 
better housing and health education (Bourne, 1984; Feachem, 1984). 
Therefore, the provision of water supply and sanitation facilities is 
seen to form part of a broader Primary Health Care programme. However, 
because the reduction of these diseases requires intervention in several 
, , 
forms, it is difficult to measure the particular contribution that can 
be made by either'water supply or sanitation provision (Bourne, 1984). 
Yet, research suggests that the reduction in the incidence of any of 
these diseases cannot be aChieved without a coordinated programme which 
includes all of these forms of ,intervention (Feachem, 1984). 
Health benefits, therefore, represent the principal goal of the Decade 
(Subrahmanyam & Cvjetanovic, 1986). This has been most forcefully 
argued by Feachem (1984). During the past two decades research has been 
conducted at the international and national levels to seek ways of 
measuring the impact that water and sanitation interventions can make on 
the reduction of the incidence of these environmental diseases, and of 
identifying ways of maximising the impact of such preventative forms of 
intervention (Blum & Feachem, 1983; Cairncross, 1980; Feachem et al, 
1978; White et al, 1972; Saunders &.Warford, 1976). A major concern is 
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·to extend access to these services to as many people as is possible 
during the Decade, to monitor the impact on health but equally 
importantly to provide a platform for continued efforts in the future. 
This is a daunting task. In 1980, water and sanitation facilities were 
available to only a minority of the population, especially in rural 
areas (see Table 6). A number of other benefits which can accrue from 
the provision of these facilities have been identified and represent 
. secondary goals of the Decade. 
- The reduction of human drudgery, in terms of the time and effort 
expended in fetching water in rural areas particularly during the dry 
season. Time and effort.saved can be used for more productive 
activities such as crop cultivation, as well as alleviating the burden 
of transporting water over large distances, while latrines can provide 
convenience and privacy (Baum & Tolbert, 1985; Cairncross, 1980; Hofkes, 
1983) . 
- The creation of infrastructure spin-offs. A water supply can form the 
basis for. the provision of social infrastructure such as primary schools 
and health facilities and may provide the opportunities for developing 
small-scale.manufacturing, building ~onstruction and commerce (Feachem 
et al, 1978; Saunders & Warford, 1976). 
- Institution-building and administrative re-organisation at the local 
government and community revels can resu It from the pl anni ng, 
implementation and maintenance of such public utilities (Cairncross, 
1980; Glennie, 1983; Feachem et al, 1978; Saunders & Warford, 1976). 
Achieving the Goals of the Decade - Community PartiCipation & 
Appropriate Technology: 
The health benefits sought in the Decade can only be achieved through 
active consultation and cooperation with the recipient community in both 
the design and implementation of policy (Feachem et al, 1978; White & 
White, 1984). This is justified for a number of reasons. Research has 
shown that the provision of these facilities cannot be implemented 
successfully without a parallel health education campaign directed at 
personal and community hygiene and public health. Only in this way can 
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Table 6: Level of Provision of Water &. Sanitation in the Third World - 1980 
• 
NOS (mill) 
Watpr Suppl ips: 42 986 70 27 
Sanitation 26 614 14 
·(Bas,d on fi9ur,S from Th' Couri". 1986) 
Table 7: Level of Provis::n of Water & Sanitation Prcvision in Africa - 19':·0-19:::3 
POfN (IT! i 11 ) , 
1980 
No~ I. 
B, 61 
RURAL 324 356 72 22 
No~ i~ 
9' c:-j -' 
103 29 
Stl~;TATJ r.~ 
1980 
No~ i: 
73 54 
67 20 
(Ba~pd on fi9ur'~ pr,.,ntpd in Th, Couri,r, 1966) 
1983 
88 55 
64 18 
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it be ensured that facilities provided will be used and maintained 
properly and that the other public health interventions such as personal 
cleanliness and protection of food sources can be ensured. Benefits 
cannot be achieved through the provision .of infrastructure on its own 
(IRC, 19B4). Recognition of the importance of this health.education or 
"software" i ntervent ion has b'een reflected in a. prol iferat ion of 
literature identifying the ways in which community cooperation can be 
elicited and how constraints on achieving the desired behavioural 
changes can be overcome. In particular, it has been recognised how 
culturally and socially sensitive these issues are, and how the success 
of any programme depends more on aChieving community support and 
awareness of health benefits' than on the simple provision of the 
facility. It has been recognised that behavioural attitudes to water 
·use and excreta disposal are strongly linked to traditional perceptions 
and customs and to traditional beliefs about the transmission of 
diseases. Emphasis has, therefore, been placed on identifying 'Human 
Factor' and 'Socio-Cultural' variables and on considering the 'Social 
Feasibility' of projects (Cairncross, 19BO; Falkenmark, 1982; Perrett & 
Lethem, 1980; Perrett, 1983; Simpson-Herbert, 1983; White et al; 1972) • 
. Therefore, the planning of a "software" package to accompany the 
provision of infrastructure is essential to establishing the link 
between water, sanitation and education themselves (Cross, 1983). 
Research has focus sed on developing the most appropriate technology 
options and software packages for projects which are socially and 
culturally acceptable. COlTlTlunity participation is argued to be the most 
important component for ensuring Decade success. This is'because the 
recipients must make the changes in hygiene and health customs (Cross, 
1983; IRC, 1984). They must, therefore, be actively involved in all 
. . 
stages of policy design and implementation. Bottom-up initiativ~s are 
called for, though it is recognised that usually such initiatives 
require support from an external agency too. 
COlTlTlunity participation is an essential input to achieving the benefits 
of health education and at the same time to achieving user acceptibility 
and cooperation (Van Wijk-Sijbesma, 1981; White, 1981). This must be 
combined with the development of appropriate technology. The technology 
must be effective in providing the prescribed service but at the same 
time must be easily operable and maintainable. The system must be 
socially acceptable to the community and it must also be affordable. 
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This is important because in all likelihood, the community will be' 
required to contribute to the cost and maintenance of the programme. 
The provision of socially acceptable and affordable systems is a 
pre-condition to achieving long-term benefits. In the water supply 
sector, for example, the village Level Operated and Maintained (VLOM) 
hand pump project has been set up to develop a technically appropriate 
handpump (World Water, 1983), while in the sanitation sector, the "VIp· 
latrine has been developed in Zimbabwe (Van Damme & White, 1984). The 
emphasis that has been placed on developing appropriate technology 
through community consultation has been prompted by the history 'of past 
failures of projects which have been poorly designed, inadequately 
maintained and which have often been unacceptable to the consumer (Baum 
& To1bert,' 1985). Appropriate Technology has, therefore. come to stand 
for the design of technically appropriate, socially acceptable and 
affordable systems. 
Finally, community participation and the design of an appropriate' 
technology has been encouraged for reasons of cost reduction. It is 
recognised that the ambitious goals of the Decade can only be achieved 
by passing on some of the costs to the consumer, 'in the form of 
self-help contributions. At the international level, the Decade has 
called for an 80% contribution from national governments, with the 
remainder being provided by the donor community (Bourne, 1984). 
Therefore, nationa; governments are compelled to reduce costs through 
the development of appropriate technology and through consumer 
contributions to the costs of construction, operation and maintenance. 
As such, governments are normally asking for a 10-15% consumer 
contribution (Baum & To1bert, 1985; Ka1bermatten & Listorti, 1984). 
However, while costs can be recovered through the imposition of service 
charges in urban ar~as, this is rarely possible in rural areas (Baum & 
Tolbert, 1985). It is, therefore, all the more important to develop a 
technology which is cheap but which remains acceptable and effective. 
RESULTS: A MID-DECADE ASSESSMENT: 
Despite the relatively high political profile that the Decade has 
enjoyed, the level of investment and the impact that has resulted at the 
Decade's mid-point have been disappointing (The Courier, 1986). 'First, 
it is quite obvious that the goal of achieving, "water and sanitation 
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for all by .the year 2000" is unattainable. In this respect, the 
provision of new services has only just managed to keep pace with 
population growth and settlement change. Therefore, access to improved 
water and sanitation remains limited·, while there is even evidence to 
suggest that fewer people have access to sanitation facilities today 
than was the case in 1980 (The Courier, 1986) (see Table 7). 
Second, there is evidence that than an unacceptable proportion of new 
facilities have either been abandoned, misused, or are in a state of 
disrepair. Insufficient attention has been paid to ensuring that 
appropriate arrangements for 'operation and maintenance have been made, 
while it is acknowledged that systems have often been poorly designed 
(Bourne, 1984; The Courier, 1986). Furthermore, greater emphasis has 
been directed to water supply provision than to sanitation provision, 
which lias been generally neglected, while health education has often 
been wholly ignored. 
Therefore, from both a qualitative and quantitative point of view, the 
Decade has fallen short of achieving its major objectives. In 
particular, it is clear that the long-term health objective of the 
Decade cannot be met under current levels of investment and provision. 
At the same time, results have varied considerably between countries 
participating in the Decade. There are indeed a number of success 
stories which can be contrasted to examples of failure. 
A range of explanations for these disappointing results have been 
. offered by donor agencies, host governments, project·officers and the 
recipients themselves. Indeed, in a publication marking the Decade's 
mid-term point, several key explanations for the apparent variation in 
the success of the programme at the intra-national level are considered 
(White & White, 1984). It is argued that constraints to success can be 
identified at the international, national and community levels,· and 
concern socio-cultural, institutional and organisational, economic and 
financial, political and environmental factors. 
These are discussed at greater length in the following chapters as the~ 
have influenced the provision of water supplies. and sanitation in rural· 
Botswana. The precise impact that these different factors have had on 
achieving policy objectives has been noted extensively in the literature 
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and more especially, in policy evaluations. Indeed the emphasis which 
has been placed on community participation, appropriate technology and 
on institution~building as key components of the Decade reflects the 
awareness that exists of the potential constraints which may affect the 
aChievement of policy objectives. Particular attention has been 
focussed on three of these problem areas, which are discussed in more 
detail in the rest of the thesis. 
Socio-cultural constraints; 
Arguably, constraints of a socio-cultural nature have presented the'most 
serious barriers to the achievement of the Decade's goals. 
Socio-cultural factors are defined here as the customs, laws, beliefs 
and economic circumstances which govern society and the way people 
'behave. Social behaviour towards personal hygiene, community health and 
excreta disposal ~an be influenced by religious'beliefs, the status of 
women and local economic circumstances. Acknowledgement of the 
importance of these factors is reflected in the fact that increasing 
attention has been paid in the literature to a consideration of the 
impact of ,socio-cultural factors on policy implementation (Perrett & 
Lethem, 1980; Simpson-Herbert, 1983). 
Development projects in the past ,have all too often overlooked these 
socio-cultural considerations and planners have been surprised when 
projects have either failed to be completed or have been abandoned by, 
the intended. beneficiaries. This has been apparent in relation to 
small-scale community projects but also in relation to larger scale 
agricultural projects,(8arnett, 1975). It has been against the evidence 
of the limited success of many schemes, which depended on the use of 
western technology and the adoption of western values, that the ca]l for 
appropriate technology gained'credence. 
Thus, a full consideration of socio-cultural factors is now recognised 
to be indispensible in the design of projects which require recipients 
to undertake behavioural changes to well-established customs, or to make 
personal contribufions to the implementation of the project. Indeed,' in 
relation to the specific aims of the Decade, these factors are 
recognised to be important with reference to; 
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- achieving behavioural changes in relation to household hygiene, 
excreta disposal and water use. 
- assessing the socio-economic capacity and willingness of recipients to 
make a self-help contribution to the implementation of the project. 
- ensuring that the technology and wider goals of the project are 
acceptab le to and .supported by the communi ty. 
Failure to consider community attitudes, aspirations and perceptions, 
and their ability and willingness to take part in Decade projects has 
now been widely accepted as an explanatory factor for the disappointing. 
results to date (Cairncross, 1980; Falkenmark, 1982; Perrett & Lethem, 
1980). However, in addition to these socio-cultural factors which can 
affect the likelihood of aChieving·active community support and 
participation, insufficient attention has been paid to a consideration 
of the soci.al and political characteristics of recipient communities 
(Bourne, 1984). Political and social tension at the community level 
which is often overlooked may determine the possibility of achieving the 
sort of community-wide partiCipation desired, while often it is assumed 
that community partiCipation or .self-help is a traditional 
characteristic of rural communities which can.be exploited, when in fact 
it is not (Glennie, 1983). In recognising the critical impact of. 
socio-cultural factors on ·policy success, WHO, along with a number of 
other agencies have recently prepared guidelines for undertaking 
feasibility and ex-post evaluations of projects to assess the precise 
impact of these factors (WHO, 1983). 
Institutional Constraints;. 
Incr~ased attention has also been paid to problems of administration in 
relation to planning and implementation capacity and of manpower 
training at central government and local government levels. It is 
persistently stated in the literature that inadequate manpower both in 
skills and absolute numbers represents one of the greatest challenges to 
the achievement of Decade aims, particularly at the local government 
level but also at the community level (Baum & Tolbert, 1985; Falkenmark, 
1982; Saunders & Warford, 1976). Inadequate manpower constrains the 
planning and implementation capacity of government and leads to a 
situation in which donor funds cannot be fully utilised within agreed 
timespans (Bourne, 1984). Yet it is also noted that organisational 
problems exist at the central government level, too. There is evidence 
of inadequate cooperation between ministries and departments, as well as 
between central government and local government and a relegation of 
water and sanitation departments to subordinate positions. As a result, 
they are frequently under-staffed and under-financed (Baum & Tolbert, 
1985; Falkenmark, 1982; Glennie, 1983). Moreover, responsibility for 
water and sanitation provision often falls under separate departments or 
even separate ministries. At the field level, there are difficulties in 
recruiting suitable project officers, who are sufficiently skilled but 
who are prepared to work at relatively low levels of· pay, in a low 
status sector (Falkenmark, 1982; Glennie, 1983). Others have pointed to 
the massive logistical and scheduling problems involved in coordinating 
projects which must adequately cater for donor, central government, 
local government and community interests (Perrett & Lethem, 1980) •. At 
the community level, the problem of institutions which are unable to 
support the delivery systems recommended has also'been attributed to 
socio-cultural factors. 
Financial Constraints; 
Financial constraints on the achievement of project goals.can be 
identified at two levels. First, at a general. level, constraints are 
apparent in relation to the funding procedures and arrangements of 
individual government ministries and departments both at the level of 
central and 'local government. It is recognised; for example, that local 
government capacity to implement pOl.icy is constrained by limited 
opportunities to generate revenue to fund recurrent expenditure and to 
have access to qualified manpower. Second, at a policy-specific level, 
financial constraints can be identified in two areas. On the one hand, 
policy success depends on the capacity of recipient communities and of 
individual households to make a self-help contribution to the Decade. 
On the other hand, policy success depends equally on convincing host 
governments that the provision of water and sanitation facilities 
represents an attractive investment which deserves political and 
financial support (Kalbermatten & Listorti, 1984; White & White, 1984). 
There is, therefore, an overall shortage of funds to aChieve the 
ambitious objectives of the Decade at the international level (African 
Busi ness, 1986; The Courier, 1986). Pledges to support the Decade 
--
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coincided with the beginning of world economic recession. As a result, 
international financial support has been reduced while in a climate of 
economic austerity, available resources have been diverted to more 
cost~effective projects (African Business, 1986)'0 Governments have been 
asked to provide 80% of funds and to pass on some of the cost to the 
recipient by encouraging self-help efforts. As a result, there has been 
a bias towards allocating resources to the most cost-effective areas 
which tend to exclude the smaller, remoter and poorer communities 
(Falkenmark, 1982). Allocations are, therefore, influenced primarily byo 
technocratic considerations. Rural areas generally are perceived as 
unattractive as compared to urban areas because of the limited capacify 
to generate revenue for the operation and maintenance of services, and 
government s are ret i cent about i ncreas ojng recurrent budget all ocat ions 
to local authorities to subsidise these services especially when such 
projects demand high transport and manpower overheads (Cairncross, 
1980). As a result, systems are often left abandoned or in a state of 
disrepair when resources are not forthcoming (Saunders & Warford, 1976). 
°More generally, botOh the water and sanitation sectors, but more 
especially the sanitation sector, are seen to provide poor returns on 
investment while generating few direct economic spin-offs. At the same 
time, the substantial health benefits that can accrue from these 
investments are difficult to measure in the short term O and cannot be 
quantified according to standardofinancial or economic criteria 
(Falkenmark,1982). 
These financial disincentives can be understood more generally in terms ° 
of the contradictions between the finanCial and organisational 
prerogatives of large aid agencies and governments, and the complex and 
costly nature of poverty-focussed "Basic Needs" projects of which water 
and ° sanitation are examples. oThere is a fundamental conflict between 
investors' aims of achieving rapid and assured returns on investments, 
governments which seek to restrict public expenditure and the 
characteristics of such projects which are risky from a financial pOint 
of view, are time consuming and, therefore, costly, and are certain not 
to generate attractive financial returns. Moreover, their recurrent 
° costs are high whi le the pote~tial benefits of the investment cannot be 
measured in monetary terms (Ayres, 1983; Chambers, 1978; Tendler, 1982). 
Such projects which have a high' software' and community participation 
component are seen by donor agencies and governments as troublesome for 
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these reasons. In addition there can be administrative problems from 
the viewpoint of cooperation between aid agencies and host governments. 
94% of World Bank staff, for example, are located in Washington (Ayres, 
1983). Field trips which are indispensable for project planning, 
monitoring and evaluation, are expensive, time consuming, infrequent and 
often inadequate. They amount to short trips into the 'bush' or to 
bouts of "rural tourism" (Chambers, 1978). However, on the basis of 
these field excursions, important decisions concerning the programme 
have to be taken. Finally, governments are often wary about supporting 
poverty-focussed projects, which seek to challenge existing 
inequalities, particularly in rural areas, and which might consequently 
compromise the interests of rural elite groups on whom they depend for 
political support (Ayres, 1983; Tendler, 1982). 
EXAMPLES OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROVISION IN AFRICA: 
Rural Water Supply in Malawi: 
Water supply in rural Malawi provides a good illustration of how 
specific environmental and political economic factors can influence the 
design of policy in a particular country. Conditions in Malawi appear 
to be conducive to ensuring that a project delivery system based closely 
on the prescriptions advocated by the international community can be 
implemented. 
Provision is based upon the use of low-cost technologies and on a high 
level of community participation. The programme has concentrated on 
ensuring success through a process of gradual implementation in a few 
communities, and of ensuring proper operation and maintenance of 
installed systems, before expanding the programme to cover a wider 
catchment. It has as such developed from the bottom up. The programme 
has been divided into two schemes. One is based upon a gravity-fed" 
surface water supply and the other is based upon groundwater supply by 
means of boreholes and wells. 
In the former scheme, which caters for 25% of the rural population, 
community partiCipation is a major component of the project from start 
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to finish. Recipient conrnunities are responsible for making the initial 
request to take part in the project, for installing the supply and for 
overseeing the operation and maintenance of the supply. Specially 
'elected conrnittees which represent the interests of tribal leaders, 
party leaders and villagers, are responsible for these tasks. No 
external project staff are involved beyond the provision of technical 
support and training. Central government only intervenes as a 
mobilising force at the outset and for providing training facilities for 
'the elected conrnittee members. It is also worth noting that the 
ministry responsible for this progranrne is not a technical one as is 
often found, 'but is ,the Ministry 'of Conrnunity Development and Welfare 
(Msukwa, 1983). 
In'the latter scheme, which caters for the remaining 75% of ' the rural 
population, provision is based upon the construction of shallow wells 
where the water table is less than 6'meters below the surface, and the 
installation of boreholes when it is greater than 6 meters. Emphasis 
has been placed on limiting costs wherever possible. So for example, 
low cost, low yielding boreholes have been used which can be installed 
with manual pumps. These pumps are cheap to construct, easy to install 
and cheap to operate. Moreover, they can be easily maintained by local 
mechanics and do not depend on' imported parts.' The scheme has also 
depended on community participation to ensure'that' reCipients are 
wining and able to operate and ,maintain their supply without external 
support, While this approach has slowed down the rate of 
implementation, it 'is considered an acceptable compromise if it ensures 
better operation 'and maintenance in the long term (Smith.- Carrington, 
1983) • 
Rural Water Supply in Kenya: 
Kenya has conrnitted itself to supporting the objectives of the Water 
Decade by intensifying its rural water supply progranrne. While the 
progranrne is administered by the Ministry of Water Development, the 
progranrne is less systematically organised than in some other countries. 
,This ,is probably due to the contrasting socio-ecoriomic and environmental 
features of the country which demand different forms of intervention. 
One can contrast the needs of nomadic groups in the arid areas to those 
of farmers in the fertile highlands.' Policy formulation' is centralised 
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and depends on the support of professionals both from home and abroad, 
for designing systems (Kabuaye, 1983). At the same time, local 
authorities are expected to provide financial and administrative support 
to the implementing ministry, while the-international donor community 
has also provided financial and manpowe"r assistance. Most projects also 
rely on community participation in the implementation phase as a means 
of generating user interest and-of reducing costs. It is argued that 
the level of provision should be commensurate with what communities are 
able to afford, and that effective operation and maintenance can only be 
real ised if the recipient perceives a felt need for the supply (Kabuaye, 
-1983). To date, the programme has concentrated on providing supplies to 
the highly populated agricultural areas, while remoter areas have been 
often ignored because of the prohibitive costs involved. _ 
L 
Rural Water Supply-and Sanitation in Zimbabwe: 
Rura 1 Zimbabweans depend on both central government and non-governmental 
organisations for the provision of improved water.supplies. State 
intervention in rural provision has increased substantially since 
independence reflecting a national commitment to ensuring the provision 
of ·"Basic Needs" to the rural sector (Kinsey, 1983). A major water 
programme (the Water Master Plan) has been established as part of a 
resettlement and Primary Health Care strategy. Provision is based on 
the use of an assortment of technologies to suit local environmental 
conditions. These range from boreholes to dams and shallow wells while 
most supplies are reticulated to standposts. A major constraint faCing 
the programme is the shortage of dri 11 ing equipment for the .borehole 
" programme. 
Non-governmental organisations have also been active in implementing 
projects in rural areas. Usually, such projects depend on a high 
element of community participll-tion and focus on a smal·l target 
population. A protected well and sanitation project has been 
established in one district which is based upon cooperation between a 
medical centre run by a mission, local ·councillors, teachers, tribal-
leaders and community members (Walsh, 19B3). While government provides 
support to maintenance work and has provided advice on technical matters 
- the- Blair Institute has been providing ·assistance in the design of a 
suitable latrine - the community has· played an active role in the 
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.installation, operation and maintenance of facilities. Community 
participation· accounted for 60% of installation costs, while in the 
long-term it has made the community self-reliant in ensuring the proper 
operation and maintenance of the scheme. Local skills were exploited in 
the building programme while a workshop has been provided by the 
mission. To date, this project has built 300 wells. The sanitation 
project has been less successful due to initial difficulties in 
generating enthusiasm for the. project. Yet despite a less obvious 'felt 
need' 500 units have been constructed. 
Zimbabwe has made an important contribution to the research and 
development of low cost water and sanitation systems at the Blair 
institute. This centre has received support from the international 
community and has cooperated closely with United Nations organisations 
responsible for the Decade. The benefits of innovations made at this 
institution have been exported to several other African countries such 
as Botswana and Tanzania who have used the Blair·technology as the basis 
of their own rural sanitation programmes. 
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Chapter 5: RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROVISION IN BOTSWANA: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROGRAMMES: 
This chapter examines Botswana's contribution to the Decade. It begins 
with an introduction to the water and sanitation programmes which 
support the objectives of the Decade. Major policy objectives, the 
delivery systems used and results to date are briefly reviewed. The 
following section discusses the fieldwork methodology used in the study 
of these programmes before proceeding to examine each in more detail. 
The respective del ivery systems of the two programmes and 'the role 
pl ayed by central government, local government and community 
institutions in policy formulation and implementation are then examined. 
A final section considers the relative importance of political, economic 
and environmental factors, and the influence of the Decade in 
determining the delivery systems used in the respective prograrrmes. 
The government of Botswana has endorsed its corrmitment to the Decade 
through a major water supply programme and a sanitation project for the 
rural sector. The Decade was launched in 1980 following on from a 
preliminary report prepared by SIDA/WHO. However, it was clearly stated 
that the provisions laid down referred to the aspirations and goals of 
the NDP, forming part of government's wider rural development strategy 
and ,not necessarily to those of the United Nat ions, though the major 
principles of the Decade were acknowledged (GOB, 1985).' Thus, whi le no 
Decade plan was prepared, in 1981, an inter-ministerial water, and 
,sanitation committee 'was established, involving the ministries 'of Local 
Government and Lands, Finance and Development Planning, Mineral 
Resources and Water Affairs, He'alth, and Works and Communications' 
. ' 
(IDWSSD, 1984). Rural water supply provision is directed through the 
Village Water Supply Programme '(VWSP) established in 1972, while rural 
sanitation provision is directed through the Self-Help Environmental,' 
Sanitation Project (SHESP) which began as a p'ilot project in 1979/80 • 
• 
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THE VILLAGE WATER SUPPLY PROGRAMME: 
Objectives: 
The VWSP is a long-term sectoral programme of nationwide proportions 
funded both by the government and the Swedish aid agency, SJOA, and 
implemented through the,Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. 
It aims to provide potable and reliable water to all recognised villages 
for domestic consumption purposes. It commenced in 1972 following an 
agreement reached between the GOB and SIOA (Coppermann, 1978). The 
original programme ran from 1972 to 1976 but was extended until 1982 
under NOP 5 and then again to 1991, under NOP 6 (GOB, 1985). It is now 
formally referred to as the, "Extended Village Water Supply ProgralllT1e." 
The progralllT1e provides the ,following settlement categories with 'fully 
subsidised domestic water supply facilities; major villages, rural 
villages and some lands areas. The following settlement categories are 
,however excluded; towns, cattle posts, freehold farms and nomadic 
settlements (Agrell et al, 1984). It is calculated that the programme 
should eventually reach 63% of the rural population, nationwide, though 
this may account for as few as 10% of the total number of settlements. 
However, with rapid population growth and with the recent 'establishment 
of small permanent settlements at the lands, it isl ikely that only 55% 
of the rural p'opulation wi 11 be reached by the programme (GOB, 1985). 
The remaining 45% resident in scattered lands and cattle post 
settlements must obtain water from alternative unprotected sources. 
'Government provides some funding for improving surface water supplies at 
the lands through the Ministry of Agdculture. Otherwise, communities 
must rely on private boreholes or on traditional sources. The programme 
is structured around three tiers of provision, based upon 'settlement 
size (see Fig 2). 
Until ,1979, consumers were required to pay a tariff for public water 
supplies. Since 1979, provision has been free to those consumers using 
public standpipes. Households which have opted for a private connection 
must pay a charge similar to the urban tariff (SIOA/FAO, 1983). The 
decision to discontinue a rural tariff for 
a reconsideration of rural pricing policy. 
public consumers was based on 
This policy change took into 
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'WB 17' - Major Village Water Suppl ies. 
- Provision to all major villages (pop'n +2000). 
- Standpipes no more than 400m from furthest compound and reticulation 
to government fac i lit i es. 
- Private connections available subject to installation & consumption 
charge. 
- System to prov'i de 40 litres per cap ita per day. 
'WB 26' - Rural Village Water Suppl ies. 
- Provision to villages with populations between 500 & 2000. 
- Standpipes no more than 400m from furthest compound. 
- System to prov i de 30 litres per cap ita per da:'. 
'WB 30' - Small Village Water Suppl ies. 
- Provision to villages with populations under 500. 
- Reticulation to, school and heal:h facil ity only. 
Fie 2: The VWS? - Hierarc:ny of ?covision. 
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consideration the following objectives. First, to conserve scarce water 
resources, second, to control the growth of recurrent expenditure and 
third, to reduce urban bias. It was decided that a consumer tariff 
could not achieve these objectives. Evidence suggests that the rural 
consumer does not waste water and, indeed, from .the point of view of 
health, uses an insufficient Quantity of water. Furthermore, the cost 
of administering the collection of revenue was shown to exceed the 
revenue collected. Finally, the provision of free water could be used 
to re-emphasise government's policy of redistributing national wealth 
from the mining sector through the provision of subsidised basic needs 
(GOB, 1980, 1985).· 
The programme provides· villages with reticulated·standpost water supply 
systems. Water is drawn predominantly from deep :groundwater sources 
raised with diesel· powered monopumps. In some areas, water is. 
abstracted from surface sources but this is rare. Water is pumped from 
source to storage tanks and then reticulated to individual standpipes. 
Results to Date; 
The primary objective of the.VWSP has been to install .water supply 
systems to as many villages as possible as rapidly as possible. It, 
therefore, represents a major physical infrastructure programme. 
Accordingly, the major parameter that has been used to measure success 
has been the rate of installation. While, more recently, attention has 
shifted towards measuring.Qualitative aspects of the programme (see 
below), this section considers programm~ achievements from the point of 
view of installation rates. 
It is recognised that an assessment of the VWSP ought to consider a 
number of other measures of success. Attention ought to be paid to 
evaluating standards of installation and of operation and maintenance, 
and of long-term reliability while the impact of water provision on 
·community health and on household hygiene must also be considered (GOB, 
1985). Given the existing bias towards infrastructure provision, 
results based in installation rates are provided. 
By the end of the programme in 1991, a total of 354 sett.lements should 
have been provided with an improved water supply·system, though it is 
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likely that further settlements may be 
the plan period (Agrell et al, 1984). 
brought into the programme during 
This will account for 65% of the 
rural population (Agrell et al, 1984). However, prior to the extension 
of the programme in 1982, th'e VWSP a imed to serv i ce only 45% of the 
rural population .. An additional 154 settlements have had to be included 
in the programme in view of the results of the 1981 census which 
identified a number of new and expanding settlements which qualified for 
inclusion in the programme (GOB, 1985). Within the extended programme, 
efforts will be concentrated on those smaller settlements which qualify 
for provision under the WB3D scheme. By September 1985, 254 settlements 
had been reached, representing 91% of the target population (SIDA/GOB, 
1985). Between 35 and 45 villages are provided annually. At this rate, 
it is estimated that the programme should be compieted by 1990 (Agrell 
et al,1984; GOB, 1985). More detailed figures illustrate the extent to 
which the programme has succeeded in reaching its target settlements 
(see Table 8). 
17.of the 254 villages supplied are major villages provided under the 
WB17 scheme. This accounts for 183,680 people or 18% of the national 
population (GOB, 1985), .while 6,505 private connections have been made 
(IDWSSD, .1984). The remaining 237 villages have been provided under 
WB26 and WB30. This accounts for 200,000 people. 
The programme has, therefore, successfu lly reached all the major 
villages and a high proportion of the medium-sized rural villages with 
populations above 500 but below. 10,000. Now the emphasiS is to 
intenSify provision to smaller and remoter settlements under the WB30 
scheme, while concentrating on the rehabilitation and extension of 
facilities in the already serviced villages (SIDA/GOB, 1982). This is 
particularly necessary in the major villages which have experienced 
rapid growth since the completion of their water supply systems (Agrell 
et al, 1984). It is clear that in many of these major villages, but 
also in some of the expanding smaller villages, reticulation is 
inadequate (GOB, 1985) and does not fulfil the requirement of ensuring 
that no household is more than 400m from the nearest standpipe. 
Furthermore, estimates of consumption have had to be reassessed upwards,' 
as demands on many older systems now exceed storage and distribution 
capacity, particularly where non-domestic.demand has increased in some 
of the major villages (SIDA/FAO, 1983). In other villages, boreholes 
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Table Et: The WSP - The Extent of Village Coverage bx \984' 
VI LLI,SE '.T"'TlI'· I. RURH" POPt~ i. REAcHED I. CATEGORY 
Other rural 
TOTA~ PURAL 
(aft" Agr'!l et -, C:' .' 
23 23 
40 23 
100 41· 
100 
! 
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have dried up and new boreholes have had to be sunk. At the same time, 
smaller settlements which previously did not have village status, 
usually because there was no stable nor permanent population, have now 
become recognised settlements and ,require formalised water provision. 
'Therefore, in the future, greater attention is to be paid to maintaining 
and improving existing facilities in line with government's current 
policy to'support existing investments, rather than to extend services 
to new settlements. In particular, small and remote villages where the 
unit cost of provision is extremely high might be excluded (GOB, 19B5). 
In this way, a trade-off between government's goals for the sector 
between quality and quantity has had to be made (GOB, 1985). 
THE SELF-HELP ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION PROJECT: 
This project represents government's first major commitment to 
supporting rural sanitation provision. Emphasis has been placed on 
promoting the development of low-cost sanitation options and on 
.coordinating a health education programme through a high level of 
community particip~tion. The project represents a new dimension to 
state supported rural welfare provision, inspired both by earlier 
successes in urban projects and on recommendations from the 
international donor community. The project is coordinated through the 
Ministry of Local Government and Lands, and the District Councils, on a 
district by district basis. 
The current project operating in three· districts has been developed·from 
the experience of an earlier pilot project. The Environmental 
Sanitation Protection Project (ESPP), as the pilot project was called, 
was implemented in Kgatleng and Southern Districts during 1981 and 1982. 
}t was developed as a response to a growing concern on the part of the 
Government of Botswana and the District Councils that a national effort. 
was required to improve rural sanitation as a means of reducing the 
increasing incidence of sanitation-related diseases such as diarrhoea, 
cholera, hookworm and roundworm (Du Pradal, 1982). 
The decision to undertake such a project was proposed at the 1976 
National District Development Committees Conference. In 1979, USAID, in 
collaboration with the Government of Botswana, submitted.a Project Paper 
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for ESPP (USAID/GOB, 1979). As a pilot project, it represented the 
first major effort to address the problem of sanitation in rural 
Botswana. There was, therefore, no previous experience to learn from 
apart from an urban site and service project. The project.aimed to 
develop, test and evaluate·health education materials and develop 
latrine and refusal disposal systems which. were technically appropriate, 
socially acceptable and affordable to rural households (USAID/GOB, 
1979). Finally, the project was to look at ways in which ESPP could be 
replicated on a district-by-district basis. 
ESPP was implemented in the villages of Mabalane, Artesia and Olifants 
Drift in Kg~tleng District, and Ranaka, Selolokela and Keng in Southern 
District. The two districts were chosen for the pilot project on the 
grounds that they had identified the need to tackle the problems of poor 
sanitation in their respective 1977-82 District Development Plans. The 
chosen districts were asked by government to select three pilot villages 
each, on the basis of criteria set down by a consulting social scientist 
and the Senior Water Engineer and' according to their own priorities. A 
major concern was to select a sample of villages which displayed 
contrasting social and ecological characteristics (Kjoer-Olsen, 1980). 
The allocation criteria used in this pilot project has not been used in 
the follow-on project. 
Following initial delays in recruiting the ESPP team and in finalising 
organisational arrangements, the project was implemented during 1981 and 
1982. The first year of the project turned into a period of 
organisation and mObilisation during which certain health education 
materials were developed and a limited amount of health education 
dissemination occurred. A refuse campaign was successfully conducted 
and the Botswana Improved Trench Latrine was developed. During ,the 
second year, the project concentrated almost entirely on household 
latrine construction. Health education was dropped together with the 
development of multi-media packages while an effort was made to· 
establish a replicable village-based delivery system (World Bank/UNDP, 
1982). 
In 1982, discussions held at the annual National District'Council's 
Conference confirmed that the ESPP project had been a success and moved 
that the project be replicated nationally on a district by district 
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basis. A new donor, UNICEF, was found to replace USAID whose contract 
had terminated and thi s meant that a new project memorandum had to be 
prepared •. Individual District Councils were·to be responsible for 
mobilising interest in the project at the village level, for .including 
the project within their development plan and for submitting a proposal 
to government to take part.' As a result, three districts were selected: 
the two origi.nal ESPP districts, where the project would be extended to 
new villages and Kweneng district. 
In Kweneng district, four villages were chosen for the first stage of 
the project: Molepolole, Thamaga, Mmankgodi and Gabane. In Kgatleng 
district, the project was extended to the four river villages; 
Mathubudukwane, Ramonaka, Malolwane and Sikwane (see Maps 2 &'3) ), 
while in Southern district, the cluster of villages around Pisane-Molopo 
were brought into the project (MLGL/UNICEF ,1985). In 1986, Central 
District was brought into the project albeit on a more 1 imited scale, 
for the remaining period of ·the UNICEF-supported project. Assistance to 
this district has taken the form of a limited supply of materials and 
.technical support, in order to get started, but there has been no 
manpower nor financial support. Here, the district must rely on their 
existing resources (MLGL/UNICEF,·1985). The aim is to construct 
demonstration units in each of the sub-districts. 
In Kgatleng district, the team planned to construct 450 units by the end 
of 1985 and to construct a number of demonstration latrines in the-next 
cluster of villages in the southern part of the district, which will be 
the focus of attention in the project's second phase (KgDC, 1985). This 
represents part of a long-term strategy which has been proposed for the 
district by the project coordinator, but which has not yet been 
discussed at a formal level. This plan of. operation anticipates 
coverage of all 22 recognised villages by 1998, providing that manpower 
and financial support can be guaranteed. The proposal envisages the 
construction of a further 1200 units which would represent about half of 
all recognised household plots. However, such'a long-term commitment 
will have to be fully incorporated into the forthcoming District 
Development Plan and will undoubtedly require a longer term commitment 
from central government and a donor agency in order to succeed. In. 
Kweneng district, the curr.ent project anticipates the construction of 
1000 units and a similar number in Southern district (KgDC, 1985). 
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The Self-Help Environmental Sanitation Project (SHESP), as it is now 
called, is jointly funded by the Government of Botswana, 
UNICEF/Government of the Netherland·s, the District CounCils and the 
residents themselves. Participation in the project is voluntary. 
Residents who elect to take part, must provide P30 in cash, labour and 
building materials for the superstructure. In return, they are provided 
with logistical support,.essential materials (the ·toilet seat, v~ntpipe, 
and cover-slabs) and technical assistance for the excavation of the pit. 
The project is coordinated at the national level by the technical unit 
of the MLGL. At the district level, a coordinator employed by the 
Council is responsible for coordinating all implementation activities 
between central government and local gov~rnment and in the project· 
villages. Additionally, each village is allocated a coordinator, a 
works foreman and labourers. A health education campaign is to be run 
in parallel for the duration of the project with support from corrmunity· 
hea lth workers. 
Resu lt s to Date: 
It is difficult to compare the achievements of the sanitation project 
with those of the Village Water Supply Programme. While the provision 
of domestic water supply and sanitation ought to be closely linked, in 
reality, the two projects are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different. This is so in a number of respects, ranging from their 
organisational set-up, scales of operation and their chosen parameters· 
of success. Moreover, the rural sanitation project is still in its 
first stages of development while the Vi 11 age Water Supply Programme is 
well established and operating as a priority programme on a nation-wide 
scale. Presently, the sanitation project has only just developed. beyond 
the pi lot project stage and operations are .restricted to just three 
districts. 
Project aChievements measured in terms of total units constructed can be 
presented. However, these figures represent. only one measure of 
success. ESPP operated in 6 villages in two districts. Approximately, 
134 households partiCipated (Du Pradal, 1982). As a result, by the end 
of the project, the proportion of households with latrines had doubled 
from about 15% to about 30%. However, a recent evaluation of the 
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project in Kgatleng district calculated that only 40% of participants 
had completed their latrines and that 60% of units remained incomplete 
or not even started (Land & Raditloanerig, 1985b) (see Table 10). It is 
argued below, however, that these figures are really quite meaningless 
if they are not considered in the context of the wider goals of the 
project. Of greater importance is to examine the extent to which the 
construction and health education programmes have become 
institutionalised at the district and village levels, so that the 
project can become self-perpetuating, and to assess the extent to which 
the latrines that were built are being properly used and maintained by 
their owners. Yet, on the basis of these limited results, government, 
District Councils and donors were confident that the project should be 
extended. From this emerged a revised plan of operations under UNICEF 
sponsorship. 
So far, the extended project which began formally in 1984, following a 
number of delays., has progressed slowly, but there are strong 
indications that the rate of implementation is speeding up. The rate of 
implementation remains a major objective of projects which are funded by 
external donors, on a short-term bas is. In Kweneng di stri ct, it. has 
been estimated that up to 200 households have already signed up for the 
project and most recently, the project has been extended to a further 
two villages. At least a similar number .have already begun constructing 
their latrines in Kgatleng district where the project began at an 
earlier date. According to a progress report (KgDC, 1985), by early 
1985, over 100 units had already. been completed. However, in Southern 
district, a number of institutional teething problems have so far 
de layed the start of the project but it is hoped that the arri va 1 of a 
volunteer should speed developments up. It is probable that the 
government will cooperate with a SIDA-funded environmental health 
project in North-West district, which aims to control the spread of 
Bilharzia through a number of interventions including the construction 
of latrines. 
The total number of latrine units constructed is only one measure of 
project success. This is because the project aims to achieve a number 
of wider goals, which clearly distinguish it from a straight. forward 
physical infrastructure project. In particular, the project has 
focussed on institution-building at the village and community levels and 
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also on the development of a health education progralll11e. It is 
recognised that the benefits of improved environmental health can only 
be ,achieved providing there is succes'sful coordination of these three 
facets of the project. However, these non-visible facets of the project 
take a longer time to develop and cannot be so easily measured in 
quantitative terms - certainly not within a two year time-span. In the 
long-term, their success is of far greater importance than illl11ediate 
achievements in 'latrine construction. However, there seems to be an 
over-powering temptation to concentrate efforts on achieving these 
short-term goals. 
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FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY: 
Fieldwork was carried out in Botswana between August 1984 and July 1985. 
During this period, I was attached to the Applied Research Unit of the 
Mi ni stry of Loca 1 Government and Lands, and was prov ided .with a 
sociologist counterpart to work in connection with the jOint 
government-UNICEF rural self-help sanitation project. During my 
~attachment to the ministry, I prepared two socio-economic .and 
attitudinal reports on the project as an integral part of research for 
this thesis (Land & Raditloaneng, 19B5a, 1985b). Attachment to an 
applied research institute was a condition set by the government of 
Botswana in order to receive research permission. 
OBJECTIVES OF FIELDWORK: 
Information was sought in the field to test how far Botswana's. rural 
water supply and sanitation programmes have adopted the approach to 
delivery recommended by the Decade and to identify constraints in the 
. implementation of policy.· Information on the following subjects was 
gathered: 
the delivery systems used in the two programmes with particular 
reference to the role of central government, local government and 
community institutions in policy formulaton and implementation. 
- the objectives of national and rural development policy and the. 
framework of policy formulation and implementation used. 
- the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of rural society and 
the rural households relevant to the study of community participation 
in the water and sanitation programmes. 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES: 
Fieldwork was based on the use of a number of data collection techniques 
which ranged from the more general ·to the specific and from the 
quantitative to the qualitative, according to the nature of· the 
information sought. At the most general level,. a form of participant 
observation and action research was used to study the implementation of. 
the water and sanitation projects and to study the role of national and 
sub-national institutions and their personnel in rural development. On 
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the basis of this approach, more specific information was obtained 
through the use of more rigorous research techniques based on a 
household questionnaire survey and the interviewing of individuals in 
government and at the village level. The former method was used to 
obtain information about 'village residents and community organisations 
to support the investigation of community participation. The 
information gathered was substantiated through the interviews conducted 
and the consultation of relevant documentary sources. Government 
officers were also interviewed, in order to discuss wider issues 
concerning the formulation and implementation of rural policy. 
, ' 
FIELDWORK AT THE V I LLAGE LEVEL: 
The Household Survey: 
Two surveys were undertaken in association with the government. The 
first was a baseline study for Kweneng district where the project was 
about to be launched. The second was an ,eva luat ion study for Kgat leng 
district where the pilot project had been completed two years earlier. 
Both surveys sought similar information and used comparable 
methodologies, although, one focus sed on the past and the other on the 
future. A random household survey based on a questionnaire-interview 
system was used to seek information on the following subjects: 
- socio-economic household data. 
- socio-cultural data on household water and sanitation practices. 
- the capacity and willingness of households to participate in the 
sanitation project. 
- hous'ehold attitudes towards community participation and attitude to 
the use of extension workers. 
The purpose of conducting a household survey was to obtain information 
concerning political, economic and social features of rural society. 
This was sought for two reasons. First, to contribute to an assessment 
of the impact of these different factors on the likely success of the 
sanitation project. Second, to contribute to a~ examination of, 
community participation in 'rural development more generally. 
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The questionnaires used, comprised open-ended and closed questions in, 
order to obtain both factual data and records of subjective attitudes 
and perceptions of the respondents. In this way, it was possible to 
accumulate both qualitative and quantitative data. The questionnaires 
were written in English while Batswana enumerators employed through the 
Applied Research Unit, and all with previous survey work experience, 
administered the questionnaires in Setswana, translating and recording 
the responses back into English (see appendix). 
473 households were interviewed in the Kweneng survey in the four 
project villages:,Molepolole, Thamaga, Mankgodi and Gabane, while in the 
Kgatleng survey, 213 households were interviewed in the three 'project 
villages: Olifants Drift, Artesia and Mabalane (see Maps 3 & 4). A 
random sample was chosen from each village. Aerial photographs were 
,used to identify individual household plots which were used as the 
sample units. The sample was drawn by numbering the households and 
drawing lots. 
A degree of bi as was i nt roduced into each survey. I n the Kweneng , 
survey, the sample in each village was stratified. In order to ensure 
that both old and new areas of settlement were assured of 
'representation, the sampling frame was divided sectorally. A 10% sample 
was then selected from each sector. In the Kgatleng survey, where it, 
was possible' to undertake a more comprehensive sample owing to the small 
size of the villages, the sample was divided into three socio-economic 
categories: project participants, of which 54%'were sampled, households 
which already owned latrines, of which 53% were sampled and households 
which had not participated and which did not have latrines, of which 56% 
were sampled. Data collection took seven weeks to' complete in Kweneng 
district and four weeks in Kgatleng district. 
Informal Interviews and Participant Observation: 
The household surveys were complemented by informal interviews with key 
individuals and participant observation in the project villages. These 
methods of data collection provided qua,litative data which, could be 
compared with the data obtained from the household surveys. In each 
project vi llage, the author conducted informal i ntervi ews with members 
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of the tribal authority,'modern village institutions and the extension 
team. Discussion focussed both on the specific sanitation' project and 
more generally 'on community participation and extension at the village 
level. The author was also able to attend a number of village-based 
work shopsassoci ated with the project, whil e on numerous oceas ions was 
'able to accompany the project team in the implementation of the project 
in both districts. Fi'nally, by living and working in the districts for 
most of the year in Molepolole and Mochudi, the author was able obtain 
the sort of insight into the daily lifestyle of rural Batswana which 
cannot be ellicited from either written material or interviews. 
,Archival Work: 
Reference was made to documented ,research prepared by governmental and 
non-governmental organisations on community participation and on Tswana 
history and culture. 
FIELDWORK AT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS: 
Participant Observation: 
Advantage was taken of the opportunity of'working directly with a 
government ministry and with personnel responsible for the sanitation 
project. At the ministerial level, the author was privy to daily 
di scuss i on and events concerni ng the project and more genera lly with 
daily ministerial business. The author part'icipated in a number of 
meetings'and presentations on the issue of the project. More 
significantly, the author spent considerable time working at the rural 
administration centres in the two districts where accomodation and, 
office space were provided. It was, therefore, possible to become 
familiar with District Council and District Administration functions, as 
well as to attend meetings and accompany the project team in field 
implementation. 
Informal Interviews: 
Attached to the government, the author was able to organise informal 
'interviews with a range of government officers at the central and local 
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levels to discuss both the projects and more generally wider issues 
relevant to rural development and policy formulation and implementation. 
Documentary Evidence: 
Governmental and non-governmental reports available within government 
and in the national archives were used to complement and substantiate 
information obtained through other data collection techniques. 
DISCUSSION: 
The undertaking of socio-economic and related survey work has become an 
·increasingly important and essential part of social planning (Conyers, 
1982) and is recognised to represent a crucial part of work associated 
with the Decade (Perrett & Lethem, 1980; Simpson-Herbert, 1983) .. With 
regard to the Decade, the collection of a wide range of "socio-cultural" 
and "human factor" data is required in order to ensure that the 
objective of providing affordable, socially acceptable and technically 
appropriate systems is possible. It is also necessary to obtain 
information in order to plan and evaluate project delivery and to 
identify the most suitable institutions and personnel to work through 
(Cairncross, 1980; Simpson-Herbert, 1983; WHO, 1984) .. It is,. therefore, 
common to find social survey work accompanying Decade projects. 
Usually, baseline, monitoring and evaluation studies are undertaken in 
th i s respect. 
Reports prepared by UNDP and WHO, such as that of Simpson-Herbert (1983) 
have provided recommendations for the type o( data that should be sought 
and of suitable data collection techniques that should be used. and 
discuss the possible constraints to data collection that can be 
encountered in the field. The issues raised can be compared to those· 
.raised in discussion, more generally, on the constraints to survey work 
in the Third World and especially in rural areas (Casley & Lury, 1981; 
Peil et al, 1982). Attention is drawn to the fact that data is far less 
accessible and reliable in these circumstances and that, therefore, it 
is all the more important to use a research methodology which is 
flexible to accomodate potential constraints and which does not rely 
unduly on any single· technique. The use of a variety of techniques is 
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recommended in order to reduce the risk of inaccuracy and 
misrepresentation and at the same time in order to obtain a range of 
qualitative and quantitative information. With respect to the Decade, 
emphasis has been placed on the use of four methods: participant 
observation, case studies, key informant interviews and household 
interviews (Simpson-Herbert, 1983). No single method in itself is 
adequate. Full benefits can only accrue through the complementary.use 
of the different techniques. 
Particular attention has been drawn to the constraints involved in 
undertaking purposive village surveys based upon household interviews 
and questionnaires. The collection of quantifiable data in order to 
carry out statistical analysis as the basis for making generalisations 
and inferences, depends all the more on access to reliable and complete 
data. Results may, therefore, prove inaccurate or misleading if the 
data source is not satisfactory. Where the collection of statistically 
testable data is required, great care must be taken to ensure that risks 
are minimised and that the data obtained and results inferred are 
treated with caution. The major constraints to the collection of 
quantifiable data are as follows: 
- An inaccurate sampling frame which does not provide a correct 
representation of the sample population on which to base the random 
sample. 
The difficulty in identifying an appropriate sampling unit. This in 
particular concerns the definition of the household. 
- Poorly constructed questionniares which are too long, jargonistic, 
provide leading· questions or are insensitive to culture and to taboo 
subjects. 
- Enumerators who interpret and translate information incorrectly or who 
resort to the practice of filling out questionnaires while sitting 
under a tree. 
- Respondents who p.rovide inaccurate information or who answer what they 
believe the interviewer wants to hear. 
- The watering down of crude data during the process of data coding and 
interpretation. 
- The disproportionate amount of time that must be spent .designing and 
testing the method, and on processing the data. 
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Ideally, it is recommended that such techniques are complemented by 
other techniques which provide less quantitative, but mor.e qualitative 
information which can be used to substantiate or test quantified data. 
These include case studies which provide in-depth information on a 
number·of perhaps non-randomly selected households, the interviewing of 
key informants who can provide detailed and verifiable insights into 
particular issues and local conditions which might not otherwise be 
available and participant observation which provides the opportunity for 
witnessing society in action over a more extensive period of time. 
These techniques can all provide detai led and reveal ing qual itative 
information which the formal survey can normally only scan, or in fact 
misrepresent. The information is, therefore, highly qualitative; It is 
even suggested that where resources and time are restricted, that the 
formal random survey should not be employed and that under the 
circumstances, more meaningful results could be obtained by USing such 
alternative techniques (Casley & Lury, 1981, 1982; Peil et al, 1982). 
At the same time, it cannot be used for statistical purposes nor·for 
forming generalisations because the data is ne.ither wholly 
representative of a population nor collected objectively ·(Peil, 1982). 
As such these techniques cannot provide quantitative data even if the 
actual quality of data and understanding provided 
substantial than that based on the formal survey. 
was ,therefore, infl uenced by the recommendati ons 
is in fact more 
Fieldwork in Botswana 
provided by the Decade 
and by specific discussions of sociar science research methodology in 
the Third world~ but also was influenced by the specific circumstances 
which were encountered in the field . 
. . Practical Evaluation of Fieldwork: 
A random household survey was used to investigate community 
participation in rural development. Problems associated with the design 
and implementation of the· survey were experienced although their effect 
was reduced owing to the support provided by the ministry (see below). 
It is appropriate to consider some of the problems experienced. 
The Choice of Sampling Frame. 
While local government registers and national census data are relatively 
accessible and recent, information about particular villages is less 
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complete. For the purposes of choosing a village _sample, tabulated data 
is unsuitable for identifying the precise number of residing households 
at anyone time, or for locating those households on the ground. Aerial 
photographs_ were, therefore, used as the best available means of 
locating village boundaries and individual compounds. The use of aerial 
photos also presents problems. A complementary ground survey is 
essential prior to choosing the sample to-ensure that identified plots 
still exist and are actually occupied. With sometimes a frequent turn 
over of whole households or of their occupancy within and between 
settlements, even quite ·recent photographs can become out~dated. 
Account must also -be taken of seasonal variation in occupancy. During 
the wet season, a majority of household members migrate to the lands 
leaving only the old, the young and the infirm who may not be suitable 
for interviewing purposes, or the plot may be abandoned altogether. 
The Choice·of Sampling Unit. 
Difficulties can arise in using the household compound plot as the unit 
of analysis in socio-economic surveys. While there is a close 
relationship between an identifiable compound and a distinct household, 
it is evident that the networks charcteristic of the extended family 
reach beyond a particular compound. Members of a household who might 
provide financial and social contributions to it, may be resident in 
another part of the village or in another settlement altogether. By 
differentiating between individual plots, there is the risk of 
overlooking important networks of social interaction between and within 
households which are fundamental to the socio-economic and political 
status of the household.· It is only through the use of case study or 
participant observation techniques that it is possible to identify the 
. existence and relative importance of such networks. 
The Survey Schedule. 
The formal questionnaire is not well suited to obtaining detailed and 
verifiable information about individual households. The quality of the 
information obtained depends on the questions asked, the quality of the. 
enumerator and the attitude of the respondent. While straight forward 
factual data can be more easily obtained, attitudinal information can be 
misrepresented through the manner in which questions are interpreted and 
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reinterpreted by the enumerator, the respondent and the data analyst. 
Questions must be addressed which do not offend or mislead the 
respondent - this is particularly important in relation to taboo 
subjects such as personal hygiene and personal wealth. Sensitivity to 
these issues is difficult for the researcher who is unfamiliar with 
local language and custom. 
Interviews of Key Individuals and Participant-Observation. 
Given the limitations of the survey technique, a major part of fieldwork 
was based on conducting interviews with key individuals and on 
part icipant-observat ion. 
Informal interviews proved indispensible for the purposes of clarifying, 
substantiating or rejecting information gathered from the household 
surveys and from documentary sources. Yet, for an ·i ntervi ew to prov ide 
useful information, a number of issues must be considered. Obtaining 
desired -information and cooperation depends on the approach used by the 
researcher. It is too easy to fall into the use of jargon or to presume 
that the interviewee is fami liar or at all sympathetic to ones 1 ine of 
research. Therefore, questions must be simple and direct and presented 
in as objective a· manner as possible to avoid the-risk of offending or 
of appearing to accuse the respondent. However, the initial problem to 
surmount, is to locate suitable people to interview and to convince them 
that it is worth their while to cooperate. Finding the right people can 
be a particular problem in remote rural areas. Poor communications and 
misunderstanding can account for many wasted trips to cancelled 
meetings. Convincing people to cooperate is more of aproblelTl in 
government circles where time is at more of a premium, or, at least, is 
made to appear· so. 
Participant-observation was employed in a multi-dimensional sense to 
study the implementation of the sanitation project and rural development 
more generally: As a partiCipant in the project, albeit on the 
/' peri phery, thi s form of observat ion· represented action research •. 
. . / 
Investigation focussed on investigating implementation at· the central 
government, local governmment and the community leve 1 s. The opportunity 
of working with a project and of.being,able to·move between.the 
government and community levels was used as the basis for examining the 
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translation of prescription into action. Direct involvement yielded a 
breadth and depth of insight which would have been unobtainable as an 
external observer relying solely on"indirect methods of data collection. 
However, this form of action research can be criticised for yielding 
undefinable and biased information. It is possible that the researcher" 
loses objectivity by becoming too involved in the immediate needs of the 
project. It is strong ly argued here that such parti ci pat i on provi ded 
the sole of means of evaluating the interpretation of theory into 
practice - of examining the principles of the Decade in action in a 
specific country. Within this context, it was appropriate to cond"uct 
household surveys to obtain more detailed information about field 
implementaton. 
Practical Constraints. 
Beyond the problems associated with the design of a suitable research 
methodology, the expatriate post-graduate researcher can expect to 
encounter a number of not "insignificant practical constraints which can 
limit the scope of anticipated research. 
Constraints in particular concern one's status as a researcher and one's 
status as an expatriate. Regarding the former, the researcher who 
arri ves with no formal attachment to a recogni sed government or 
non-government organisation"faces serious problems in trying to 
undertake research. Problems can range from obtaining permission to 
undertake research to obtaining the" elementary supports for fieldwork 
such as accomodation, transport, cooking "facilities and access "to 
translators and enumerators. In all 1 ikel"ihood, the researcher is 
unfami 1 i ar with on-goi ng research and cannot eas ily ascertai n how" 
relevant or indeed desirable the intended research is to the host 
government. Regarding the latter status, the expatriate arrives in a 
new country, unfamiliar with language, customs and culture, and is bound 
to have to spend time becoming aquainted with the new environment, as is 
indeed standard practice with most newly arrived expatriates. Personal 
affairs and administration can become complicated and time-consuming. 
This is certainly the case with regard" to obtaining a residence permit 
and access to banking and medical facilities too. 
= 
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These constraints are all the more ·apparent when research is conducted 
in remoter rural areas. Yet, they are in all cases. particularly serious 
for the researcher who has limited financial resources and time. The 
maximum period of time which can be realistically spent overseas is one 
year. While this should be quite adequate under normal circumstances, 
one must recongise the constraints noted above which can reduce the 
effective time spent doing research. Furthermore, there is little 
opportunity to undertake a preliminary visit, nor to organise a 
subsequent return visit so that everything must be planned, organised 
and completed during the one visit. 
One must, therefore, consider what the researcher can be expected to 
achieve in a year .. It is strongly argued that the attachment of the 
author to a government ministry was an indispensible asset which limited 
the effects of the constraints noted above and ensured that effective 
research could be undertaken. While some disadvantages were experienced 
as a result of this attachment, it is conclu.ded that these were far 
out-weighed by the advantages enjoyed .. The major disadvantages and 
advantages are summarised here. 
- The disadvantages -
Attachment to the ministry and working in association with a counterpart 
demanded a degree of accountability to the government and the project 
team to ensure the completion of survey work. While this did not 
interfere with my own priorities, a considerable amount of time was 
dedicated to survey work while it is also recognised that the household 
survey technique.might not have been used if it had riot been required by 
the government. Furthermore, the· surveyed districts and villages were 
determined by the government in connection with the needs of the 
project.· Yet since this was the subject of analySis in any case, this 
bunt-in bias was of less importance, whne I was assured of complete 
freedom· in the organisation of the questions.and issues that I 
addressed. Finally, it might be· argued that my attachment to government 
took away from the status of an unattached researcher and that this may 
have affected the attitude of respondents in answering questions. At 
the same time, it is suggested that as an overseas European researcher, 
I was immediately associated with government officialdom by rural 
residents. 
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- The Advantages -
The most important benefit was the opportunity provided to be a 
participant observer of government and non-government institutions in 
the implementation of the projects which was central to the research and 
which could not have been possible otherwise. The attachment to the 
ministry also provided ease of access to government personnel and 
documentation for consultation, which again would have been difficult to 
organise as a wholly independent researcher. As a member of the project 
team, it was possible to organise informal interviews with key 
informants at all levels. Participant observation and informal 
interviewing provided valuable qualitative information which. has been 
used as the basis for chapters 5 and 6. 
The government .also provided the essential logistic, manpower and 
fi nanc i a 1 support necessary to undertake househo 1 d surveys in rura 1 
areas. The ministry provided transport, bicycles, accommodation, 
cooking facilities, enumerators, typing and printing facilities, 
stationary, maps and photos. These would have been·far less readily 
available without governmental support and it is certain that survey 
work would have proved. to be less comprehensive and successful. 
Furthermore, as a member of the project, it was possible to arrange 
meet i ngs with .vi 11 age key informants as we 11 as to recei ve the 
permission of the·village headmen to interview households. This 
permission may well have been refused, or my presence treated with 
suspicion if I had arrived as an independent researcher. The status of 
a government researcher could, therefore, be used as a platform for. 
undertaking my own research. 
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THE VILLAGE WATER SUPPLY PROGRAMME - POLICY FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION 
AND OPERATION/MAINTENANCE: 
This section .examines the delivery system and·associated institutional 
structure of the Village Water Supply Programme (VWSP). First, the 
institutional structure of the programme is described. The relative 
influence exerted by central government, local government and community 
institutions in policy formulation, implementation and 
operation/maintenance is evaluated. Second, explanations are provided· 
why a top-down framework has been used at a time when the provision of 
rural water supplies is being promoted on the basis of community 
participation and self-help, by the international aid community. 
The distinctive feature of the Village Water Supply Programme is that 
policy formulation and implementation is dominated by central 
government. More recently, local government has been provided the scope 
to influence the operation and maintenance of instal·led systems. By 
contrast, the community has remained a passive recipient playing no part 
in project delivery, and is not even required to pay user charges (see 
Fig 3). The programme is distinctly top-down .. This can be contrasted 
to the bottom-up characteristics of the rural sanitation project. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: 
Policy Formulation: 
Within the broad framework of water resource policy set out by 
government, guidelines for the provision. of rural water supplies are 
prepared for the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs 
(MMRWA) . 
At the broadest level, central government determines the capital and 
recurrent budget allocations that are deemed appropriate for the rural 
sector and determines the means by which rural supplies are to be 
provided. The details of this strategy are negotiated prinCipally 
between the MMRWA, the MLGL and the MFDP. However, central government 
decision-making is influenced by two other sources. First, by the 
District Councils through. their District Development Plans (see ch 7). 
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Second, and more importantly, by SIDA, the major external donor which 
has been closely associated with the VWSP since its inception in 1972. 
In view of the significant capital and technical support it has 
provided, SIOA is in a strong position to influence broad policy making 
at the highest level. The role of SIDA in the VWSP merits further 
discussion. 
The Role of SIDA; 
SIDA has been actively involved in supporting the provision of domestic 
water supplies in developing nations since the mid-1960's. It has been 
primarily concerned with improving the use of water, increasing the 
supply of water and improving sanitation (SIDA, 1984). It has targetted 
its support to rural areas through assistance at both the national and 
!"egional levels. Support is based on three activities; the construction 
of infrastructure, the provision of training for operation and 
maintenance, and the encouragement of inter-sectoral cooperation. To 
date, 80tswana is in receipt of SIDA's third largest aid programme, 
after Tanzania and Kenya (SIDA, 1984). Since 1972, SIDA has played an 
influential role in the design, implementation, and supervision of the 
VWSP, in both financial and manpower terms. According to Agrell et al 
(1984), SIDA has provided up to 72% of the total capital costs of the 
programme, with the remaining 18% of the investment programme being 
provided by government's own Domestic Development Fund. The level of 
this contribution, however, ·has varied from year to year. For the 
financial year 1981/82, for example, S-IDA only provided 50% of the total 
budget, but this figure does not take account of the provision of 
further funds for- setting up the Council Water Maintenance Units (see 
below). 
While financial support from SIDA is provided in grant form, it is tied 
to the procurement of Swedish goods. Moreover, SIDA prohibits the 
purchase of materials from South Africa, irrespective of the economic 
_ advantages that could be gained. Support from SIDA has been directed to 
three areas. First, to the VWSP, coordinated through the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources & Water Affairs (MMRWA), second, to the-support of 
operation, maintenance and rehabilitation activities: at the district 
level, through the Ministry of Local Government & Lands (MLGL), and 
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third, and most recently, to a health education and sanitation project 
through the Ministry of Health (MoH) (SIDA, 1985). 
Fifteen years after the inception of the VWSP, a well established 
planning and implementation delivery system has been created, although 
the design and installation capacity of the ministry could well be 
strengthened, according to a ministry planner. A standardised delivery 
system has been established. Few changes have had to be made to broad 
-
policy guidelines, although procedures are constantly reviewed by 
central government in association with SIDA. Negotiations for capital 
funds are carried out between the implementing ministry - MMRWA, the 
MFDP and SIDA. Capital fund allocations are calculated according to 
existing and forecasted implementation capacity at both the centra'l 
government and local government levels. More recently, in an attempt to 
speed up the rate of implementation, dri 11 ing contracts have been 
awarded to the private sector to make up for government's limited 
drilling capacity. In 1985/6',for example, 34% of drilling was 
undertaken by private contractors (SIDA/GOB, 1985). 
The allocation of resources between the nine districts is determined 'by 
the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), within the MMRWA, which is 
responsible for the design and installation of supply systems. 
Allocations are based on consultation with the MLGL, who consult the 
individual district water sector forecasts submitted as part of the 
District Development Plans by the District Councils. The DWA must also 
decide on how best to distribute resources between a number of 
activities linked to the VW5P. These include installation of new 
systems, rehabilitation of existing systems and the provision of 
emergency relief to drought-striken areas. Therefore, the department 
must be sensitive to the political preferences of the day. 
Policy Implementation: 
Policy implementation is undertaken by central government with little 
assistance from either local government or the recipient community. 
Installation is the responsibility of the DWA/MMRWA. It installes the 
boreholes which supply the system. A number of test drills are made in 
suitable locations in proximity to the village by the drilling team. 
Once a suitable borehole is identified, it is equipped with a pump and 
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pump motor. A.suitable borehole must provide an adequate yield to 
satisfy present and projected demand, and must be potable. In this 
respect, water chemists from the DWA are brought on site to conduct 
tests on bacteriological and chemical levels. The borehole is then 
connected to a storage tank of.standard specification. According to the 
size of the village, the system is reticulated to a number of 
standpipes. The community assists the DWA by digging the trenches which 
carry the pipes. Once the reticulation system has been installed and 
tested, it is handed over to the District Council for operation and 
maintenance, with the exception of the major village supplies which are 
operated and maintained by DWA staff. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: 
Currently, local government makes no contribution to the implementation 
of the programme and, therefore, is not directly involved in policy 
formulatio-n. However, it ·is likely that this state of affairs will 
change in the near future. Increasingly, government is concerned to 
improve the operation and maintenance of existing systems and has 
recommended that the District CounCils be made responsible for this 
activity. As their role in this domain increases, it is probable that 
they will be invited to make a more substantial contribution to both 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Policy Formulation: 
The allocation of VWSP ·resources to individual districts is outlined in 
annual plans based on estimates set out in the National Development 
Plan. These estimates are based on forecasts provided by each district 
in their respective District Development Plans (DDP) (see ch 7). 
Forecasts are channelled through the DDP because the programme 
represents a nationwide sectoral investment programme, undertaken by a 
line ministry which receives an annual capital and recurrent fund 
allocation. Each District Council is, therefore, expected to prepare a 
plan of action for the water sector based on an evaluation of existing 
facilities and future water needs in the district. It must note the 
number and type of settlements which. still require servicing, or which 
may be entitled to provision, in the future, under the terms of the 
programme. Based on this assessment, it must provide a list of villages 
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which it considers ought to be included in the programme under the 
current plan period. The criteria used by the Council to choose 
appropriate settlements vary according to individual districts but are 
bound by general guidelines provided by central government (see Fig 4). 
Once the Council has prepared a list of priority villages, it is 
submitted to the Oistrict Development Plan and time-tabled in the Annual 
Plan. These plans are forwarded to the MLGL and the DWA who negotiate 
the final choice of 20 or so villages which will be serviced in the 
Annual Plan period, across the nine districts. 
Local government intervention.in policy formulation is limited to 
influencing the level of resource allocation within a given plan period. 
This is achieved through the district planning process. Little else cari 
be achieved in policy formulation. Local government does not directly 
influence broader policy making, regarding the setting of policy 
objectives and the design of an implementation framework. The extent to 
which it can influence the resource allocation process is, however, 
constrained by two major factors: 
- the fact that it is not responsible for policy implementation (it 
does not even handle the funds). 
the fact that its influence depends on government paying serious 
attention to the recommendations contained in the District 
Development Plans (see ch 7). 
Operation and Maintenance: 
Recently, local government has been assigned the responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of installed systems, except in the major 
villages where the systems continue to be serviced by the DWA. A 
greater degree of cooperation between central and local government has, 
therefore, become necessary in policy formulation so as to ensure that 
the rate of system installation does not exceed the operation and 
maintenance capacity of the District Councils. 
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Criteria set by Government/SIDA: 
- Settlement characteristics; 
population si::'? &: deilsit~', remoterro?ss, d'?g:-ee of p€'rma.n~ncy <actual or 
anticipated). 
- Existence of basic amenities; 
a village applying for a system must ha'H an e·"isting or planned 
heal th post and p,·irr,arr school. 
- Service hierarchy; 
The qual ity of service provided is determined b, settlement 
characteristics and its role within a settlement hierarchy and/or 
rural development programme (see fig 2). 
- Felt Needs; 
Application fer participation must originate within the community 
itself. There must, therefore, be ev idence of a 'fel t need'. 
Criteria set by the District Councils: 
- Councils will only consider settlements·which have made a formal 
appl ication through the appropriate local. gO'lernment channels. 
- Resources may be divided between the provision of new supplies and the 
rehabilitation/exte"sion of existing supplies. The choice of 
allocation is mcre relevant in the smaller dis'ricts where most of the 
major settlements have been suppl ied. This choice is influenced by 
the following con,~ido?rations; 
- the need for emergency action to prouid. water to drought-stricKen 
area.s. 
- the need to con.ider the Council's capacity to operate and .maintain 
existing systems, frem a manpower, finance and logistics point of 
view. This ma! affe-ct the rate of imp1ementation. 
- the need to consider the implementation capaei ty of the DWA 
and the cost of providing the service to remote settlements. 
Influence of Community ConSUltation: 
A settlement can onr,; be considered for inclusion in the programme if it 
submits an application to the Council. HQI.\ler.!er, l,oJater supply is 
genlrally identified as the first priorit;, of all communities and 
inclusion in the pro~ramrTre is sought b:, e-rJl?ryone. Consultation, 
thereforo?, s~rves t·~ confirm I.lIhat is alr'ea.d~,' Knol,lIn. At the same time, 
the Councils are (il,\lare that 'lJater prcll)ision is a sensitil)e politica; 
issue '''hieh must be addr.essed sniousl;; and that, therefore, there is an 
imperati',e for Coun:;ls to satisf;, demand as rapidly as possible. 
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In 1980, SIDA and GOB set up a programme to provide the districts with 
financial and manpower resources to support the establishment of water 
maintenanc"e units (WMU's) (Endresen et al, 1981). These funds are 
provided through the MLGL, by SIDA. For the time being, the programme 
is coordinated by an expatriate water technician working within MLGL 
(SIDA/GOB,1982). At the district level, expatriate personnel have also 
been employed to run the new units. At present the units face a number 
of technical problems which have prevented effective operation. These 
problems concern in particular a shortage of trained manpower and 
inadequate transport (GOB, 1985). 
Onte a water supply system has been installed by the DWA, it is handed 
over to the relevant District Council. It is then under statutory 
obligation to operate and maintain the system through the WMU's. 
Councils are responsible for the employment and training of pump 
operators, to be assigned to individual villages, the distribution of 
fuel for running the diesel pumps and the undertaking of routine and 
emergency maintenance tasks. These units are also responsible for 
rehabilitating existing systems and for installing private connections 
(SIDA/G08, 1982). 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: 
The outstanding feature of the VWSP is the extent to which community 
participation is absent from policy formulation, implementation and even 
operation and maintenance. This is so, even though the VWSP is a 
community-based service, often serving remote and scattered rural 
settlements. The limited part played by the community in the provision 
of this service can be contrasted with the central part played by the 
community in the sanitation project. 
Policy Formulation: 
Community participation in policy formulation is particularly absent. 
The community plays no part in policy design at all, neither in relation 
to decision-making within the broad framework of the programme, nor in 
relation to the design and implementation of field operations. It 
provides, for example, no input into the choice of technology that is 
used. Absence from participation in decision-making reflects the fact 
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that the community is not involved in the installation 'process. The role 
of the community in policy formulation is, therefore, restricted to two 
areas. 
First, the community can in theory influence the process of resource 
allocation. In this respect, the community is responsible for lobbying 
its interest in taking part in the programme. This point is raised 
above in,relation to the part played by local government in preparing a 
list of priority villages. The community is supposed to express its 
interest during the consultation stage of the district planning process 
(see ch 7). In drawing up its list of priority villages for the' 
programme, the District Council is then expected to consider the 
applications that have made by individual communities for inclusion in, 
the programme. Yet, submission of an application represents only one 
factor which can influence resource allocation. 
Second, should a particular settlement be included within the 
programme's implementation schedule, it then has a limited opportunity 
to influence the design of the water, supply system. A meeting is 
convened at the Kgotla to officially inform the headman and community, 
that the village has been included in the current programme. The 
opportunity is taken to seek the approval of all interests within the 
village and, in particular, of the tribal authorities. At a later 
stage, a further meeting is arranged to discuss the design and 
installation of the system. At this stage, the community may suggest 
where the standpipes ought to be installed. A representative from the 
DWA is present to discuss the preferred location of the standpipes 
(Coppermann, 1978). This is the only stage during which the reCipient 
community can influence policy formulation in a tangible way. 
Otherwise, planning remains top-down (Coppermann, 1978). 
Policy Implementation, Operation & Maintenance: 
Community partiCipation in policy implementation is equally restricted. 
Neither individual households, nor the community at large is called to 
make a self-help contribution, either'in terms of providing direct 
labour, materials or providing a cash contribution. The VWSP is fully 
subsidised by government. Even user tariffs imposed originally on 
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consumers to support running costs have been abandoned. The community 
is,'therefore, a passive but satisfied recipient which perceives the 
provision of water as one of several government services such as primary 
schools and health facilties, to which it is entitled. 
Participation is restricted to the excavation of trenches for laying the 
water reticulation pipes. Use of village labour serves to provide cheap 
labour on the spot. However, strictly speaking, this does not count as 
community participation as the workforce is employed and paid as casual 
labour, even though it might be the VDC which chooses the labourers 
(Coppermann, 1978). This represents the full extent of participation in 
the Implementation stage of the programme. VDCs are, however, 
encouraged to undertake additional work to the water supply facility 
such as to erect fences around standpipes and the pump house to 
damage and fouling by livestock and children (SIDA/GOB, 1982). 
activities do call for a small self-help contribution from the 
community. 
prevent 
Such 
The community is also excluded from direct involvement in the operation 
and maintenance of the system. Each supply requires a trained operator 
to take charge of the day to, day runni ng of the system and to undertake 
basic preventative maintenance. This includes, maintenance of the 
diesel-powered pump, ordering of fuel, daily checks to standpipes and 
taps, and observation of the pumping,timetable. The operator is, 
however, a local government employee who is not necessarily a resident 
of the village in which he works (Coppermann, 1978).' Candidates for the 
post of 'pump operator are allocated to newly installed systems after 
receiving a short training course. Major repairs are undertaken by the' 
Council's WMU's. The community itself is not able to carry out routine 
repairs and servicing. It must rely on the Council employed pump 
operator, or indeed the WMU, in the case of a major breakdown or if fuel 
supplies run out. However, many villages are located uP.to 200km away 
from the WMU along poor quality tracks. 
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FACTORS DETERMINING THE VWSP DELIVERY SYSTEM: 
The Vi 11 age Water Supply Programme has been primarily concerned to 
install water supply systems in as many villages as possible, as quickly 
as possible. By contrast; far less attention has been paid to the 
issues of operation and maintenance and of providing a complementary 
health education programme. More recently, these issues have received 
_greater attention, as policy objectives have evolved. Yet, as a result 
of the emphasis given to the installation of infrastructure, the 
prograrrme has become organised in a top-down fashion, dependent on 
capital-intensive methods and a skilled and centralised management and 
labour force. Little scope has been given to either local government or 
corrmunity participation in any stage of the prograrrme. The 
characteristics of the programme may be contrasted to examples of rural 
water supply projects undertaken in other parts of Africa and as 
advocated by the Decade. It is likely, however, that in the foreseeable 
future, the institutional structure of the programme will change as 
policy objectives are revised. 
In accounting for the top-down approach to delivery in-this programme, 
features of Botswana's political economy and environment must be 
examined. Such contextual factors can explain why the VWSP is so very 
different to projects found in other parts of Africa and to the 
recorrmendations that have been proposed by the Decade. They can explain 
why a top-down approach has been used at a time when bottom-up 
approaches are being advocated. The following factors are considered to 
have most directly influenced the design of project delivery (see Fig -
5) . 
1. Politico-economic factors: 
the status of water as a valuable but scarce resource in Botswana. 
The timing of the programme in relation to government's rural 
development -strategy during the 1970s, characterised by a high level 
of state intervention and a bias towards social infrastructure 
proviSion. 
The centralisation of rural policy formulation and implementation 
away from local government and corrmunity institutions during this 
period. 
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the technical and financial input that has been provided by the 
donor community. 
2. Environmental factors: 
the geographical scarcity and geological distribution of water and 
the implications that this has had on the type of technology required 
to exploit reserves. 
Politico-economic factors: 
The Status.of Water: 
Ensuring access to water has always been a pre-occupation of the 
Batswana. Water' is a scarce resource in a marginal environment where 
drought conditions are close to endemic. Access to reliable and 
convenient sources of water is critical for the survival of both the 
human and livestock populations, and for food production. This fact was 
recognised by the colonial administration.which invested heavily in 
water provision as a means of supporting the development of the 
livestock sector (Roe, 1980). The organisation of traditional Tswana 
society was structured to co-exist within this harsh environment. This 
was, for example, reflected in patterns of settlement and in laws 
pertaining to the ownership and use of water. Permanent villages were 
located close to reliable sources of water, while livestock was grazed 
away in the bush and trekked between available water sources (Schapera, 
1970). Often settlement at the 'lands' was restricted because of 
inadequate supplies of water especially during the dry season. Water 
sources were, therefore, cherished by their owners and jealously 
guarded. Access to water was a pre-condition for exploiting grazing 
land and so in.turn of raising livestock as the basis of the subsistence 
economy. 
At.the village level, the tribal headman was responsible for managing 
water resources. In particular, he was responsi~le for the allocation 
of water sources between households and of settling disputes between 
rival claimants over a source. He, furthermore, had the esteemed 
responsibility for ensuring that the rains would fall during the wet 
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season (Schapera, 1970, 1980). For the Batswana, therefore, water was 
perceived to be the crucial factor to ensuring their livelihood and 
survival; In contemporary Botswana, the central ity of water to national 
development is only too apparent and has been highlighted by the 
persistent recurrence of drought, most recently in the 1980-85 period. 
It is recognised that ensuring access to water is the key to achieving 
development and prosperity. It may be noted that the Setswana word for 
rain, "Pula", has been used for the national currency, and also serves 
as the national slogan, to express goodwill and'prosperity. Moreover, 
the importance of water to national survival is symbolised on the 
national flag and coat of arms by a horizontal blue band. 
Against this background, the central state has undertaken to oversee the 
management and distribution of water resources in all sectors of 
society. This is not uncommon in either developed or developing 
countries where ",ler is perceived as a natural resource which must be 
managed by the state as a publ ic asset (Saunders & Warford, 1976). 
However, in poor drought prone nations, this perception is all the'more 
emphasised. In this respect, the modern state has inherited the 
responsibility, previously held by the traditional tribal leaders, to 
ensure that adequate water is available for human, livestock and 
production purposes. However, particular emphasis has been placed on, 
ensuring that the majority of the rural-based population has access to 
free and plentiful water. By contrast, urban consumers must pay a 
tariff while cattle owners are now responsible for providing their own 
supplies. It may be argued then that evidence of state intervention in 
the provision of water supplies confirms.in the minds of the majority of 
peo'ple, the belief that the mO'dern state protects their interests in a· 
way that the, tribal leaders had done previously. As such, state 
provision of water can be'understood to have symbolic conotations. 
Indeed, to shirk responsibility in this domain would undoubtedly 
represent political suicide. Government has, therefore, had to be 
sensitive to the traditional status of water in Tswana society. This 
has been all the more important given that under colonial rule, the 
administration made little effort to develop water resources for human 
consumption in traditional settlements. Government's commitment to 
water provision reflects its awareness of the great importance that both 
the local authorities and the community place on water as the 
'cornerstone of development. It is sensitive to opinions voiced by 
182 
politicians, local government administrators and community 
representatives in relation to water provision at the local government 
1 eve 1 . 
Rural Development and Institution-Building: 
The VWSP has been closely associated with the evolution of government's 
rural development strategy and institution-building programme (see ch 2 
& 3). As a highly political issue, water provision has played an 
important role in spearheading government's rural rural development 
strategy since independence. 
The VWSP, therefore, formed an integral part of the rural investment 
progralllTle undertaken during the 1970's, being included within the 
massive physical and social infrastructure provision programme - the 
Accelerated Rural Development ProgralllTle. In line with government'S 
rural development strategy (GOB, 1972), access to water was seen as a 
prerequisite for investment in directly productive activities in the 
rural sector and essential for making up for the dearth of 
infrastructure which had been inherited at independence. It was, 
moreover, politically expedient, just prior toa general election, for 
·government to be seen to be providing tangible symbols of development to 
, 
the relatively deprived rural areas paid for by the profits of the 
mining and livestock sectors, and by donor financial support (Colclough 
& McCarthy, 1980). 
As a result, in line with most government supported rural infrastructure 
programmes at the time, the VWSP was structured in a top-down fashion 
with emphasis placed on rapid physical implementation over as wide an 
area as possible through central government institutions. From a 
political point of view, such a policy would further highlight 
government's 'caring' image .. From a practical point of view, central 
government was concerned that local government institutions lacked the 
necessary implementation capacity to achieve policy objectives and could 
consequently compromise government'S political aspirations (Chambers, 
1977). Furthermore, there was a growing belief, expressed in particular 
by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, that 
decision-making and implementation oJ rural development activities ought 
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to be firmly re-centralised and that the fledgling District Councils, 
established at independence" be done away with (Picard, 1979). Clearly, 
the political and technical issues are inseparable, as chapter 7 
discusses further. 
Donor Agency Influence: 
Notwithstanding government's clear commitment to providing water on a 
national scale, it must be recognised that this objective has been 
achieved only as a result of the substantial support that has been 
provided by SIDA. It has provided indispensible capital expenditure 
grants and skilled technical manpower. Without SIDA's support, or that 
of another donor, the programme could not have achieved the results to 
date, while it may have been designed to different specifications. It 
is unclear, therefore, the extent to which SIDA, as the principal donor 
involved in the sector, has influenced the form of delivery used. 
Indeed,' SIDA has emphasised its c6mni'tment to investing exclusively in 
the rural sector and for concentrating on domestic rather than on 
production-orientated water supplies. It may be argued that resources 
would not have been forthcoming from SIDA if government had not shared 
the same objectives as the Swedes. 
Environmental Factors: 
The Relationship Between Technology and the Environment: 
The extraction and distribution of water in Botswana's Village Water 
Supply Programme is highly technology dependent. This dependence can be 
attributed to both the objectives of the programme but also the. 
influence exerted by environmental factors. In relation to the former, 
the major objective of the programme has been the rapid installation of 
water supply systems with little attention paid until recently on 
ensuring that a high standard of operation and maintenance of installed 
systems is achieved. While the options, available to government are 
restricted by environmental factors, alternative technology options 
could be developed if the emphasis had been on reducing. costs per capita 
and on improving the standard of operation and maintenance. 
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Emphasis has been placed on using a technology which is highly 
capital-intensive and which depends on the operation of small teams of 
skilled engineers, hydro-geologists and operators. Reliance on this 
. technology option reflects distinct geographical characteristi.cs, 
especially geological and climatic features of Botswana which prohibit 
the exploitation of water resources by alternative, cheaper and less 
highly technology dependent means, which could perhaps. rely more heavily 
. on'community participation. This technology package has demanded an 
organisational framework which is centralised, specialised and well 
coordinated. Only. central government within the public sector has this 
required implementation capacity. Neither the existing local government 
institutions, nor community level institutions are in a position to 
offer these capabilities. Consequently, they have been excluded from 
the design and implementation of the programme. 
The programme depends overwhelmingly on groundwater extraction, as there 
is quite insufficient surface and sub-surface water available in most 
parts of the country. ·Apart from the Okovango, Chobe, Molopo and 
Limpopo rivers, all other rivers are ephemeral. Even such major rivers 
are prone ·to irregular flow and descend across a low gradient. These 
features prohibit the possibility of constructing large dam reservoirs. 
Moreover, reservoirs which do exist must also contend with extremeiy 
high evaporation rates. In the western part of the country, in the 
Kgalagadi desert, even ephemeral rivers are absent, but here, few 
settled communities are found. The only viable alternative source of 
water is the underground aquifer. However, the combination of 
geological features, which preclude the occurance of large aquifers, 
irregular rainfall and extremely high evaporation rates caused by 
persistently high temperatures and often clear skies, means that aquifer 
reserves and their rate of recharge are uncertain (Gould, 1984); In the 
Kgalagadi desert, the sand is so thick that water can never percolate 
down to the underlying bedrock. Nevertheless, because of the general 
absence of adequate surface water sources, as much as 75% of the human 
and cattle population has become wholly or partially dependent on 
groundwater sources (Gould, 1984). 
The Village Water Supply Programme has, therefore, come to rely 
predominantly on seeking supplies from deep aquifers, sometimes as much 
as lOOm below the surface (Gould, 1984). These sources can only be 
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reached by means of powerful drilling rigs. These are both expensive to 
purchase and to maintain. Access to such machinery is beyond the means 
of District Councils which lack the necessary financial and manpower 
resources to support such equipment. Even the DWA has insufficient 
capacity·to fulfil demands for borehole drilling and has had to resort 
to the private sector for assistance. New equipment is normally 
provided in the form of gifts from SIDA. For example, SIDA recently 
provided new trucks for the DWA in order to increase the implementation 
capacity of the department (Daily News, 1985). Reliance on this 
technology, therefore, restricts the capacity of both central government 
and also of ,local government to operate independently of external 
assistance. 
There are other problems facing the use of groundwater sources. There 
is little accurate data available concerning the quantity and age of 
aquifers, and of the rates of recharge if indeed recharge is occuring at 
all. Furthermore, many of the boreholes sunk provide very poor yields. 
The siting of a borehole is something of a costly financial gamble. 
Often several boreholes must be sunk before a suitable source is found.' 
On average, there is a 40% success rate and most villages require 2 
boreholes (Agrell et al, I984). Between 1981 and 1982, for example, 111 
boreholes were sunk as part of the project. Of these, only 49 proved' 
successful, while 52 were dry and 10 were too saline (SI DAjGOB , 1982). 
This success rate diminishes as one progresses into the Kgalagadi where 
often only 30% of boreholes yield potable water (SIDAjGOB, 1983). In 
terms of water quality, a high proportion of boreholes have excessively 
high levels of saline, nitrate and bacteriological content and are, 
therefore, unpotable. Of a sample taken of 248 boreholes in Botswana, 
53% were considered to be unacceptable for human consumption according 
to the 'standards imposed by WHO (Gou ld, 1984). 
For these reasons, this method of water extraction is particularly 
expensive. It has been calculated that the. average cost of drilling, 
equiping, and reticulating a water supply system, is in the order of 
P130,OOO. This can be translated into an average cost per head of P50, 
or of P100 or more in remoter western areas (MLGL, 1983), where one must 
take into account a lower population density, a high remoteness factor 
and the high risk of obtaining blank or contaminated test drills. As a 
result, the costs incurred rise significantly .. 1n the remoter areas. 
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Transport overheads, moreover, absorb an increasing proportion of total 
costs. Therefore, there are distinct economic constraints which 
discourage investment in areas of scattered and remote settlement. 
Increasingly, government is looking for alternative technologies which 
may be appropriate for smaller communities and less onerous to 
government (GOB, 1985). 
The form of technology used for pumping and distributing water also 
demands a level of skill and finance which a community is unable to 
provide. Because of the great depths at which water is abstracted, it 
has been argued that manually-operated pumps are not suitable and that 
motorised alternatives are required. As a result, the VWSP has relied 
on the installation of "Lister" diesel motors. While this engine has 
proven reliability, it depends all the same on external support for 
peri od i c ma i ntenance and the regu 1 ar de 1 i very of fue 1. The techno logy 
is still relatively sophisticated and onerous. Furthermore, the 
borehole itself and the mono-pump are prone to breakdowns as well as 
requiring·periodic cleaning. All these activities require the use of 
specialised tools and replacement parts which are not available to the 
water supply users. 
Against these technological and environmental constraints, it is only 
central government which has the capacity to orchestrate a nationwide 
programme of water provision on the scale required, given policy 
objectives. It is argued that the standardisation of equipment and the 
creation of a top-down implementation framework, has been essential for 
efficiently organising such a technology dependent programme (Agrell et 
al,lg84). 
A further factor which has influenced government's choice of technology 
is the implementation capacity and assets inherited at independence. 
Government has continued to use this capacity,.which was built up during 
the colonial period for livestock watering purposes, but has harnes~ed 
it for supporting its domestic programme. A situation did not arise, as 
has been the case in relation to the sanitation project, in which 
government was forced to design a programme and to set up an 
institutional framework to support it from scratch. 
1 S 7. 
In terms of achieving the goals of the programme, as defined by the 
number of villages served, top-down delivery is highly effective 
providing a widespread and egalitarian distribution of the service 
(Agrell et al, 1984). Variations in the distribution,of water between 
and within districts have been minimised. These are precisely the 
conditions required in order to aChieve the political success that 
government has sought in supporting this visible infrastructure 
programme on a national scale. 
But there have been drawbacks too, some of which have been already. 
mentioned. In particular, there are logistical problems associated with 
an inadequate implementation capacity which is highly centralised. In. 
such a sparsely settled country, with often ve,ry poor communications 
between settlements, provision could be more efficiently organised from 
the district level. However, this is unlikely in the foreseeable future 
gi ven th_e constraints wh i ch face focal government. However, as 
provision in smaller and remoter communities becomes prohibitively' 
'expensive, under existing circumstances, it is likely that resort may be 
made to alternative low technology systems. This could stimulate 
greater partiCipation at the district level and at the·community level 
too. 
A Change of Priority; 
In light of a critical evaluation of programme achievements to, date, 
policy objectives have been revised. The initial emphasis placed on 
physical infrastructure installation has been replaced by a growing 
concern to aChieve higher standards of operation and maintenance, and on 
encouraging the promotion of a complementary health education campaign. 
As a result, as policy objectives have changed, so too has the 
programme I s de 1 ivery system. Increasi ngly, the top-'down approach, 
appropriate for a programme which was only concerned with installation, 
is recognised to be less appropriate for a.programme concerned with 
operation, maintenance and health education. Consequently, greater 
opportunities for involving local government and community institutions 
within the framework of the programme have been provided. In future 
years, it is probable that the programme will come to depend 
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increasingly on bottom-up delivery and thus more closely resemble the 
fe~tures of the SHESP sanitation project. 
The apparent shift in policy objectives can be explained by the 
'following factors. First. it may be argued that the original objectives 
have been sucessfully achieved. While many smaller villages still await 
inclusion in the programme. in general. the VWSP has been spectacularly 
successful in providing safe and reliable water supplies to a large 
number of settlements across the country. From the pOint of view of 
distribution. the programme has achieved the goal of providing 
widespread access to a state service. over a relatively short period of 
time. In so doing. government has also achieved its primary political 
objective. 
Having ach'ieved the quantitative aims of the programme. attention can 
now focus on qualitative issues. concerning the reliability and the 
health benefits of supplies. The problem is that in having focussed 
primarily on the challenge of installation. a technology and 
implementation capacity has been built up which is not conducive either 
to encouragi ng improved standards of operation and mai ntenance. nor of 
health education. which to succeed. mustde'pend on the more thorough use 
of local government and community institutions. However. it is apparent 
that government is more confident. than ten years ago. in the ability of 
district-level institutions to take on a greater responsibility for 
managing rural development programmes. as witnessed by the establishment, 
of the WMU's. 
Second. the clear shift in policy can'be attributed to evidence that 
installed water supply systems have a poor record of operation and 
maintenance (SIDA. 1985). and water hygiene remains poor with 
contamination of water still common. ,These findings point to the fact 
that the installation of infrastructure in itself cannot lead to the 
sorts of improvements to community health that are desired. as has been 
acknowledged ,by government in the most recent NDP (GOB. 1985). Indeed. 
the problems associated with polluted water and regular breakdowns in 
water supply have often received widespread coverage in the national 
press. Constant pressure has been placed on ,government to alleviate 
these problems exacerbated by the continuing drought conditions. 
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Operation and maintenance and to a lesser extent health education have 
become political issues. 
This concern has also been influenced by the emphasis placed by the 
Oecade on. the importance of linking together water supply provision and 
sanitation provision, through health education and community 
participation in the fight against environmental diseases. SIDA has, 
moreover, encouraged greater inter-sectoral cooperation between water 
and sanitation in its revised water sector support programme for 
Botswana (SIDA/GOB, 19B5). The current concern over 
operation/maintenance and health education is discussed in more detail .. 
Improved Operation and Maintenance: 
Presently a large number of installed systems breakdown, run out of fuel 
and are left abandoned sometimes for lengthy periods of time. As a 
result, consumers resort to traditional water sources which may be 
unprotected and distant. Appropriate action cannot be undertaken by the 
pump operator unless the breakdown can be easily repaired. For all 
major repairs and for the supply of fuel, the districts' WMUs are 
required but these are heavily over-burdened. This is more of a problem 
in the remoter villages where the standard of operation and maintenance 
is lower and breakdowns are more frequent. At the same time, they are 
far more inaccessible, neither ·connected by radio phone nor graded 
roads. . 
In order that the village can be self-reliant in terms of operating and 
maintaining the system, and to ensure that breakdowns are less frequent, 
it is necessary to consider alternative appropriate technology options 
for the pumping systems. Indeed research is being conducted on a number 
of solar and wind-powered pumping systems (Gould, 19B4). Moreover, 
breakdowns could be prevented if the community was more directly 
involved in the design and construction of the system. Breakdowns often 
result through careless use by residents who perceive the system as 
belonging to government and, therefore, not their responsibility to look 
after. It is probable that more care would be taken, if the community 
felt that the system belonged to them, rather than to government. This 
will also require an increased role for the community in the operation 
and maintenance of systems. In turn this might call for a 
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reconsideration of technology options, especially as concerns 
appropriate pumping systems. Technology options which could be based on 
greater community involvement and which would be especially suitable for 
smaller and remoter settlements include small dams and haffirs, sand 
river wells and catchment tanks (Gould, 1984). Therefore, there are 
strong reasons from this practical perspective, for increasing community 
participation in both policy formulation and implementation. Efforts 
need-to be made to evaluate how such changes could be worked into the 
existing programme, and to identify the problems which might arise. 
Health Education: 
Research has found that; 
Households measure the benefits of standpipe water in terms of 
improved convenience and reliability, rather than of improved 
health. When systems break down, households will resort to 
traditional sources. In a situation where a standpipe is. located 
further away than a traditional source, use will be made of the 
closer source (Land & Raditloaneng, 1985a). 
Water at the standpipe which is clean becomes contaminated during 
the process of transportation, storage and use in the household. 
Furthermore,inadequate water .is used for cleansing purposes 
by household members, in relation to personal and household 
hygiene (MMRWA, 1985). 
These findings reflect the fact that the VWSP has not included an 
integral health education component to complement the infrastructure 
programme. It has been an engineering, rather than a health and 
education programme. The design of the sanitation project, by contrast, 
reflects awareness of the shortcomings of this approach in terms of 
achieving the long-term goals of the programme. Now, increasing 
attention is being focus sed on qualitative aspects rather than on 
quantitative aspects of the VWSP. In 1984, a Water Hygiene Campaign, 
coordinated by a SIDA consultant was introduced by government. It is 
imperative that this campaign becomes institutionalised and replicable 
in the long-term, as is advocated in relation to the sanitation project. 
It must become part of a broader Primary Health Care programme based at 
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the community level. The full benefits of water and sanitation 
provision can only be achieved through a combined and coordinated health 
education campaign. This suggests that health education for water must 
be modelled on, if not incorporated into the existing health education 
programme which has been developed during the sanitation project. It is 
essential that the community is actively involved in the design and 
implementation of such a scheme and that efforts are made to coordinate 
intervention'by all community groups; the traditional leaders, extension 
workers such as the FWE,and the nursing staff. In so doing, it is vital 
that communities are aware of the link between the provision of improved 
water supplies, and changes in water use and hygiene. This cannot be 
achieved so long as it is felt that standpipe water provides nothing but 
a convenient service; or that it serves as a symbol of development. 
However, so long as the programme maintains' its present top-down status, 
these wider goals will be difficult to achieve. 
While it is recognised that the mobilisation of institutions at the 
community and local government levels is fraught with problems and 
subject to the sorts of constraints which are discussed in relation to 
the sanitation project, it is imperative that the effort is made 
increasingly to disassociate the VWSP from being viewed as a simple 
infrastructure' provision pro~ramme. 
o 
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THE SELF-HELP ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION PROJECT: POLICY FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION: 
This section examines the delivery system of the SHESP project. It 
identifies the role of central government, local government and 
community institutions in policy formulation and implementation (see Fig 
6). Explanations are then provided why a bottom-up delivery system has 
been used to support this project. The project depends on a bottom-up 
delivery system which relies on community participation and local 
government coordination in the 'hardware' and 'software' components of 
the project. At the same time, it depends on financial and technical 
support from central government and the donor community. While, 
therefore, the project shares common long-term objectives with the VW5P, 
the delivery system it uses is very different. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: 
Policy Formulation: 
SHESP owes its existence to the intervention of central government. It 
was instrumental in promoting research into sanitation during the 
1970's. During that period, attention focus sed on developing 
appropriate low-cost sanitation systems in urban site-and-service 
squatter settlements, with support from the international donor 
community and consultants. On the basis of this experience, government 
made a commitment to support a pilot rural-based sanitation project in 
association with an external donor, as a response to evidence of an 
increasing incidence of sanitation-related diseases in rural areas 
especially in the larger villages (Kjoer-Olsen, 1980). The broad 
objectives of· the project and the delivery system to be used were 
selected by government in association with the donor agency on behalf of 
the eventual recipient districts. External expertise has also supported 
government in furthering research into the technical, social and medical 
aspects of providing low-cost sanitation to rural communities, forming . 
part of an international effort in this field (Basaako et ·al, 1983; Van 
Nostrand, 1983). Without the political support provided by central 
government for rural sanitation and its decision to invite outside 
expertise to provide assistance in the design and formulation of a.pilot 
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project, it is unlikely that a district-based project wou'ld have 
emerged. If central government has provided the political impetus, then 
the donor community has made a significant contribution to the design 
and implementation of the project, even if their recommendations have 
had to be modified by government. 
In both the ESPP and SHESP projects, the aid agency has provided crucial 
financial and manpower assistance, without which the project could not 
have materialised. Financial support has been provided in the form of a 
grant by the Netherlands government through UNICEF but covers capital 
costs only. The funds are used to provide essential building materials, 
vehicles, other logistical support and technical assistance. Central 
government must, therefore, providing recurrent expenditure. 
Furthermore, project coordinatiDn has been assigned tD the SeniDr Public 
Health Engineer (SPHE), an expatriate appointee funded by UNDP, in the 
Ministry Df LDcal Government and Lands. 
The design of the pilDt project which has prDvided the blueprint fDr the 
current project was undertaken by the donor agency, USAID, in 
collabDration with the host gDvernment, represented by the SPHE. The 
resulting Project Paper (USAID/GOB, 1979), therefDre, represents a joint 
proposal between government and the donor. GDvernment, for example, 
insisted that the prDject be designed on the basis of community 
self-help. USAID had by contrast suggested that a project team be made 
fully responsible for all construction work assDciated with the project. 
GDvernment was likewise adamant that the prDject be organised and 
financed through existing government structures rather than through 
purpose designed institutions. This point was reinforced when the 
project was extended in 1983, under the sponsorship of UNICEF. 
It also recognised that it would have to coordinate the project and that 
this should be undertaken by the MLGL. This appointment made sense 
since the MLGL is respDnsible for supervising all District Council 
activities and in particular, social infrastructure provision. 
there had been suggestions that,the Ministry of Health would be 
suitable coordinating ministry since health education was a key 
However, 
a more 
, component of the project, or that even the MMRWA, which is responsible 
for providing rural water supplies would be suitable. However, while 
the project would contribute to Primary Health which is the -
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responsibility of the MoH, implementation would be undertaken through 
the District Councils. On this basis, MLGL was best suited to provide 
supervision. 
During 1983/4, the ESPP Plan of Operations was revised with the new 
funding agency, UNICEF. The revised Plan was based upon an evaluation 
of the pilot project, after consultation with MLGL, UNICEF and the 
District Councils, and following interviews with the pilot project 
participants. Under the current project, central government has 
continued to coordinate and monitor the project on a national scale. It 
is responsible for policy concerning manpower, financial and material 
support to the participating districts and for preparing policy for the 
accompanying health 
government provides 
education programme. 
the link between the 
Policy Implementation: 
In this way, 
districts and 
central 
UNICEF. 
The role of central government in project implementation is largely 
supervisory. It provides a channel of communication between the 
individual participating districts and the donor agency while 
coordinating the construction and health.education.programmes. It 
provides essential materials and technical advice, but more cri~ically, 
allocates and audits project funds. It takes major deci si ons ·concerni ng 
implementation timetables, funding allocations and the placing of 
tenders to the private sector for the provision of technical inputs, 
such as the compressor and latrine components. Government also 
coordinates health education activity by providing assistance in the 
design and dissemination of health education materials, in association 
with other ministries, especially the MoH. This component of the 
project, likewise, depends on cooperation at several levels, but in 
particular, requires a greater degree of horizontal cooperation between 
sectors. Again, the role of the ministry is largely supervisory. It is 
supposed to provide technical and administrative support for .the health 
education programme and to establish links between relevant ministries. 
MLGL has established links with the Ministry of Education's Health 
Education Unit, which has been involved in providing multi-media 
education materials, with the MoE's Non-Formal Education department, 
which has given advice on methods of communication, and the MMRWA, which 
is currently undertaking a water hygiene campaign. 
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The government has also prepared a number of social impact studies to. 
accompany the project through the Appl ied Research Unit of the MLGL •. 
The most important individual in the project is the SPHE. He is 
accountable to both the minister of local government and the donor 
agency. As national coordinator, he provides technical assistance 
whilst ensuring that correct procedures for implementation and 
disbursement of funds are followed. Furthermore, he coordinates 
project-related affairs with other ministries. He·represents the 
project, for example, on the Inter-Ministerial Action Group for 
Sanitation. This group normally meets on a quarterly basis and is 
represented by the MLGL, MOH, MMRWA, and MOE. Under the present 
UNICEF-supported project, direct ministerial intervention has increased 
following a decision to channel funds and assistance through central and 
local government institutions, rather·than directly to the project team 
in the field, as had been the case· under the USAID pr.oject. Inspite of 
the relatively high profile of central government in a supposedly 
bottom-up project, the districts are s·ensitive as to how far central 
.government should be permi~ted to interfere in what is understood to be 
a district-based project. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION.: 
The major responsibility for project coordination has been delegated to 
the district level, albeit under the supervision of MLGL. The success 
of the project, therefore, depends on the capacity of the District 
Council to undertake thi s respon·s i bil ity as a major deci si on-maker, 
administrator and implementor. 
Policy Formulation: 
While central government is responsible for policy decision-making in 
. relation to the broad principles of the project, the individual 
partiCipating districts are responsible for policy making as it affects 
the implementation of the project in the field. The first stage is for 
the Council to mobilise support for the project. Mobilisat.ion involves 
the lobbying of both local politicians such as councillors, traditional 
leaders and the community, through existing channels of communication. 
These might include formal debates, district tours or consultation (see 
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ch 7}. In this respect, decision-making must follow the procedures set 
out for District Development Planning. A formal request to participate 
in the project must, therefore, be written into the District Development 
Plan. If the project is not accounted for in the plan, the district is 
not eligible to take part as available funds only permit a limited 
number of districts to participate at anyone time. In submitting its 
proposal, the district must assess the following: 
_ the degree to which the project is likely to be supported at the 
community level. 
_ the eitent to· which additional financial and manpower resources will 
be required to service the project. These calculations must take into 
account existing recurrent budget allocations to the district. 
While the external donor provides capital expenditure support, 
recurrent costs must be borne by the Council. It is their 
responsibility to lobby MLGL to increase recurrent budget 
allocations to take account of the additional funds needed to service 
the project. Therefore, any additional funds that might be required 
must be indicated in the forthcoming District Development Plan. 
District planners must also pay attention to the allocation of personnel 
and to the mobilisation of relevant District Council departments such as 
Public Health, Education, and Community and Social Development to 
support the construction and health education programmes. Establishing 
an implementation capacity based on existing staff and departments is 
essential, as it is the Council which must coordinate the implementation 
of the project and ensure its continuation in the long-term. In view of 
the fact that the project is competing for resources with other 
departments within the district, as well as against other districts, 
achieving political support for the project at the district level is 
essent ia 1. 
As part of the responsibility for planning the implementation of the 
project, the District Council chooses the vi llages to take part in· the 
project. The allocation criteria used are based on guidelines provided 
by central government - this was all the more so. for the USAIDfunded 
pilot project - on consultation with the district communities and on the 
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preferences of the district planning officers. These criteria are 
listed in Figure 7. 
Within the guidelines set down in the Plan of Operations~ the District 
Councils are free to plan the implementation of the project as they see 
fit and may make alterations according to feedback from field personnel 
and participants, in relation to both technical and administrative 
issues. 
Policy Implementation: 
The District Council is responsible for project implementation beyond 
the support provided by central government and the 'donor agency. It 
coordinates the provision of latrine infrastructure and the 
orches trat ion of a health educat ion campaign. However, the ab i1 ity of 
local government to execute the project depends on it receiving support 
from both central government, above, and the recipient community, below. 
The project is implemented under the direction of a project coordinator 
who is directly accountable to the District Council and indirectly 
accountable to the MLGL. In association with a project team, and staff 
seconded from other departments, the project coordinator mobilises the 
project. The coordinator is required to supervise implementation and to 
provide a link between the ministry. the field staff and participants. 
This coordinator should be assisted by a foreman responsible,for 
planning day to 'day operations and for supervising the village 
coordinators. All these posts fall under the technical and industrial 
class recruitment tier and applicants are'employed through the Council. 
It had been hoped that the project could be implemented wholly through 
existing local government departments without placing undue additional 
burden on financial and manpower facilities. However. it has been 
recognised that a number of key individuals need to be employed 
specifically for the project. It is up to individual Councils. 
therefore. to decide whether or not this manpower can be obtained from 
the existing establishment registry or whether additional manpower must 
be recru ited. 
lVia 
Criteria Set by Government: 
The number of districts able to taKe part in the project is decided by 
cen tra I .governmen t accord i n9 to two cr i ter i a: 
the availabil ity of donor funds and funds from the Domestic 
Development Fund. Over a 2-3 year project period, up to 3 districts 
may be included. 
the implementation capacit:' of central and local gOl,ernment suggests 
that no more than three districts at a time can expect to 
participate. This reflects in, particular, serious manpower and 
transport constraints. Moreover, there is no guarantee that support 
will continue after the end of the current project period. 
Criteria Set by the District Council: 
A district wishing to participate must submit a project proposal within 
the District Development Plan. Target villages are chosen by the 
District-Council according to the follm'ing"priority criteria; 
priorit:' to communities which have expressed an interest in 
participating in the project during consultation (see below). 
priority to the principal settled communities according to standard 
planning procedures for providing services on a hierarchical basis. 
priority to communities involved in specific rural development 
programmes such as CFDA .~ RADP. Inclusion in the project, 
therefore, forms part of a larger investment pacKage. 
priority to built-up, densely populated settlements. Th. major 
concern is to allocate resources to the.most need;.' from a publ ic 
health point of view. 
priority to settlement clusters in order to maximise use of limited 
resources and to ensure a high rate of implementation. Major concerns 
are financial and logistica!. 
Influence of Community Consultation: 
Provision at the community le"el is basld on household participati~n. 
This is encouraged through mobilis.ation campaigns and publicit;, 
conducted by the project team/e.tension worKers to obt.in signld 
contracts' and peyment from participating ~,ouseholds. Capacity to taKe 
p~rt is determined by socio-economic status, which may discriminat~ 
against the poorest (see ch 6).' Some efforts have been me.de to help the 
destitute by providing latrines free of charge. 
Fi: 7: The SHESP - Resource .A.lIccalion Crileria. 
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In relation to construction activities, major responsibilities include 
the provision of essential materials, labour, technical advice and 
logistical support and the mobilisation of community groups to 
participate in the project. The Council must ensure that contracts are 
signed and that contributions. are paid by participants, and in turn, 
must submit proof of financial disbursements as well as receipts of 
contributions paid, to the MLGL. The Council provides manpower - the 
project coordinator, foremen, driver and assistant, village 
coordinators, and labourers - as well as basic materials and fuel and, 
more generally, access to Council facilities. 
In relation to health education, major responsibilities include 
coordinating and mobilising. activities between community health workers, 
the village extension team.and the Council's health, non-formal 
education and community development departments, in the preparation of a 
health education campaign, to complement the latrine construction 
programme. These activities are supposed to be supported by experts and 
materials provided by ·the MoH's Health Education Department. The 
project coordinator again provides a link between local government 
activity, central government support and community extension workers in 
the field. 
That the districts achieve an effective delivery' system is crucial 
because in the long-term, support from central government will be 
reduced substantially. The districts will then be responsible for 
providing this service on a permanent basis, from their own capital and 
recurrent budgets. Yet, to date, no long term plans have been drawn up. 
In.this respect, the future of the. programme rests on achieving 
political support from central government which must weigh the merits of 
the project from the point of view of achieving better health, against 
wider economic considerations such as the scope for increasing recurrent 
budget allocations to the districts. 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION; 
The success of the project depends on active participation by the 
community in policy formulation and implementation, together with the 
District Council. 
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Policy Formulation: 
Community participation in decision-making is restricted to the planning 
of the project in the field in association with the project team. The 
community has not been involved in the preparation of broad policy 
objectives. In this. sense,'the project has been imposed from above. 
, The community can influence field level planning in two ways. Through 
the district planning process, individual villages must express their 
interest in taking part in,the project (see allocation criteria above). 
This exercise is supposed to involve community leaders, extension 
workers and councillors, as well as individual households, as part of 
wider district planning (see ch 7). Once a village has been selected 
for the project, community groups are responsible for organislng the 
implementation of the project on behalf of the participating households. 
This is especially important for the health education campaign . 
. Communities have also been requested to provide comments and suggestions 
o~ ways of improving project delivery and on improving project 
technology. 
Policy Implementation: 
Project implementation relies upon a high level of support from the 
recipient community. As a result, the opportunity for different 
community-based groups and interests to influence the project is 
considerable. Community participants provide labour, materials for the 
superstructure and a cash outlay of P30 each on an individual household 
basis, and more generally, provide support to community voluntary groups 
involved. The success of both the latrine construction programme and 
the health education programme depends, therefore, on achieving active 
cooperation from the community and of establishing good working 
,relations between the local government project team and the community 
recipients. Without community cooperation, the project is unworkable. 
At the village level, the project team is made up of locally recruited 
people who work in cooperation with existing village 'institutions. It 
has been stressed, that village coordinators should be local people, 
either from the project village or at least from the district, in order 
to maximise cooperation and support with the communities involved. 
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Village coordinators supervise the day to day running of the project, 
including the supervision of labourers and the coordination of local 
voluntary groups and extension workers. It is expected that village 
voluntary groups such as the Village Development Committee (VDC) and 
Village Health Committee (VHC) should play an active role in mobilising, 
as well as implementing the project on a more informal basis, with 
support provided by government extension workers. 
Similarly, the health education programme relies on cooperation between 
participants, voluntary groups and extension workers, in association 
with the project team. The health education programme must rely on the 
support of the Village Exension Team (VET) and, in particular, on the 
Family Welfare Educator (FWE). It is her responsibility to organise the 
'software' programme in association with the .local· health staff, notably 
the nurse in charge. While they are responsible for the technical 
details of the campaign, other extension workers are expected to 
contribute to the mobilisation of the project. At the same time, they 
should seek grassroots support from village voluntary groups such as the 
VDC and its sub-committee, the VHC, as well as such groups as the Red 
Cross, Women's Group, 4B and church groups. In this way, it is hoped 
that the project will be recognised by the participants to be their own, 
and not a one-off project which has been imposed from above. This is 
considered especially important for such a culturally-sensitive project, 
from which the long-term benefits can only be realised if action is 
taken on a community-wide basis by participants who understand and, 
moreover, want the project. 
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FACTORS DETERMINING THE SHESP DELIVERY SYSTEM: 
The SHESP project is a small-scale, district self-help project designed 
to provide physical infrastructure (VIP latrines) and to orchestrate a 
health education campaign. The project depends upon a high level of 
community participation, supported by local government and supervised by 
central government. In this way, it may be described as a bottom-up 
project, but one which has been imposed from above. Emphasis has been 
placed on exploiting human resources rather than relying on capital 
support or sophisticated technology. As such, the project more closely 
resembles the recommendations prescribed by the Decade and can be 
contrasted to the top-down approach of the VWSP. However, to date, the 
'hardware' aspect of the project has received a disproportionate level 
of attention while the health education campaign has been allowed to lag 
behi nd. 
In order to explain why a system of bottom-up delivery has been used to 
achieve policy objectives, features of Botswana's political economy must 
be examined together with a consideration of the technical arguments 
used to justify the benefits of bottom-up delivery 1n the Decade. This 
illustrates how such pol icy recommendations have been accepted but 
modified to suit the context of project delivery in rural Botswana. The 
following factors are considered to have most directly influenced 
project design (see Fig B). 
1. Po 1 iti co-economi c factors: 
_ The timing of the project in relation to. the reform of government's 
rural development strategy in the late 1970's, characterised by 
decentralisation of decision-making and implementation 
responsibilities and by the reorientation of policy away from social 
infrastructure provi sion to multi-sector development ·projects. 
_ The relatively low status of sanitation as a government priority for 
rural and national development. 
2. Technical/Practical factors: 
_ the use of community participation as a means of achieving 
behavioural changes in personal hygiene, at an individual household 
2Ul ... 
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Fig 8: TheSHESP - Factors Influencing the Delivery System. 
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and community level, through latrine construction and health 
educat ion. 
the use of community participation as the means to limit costs in 
order to reduce dependence on central government, and to achieve 
widespread participation. 
- institution-building at the local government and community levels 
to create a long-term implementation capacity capable of replicating' 
the project on a district-wide basis. 
Politico-economic factors: 
The context of rural development in the 1980's: 
The SHESP project was introduced at a time when government was 
dramatically changing the emphasis of its rural development strategy, in 
preparation of NDP 5. The re-orientation of policy included the 
creation of District Development Planning as the basis for rural 
development policy making and the decision to emphasise the need to 
prepare integrated regional 'development plans, such as CAD to replace 
the traditional sectoral plans. These policy revisions were based on 
the experience of the limitations of top-down implementation and of 
social infrastructure provision during the 1970's. Thus, both the SHESP 
and the principles of district planning were introduced at the 1976 
National District Development Conference. The implications of these 
changes, examined in chapter 7, were that planning would become 
increasingly decentralised and would be based on consultation between 
local government and community groups. In theory, this provided the 
scope for increased bottom-up planning. Furthermore, local.government 
,and community institutions would become increasingly responsible for the 
implementation of policy too. The new approach reflected government's 
new ,confidence in the capacity of local institutions to direct rural 
development. These changes, moreover, signalled the demise of the 
accepted top'-down rural infrastructure provision approach, symbolised by 
the ARDP programme. Against this changing context, the rural sanitation 
project can be seen to have fitted in rather neatly. Indeed, project 
planning has been integrated into the District Development Planning 
process. Resource forecasts must be based upon consultation with the 
community, while proposals for funds must be submitted to the MLGL. 
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Therefore, community participation in SHESP may indirectly contribute to 
improving the decision-making and organisational capacity of village 
institutions such as the VDe, which are now involved in District 
Development Planning. 
The project has also benefitted from lessons learnt from the experience 
of previous projects, designed and implemented in a top-down fashion. 
As discussed above, it became clear that the long-term success of the 
VWSP had been compromised by the emphasis that had been placed on rapid 
installation of water supplies without due attention to operation and 
maintenance. The absence of local government and community 
participation in the programme has been acknowledged as an oversight 
which has led to poor standards of operation and maintenance and to the 
neglect of health education. 
The Status of Sanitation: 
The relatively low political status that the project enjoys, as compared 
to the water supply programme, is a further reason why central 
government has been less inclined to assume a high profile in its 
implementation. The project cannot offer the state the same level of 
political capital, nor is it nearly so politically sensitive, as is the 
provision of water. There is, for example, no previous experience of 
rural sanitation to live up to, while s.anitation is not perceived by the 
community as such a priority, need. It is also true that as an on-site 
facility - that is to say within ·the household - it is not perceived as 
a public utility which deserves the same degree of state intervention. 
Furthermore, the installation of latrines cannot directly contribute to 
the generation of economic activity in the rural economy, as can the 
provision of water, and this tends to reduce the importance attached to 
the project. For these reasons and in light of the new decentralised 
approach to rural development, central government has not felt compelled 
to assume a high profile in the provision of this service. It may be 
noted that the capital allocation that has been granted to the project 
under NDP 6 is dwarfed by the allocation granted to the rural water 
supply programme. Under NDP 6, it will receive only P1.6 million 
compared to P33.0 million for the VWSP (GOB, 1985). 
Technical/Practical Factorsi 
The use of bottom-up delivery has been-influenCE:.' by Decade 
prescriptions. Community pa.rticipation is used for largely pragmatic, 
rather than political or ideological reasons. It is considered the best 
means of achieving policy objectives, in the same way that a centralised 
and technology-dependent implementation structure was considered 
appropriate for achieving the objectives ·of the VWSP. In the sanitation 
project, the choice of technology has been subordinated to the adoption 
of a desired organisational structure, and the contrary is true of the 
water supply programme. This contrast reflects the fact that the major 
obstacle to the achievement of policy objectives in the sanitation 
project has been social acceptability and affordability, while in the 
water supply programme, the major constraint has been an environmental 
and technical one. 
It is felt that community participation supported by government can most 
effectively achieve policy objectives by redUCing overall costs to both 
recipient and government and by maximising.the recipients.understanding 
and support for the objectives of the project. These objectives include 
the widespread construction and use of improved pit latrines, and the 
development and delivery of a health education campaign linked to 
existing Primary Health Care activities in order. to improve community 
health. 
Community PartiCipation in Policy Formulation and Implementation: 
The preCise reasons why community partiCipation has been advocated as 
the basis of the project merits further discussion. This is because an 
anomaly in the justification given for advocating cotmlunity 
partiCipation can be noted. At issue is whether or not it is promoted as 
a means of reducing cost to government, or whether it serves to achieve 
the desired behavioural changes and conditions for long-term 
repl icat ion. 
- Policy implementation -
Community participation is required to support latrine construction for 
three reasons: 
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The provision of labour and materials by participants serves to: 
i) reduce overall costs to government and to the recipients 
(assuming that there is an opportunity cost). 
i i ) permit the household to build what it wants at a price it can 
afford, with a technology which is familiar and 'appropriate' to 
community skill (Social acceptability and affordability) 
_ A cash contribution must be made by the participant because; 
i) government will not subsidise the full cost itself. 
ii) a cash contribution can be used to·measure the recipient's 'felt 
need' and willingness to support the project (achieve behavioural 
change) . 
_ Village institutions must be involved in order to; 
i) maximise coordination of the construction process between 
households and to mobilise participation. 
ii) promote skills in organising community development projects 
(institution-building). 
iii) ensure the long-term success of the project by building up a 
capacity to replicate the project once government support is 
retracted and in so doing to reduce community dependence on 
central government. 
Community participation is required to support the health education 
campaign in order.to ensure that an appropriate and sustainable health 
message can be developed. The campaign must be directed at mobilising 
community interest in the project and of drawing attention to the health 
issues in the short term, while in the long term behavioural changes in 
community and personal hygiene must be encouraged. This campaign must 
be integrated into existing Primary Health Care by working through 
existing institutions and personnel at the community level. The 
creation of a 'felt need' for the benefits of the project and,the need 
to monitor behavioural change depends both on efforts emanating from the 
community and on support being provided by village health extension 
workers. 
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- Policy Formulation -
In relation to policy formulation, community participation is advocated 
for the following reasons. 
1) Appropriate Technology: Hardware Design & Community Feedback: 
Community participation is required to achieve the sort of behavioural 
adjustments to hygiene practices related to excreta disposal and water 
use, on a community-wide level. This can only be achieved if the 
objectives of ' the project are understood and desired by the recipient 
community. ,The project must, therefore, be socially acceptable, 
affordable and technically appropriate to the community. Such 
pre-conditions can only ,be met if participants are invited to take part 
in the design of the project and to express opinions concerning 
technology preferences, the most suitable village groups to work through 
and the content of the health education campaign. For example, in 
designing the latrine, consideration to existing community attitudes, 
practices and preferences must be made in order to ensure that the 
system provided will be socially acceptable and technically appropriate. 
Given that the recipient is responsible for building and indeed paying 
for the latrine, it is essential that a structure is offered which is 
within the building competence and financial capacity of the recipient. 
To ensure that the project can be sensitive to socio-cultural parameters 
and flexible enough to accomodate the socio-economic circumstances of 
individual households, the recipient community is encouraged to be 
involved in all stages of the deSign, monitoring and evaluation of, the 
project in such a way that feedback can reach project planners. This 
can be seen as a two-way process of communication. Participation at the 
formulation stage is, t~erefore, a pre-condition to achieving wide 
support in policy implementation. 
2) The Identification and Expression of 'Felt Needs': 
While the community has not contributed to the overall design of the, 
project, it must submit a formal request in order to parti"cipate. 
During the preparation of the District Development Plan, a community 
which wishes to take part, assuming that the district is inv,olved in the 
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project, must submit a formal application, indicating that they have 
identified sanitation as a priority need. For the household, a contract 
must be signed which commits them to paying P30 for project materials 
and support. It is argued that only those communities and households 
which are genuinly concerned to improve environmental health will be 
included. In so dOing, it is hoped that by encouraging communities to 
express their 'felt needs', the project is more likely to succeed. 
The expression of 'felt needs' is considered to represent a key aspect 
of the decision-making process. However, a number of other factors 
determine the allocation of funds for the project, so that the extent to 
which the community can influence resource allocation must be 
questioned. Moreover, it is unclear how a community can express a 'felt 
need' for sanitation, as compared to water supply which is critical to 
basic survival. So far, the experience of the project has been. that 
communities must be mobilised and educated by the project team in order 
to identify sanitation as a 'felt need'. In this sense, it is a 
bottom-up project imposed from above. 
External agents are required to mobilise community interest in the 
project and to create awareness of issues which may not be immediately. 
noticable nor tangible, or which do not appear to directly impinge on 
. community welfare. 
3) Institution-building: 
A further aim of the project is to ensure that the project can be 
self-supporting in the long-term once central government support is 
retracted. The capacity for replication requires that an institutional 
capacity is built-up at the community and local government level which 
is capable of designing and implementing the project without external 
assistance. Government has, therefore, encouraged local government and 
community institutions to identify those groups· which can best build up 
an.adequate implementation capacity. It is envisaged that local 
government will be required to absorb the project into their existing 
statutory duties and will, therefore, be responsible for capital and 
recurrent expenditure forecasts. This objective can be understood to 
coincide with government's present pol iCy to encourage greater bottom-up 
planning in rural development. The emphasis that has been placed on 
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institution-building reflects the concern being expressed at the 
international level towards this issue. Policy objectives often fail 
precisely because undue attention has been paid to building up the 
institutional infrastructure necessary to support the 
operation/maintenance and replication of projects. As a result, many 
systems which have been successfully installed are rapidly abandoned 
when they break down as a result of insufficient commitment of manpower 
and financial resources to service these investments. 
4) Health Education: 
Community involvement in project design is required all the more in the 
preparation of the project's health education campaign. This is because 
its success depends that much more on developing an appropriate 
programme which .is acceptable to the community and can be implemented by 
the community. It is recognised that environmental health can onlj be 
improved on a community wide basis, over a long-term period. To achieve 
. policy objectives through such a health education campaign, the active 
support of the community must be sought with the aSSistance of 
government health and welfare extension workers. The experience of 
Primary Health Care has indicated that the effort must come from within 
the community through cooperation between the extension team and 
voluntary groups such as the VHC, and Women's groups in order to aChieve 
genuine behavioural change. Attitudes can be more easily changed by 
local health committees which are more readily trusted by the community 
than by external medical staff who may make only short and infrequent 
visits to the community and who are necessarily viewed as "outsiders" 
who do not understand local problems and aspirations (Perrett & Lethem, 
1983; WHO, 1978). 
- Meeting Policy Objectives; Community PartiCipation as a Means to an 
End -
Community participation is advocated as a means of achieving several 
policy objectives associated with the reduction in the incidence of 
environmental diseases. It is used as a means of redUCing the cost of 
the project to the .state and as a means of promoting community support 
. for the objectives of the project and to thereby achieve desired 
behavioural changes. In this way, it. is anticipated that the project 
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can succeed in both quantitative terms - by reaching as many people as 
possible at least cost, and in qualitative terms - by ensuring that the 
appropriate behavioural changes in personal hygiene habits are achieved. 
Yet, as discussed earlier, it is not entirely certain whether or not 
these reasons for advocating community participation are mutually 
reinforCing. This point is important because policy objectives may 
poSSibly be better achieved through more comprehensive state 
intervention, thereby cancelling the need to rely on community 
participation. The precise reasons why the state has so 
enthusiastically supported community participation in this project must 
be further discussed in view of the fact that in Botswana, social 
service proviSion, including health care, has been based on direct state 
intervention and subsidy (see ch 2 & 3). Community participation is 
glaringly absent from social service provision and rural development 
more generally. Furthermore, the involvement of the community 
necessarily exposes the project to possible constraints which might 
compromise the achievement of policy objectives. Why then has the state 
chosen to base this project on community participation? 
A major reason for,promoting community participation is that the state 
can pass on part of the capita 1 and recurrent cost of the project to the 
community. To do so reflects the fact that the state is not willing to 
subsidise the project fully as is the case with domestic water supply 
provission and other social services. The economic reasoning behind 
this decision is that the unit cost of building a latrine is too high 
for the government to support. At an estimated P1300 per unit, compared 
to no more than P100 per' head to provi de a vi 11 age water supply system 
and a forecasted demand for 100,000 units, the cost is considered 
prohibitive. While a total cost of Pl.3 million appears insignificant 
by project standards, government is not sufficiently convinced of the 
health and political benefits of the scheme as compared to, for example, 
the water supply programme or other projects which, at least, provide 
economic returns, can be self-liquidating, or provide political capital. 
Yet, besides this project, private sector contractors have been charging 
up to P500 to build household latrines. Such a price is clearly beyond 
the means of the majority of the rural population. Under such 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the desired community-wide adoption 
of latrines, which is so necessary to achieving health benefits, can be 
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realised. Alternatively, individual cheap" and ready self-help latrines 
have been, and continue to be built by households, but these are usually 
unsafe and insanitary (Land & Raditloaneng, 1985b). Furthermore, 
neither"of these private sector options involve health education nor 
community mobilisation and can do little to improve community health. 
A state supported self-help project provides a solution. The state is 
prepared to sUbsidise the construction of safe and sanitary latrines and 
to combine this with a health education campaign, ass1sted by the 
recipients who both take part in latrine construction, and in the health 
campaign. In this way, policy objectives can be aChieved. 
Yet there is some doubt as to whether community participation in policy 
implementation, most especially, helps to achieve policy objectives. It 
is possible that quicker results could be achieved if state subsidies 
were more comprehensive. It is indeed questionable whether or not 
self-help can ensure the rapid and sound construction of latrines'-
There is evidence to suggest that where households are forced to provide 
labour and materials, the latrines will remain incomplete well after the 
expiry of the project and may be abandoned (Land & Raditloaneng", 1985b) 
(see ch ~ ). Under such circumstances, health benefits cannot be 
" realised, irrespective of any well-planned health education campaign. 
This" situation is all the more likely to arise where project supervision 
and mobilisation is inadequate (this is most likely to occur once the 
project team has left). Similarly, if a latrine has been completed but 
is poorly constructed, then it is also unlikely that the long-term 
benefits will be achieved, as the unit falls into a state of disrepair. 
A poorly built latrine can serve to increase the spread of environmental 
diseases rather than serve to control it. 
Moreover, in the long-term, total costs may actually escalate as a 
result of having tried to reduce costs through self-help. The benefit 
of cost savings in the implementation stage must be weighed up against 
the risk that poorly constructed units may be built, which will have to 
be reconditioned at a later date at further cost. At the same time, 
cost savings arising from self-help construction may be lost against 
financial penalties imposed as a result of delays in the 1mplementation 
time-table, arising from a dis-jointed and un-professional construction 
schedule. In the long term, it may even work out cheaper for government 
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to subsidise the construction programme and in so doing be sure that the 
latrines are built properly, so that they can be used and will not need 
refurbishing at a later date (Mbere, 19B1). 
For wealthier residents, this cost-benefit analysis of ·the merits of 
self-help is less relevant. Such residents are likely to hire a 
contractor to build their latrine in any case, in preference to building 
it themselves. Where cash is available, households prefer to spend more 
money to ensure that the latrine is built quickly and properly. The 
provision of labour is only required where incomes are too low. 
Otherwise, it is fair to say that the decision to spend cash on building 
a latrine is a reasonable indicator of an individual:s commitment to the 
project. Furthermore, project objectives are achieved more rapidly. By 
paying to have the latrine built profeSSionally, one achieves the 
primary objective of building a viable unit, and ensuring that it is in 
a useable condition. The health benefits may then be achieved more 
rapidly assuming that the building programme has been complemented with 
a health education campaign. 
For poorer residents, the option to pay for the latrine to be built is 
not available. It is certain that they cannot afford to pay the full 
cost themselves. Nor;s government prepared to. The compromise reached 
is that btith sides must contribute. In so doing, the household,. short 
of cash, must provide labour and materials. However, the risk is that 
the latrine may never be completed, unless the government is prepared to 
foot the whole bill. Since it is not, it is suggested that the primary 
motive for encouraging self-help in latrine construction is to reduce 
costs to the state, rather than to engender a feeling of commitment and 
sense of belonging to the project. The counter-argument is that direct 
·community involvement in policy implementation is the only means of 
ensuring the recipient's commitment to the goals of the project and of 
building up an implementation capacity to ensure that latrines will be 
completed. Were the state to provide the latrine free of charge, there 
is no guarantee that the latrine would be used (Whyte, 19B4). , 
In relation to the health education component of the project, issues 
concerning the merits of community participation are more clear cut. 
This is becalJse the question of cost-saving does not directly enter into 
the argument. In terms of achieving behavioural changes concerning 
• 
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personal hygiene, there are strong reasons for advocating 
community-based mobilisation. It is a long-term process, which relies 
on persistent education and cons-ultation to change entrenched beliefs 
and habits within the community . 
This discussion has served to highlight the wide-ranging and often 
illusive reasons used to justify community participation. It also 
highlights the possible end results which may be achieved according to 
the level of support that the state is prepared to provide. 
Local Government Coordination: 
While the project cannot succeed without the active support of the 
recipient community, equally, its success depends on District Council 
participation. It provides the link between participants and the policy 
makers in central government, while also serving to execute the project 
in the field. There are, therefore, practical reasons for encouraging 
local government intervention in this project. 
The District Councils are ideally located to coordinate the activities 
of a community project in the field. First, from an admi'listrative 
pOint of view, the Councils can provide the appropriate institutional 
_ linkages with community groups. Second, they also have the transport-
and communications facilities to operate in remote areas -between 
scattered communities. They are, therefore, in a better position, than 
would be central government, to distribute project materials, allocate 
manpower and supervise activities within the project villages. 
Financial and -time-saving gains can be made. Third, the CounCil 
administration operates at a sufficently large scale to merit the 
manufacturing of materials-, such as slabs and bricks, which can then be 
distributed to the individual project villages. Individual villages are 
normally too small. Fourth, the Councils are still in a position to 
-work through the MLGL to obtain funds and technical advice from the 
national coordinator. 
In the long-term, the building up of an implementation capacity at this _ 
level is considered essentiillto ensure the replicability of the 
project. Since it depends on community participation, coordination must 
be both flexible and responsive to activity in the field. This cannot 
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be achieved by depending on central government, either for intervening 
directly, or for providing financial and technical assistance when it is 
most needed. 
The District Councils have also assumed· an important role in policy 
formulation as far as the planning of field operations is concerned. In 
order to coordinate the project effectively, the Councils must be in a 
position to assess their financial, manpower 
plan an appropriate implementation schedule. 
and transport costs and to 
These activities form an 
intrinsic part of institution-building. It is for this reason that 
participation in the project depends on individual Councils assessing 
both the demand for the project and their own capacity to·support it. 
The project has, therefore, been added to the Councils' existing 
statutory responsibilities. 
In the long term, it is hoped that the project will become 
self-supporting, from a financial and institutional pOint of view. In 
this way, sanitation provision will become a District Council 
responsibility, with manpower and finance allocations being calculated 
as an integral part of the district capital and recurrent budget for. 
statutory duties. The Council will then be in a position to extend the 
programme through out the district. However, it is unclear whether or 
not, the self-help contribution will be required in the future . 
. SUMMARY: 
An international effort has been orchestrated to encourage the provision 
of domestic water supplies and sanitation as an integral part of Primary 
Health Care to reduce the incidence of environmental disease. This 
effort has been directed through the United Nations' International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. It has identified policy 
objectives and has provided recommendations on policy delivery. These 
prescriptions suggest the use of bottom-up delivery systems which rely 
on community participation and on the use of appropriate technology. 
These suggestions are based on managerial or technocratic considerations 
which seek to identify the best means of achieving policy objectives. A 
bottom-up framework is seen as best suited to ensuring the widest access 
to water and sanitation facilities, to the provision of a technology 
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which is acceptable, reliable and effective, and to the achievement of 
behavioural change in personal and community hygiene. 
Experi ence in Botswana suggests that 1 oca 1 socio-econom.i c ci rcumstances 
and political priorities may not be conducive to the adoption of such 
policy prescriptions. In Botswana, rural water supply and sanitation 
have been provided through two independent and wholly different 
programmes - the VWSP and SHESP. While the two programmes share a 
common objective of contributing to better community health, the 
delivery systems that are used are fundamentally different. 
THE VWSP: 
The programme uses a top-down and technology dependent ·del ivery system 
which relies on a high level of central government intervention in 
policy formulation and implementation. The use of this strategy can be 
attributed to specific characteristics of rural development policy and 
to particular environmental features. While the programme has been 
succeSSful in terms of achieving a high rate of implementation, there is 
evidence of poor operation and maintenance and a neglect of health 
education. As policy objectives address these issues in the future, it 
is likely that greater use will be made of a delivery system which 
relies on community participation and local government. intervention. 
THE SHESP: 
By contrast, this project has adopted Decade prescriptions more 
comprehensively. It uses a bottom-up strategy based upon local 
government coordination and community participation, and on the 
development of appropriate technology accompanied by health education. 
The delivery system has been influenced more by managerial factors than 
by local political factors though these have not been wholly absent 
either. Because the project depends on. community participation, it is 
suggested that the risk of problems constraining the achievement of 
policy objectives is heightened. 
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Chapter 6: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD: 
INTRODUCTION: 
Chapter 6 examines the performance of institutions involved in 
implementing the Village Water Supply Programme and the Self-Help 
Environmental Sanitation Project and considers which factors have 
determined their effectiveness in supporting the delivery systems used. 
·Local government and community institutions are considered in particular 
on the grounds that: 
- SHESP uses a bottom-up delivery system which depends on local 
goverment and community participation. 
- VWSP is likely to rely increasingly on a more decentralised delivery 
system as policy objectives are revised. 
- Decade prescriptions recommend the use of bottom-up strategies. 
On the basis of fieldwork, constraints on policy implementation are 
identified. These constraints are not unique to the two projects but 
are symptomatic of broader constraints facing the implementation 
capacity of local government and community institutions in rural 
development. These wider constraints are, therefore, examined in order· 
to assess the suitability of such institutions to support delivery 
systems which are based on a bottom-up approach .. The influence of these 
broader constraints on the sanitatio·n project has resulted in a failure 
·to mobilise community partiCipation and in so doing to provide the 
conditions for project replication. Furthermore, the probable future 
decentralisation of the water supply programme is likely to face similar 
constraints if the wider framework of rural policy formulation and 
implementation remains unchanged. To date, the success of the water 
supply programme in achieving its limited objectives of rapid 
infrastructure provision can be attributed to the use of top-down 
delivery, whiCh has not been constrained by these problems. 
A Note on Data Sources: 
The analysis of ;the VWSP programme is based upon existing evidence of 
local government and community participation in the programme. Evidence 
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of local government and community participation outside of the programme 
which wi 11 be of relevance when the programme is decentral ised is al so 
considered. 
Research on the SHESP project was undertaken during a period of 
evaluation and redeSign which fell between the termination of the ESPP 
pilot project and the start of the current SHESP project. Field 
evidence is, therefore, based on an evaluation of the pilot project, and 
a baseline study of the new project. Evidence is based on verbal and 
documented accounts of past events, verbal discussion about future 
events and verbal and documented accounts of contemporary experience. 
The Self-Help Environmental Sanitation Project (SHESP): 
The constraints to policy implementation that SHESP has experienced can 
be attributed to the low implementation capac,ity of the District Council 
and of community development institutions. Constraints facing these 
institutions have restricted the achievement of project objectives 
because the project relies heavily on their input. Projects relying on 
bottom-up delivery are, therefore, vulnerable to a wider range of 
constraints affecting different institutions than those which depend on 
a top-down approach. Accordingly, it was found that: 
-.Household participation has been limited. Mobilisation has been slow 
while there is also evidence of a high drop out· rate. 
- An increaSing proportion of partiCipants have preferred to pay more 
money to ensure that their latrine is built professionally, than to 
provide their own self-help input. 
- A replicable delivery system has not been built up either at the local 
government or community level •. Community 
role in the 
groups and extension workers 
project. have only played a peripheral 
- Crucially, no parallel health education programme has been instituted, 
resulting in·little awareness of health issues amongst partiCipants. 
The following analysis examines the major problem areas affecting the 
capacity of local government and community institutions to perform their 
duties in relation to the design and implementation of the project. 
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The Village Water Supply Programme (VWSP): 
Political, financial, technological and organisational support have all 
helped to ensure the relative success of the VWSP from the point of view' 
of achieving a rapid and egalitarian distribution of rural water 
supplies. Over a relatively short period of time, access to improved 
rural water supplies has improved substantially so that the majority of 
the rural population living in settled villages now have access to 
potable water. 
Top-down delivery has, however, incurred long-term costs which are now 
being experienced. Centralised maintenance units have been unable to 
provide an efficient back-up service to systems which have broken down 
and, therefore, remain in disrepair for lengthy periods of time. 
Frequent breakdowns have, moreover, been experienced as a result of poor 
installation, user misuse, exhaustion of water supplies and the 
depletion of fuel supplies. There is also evidence that few of the 
anticipated health benefits from the use of clean water have been 
forthcoming. Government now recognises that in order to achieve better 
results in these areas, both reCipients and local authority departments 
must be more actively involved in the design and implementation of. 
policy. So far, government has decentralised the operation and 
maintenance of rural water supplies to the District Council level, 
without fundamentally having to change either the organisational 
structure or technology on which the programme is based. Yet, in order 
to be able to .involve communities more fully in the prog.ramme, as in the 
case of the sanitation project, substantial changes will have to be made 
to both the type of technology and the delivery system that is used. 
It is probable that in the future, responsibility for policy 
implementation and operation / maintenance will be transferred to local 
government and community institutions, in order to. reduce dependence on 
central government, to improve standards of operation and of maintenance 
and to undertake a health education campaign. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to consider the factors which presently constrain 
decentralised policy implementation and which are likely to constrain 
the programme if and when operations are decentralised. Currently, the 
programme is characterised by the following features: 
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- District Council Water Maintenance Units (WMU) have a low capacity 
and rely on central government and expatriate support. 
- Supplies which have been rapidly installed by the DWA are prone to 
breakdown and abandonment especially in remoter areas. 
- Standpost water has been welcomed by recipients for reasons of 
convenience and reliability, while health benefits have been largely 
ignored. 
- Recipients are unable to operate and maintain their village supplies 
and, therefore, must depend on government assistance in every 
eventua 1 ity. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT COUNCIL: 
District Councils have a weak implementation capacity .. This is apparent 
in the water and sanitation programmes but more generally in the 
implementation of Council's statutory duties. Weak implementation 
capacity can be attributed to several constraints facing the District 
Counci l. According to Rei lly (1981) planning and implementation 
capacity are determined by the strength of the institution and of the 
calibre of the personnel employed. This assertion holds true in 
Botswana. District Councils have been constrained by inadequate 
financial and manpower resources, and remain dependent on central 
government support. It is clear that what might appear to represent 
only minor problem areas· can in fact have serious effects on 
implementation capacity and can in turn affect the outcome of specific 
projects. 
·ESPPjSHESP - DISTRICT COUNCIL SUPERVISION: 
The project teams responsible for coordinating SHESP have had to face a 
series of financial, manpower, and administrative constraints which have 
reduced, their effectiveness in the administration and supervision of the' 
project. Problems include, inadequate provision of qualified manpower, 
insufficient recurrent funds to support capital investment,' and 
inadequate logistical support (especially transport). All these factors 
have reduced the team's implementation capacity. 
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Tne effect of these constraints has been compounded by the peculiar 
status of the project. While it purports to being decentralised, 
·central government continues to play a major role in decision-making, 
while the recipient community is responsible for implementation. The 
project functions according to a bottom-up framework, but one which has 
been imposed from above .. The dual status of the project has led to 
problems in defining lines of accountability and responsibility. This 
ambiguity has prevented the hoped for institutionalisation of the 
project within the District Council system. Evidence of the problem can 
be seen in the failure of Councils to provide appropriate administrative. 
and financial support for the project. Rather than becoming integrated 
within the existing adminstrative framework, as had been planned, the 
project has functioned as an appendage, having to compete for resources 
against more established departments. The status of the project has 
been called into question by the fact that the project is short-term 
(though contracts have been extended) and financed from an external 
source. Nevertheless, the fact that a relatively low-budget project has 
faced such constraints reflects the fact that the District Council 
system at large suffers from under-capacity in the planning and 
implementation of policy. The status of the District Council as an 
agent of change with i n rural development mus t, therefore, be 
investigated. Several examples of constraints experienced in. the 
project are examined. 
Manpower Constraints: 
Project coordination has been compromised by manpower shortages. This 
problem can be i llustratedwith examples ·from Southern and Kweneng 
district. Although Southern district took part in the the ESPP pilot 
project, and is presently involved in the .SHESP project, it has been 
plagued with manpower problems. To date, project implementation has 
been poor, and few tangible results have been achieved. The project has 
stagnated due to the Council's inability to recruit a suitable project 
coordinator who posseses the appropriate technical and managerial 
credentials. A make-shift appointment was made, involving the 
appointment of a junior health assistant from the Public Health 
.department, to coordinate the project over and above his existing 
. responsibilities. This appointment proved unsatisfactory, thereby 
forcing MLGL to request the appointment of an overseas volunteer on 
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behalf of the Council. During this period, the financial and political 
commitments which had been made to the project were not realised. 
Kweneng district only became involved in the SHESP project in 1983/4, 
representing the only new "district to be added to the revised project. 
Here too, government has been obliged to employ a volunteer to act as 
project coordinator, as no suitable Motswana candidate could be found. 
"Reliance on expatriate personnel is unfortunate for a project which is 
designed to be community-based, and there is evidence of a certain 
frustration felt by local government officers in relation to this fact. 
The particular problem confronting the project is that it commands low 
status amongst" qualified personnel and the position of coordinator does 
not enjoy a high salary. At the same time, the positio"n demands both 
manage~ial and techn~cal skills, possessors of which are often snatched 
up by the higher status sectors that can offer higher salaries. Even at 
the more junior level of village coordinator, there have been 
difficulties in finding suit"ably qualified and motivated candidates who 
can supervise ard mObilise the project. The majority of such candidates 
offer few educational qualifications and minimal work experience, while 
they see the job merely as offering opportunities for gaining access to 
other more attractive jobs. 
Financial Constraints: 
Part and parcel of the problems associated with manpower recruitment is 
the problem of financial management. A number of difficulties 
concerning the allocation of recurrent budget resources have arisen, 
which may be attributed to the peculiar status of the project. 
Mismanagement has occurred because of an incompatibility in accounting 
procedures between the D i s tri ct Council and the fund i ng agency, UN ICEF, 
and because of a misunderstanding over the respective financial 
responsibilities of the two sides. In particular, problems have arisen 
over procedures for expense accounting and capital fund disbursements. 
These difficulties must be taken serious ly as they highl ight an issue of 
great sensitivity to the District Councils, concerning their financial 
autonomy and the extent to whi ch they are accountable to central 
government. Several examples of finance-related problems can be cited. 
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The Procedure for expense reimbursement: 
The donor agency requires that capital budget expenses incurred by 
Councils in the implementation of the project shall be reimbursed by the 
donor on submission of receipts on a quarterly basis. This procedure, 
however, conflicts with standard procedures followed for capital expense 
accounting such as for statutory duties whereby funds are provided by 
the government or a donor in advance. This has led to lengthy delays in 
the submission of claims by both Kgatleng and Kweneng District Councils 
and· the subsequent delay in allocation of funds, thereby affecting 
project implementation. This procedure, moreover, constrains the 
Council's freedom of .action in executing its duties. 
Recurrent budget planning: 
Project implementation has been seriously delayed by Councils which have 
overlooked the need to budget for recurrent expenditures in order to 
support the project. It has been assumed that the donor is responsible 
for providing both capital and recurrent financial support, when in fact 
this is not so. Against a background of increasingly tight recurrent 
budget auditing by central government, Councils are lH.L 1y to give low 
priority to ensuri ng that adequate funds h·ave been budgetted for such 
auxiliary and relatively short-term projects,especially when it is 
known that a donor is involved who may have additional funds availabl.e 
to cover any shortfalls. In Kweneng district, for example, no provision 
was made to cover the payment of wages and transport overheads and, 
therefore; the Council had eventua llyto be ba i 1 ed out by central 
government. 
Manpower Recruitment: The Project Coordinator: 
The problems associated with the recruitment of the·pr.oject coordinator 
have been compounded by difficulties concerning the calculation of a 
suitable salary and on deciding to which department the.postshould be 
allocated. Appropriate salary allowances cannot be budgetted into the 
recurrent budget estimates until the personnel department, ULGS, has 
formalised the new post within the local government establishment 
register. Yet to date, ULGS has not confirmed the post. . For the time 
being, therefore, the coordinator has had to be registered as a health· 
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assistant, and be paid at a significantly lower scale than the job 
merits. For the time being, the appointment of volunteers in two 
districts, paid externally by the volunteer organisations, has 
artificially postponed this problem for the Councils. However, as soon 
as 'local recruits are appointed, additional funds will have to be 
budgetted to cover the new salary. 
Project Status: 
The District Council finds itself accountable upwards to the MLGL and 
donor agency, and downwards to the recipient community. Each side 
, imposes demands on the project team which are not entirely compatible. 
A particular problem which does not appear to have been resolved is the 
accountability of the project 'team, to ,either the Council secretary'as 
chief executive officer of the Council, or the Senior Public Health 
Engineer (SPHE) of the MLGL. This particular problem is exacerbated by 
the ambiguous status of the project within the Council. It is clear 
that the nature of the project could merit its inclusion within any of 
the following departments: public health, community welfare & 
development, water maintenance unit, or technical. As yet, no clear 
guidelines have been established. 
The advisory capacity of the SPHE is, moreover, ambiguous and has ,led to 
misunderstandings. On one occasion, the ministry (MLGL) overruled a 
Council policy decision taken by the Council health inspector concerning 
the choice of participating villages. This led to a serious 
confrontation resulting in the resignation of the health inspector. 
More recently, a volunteer coordinator was cautioned by his Council 
Secretary for approaching the SPHE for technical advice, instead of 
approaching the Council's own technical officer. In another district, 
relations between the project coordinator and the Council Secretary have 
been strained over this issue of accountability. In this case, the 
coordinator felt accountable to the ministry 'rather than to the Council 
Secretary since he was responsible for spending the funds provided by 
the donor through the mi ni st ry. The Council Secretary resented the 
apparent special status that had been accorded to the project, which had 
by implication removed his authority over it and over the Council 
officer in question. The conflict then spilled over into a disagreement 
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. over the rights to use Council vehicles and labourers to support the 
project. 
A second problem can be traced to a contradiction between the 
operational imperatives of a centralised and bureaucratic donor, and 
central government administration, and the socio-economic and cultural 
.customs which dictate the behaviour of the partiCipating recipient rural 
community (discussed below). Within this contradiction stands the 
District Council which against a number of its own technical, 
administrative and political constraints, is responsible for mobilising 
the recipient community and for satisfying central government demands. 
This contradiction is linked to the next issue. 
Health Education: 
The failure to develop a complementary heath education campaign must be 
attributed to central government's decision to postpone investment in 
this area and to concentrate on the latrine construction programme. In 
the current project, a health·education campaign has been promoted but 
only after considerable delays. The low priority accorded to health 
education by government, inspiteof policy goals which identify health 
education as a major objective of the project, can be explained in 
relation to the spurious bottom-up status of the project. There is an 
eviderit conflict between the desire to achieve short-term and long-term 
project objectives. Donors are under pressure to expend project funds 
as efficiently as possible and to ensure that tangible results accrue 
from this investment. Any physical installation project is bound to 
yield results far more quickly than a health education campaign which. 
aims to encourage changes in culture-bound hygiene practices and 
beliefs. Success in this domain can only be achieved incrementally and 
demands a high level of human resource commitment and even then, results 
might be hard to measure. The demands made on the District Councils to 
-
achieve such objectives are likely to be prohibitive, requiring 
inter-sectoral and departmental cooperation. This may be contrasted to 
the more straight forward needs of a construction programme, for which 
the District Councils have already built uP. a stronger capacity based on 
a decade or more of rural infrastructure provision. Therefore, because 
of the need to achieve results quick.ly, government has chosen to 
concentrate on the construction programme. ·Such a decision is 
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symptomatic of the biased implementation capacity of the District 
Councils. 
VWSP - THE SCOPE FOR COUNCIL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE: 
With the establishment of the District Council Water Maintenance Units 
(WMU), the Councils have become responsible for supervising the 
operation and maintenance of all rural supplies except in the major 
villages. To date, their record of achievement has been poor reflecting 
several problems associated with their implementation capacity. These 
pr ob 1 ems i nc lude inadequate access to sk il.led manpower, inadequate 
financial support, and a serious shortage of v.ehicles and vehicle repair 
services. Presently, the WMU's are supported by ·SIDA under their 
umbrella water sector support programme, providing the units with 
manpower at the most senior levels (water engine.ers), and financial 
resources to cover recurrent expenditure. Presently, 10 out of 13 units 
are headed by expatriate engineers (GOB, 1985). It is clear that the 
units are totally dependent on external sources, and could not function 
effect ively otherwise. Government has accepted the need to recruit 
expatriates to ensure the immediate achievement of higher standards of 
operation and maintenance; so long as no locally trained manpower is 
available to replace expatriate expertise. One must, however, question 
what would happen should SIDA remove their support from the sector ? 
Already, the units, such as in Kweneng district, are operating at full 
. capacity yet are unable to meet the demand to attend to breakdowns or to 
install private connections. In order to function effectively, the 
units must be able to enjoy the support· of central government through 
generous fundi ng. Whether thi s occurs or not depends on government's 
policy towards supporting increased decentralisation to the local 
authority level in the future. 
The constraints identified here reflect general problems facing local 
government and coul d be eased if the WMU' s were better integrated into 
the Council planning system. Better representation on the District 
Development Committee (DDC) would provide the unit with· the chance to 
lobby Counci 1 for an increased share of the recurrent budget. 
Presently, their budget only covers 64% of recurrent needs (SIDA/GOB, 
1985). It has been suggested by a district water engineer that more 
extensive decentralisation of activities relating to operation and· 
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maintenance 1s required through .the establishment of district· 
sub-depots, particularly in sparsely populated districts .such as Kweneng 
and Kgalagadi districts. Currently, WMU's are located in the district 
capitals, but are frequently called to service supplies in remote and 
inaccessible villages. A shortage of staff and of vehicles means that a 
trip to a remote area which may take over 72 hours may paralyse the 
capacity of the unit to attend to other business. This problem is 
exacerbated by a shortage of vehicles which tend to spend most of their 
time being repaired following use on harsh, ungraded and sandy dirt 
tracks. 
The pressure on Council WMU's would be greatly reduced if communities 
themselves could attend to breakdowns, and could supervise ·the operation 
of water supplies. Yet to do so will require that more appropriate 
technologies are· used which do not depend on the del ivery of fuel or on 
skilled maintenance procedures, as is presently the case. This issue 
will have to be faced by government as support from SIDA cannot continue 
indefinitely. This challenge to find more appropriate means to operate 
and maintain rural water supplies highlights the contradiction which 
currently ·exists of a top-down implementation capacity which can install 
systems relatively efficiently, yet which is quite clearly inappropriate 
for operating and maintaining water supplies. This contradiction has 
only now appeared as policy objectives have changed. Top-down delivery 
has also acted as a disincentive to the promotion of health education by 
distancing the recipients from the design and implementation of the 
programme and by focussing attention on installation rather than on 
health and education. 
CONSTRAINTS TO DISTRICT COUNCIL IMPLEMENTATION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
The constraints of manpower, finance and associated decision-making 
capacity which have limited the aChievements of the VWSP and SHESP 
programmes are precisely the constraints which inhibit District Councils 
in the implementation of their statutory duties. These constraints can 
be considered in this broader context. 
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Financial Constraints: 
The implementation capacity of the District Council is severely 
constrained by the fact that it depends almost totally on central 
government and donor agencies for financial assistance (Reilly, 1983). 
This dependence reflects two major issues. First, the fact that 
Councils are unable to generate adequate local revenue, due to the lack 
of a taxable rural economy, to finance even a small part of their 
activities, thereby thwarting any attempt at achieving self-reliance. 
Second, the fact that Council activities continue to grow in line with 
public sector expansion at a rate which exceeds increases in local 
revenue collection. The consequent state of financial dependence on 
external sources severely circumscribes the freedom of Councils to make 
decisions over the allocation of resources as regards for example 
manpower, transport and development policy more generally. It forces 
the Councils to depend on central government for the provision of 
deficit grants. In so doing, they must accept close monitoring and 
control of financial disbursements by government. According to Mawhood 
(1983) this funding arrangement represents the lowest level of financial 
autonomy. These financial constraints concern both recurrent and 
capital budgets. In the latter case, almost 100% of funds are obtained 
from central government and ·the donor community to cover statutory 
responsibilities such as schooling and health. (A later section 
examines the extent to which District Development Planning provides 
Council the opportunity to influence resource allocation, given this 
level of dependence.) 
Dependence on finanCial resources from central government is illustrated 
by the following figures. NDP 6 (GOB, 1985) has estimated the recurrent 
budget requirements of the District CounCils for the next plan period to 
1991. For the financial year, 1985/86, expenditure was of the order of 
34.7 million Pula of which only 4.7 million Pula could be raised from 
local revenue collection. The remainder has had to be covered by a 
central government deficit grant. The Plan does not antiCipate the 
districts being able to increase local revenue collection over the plan 
period. Consequently, by 1991, the deficit grant will have to be even 
larger. Against a forecasted expenditure in 1991 of 45.6 million Pula, 
41 million will be provided for by central government. Table 9 
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,illustrates the level of dependence of Kweneng and Kgatleng districts on 
defi cit grants. 
The problem of establishing a standard procedure for the allocation, 
,audit i ng and budgett i ng of resources becomes apparent when a substantial 
proportion of resources are obtained from various external sources. 
This has been the experience of the ESPP/SHESP project but is by no 
means peculiar to this project. The financial management of District 
Councils has been rendered particularly complex because of this external 
,dependence, and more especially because of an apparent anomaly between 
procedures for dealing with capital and recurrent budgets. 
Generally, aid agencies only provide funds to cover capital 
expenditures. These capital expenditure funds are provided through 
central government or directly to the District Councils according to the 
status of the project. As such, these funds are allocated in a top-down 
fash i on. By contrast the a lloca t i on of funds for recurrent expend iture 
involves a greater degree of district~level participation, even though 
the overall recurrent budget is calculated by the centre. It is the 
responsibility of individual Council departments to lobby their own 
administration through the DDC to ensure that adequate recurrent funds 
are provided to support any capital fund allocations that they might 
receive. However, this activity can be poorly coordinated as in the 
example of SHESP. The, proviSion of sufficient recurrent funds is not 
guaranteed to follow capital fund allocations. The situation can, 
therefore, arise whereby a project cannot be implemented, because 
inadequate recurrent funds have been allocated to cover project costs. 
Unfortunately, it has often been the case that the district has assumed 
, that the donor is responsible for providing both capital and the 
recurrent funds and it has, therefore, overlooked the need to budget for 
additional financial requirements. Moreover, government has become 
increasingly 'concerned to limit Counci l' s recurrent expenditure bi 11 and 
is, therefore, reticent to support projects which incur increased 
recurrent costs (GOB, 19B5). This places considerable strain on 
Councils to distribute scarce resources between their departments. 
District Councils are, however; unable to influence policy since' they 
have neither control over thei r recurrent nor capital budgets. 
· ')', - . 
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Table 9: Dlstnct Council Recurrent Budget Status - \985/86 
---------------------------------~-------------------------------------------
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Manpower Constraints: 
Access to manpower is in large part determined by financial 
considerations, since the wage bill for employees accounts for a major 
part of Council's recurrent budget (Reilly, 1983). Yet the Council's 
abil ity to allocate manpower is further constrained by the fact that it 
is not directly responsible for the employment and training of local 
government officers. All local government personnel are employed 
through the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS), a ministerial 
department which hires and allocates personnel within and between the 
District and Town Councils. In this way, individual Councils are unable 
to influence who they get, and to determine necessarily which 
departments ought to be serviced. 
This condition has been made worse by the fact that central government 
has had the reputation of creaming off the high calibre graduates for 
themselves, where they often remain underemployed and where they receive 
inadequate in-service train'ing, while the District Councils must make do 
with the second best recruited through ULGS (Noppen, 1982; Reilly, 
1983). By comparison, the District Administration is resourced through 
central. government's directorate of personnel and, therefore, has access 
to the better qualified. To an extent, this state of affairs reflects 
the fact that the country.suffers from an absolute shortage of skilled 
manpower (Noppen, 1982; Reilly, 1983). Those who are most able can 
negotiate the most prestigious and lucrative jobs; and can enjoy rapid 
promotion to top appointments in central government and the private 
sector. At the same time, it is only fair to say that central 
government has recognised this bias and intends to overturn it by 
introducing a policy which offers positive discrimination in favour of 
local government recruitment (GOB, 1985). 
In the mean time, the shortage of high calibre manpower has constrained 
the implementation capacity of the District Council. In the foreseeable 
future, however, the problem is likely to worsen irrespective of any 
positive discrimination, as public sector demands outpace the training 
and supply of suitable manpower. Government has even conceded that a 
policy of delocalisation may be necessary in order to sustain 
government's development strategy in the districts (GOB, 1985).· 
The problems of manpower at the District Council level are reflected in 
the following figures. Only 25% of middle/senior posts and 33% of 
junior posts are qualified according to the ULGS guidelines for 
recruitment (Reilly, 1983). Districts have to be content with often low 
quality manpower, while even at the national level, the government 
remains dependent on the services of expatriate personnel in technical 
and professional areas. NDP 6 underlines the problem of manpower 
scarcity at local goverhment level (GOB, 1985). It has calculated that 
vacancies have reached a level of 15%, particularly in the technical and 
professional areas. There is, therefore, an absolute shortage of 
skilled manpower with administrative and technical credentials at the 
national level (Egner, 1980; Noppen, 1982) and this has, in particular, 
affected recruitment at the local government level. 
All thi same, it is precisely in the districts that skilled manpower is 
most needed (Noppen, 1982). This is all the more so in light of 
government's recent increased concern to address the problems of rural 
development. The problem of manpower is recognised by the districts and 
has been referred to in the most recent development plans. Kgatleng 
District sees this to be the greatest constraint to district development 
urging central government to channel available skilled manpower to local 
government and the private sector (KgOC, 1985). 
District Councils are, therefore, not free to recruit and allocate 
manpower. They are constrained in this respect both by the system of 
recruitment which is based in central government and by absolute 
shortages of skilled manpower at the national level. 
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POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS IN THE SHESP PROJECT: 
In examining the constraints to community participation, it is necessary 
to consider both the role of community development institutions and of 
the individual participating household in the latrine constructjon and 
health education components of the project. This section discusses the 
role of community institutions while the following section considers the 
·role of the household. 
The project's Plan of Operations (USAIB/GOB, 1979) anticipated that the 
project would rely on the participation of community institutions to 
mobilise and coordinate household participation in latrine construction, 
and to orchestrate the health education campaign. The Village 
Development Committee (VDC), in particular and extension workers such as 
the FWE and ACDO, were identified as most suitable to undertake this 
task. It was argued that active community participation was a 
pre-condition for building a village-based implementation capacity which 
could become self-sustaining and replicable. 
The experience of ESPP fell short of these expectations. Community 
participation through voluntary groups was negligible and could not 
match the support provided by the Council's project team. No 
implementation capacity was built up which in part explains why so many 
of the participants abandoned the project and the construction of their 
latrines as soon as the project team departed after two years (see Table 
10). Moreover, no health education campaign associated with the project 
was implemented and no effort has been made to start one since the 
termination ·of the project. Presently, neither the VDC nor extension 
workers in the ESPP villages have been charged with the responsibility 
for promoting sanitation according to the principles of the project. 
Because implementation depended on an external project team, it meant 
that the momentum of the project died as soon as the project team 
departed. ESPP has become a distant memory symbolised by a scattering 
of half-complete and abandoned VIP latrines. The failure of the project 
to become self-sustaining must be attributed to the fact that 
insufficient effort was made to assess the feasibility of incorporating 
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village institutions into the delivery system, and the pre-occupation 
with achieving rapid results which prompted reliance on the project team 
and which led to the abandonment of the health education campaign. In 
the end, the objective of promoting institution-building as one of the 
major components of the project was subordinated to the compulsion to 
achieve rapid results. 
This experience is being repeated in the current SHESP project. The 
project teams have been assuming an increasingly dominant function in 
project implementation and have achieved rapid results in latrine 
construction. While this is commendable in its own right, it does 
1 i tt le to improve the imp.l ementat i on capac ity of community development 
institutions and only reinforces an attitude of dependence on external 
agencies. One must wonder what will happen once the current stage of 
the project is finished and the project teams move to new villages. Who 
will support the health education campaign and how will households in 
the future obtain access to support and advice to maintain VIP latrines 
and to build new ones? 
At the same time, there has been recent evidence of active community 
participation in planning a health education campaign in the Kgatleng 
"river villages". Several successful health education workshops have 
been organised by the project teams on behalf of 'community groups, and 
have received support from relevant central government departments. At 
the time of writing, the main objective of these meetings has been to 
identify the best institutions to work through at the community level 
and to seek cooperation between such institutions. It remains to be 
seen if, in this instance, policy rhetoric can be translated into 
action. 
As research was carried out at a time when the pilot project had been 
terminated and the follow on project had not yet been launched 
officially, a decision was taken to try to provide explanations why 
community participation based on the mObilisation of village 
inst itut ions had failed to respond to the project and to assess the 
likelihood of greater success in the forthcoming project. Research 
aimed to ascertain the status of community participation in rural 
development generally. The findings from this research corroborate 
findings of an earlier government research programme which sought to 
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evaluate the role of village institutions,in rural development (Brown et 
al, 19B2). It is concluded that the constraints to community 
participation experienced in the sanitation project reflect broader 
features of community participation in Botswana, and these features 
must, therefore, be examined in order to explain why community 
participation in ESPP was not forthcoming and why, unless carefully 
planned, it may not materialise during the course of the current 
project. Difficulties in mobilising community support cannot, 
therefore, be attributed solely to shortcomings in the specific design 
and implementation of the project. 
THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS IN THE VWSP PROGRAMME: 
The community is a passive recipient of a service which'is installed and 
maintained by government personnel. It can be argued that the absence 
of community participation in project delivery has eliminated the risk 
of problems arising which could constrain the aChievement of policy 
objectives, as the rural sanitation project has experienced. A top-down 
delivery system has led to rapid implementation. However, the absence 
of community part i ci pat i on has rendered the reci pi ent totally dependent 
on government services for operation and maintenance which are already 
stretched to over-capacity. Water supplies would be better maintained 
and would be more reliable if the community itself was responsible for 
operation and maintenance as is the case in a number of other countries 
such as Malawi (Glennie, 1983). Water sub-committees could be 
established under the auspices of the Village Development Committee to 
operate and maintain water supplies. Under such a scheme, pump 
operators would be resident in the village and accountable to the 
community while dependence on government services would be reduced. 
Yet, such a proposal could only work if substantial changes were made to 
the type of technology that is used to supply water. The problem is 
,that environmental conditions constrain the options for alternative 
technologies, as discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore, ,account must be 
taken of the potential problems that can arise in depending on community 
institutions such as the VDC. In this respect, it is necessary to 
consider just how viable it is to delegate responsibilities ,to village 
institutions which may not be able to offer the necessary skills or 
credentials. It is, .therefore, necessary to consider the role of 
community institutions such as the VDC in rural development. 
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COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT - THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SPECIFIC PROJECTS: 
The Village Development Committee (VDC):' 
The ESPP Plan of Operations identified the VDC as the most suitable 
village institution which could contribute to the mobilisation and 
implementation of the sanitation project. It is probable, furthermore, 
'that in the event that the water supply programme is decentralised, the 
VDC will also be used to coordinate community participatfon. This is 
because the VDC is the major institution at the village level charged 
with the responsibility for planning and implementing village-based 
development projects. 
While the VDC is the most widely found, and most popular modern village 
institution, the influence it has exerted on village development has 
fallen short of original expectations. The research programme 
commissioned by government to evaluate the role of village institutions 
in rural development reached similar conclusions (Brown et al, 19B2). 
Fieldwork carri'ed out for this thesis corroborates these findings. The 
role of village institutions "in rural development must, therefore, be 
examined in order to assess their competence to support specific 
projects such as the VWSP and SHESP programmes. 
The VDC in Rural DevelOpment: 
The majority of VDC's function ineffectively and intermittently. and make 
few tangible contributions to community development. While the VDC has 
in some cases mobilised support for the construction of small self-help 
infrastructure projects, such as the building of houses, classrooms, or 
public latrines, their contribution to production-related projects or to 
decision-making as regards the setting of development priorities has 
been all the more limited. Far from being a forum for discussion, 
decision-making and mobilisation, as suggested in chapter 3, the vast 
majority of VDC's are ineffective and many do not function at all. 
Those that do, tend to support particular interests within the community 
rather than those of the whole community (Noppen, 1982). The'major.ity 
01' households, even in small villages with less than 500 residents have 
little contact with it. They know little about the activities or 
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purposes of the VDC, nor for that matter of other modern institutions 
(Wynne, 1981). This lack of popular support has been acknowledged by 
government who admit that the majority vary from poor to almost 
non-ex i s tant (LGSC, 1979). 
The following section examines the status of village institutions based 
on fieldwork conducted in Kweneng and Kgatleng districts (unless 
otherwise stated). Evidence is based on interviews with committee 
members, extension workers and village residents. 
Voluntary development groups such as the VDC, PTA and 48 are generally 
poorly supported by the community. Membership is low and attendance of 
meetings is irregular. The groups, themselves, are often poorly 
administered and lack leadership or a sense of purpose. This is true 
for the VDC as much as it is for some of the smaller committees. No 
more than perhaps 10% or 20% of a village population attend meetings 
organised by such groups including the VDC. Many households are just 
not interested in supporting these groups, while many claimed they did 
not know of their existence. 
In the Kgatleng district survey, the following was found. Overall, only, 
23% of households belong to or attend any village institution (see Table 
11). Of those who do, the most popular institutions are the VDC, the 
PTA, and to a lesser extent the Red Cross and 4B club. However, in the 
villages of Artesia, and Olifants Drift, the VDC was not mentioned at 
all by respondents, despite the fact that they exist. In Artesia, the 
VDC committee is alarmed that nobody had attended their meetings this 
last year and that few projects are being'undertaken. They complained 
that there is too much alcoholism in the village, and concluded that 
this has led to such apathy. However, an extension worker explained 
that the lack of community ,interest is due to the fact that the village 
is relatively new and is made up of a number of tribal 
feel little attachment to the area, or to one another. 
sub-groups which 
The vi 11 age has 
in fact been built up around a railway works. This disunity has been 
compounded by the fact that the newly appointed headman is elderly and 
sick and too'feeble to carry out his duties. 
Of the 77% of respondents who claim not to belong to any village group, 
a third claimed that the reason for this was that they did not know of 
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the existence of any of these groups. Many expressed complete 
disinterest. This is discussed in more detail in relation to the VDC. 
About 7D% of residents are in fact aware that their village has a VDC. 
22% said they did not know that there was one in existence while 7% were 
convinced that there was no VDC in the village at all (see Table 12). 
Df the majority who were aware of the VDC, few could make positive 
comments about its activities. 47% said that they had no idea what it 
was supposed to do, while others stated categorically that it does 
nothing at all, except to help itself. However, in Mabalane, attitudes 
towards the VDC seemed to be more positive. Again, one must recognise 
that there is significant, inter-village variation, and that this might 
also vary from year to year, according to who is elected to the 
comm i t tee. 
In all three villages, it was confirmed that there is a VDC present 
which is represented by an elected committee. In 01 ifants Drift', the 
committee admitted that the meetings are poorly attended and that one 
rarely found the same people attending the meetings. As a result, it 
was practically impossible to mobi,lise any activity in the community. 
Lack of support has been made worse by the recent drought. Increasing 
numbers of residents have left the village to seek employment in the 
urban sector, on the bordering South African farms, or on the local 
drought relief projects. Committee members explained that people were 
no longer prepared to provide labour without receiving payment for 
community projects. The committee felt that unless it received greater 
support from the District Council, it would not be able to exert a 
greater influence on village development. In Mabalane, however, the 
committee claimed that meetings are held on a regular basis at the 
tribal Kgotla and that the meetings are well attended. However, 
commitment to decisions reached is so poor that few policies are 
implemented. Moreover, the VDC also feels isolated from local 
government, and argues that it ought to receive greater support from 
extension workers, such as the ACDO. 
Findings from the Kweneng district survey are similar (see Table 13). 
Dnly 10% of the sampled households claimed to attend or belong to 
village groups. The VDC was the most popular group, followed by the Red 
'Cross. Most respondents felt that the activities of community groups 
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just did not interest them. Others insisted that such groups did not 
exist in their village. In Thamaga, the VDC is poorly organised and is 
unsure as to what it ought to be doing. There have also been 
difficulties in organising the election of new committee members because 
the current members have refused to stand down. In the other villages, 
the VDCs are inactive and complaints were made that they refuse to 
cooperate with other village groups, and extension workers, especially 
the health staff. 
Traditional Authority as an Agent of Change: 
By contrast, the Kgotla -. the traditional assembly presided over by the 
headman - still enjoys widespread support from the community in a way 
that no other modern village institution, including the VDC, can. The 
paradox is that while the Kgotla has retained influence in a political 
and social capacity, it no longer holds the responsibility for 
influencing policy concerning village development. 
The influence of the headman and the Kgotla is, therefore, considerable 
in an unofficial capacity, despite the fact that its legal 
responsibilities 
greatly reduced. 
towards decision-making and development have been 
Tribal authority is the only institution at the.· 
village level which can provide political legitimacy for any development 
activity that is undertaken in the community, or for any group working 
within the community. Without the approval of the Kgotla, it is 
difficult to obtain community support for any externally imposed or even 
community-based initiative. The political leverage enjoyed by the 
Kgotla reflects the fact that in the opinion of the majority of the 
rural population, it is tribal authority rather than any modern 
institution whiCh reflects their interests. As a result, any private or 
public institution or individual which intends to undertake work in a 
village for whatever purpose, including fieldwork for private research, 
must receive official permission from the headman before proceeding with 
that work. While this is by no means a written regulation, it is a 
formality which carries considerable weight and which must be treated 
with respect. 
There is, therefore, a substantial disparity between the de jure and de 
facto power of tribal authority, which the government is aware of. 
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While tribal authority has been denied access to rural policy 
formulation and implementation and despite government efforts to render 
it politically redundant, it has maintained a political relevance which 
means that it cannot be neglected, when examining community development. 
The discrepancy means that an evaluation of the role of traditional 
authority in community participation cannot be based on an examination 
of its de jure responsibilities. ·More importantly, one must consider 
the reasons why traditional authority has maintained its influence 
inspite of government efforts to weaken it through legislation. 
The village institution research project (Brown et al, 1982) also 
recognised the extent to which traditional institutions remain powerful. 
In one major study, it was concluded that more people attend and 
participate in Kgotla meetings in any one.day than attend and 
participate in more 'modern' institutions in a year (Wynne, 1981). 
Government has realised that legislation in itself cannot overcome the 
continued level of support for tribal authority, particularly in the 
more remote areas where the impact of modern government has been least 
felt. In such areas, the Kgotla is often the only institution which is 
represented (Noppen, 1982). This level of representation can be 
contrasted to that of the VDC and other modern institutions which may 
only be found in larger settlements. My own fieldwork conducted in 
Kweneng and Kgatleng districts, reached familiar conclusions. 
Respect and support for the Kgotla remains strong. Over three-quarters 
of household respondents in the seven survey villages claim that they 
attend Kgotla meetings when they are· resident in their home village (see 
Table 14). This might, however, be quite rare, given the seasonal 
migration to the lands and the high rate of migration to the urban 
sector. However, the Kgotla, rather than more modern village 
institutions remains the focal pOint for community decision-making on 
development issues and on local political, social and judicial matters. 
As such, any project which requires community participation in order to 
succeed, but which by-passes the Kgotla, is unlikely to attract the 
support of the community. 
The sanitation project which relies on modern. institutions to mobilise 
community participation and to coordinate the health education campaign, 
can only succeed if the relationship between the Kgotla and such 
designated modern institutions is good. In cases where there is 
competition for power between traditional and modern forces, including 
councillors, problems can arise as experienced in the village of Gabane 
where"health extension workers and the VOC have been unable to obtain 
the cooperation of the headman. However, there are instances when the 
headman enjoys little respect and it may be the councillor who can 
exercise more influence. Therefore, a project imposed from outside must 
be especially sensitive to the specific climate of local village 
politics. 
In one of the 'river villages' in Kgatleng district, the headman refused 
to call a Kgotla meeting to introduce the sanitation project to the 
community. Without the support of the headman, it was unlikely that the 
community would take an interest. Eventually, the meeting did take" 
place but only after the project coordinator threatened to report the 
headman to the paramount chief of the Kgatla tribe, who had been 
instrumental in publicising and endorsing th~ project" in the district in 
the first place. Generally, the Kgotla can provide the necessary 
political backing"to mobilise community support. It is, therefore, 
essential to use the Kgotla to provide legitimacy to modern village 
institutions and development projects. 
The Kgotla was, for example, put to good use in introducing the health 
education campaign to the village of Mathubudukwane. A Kgotla meeting 
was convened which was attended by a"ll local dignatories, village 
residents and government officers associated with the project. At this 
meeting, speeches were presented by the headman, by a senior government 
official and by the UNICEF country representative. Gifts were presented 
to the headman while government officials were entertained with a 
display of traditional dancing. 
Nevertheless, the popular support enjoyed by tribal authority is by no 
means guaranteed. As such, the village headman must earn the support 
and recognition of his community. The influence of the Kgotla depends 
on the personality and effectiveness of the headman (Manzardo, 1982). 
Similarly, relations with modern government institutions are often 
determined by the attitude of the headman (Odell, 1985). This 
'personality' factor is of particular importance because tribal 
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authority is upheld by custom rather than by a written constitution and 
is, therefore, subject to individual interpretation. 
Moreover, the absolute authority and respect that the Kgotla was once-
accustomed too, has been declining, as suggested in chapter 3. 
Authority has been lost as increasingly, the Kgotla is unable to 
determine community behaviour, especially in social and economic life. 
Thus, while the Kgotla remains the most powerful village institution, 
its absolute power has declined substantially. 
The village institution research programme (Brown et al, 1982) has noted 
the contradictory status.of tribal authority. It concluded that 
attendance at Kgotla meetings is generally poorer than in the past. 
There has been a growing loss of respect for the institution resulting 
from the'progressive erosion of the power base of its figure heads which 
today, are little more than poorly paid civil servants (Brown et al, 
1982). Furthermore, respect for headmen appointed by local government 
tends to be lower than for those who have been appointed according to 
Tswana custom (Manzardo, 1982). Consequently", one can detect a: 
" ... contradictory situation of an apparently declining institution which 
continues to have considerable effect." (Fortmann, 1983: pll) 
Hie impos it i on of modern community and 1 oca 1 government i nst itut ions has 
artificially separated political decision-making from social and 
economic development concerns at the village level. Yet-, so long as 
Batswana identify the Kgotla and headman as their true representative, 
community participation will be compromised if that representation is 
denied access to the development process. 
While researchers have concluded that community partiCipation cannot 
ignore the importance of the Kgotla in providing legitimacy to 
externally imposed development projects and, therefore, recommend the 
need to consult the Kgotla, many are concerned that a number of social 
customs which are reflected in the Kgotla, conflict with the goals of 
government and donor-supported community development projects. While 
the Kgotla is accountable to Tswana culture, it is recognised that this 
culture displays distinct features of social differentiation between 
nobility and commoners, the old and young, and between men and women 
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which some development projects seek to challenge. It has been noted by 
many that at Kgotla_meetings priority is given to the views of the old 
and wealthy (Fortmann,-1983). In particular: 
"The views of the young, the poor, and the inferior, not to speak of the 
women, count for very little." (Hoppen, 1982: p133) 
This can have serious consequences for the success of the sanitation 
project. It is widely recognised that women are responsible for 
household health and hygiene. Women are the 'drawers of water' (White 
et al, 1972), are responsible for clothes washing, cleaning, food 
preparation and child care. Attitudes and behaviour towards the use and 
protection of clean water and to safe excreta disposal concerns women 
more than anyone else within the household, though,ultimately it 
concerns everybody - young and old, male and female. Ideally the 
project must involve the active participation of women in planning and 
implementing the project. Yet this objective can be constrained by the 
customs of the Kgotla which restrict women from participating in'debate 
and decision-making, while giving priority to men. They are, however, 
likely to 'be less informed and less concerned about health related 
issues as indeed survey results suggested (Coppermann, 1978). 
The, Role of the Extension Worker: 
Extension workers are expected to provide technical assistance to the 
sanitation project by mobilising household participation, and by 
promoting the health education camapaign. In practice, the support 
provided by extension workers to ESPP was negligible, amounting to 
little more than occasional uncoordinated assistance. In some of the 
project villages, such as Olifants Drift, extension workers helped out 
in the collection of project contributions. It would appear that the 
FWE was, provided with' no guidelines nor assistance to incorporate 
project-related health education into her _responsibilities. However, it 
is noted that the health education component of the project was 
curtailed after the first year. Furthermore, cooperation between 
extension workers and other village institutions was often poor so that 
no concerted effort could be established. 
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The lack of support from extension workers can in part be attributed to 
problems associated with the district-level coordination of project 
implementation. At the same time, the poor results can be attributed to 
broader problems facing the role of the extension cadre in supporting 
community development. The experience of ESPP was by no means unusual 
but was symptomatic of the problems facing the extension worker more 
generally. It is not uncommon to find that the contribution made by 
extens ion workers to vi llage development is haphazard and 
un-coordinated. It is likely, therefore, that the current sanitation 
project and any future decentralised water supply project will confront 
similar constraints in trying to work through the village extension 
.team. The surveys conducted in Kweneng and Kgatleng districts tried to 
establish the extent to which this might be so. 
- The Role of the FWE and Community Health Education -
The FWE is expected to undertake regular house to house visits as part 
of her Primary Health Care duties within the village. However, only 25% 
of sampled households in the project villages in ·Kgatleng district could 
remember having been visited by their FWE in the last 12 months. 42% of 
the sample, however, knew that there was a FWE in their. village while 
17% did not even know that there was one at all (see Table 15). FWE's 
who were interviewed explained that many villagers do not recognise them 
as specifically FWEs. This is because residents tend not to 
differentiate between government workers within the community. In 
Arte~ia, people confuse the FWE with the ACDO while in Olifants Drift, 
villagers are not sure as to what the FWE is supposed to do. FWEs 
complained that they receive little support from the Council or from the 
Ministry of. Health, and that they are forced to spend a disproportionate 
part of their time helping out at the clinic. This problem has been 
worsened by the current drought. Government relief measures include 
compulsory feeding to vulnerable groups at village clinics on a daily 
basis. The duty of preparing meals has had ·to fall on the FWE. For 
these reasons, they are unable to undertake routine tasks such as house· 
to house visits, which is their primary responsibility. 
Findings in Kweneng district are similar. 
of the community had been visited by their 
There again, only about 25% 
FWE (see Table 16). 
Similarly, excessive time has had to be spent working at the clinic. 
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Table 15: Household Per~eptions 01 the FWE - Kgatleng DIstrict 
~--------- ---------
OllFANI, I AR1[5IA I "ABALAN[ AGGR( GA Tl 
f WE in ViII, ge 
-r--. ---r-----r 
- I I hi\~ not v;:; i le d ZI 39:; 3) ~ ~,'~ 31 34% " 2;; I I 
r w[ in V i I I i'J ~1 c I 
ha:. vi:; i le cl in 1,,:'1 9 1 (,~. 71 3Ji. I 20 21. 2q 
12 month::. I 
No f W~ in Village 13 In n I 21 24% 17% I 
Don't Kr,olol 12 21% 6 10'; I 18 20% 17% 
TOTAL 56 9n 63 101~ I 9T lOOt 100~ 
Table \7: Ho~sehcld PerceptIons of the VHe - H(jatleng Dis~rict 
! OLlFA~IS ARTES1A MOALANE I AGGREGATE 
I 
. i n Vi 11 aGe I I VHC - 8 11.% 26 1.1% 23 25% I 27. I h.,. done nothing I 
I VHC in Villi\gc - I 
I have visilc~/hcjd 14 25% 12 19;; 14 15% I 191; 
I rnecti:1g~ I 
I No VfiC in ViII ag-:; 15 27'; 8 In 9 10% I 15% I I 
I Oor,It K;"\o .. 1 9 3:. ~~ 17 27% 45 49% I 39% 
TOTAL 56 100~ 63 100~ 91 99% I 100~ 
Table 16: HO\Jseholds Having ReceIved a Visit from ~he "\.lE: - J(wenenc District 
7r:2.:c,ci;a !.'·-:-·:::.:-·;':e.:-': i Ga~a..,,~ f>blepolole Aggree:;:";.e 
J-I.A\S P.EC£IV::!) r: .. '.E. 
VISIT 15 ( 1]) 11 (,' ) 6 ( 1)) 79.(26) (21 ) 
~;o VISIT 73 (6) ) 3~ 05 ) 29 (8j) 226 (74) (9) 
T07a: 66(100) ,,(10J) 35( 100) j05( 100) ( 100) 
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While they might be active and useful at the clinics, they are not 
fulfilling their responsibility of working with and in the community. 
While those household members who attend clinic sessions may benefit 
from the presence of the FWE, those who live in remoter parts of the 
community and who might not be able to reach the clinic are being 
overlooked. A further problem is that cooperation between the FWE and 
other village groups is frequently poor. Often, FWEs try to work with 
the Kgotla, the VDC or the VHC, to encourage health and hygiene 
campaigns, but with apparently little success. This lack of cooperation 
is looked at in a little more detail. 
The VHC, 11 sub-committee of the VDC is a voluntary group, comprised of 
locally elected residents responsible for identifying community health 
needs, promoting health-related issues and for liaising closely with the 
work of the HIE. As such, it serves as a further link between the 
community and health staff within Primary Health Care. The VHC is, 
however, a relatively new institution which operates in only a few 
villages. _Over 33% of sampled residents in the Kgatleng district study 
do not know whether _or not their village has a VHC. -About 25% know that 
there is one but feel that it does little for them, especially in 
Artesia, where the proportion was 41% (see Table 17). Here, the VHC is 
completely inactive. No meetings have been arranged during the past 
year and there is a very real sense of apathy. There have been calls to 
have the committee re-elected especially since no actions have been 
planned to improve this current state of affairs. According to both the 
FWE and VDC, the VHC is supposed to encourage people to build latrines 
and provide information on water hygiene but these amongst other things 
has been ignored. It may be noted that-the committee member that was 
interviewed in Artesia was drunk at 11 in the morning. 
In Olifants Drift, we were told that- the VHC is also inactive because 
eight of the ten committee members are either working in South Africa or 
are employed on anon-going labour-intensive road project. Such 
absenteeism is a characteristic problem facing village voluntary groups. 
In effect, such groups can only be operational during the dry season 
when most village inhabitants have returned from the lands. This means 
that for up to 6 months, these groups lie dormant. Moreover, with so 
few employment opportunities available in- the village, the able-bodied 
and able-minded migrate away so that only the less able remain to run 
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village groups. This has been all the more so during the current 
drought when household members have been forced to migrate to find work, 
rather than stay in the village to maintain village groups on a 
voluntary basis. 
These findings on the role of village institutions in community 
participation are disappointing but not unexpected. Giv'en this 
background, the task of institution-building is challenging. The goal 
of achieving a long-term implementation capacity and an 
institutionalised health education programme within SHESP will be 
difficult to realise so long as' corrmunity participation faces these' 
constraints. It is only that it has been designed to operate through 
existing institutional arrangements, and with good reason too., It is 
possible that the experience of this project together with other 
corrmunity development initiatives will contribute to a strengthening of 
village institutions so that they can become more permanent and 
self-reliant units. However, the constraints identified illustrate the 
problems that government and the donor must face up to, in trying to 
implement a project from above, while relying on a high level of 
community support. 
Yet, providing that appropriate planning has been undertaken and that 
suitable individuals have been appointed to key positions in the 
project, the community can make a positive contribution to the project. 
, Recently, an active project team, working in association with an 
enthusiastic and dedicated FWE in Malolwane has organised some' 
successful community-based health workshops which have brought together 
members of voluntary groups, churches and extension workers to discuss 
the hardware and software components of the project. The 'corrmunity has 
been active in other areas too, concerning decision making. The design 
of the latrine unit was amended to include a door following a full 
council meeting in which councillors stronglY,voiced their objection to 
the existing spiral design (Land & Raditloaneng, 1985b). 
Constraints operating at the community and local government levels 
undermine the tight implementation timetable set by the donor agency. 
Results are achieved slowly and patchily. However, the donor is only 
committed to the project for a 2 year period, after which support might 
well be retracted. As a result, the major objectives of the project, 
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such as the construction of latrine units within the project period may 
not be achieved. However, in order to exhaust funds before the 
termination of the project, which is interpreted as a measure of project. 
success, emphasis is placed on intenSifying construction so that as many 
units as possible can be built. Emphasis is, therefore, directed to 
quantity rather than to quality, in a situation of crisis management. 
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POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF THE HOUSEHOLD: 
The success of the sanitation project and similar bottom-up projects 
depend on widespread household participation. Policy objectives cannot 
be met if recipients are unable to participate. Such projects· are, 
therefore, vulnerable to factors constrai.ning household participation. 
By contrast, in top-down projects, policy implementation is unaffected 
by such issues and therefore objectives can be more easily achieved. 
This section illustrates the significance of constraints at the 
household level affecting project delivery. On the basis of the Kweneng 
and Kgatleng household surveys (see methodology), the capacity of 
households to provide self-help contributions to the sanitation project 
is examined. 
Participation is determined by a households capacity and willingness to 
take part. This study concentrates on the former issue taking as given 
that households wish to have a latrine provided by the project. Field 
data suggests that almost all households would like to have a latrine, 
be it for reasons of health, convenience, privacy or status (see table 
18) . It is, therefore, necessary to i dent i fy factors affect i ng the 
capacity to participate through the provision of cash (30 Pula), labour 
and building materials. Results from the field indicate that the 
capacity to participate is positively correlated with socio-economic 
status and that levels of participation vary between households, between. 
villages, and seasonally too. Despite subsidy, a significant number of 
households do not have the means.to provide a self-help contribution, 
while· some households have had to drop-out because of an unanticipated 
shortage of resources. 
The ability to provide cash and labour are primary factors determining 
participation while access to materials is a secondary factor contingent 
on the primary factors. To provide cash, a household must have access 
to a disposable cash income. Such access is determined primarily by the 
income and employment status of the household but also by a variety of 
mediating factors. To provide labour, a household must either have 
access to able-bodied household members or be able to hire labour. 
Circumstances vary according to the age, sex, employment and income 
status of households. The type of materials used is determined by both 
Table 18: Reason For Wantlng a l.trine - Kgatleng ['istnct 
OllFANTS ARTESIA HA8ALANE AGGREGATE 
I Don't 103:"lt latrine 3~ 2 5~ 3~ I 
I CO:1venienc.e 23 61% 2' 55~ 21 68% 61 ); 
I Mealth benefits 5 13% 13 30% 6 19% 2l% I 
I Privacy· 2 5% 2% 3 10% 5% 
I CCo:lbination of a~ove 5 13% 4% I 
I Other 3% 2 5% 3% 4% 
I No reason 3% 2% 2% I 
I TOTAL 38 101~ 43 100~ 31 100X 100X 
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socio-economic and geographical factors. Income status, in particular, 
can influence whether purchased manufactured materials such as tin 
sheeting are used instead of traditional rural materials such as thatch. 
Geography determines access to markets and supplies retailers accor9ing 
to the location of settlements while the endowment of the physical 
environment determines the nature of locally available materials. Here, 
there is a seasonality dimension too. For example, during ESPP, thatch 
was not used owing to a shortage of grass resulting from drought while 
it was found that smaller and remoter villages tended to use traditional 
mud bricks to build the latrine superstructure because of the absence of 
any nearby cement brick making plant (see tables 19, 20). 
ACCESS TO CASH AS A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION: 
The following analysis is based upon the Kgatleng ESPP evaluation survey 
unless otherwise indicated. Baseline data from the survey villages 
indicates household socio-economic characteristics consistent with wider 
analyses of the rural economy (see ch .3). Mean household incomes are 
low with a majority below the poverty datum line. While most households 
have at least one wage earner, employed outside of the rural sector, 
informal incomes and arable cultivation are required to satisfy basic 
needs while only a minority of households own cattle (see tables 21, 
22). However, there is substantial variation in total incomes, access 
to wage employment and ownership of livestock on an intra- and 
inter-village basis, consistent with evidence of a high Gini coefficient 
in the rural economy at large. 
Socio-economic differentiation is reflected in levels of project 
participation. There is a positive correlation between rising income 
levels and partiCipation. Households already owning latrines are 
amongst the wealthiest whilst households unable to partiCipate are 
amongst the poorest. ESPP participants fell between these two. This 
correlation was also evident on an inter-village level so that 
participation rates and existing latrine ownership was highest in the 
wealthiest of the three villages and lowest in the poorest (see tables 
23-28). 
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Table Iq: Factors Determining Ty~e of Materials Used in latrir;e Construction - Kga~leng District 
OLlrANTS ARIES!A ~hBAlANE AGGREGhTE 
I Availability 5 B5t 2 55t 5 42% 59% I I 
I Co,t I 4 33% !B% 
I Other 14% I 33% 8% 15% I I 
I Don't kno .... I 2 17% 9% 
tTOTAL 7 lOOt I 3 99% 12 lOOt 101% 
Table 2.0: Source of Buildi~g Materials Used - Kgatleng District 
oLlr ANT S I ARIES!A MABAlANE AGGREGA lE 
Loca 1"1 y 3 43% 1 33% 5 50% 45% 
-I 
South Africa 3 43% I S% 18% 
left-overs 14% 33% 8% 14% 
Hochuci 33% 8% 9% 
Com~ination - Locally 
and South Africa 2 1 ,., 
"-
9% 
Botsl.lana 8% 5% 
TOThL 7 100% 3 gg% 12 ggt lOOt 
2·17 
Household income was measured according to four indicators - total 
. . 
monthly income, total income earners, total wage earners and ownership 
of livestock. Capacity to provide cash and labour requires access to a 
disposable cash income. This condition is best satisfied in high income 
households. Obtaining d high income is contingent on access to. wage 
employment and/or ownership of cattle. 
Wage incomes are important because they provide the highest and most 
regular form of remuneration and are paid in cash. Cattle represent 
valuable assets which when sold can provide an immediate source of 
disposable cash. However, for the majority of households who do not own 
cattle, access to wage employment is the primary factor determining 
their total income. Incomes are supplemented by informal sector 
activities such as beer brewing and casual farm labour, by subsistence 
farming and by hunting and gathering. These sources of income are ·most 
important in those households with only one, or no wage earner at all. 
Thus, households already with latrines were the wealthiest with a mean 
monthly income of 82 Pula. A higher proportion of such households had 
access to two or more wage incomes and owned cattle, and were 
consequently less dependent on informal sector activities. Such 
households have had sufficient income available to be able.to invest in 
what for the majority is considered to be a non-essential luxury. 
ESPP participants had a mean monthly income of 58 Pula, while 
non-participants had an income of 54 Pula. Both groups had fewer total 
income sources, access to wage employment and owned fewer cattle. By 
contrast, such households rely more extensively on informal sector 
employment. However, non-participants - the poorest on average - were 
most dependent on informal sector opportunities~ These figures suggest 
two things. First, both groups are significantly less well off than 
those households which already have latrines. Second, ESPP has provided 
an opportunity for such households to invest in a latrine. However, the 
self-help commitment required is still significant and clearly a number 
of different contingent factors have prevented some households with 
comparable incomes from participating. 
An inter-village comparison also suggests that household income status 
varies spatially. Consequently, participation rates are highest in the 
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Table 21: livestocK Ownership by Village & by SOClo-Economic Group - I\gatleng District 
I I MABALAN[ I 
--I NON- I NO I OLlfANIS ARI[SIA [SPP I I I i I [SPP I LATRINE I , 
I I" -------1------,-.-)--·· I ~ 18 I I'" I I I ivest0:'", ,0 J)% L. e~; : .- 11 >. L.j% 8 L) 32'1 I I j: I" I I ' , I 
15"11",,. I ,3 <c, I 10 1o'; I i- J2% i 11 25% I 18 3< >. I 33 1>~1 I I ; I I I 
iC"tl, 2. r d ~r.,2jlstc.(~ I e lL% I 11 l~% 113 32% I 7 15% I I 7 32% I {5 11>' : I I I ~ 1 
I, _ .. 
c r.l f I , 7% I 5 E" I E% I 5 J 1't. I (, 11% : 5 ,%1 1- - , • , I I , I ! 
le. l ' en 1 J { L% I S B% I 7 e% I 3 7% I , 0% I 7 0%1 I a, I e 
I 1 I f ! ' I '! 
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Table 2Z: Access to Draught Power by Village & by SOClo-Ecc~~mlc Group - Kgatleng District 
ARTESIA MABALAN[ 11 NON- NO 1 OllfANTS 
11 
[SPP [SPP LAIRINEI 
, li 32%1 1 < g" I, 33t 5e 7<~ 16 50% 32 73% 25 i i ," 2. (. ~ (.I r '. li i 
iO""y 35 81% II 28% i 10% 11 8 25% I 6 14% <0 I I 11 I 49~1 I 
I 3 7% g 23% I 6 . 8~ 1I 3 9% 1 3 7% 12 15%: I c·''" I I, I 
loco" "". 2% < 10% 
1 , B% li 5 15% I 3 1 I I! I 7% 3 4%j 
ITOT~L 43 99% 39 99% 73 100% ~ 32 100% I 44 101% 70 100" I 
11 I . 'I 
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wealthier villages. Aggregate mean monthly incomes varied between 60 
Pula in Mabalane, to 45 Pula in Artesia and 43 Pula in Olifants Drift. 
Mean incomes in the latter two villages were, therefore, below the 
Poverty Datum Line. These figures reflect the fact that Mabalane 
residents have better access to wage employment and livestock and are 
less dependent on informal sector employment as compared to the other 
two villages. In particular, only 18% of Mabalane households do not 
have a wage income compared to 39% in Olifants Drift and 44% in Artesia. 
Mabalane is in fact the largest of the three villages situated on a 
major district highway running west to Mochudi - the district capital -
and east to South Africa and the cluster of 'river villages'. The 
village offers a greater number of formal sector activities, while many 
of the able-bodied are employed in Gaborone, Mochudi and South Africa. 
Mabalane provided the largest proportion of participants and has 
recorded the highest completion rates (see table 10). 
Secondary factors constraining a household's capacity to participate 
concern the disposability of household income. While higher incomes 
make it easier to invest in the project, for poorer households, choices 
must be made as to how available income is spent. Individual households 
face particular social and economic circumstances which determine the 
disposability of income and, therefore, the capacity to participate. 
These factors are significant given the low absolute levels of income 
and the range of potential financial commitments which individual 
households must face. The decision to participate may, therefore, be 
determined by the relative influence of such factors and explains 
variations in participation between households of similar income. 
The nature and impact of such intervening factors vary, in particular, 
according to the stage reached in a household's life-cycle and according 
to season. Several examples can be cited. 
Over and above the satisfaction of basic household needs, there are 
often obligations to spend money to pay for school fees and clothing for 
school children at the beginning of the academic year, for social 
commitments for weddings, burials and other social events, to support 
other family members, and invest in 'homemaking' or in acquiring basic 
means of production for cultivation. Evidence from other surveys 
suggests that new residents are unlikely to consider the construction of 
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a latrine a priority until at least two rondavels, a kitchen and the 
compound wall of their new plot have been built (HHC, 1985). 25% of 
such 'new' residents explained that at the time of the ESPP project, 
they had had insufficient cash to invest in the project. 
There are seasonal variations too, influenced by the agricultural season 
and the cycle of. circular migration to formal sector employment in 
Botswana and South Africa. In the former case, household income, either 
in kind, or in cash reaches a seasonal low in the immediate months 
preceeding the harvest in April, as food reserves are depleted. Income 
from informal activities such as beer brewing also tends to vary 
according to seasonal commitments, and.to when migrant workers are 
present in the ~illage. In the latter case, households must wait for 
the arrival of remittances or the return of migrant workers when their 
contracts expire. 
The significance of this seasonal dimension cannot be underestimated as 
it can have a major impact on the timing and coordination of project 
activities, and the corresponding availability of cash and labour. 
Finally, participation can be influenced by unpredictable or 
unanticipated events. Such an example is the recent drought. Drought 
conditions have intensified the marginal existence of rural households 
and increased the value of having access to a cash income in order to 
subsist. Yields from subsistence agriculture have continued to fall and 
are inadequate to sustain basic nutritional requirements. Disposable 
cash must, therefore, be used to purchase food from commercial sources, 
over and above food entitlements that households receive under 
government's drought relief programme. Disposable income is used to 
satisfy basic sUbsistence requirements, and cannot be invested in 
comparative luxuries such as latrines. In these circumstances, 
available labour is ·used to increase household income rather than to 
support non-productive and relatively non~essential projects. 
ACCESS TO LABOUR - A SECONDARY CONSTRAINT TO PARTICIPATION: 
The capacity to provide labour for the project is a secondary influence 
on rates of participation. However, it is significant only for those 
households which are resource poor. Relatively wealthy households with 
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higher· disposable incomes are able to hire labour to build their latrine 
rather than build it themselves. This has been the case most recently 
in Kgatleng district where households have employed the project team. 
The discussion here, therefore, concentrates on those households which 
are unable to hire labour and must resort to the provision of household 
labour. 
The ability to provide labour depends on whether or not a household has 
access to the able-bodied. This varies according to the specific 
socio-economic status of a particular household. Of most importance is 
the age and sex structure of the household and its employment 
characteristics. The significance of these factors varies temporally 
and seasonally. 
Households willing to participate may be unable to provide labour 
because no able-bodied household members exist or because they are 
absent. The·former circumstance is found in households belonging to the 
elderly and in some Female Headed households. The latter circumstance 
is found in households where the able-bodied are employed outside of the 
village in the formal sector or at the lands. In the sample villages, 
16% of households which had not taken part in the project explained that 
they would have taken part but for the fact that they·were at the lands 
at the time of implementation (see Table 29). 
In such situations, labour might be unavailable for an extended period 
or only during the summer months. The availabilty of labour is, 
therefore, determined by the wider characteristics of the rural economy. 
In particular, the out-migration of the able-bodied is attributed to the· 
absence of income earning opportunities and the marginalisation of 
arable production. However, even where labour is available in the 
vi 11 age, it may be requi red for other purposes .. As noted above, duri ng 
the drought,.such labour has been attracted to labour-intesive projects 
which offer payment and provide food. 
Certain socio-economic groups such as Female Headed households and the 
elderly are more disadvantaged lacking both access to the able-bodied 
and to regular employment, and are thus less able to participate in the 
project. Yet it is often such households which are the most needy but 
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least able to help themselves. These conclusions are illustrated with 
results from the Kweneng SHESP feasibility study. 
Between a third and two thirds of sampled households are able to provide 
both cash and labour for the project. The proportion varied between 43% 
in Gabane and 62% in Thamaga. By contrast, up to a quarter of 
households could neither provide money nor labour, while the remainder 
could only make a partial contribution - that is labour but no cash or 
vice-versa. 
Of those households which are able to provide labour, over three 
quarters explained that they would have to obtain this labour from 
outside the household. Obtaining labour may involve a cash outlay or 
some form of reciprocal arrangement. The implication is that cash has 
become increasingly necessary in the rural economy in order to obtain 
basic goods and services, such as manpower. The importance of access to 
labour and cash on project participation is considered in more detail as 
it affects a number of socio-economic household categories. 
- Households unable to contribute labour or cash; 
These households are poorer than the average with lower incomes and 
fewer assets. Compared to the average, a smaller proportion have access 
to wage incomes and to cattle. Only 42% have access to a wage income 
compared to the average of over 60% (see Table 30). 
- Households able to make a full contribution; 
These households are wealthier than the sample average with higher cash 
incomes. A larger proportion have access to wage incomes and a smaller 
proportion are without cattle nor wage incomes as compared to the sample 
average. 69% of such households have access to wage incomes compared to 
the average 60% (see Table 31). Of particular note is the fact that 
twice as many households in this category have access to wage incomes 
and own.cattle (40%), as compared to those households which cannot 
contribute at all. 
- Households which already have latrines; 
These households were on average the wealthiest in the communities 
sampled and had had the opportunity to invest in a latrine without the 
need for a government subsidy (see Table 32). Indeed, it was found that 
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Table 2q; Awareness of ESPP but Reason GIven for Non-PartJClpation - Kgatleng District 
OLlFAHTS ARTESTA I MABALAHE AGGREGA lE I 
Not aware 16 42% 20 47% I 9 2B% 40% I I I 
Aware but no lIoney 8 21% 9 21% I 12 38% 25% I 
Aware but away at time 6 16% 5 12% I 7 22% 15% I I I 
Aware but no reason 2 5% 2 5% I 3% 4% I 
Aware but labour 3 8% I 3% I no I I 
A...,arc but [SPP departed 3% 2 5% I 3% I 
Other 2 S" 5 12% I 3 9% 9% I I I 
TOTAL 38 lOOt 43 102t I 32 lOOt 101t I 
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80% of this category had access to a wage income while just 13% was 
found to have neither access to wage incomes nor to cattle. 
- Female-headed households; 
This category of households is given special consideration as it is 
becoming increaSingly common in the rural sector and is particularly 
prone to economic hardship (see ch 3). Consequently, as a disadvantaged 
group, it is least able to participate: It was found that as compared 
to the sample average, a slightly larger proportion can make no 
contribution at all to the project (27%), while a smaller proportion can 
make a full contribution (38%), (see Table 33). This reflects the fact 
that a smaller proportion of such households have access to wage 
employment while a considerably larger number have neither access to 
wage incomes, nor. to cattle. Moreover, fewer belong to the wealthier 
socio-economic groups which have access to both wage incomes and own 
cattle - just 17% compared to an average of 31%. Of those Female-headed 
households which could make a full contribution, less than one third 
said that they could rely on household labour. Such households would 
have to rely on cash sources in order to hire labour.and, therefore, 
represent the wealthiest of the Female-headed households. 
HOUSEHOLD PROFILES: 
A project participant: Mpho Matlapeng. 
Mpho is a resident of Olifants Drift in Kgatleng district. She is 
married and shares her home with her mother, two sons, daughter and 
grandchild in a.three rondavel compound. By the standards of the 
village, her household is quite wealthy. Her husband is employed 
clandestinally as a farm worker across the Limpopo river in South 
Africa, while her eldest son has a job in the Selibi-phikwe mine. 
Their income is shared by the household and is supplemented by the sale 
of traditional beer. While they have lands, in past years they have not 
ploughed because of the drought. Mpho says that they earn about P60 per 
month and that they also have some savings invested in a few head of 
cattle. They decided to take part in the project because the latrine 
which they had built themselves earlier had collapsed and was dangerous. 
They were able to take part because cash could be provided from. her 
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i.ble 30: Soclo-Economlc Status of Households whIch Cannot Cor.trlbute to SHESP - Kweneng District 
ThQlII(lijo. ..-on\;'~ocI' (,,·bBn<i: t'tolep~ro\e As,r-e,fClte 
~OClO- Total 1'0 lal Tot. .. l Toul Totlll E;CONOMIC Sa",pl e Sample 5o"""le Swnplc SlI"'ple S'i'AiI.l5 
}.Io WAvE 
NO C,.,iTLE 6 (~3) (25) 2 (12) (11 ) 13( 30} et3 ) le (29) (~4 ) (3' )) 
) 
(Z 1). 
tIo ".<;s )(56) 
CPiTTLE 6 (m 2. (zz) 1 (10) 8 (20) (21 )l 
"A~E 
NO C'Pr.rTl .. 6 
-
(-) ) 2. (22)1 ~ (40») 10 (~J) (22)) 
"'AG" \-l (~,) 53) (66) ~(60 (60) ~(51 ) (60) l(42) (57 ) 
:! (~,)J , CAln .• 1i 
- H) 2. (2.0)1 11 (27)) (20») 
TOTAL.: 14- (100) ~ (9) 10( 100) 41(100) ( 100) 
Table 31: Socio-Economic Status of Households which Can Contribute Fully to SHESP - Kweneng District 
Tha~~a Mrrankgod i Cabane M.olep::.lolc Aggregata 
5;:"ClO-
'i'0t2.1 70'..;::': -: c,'..io. ~ 'rot')1 ,ot~l ~..cO:-llA1IC 5:o... •. ;.1c Sa.."':",;.,;'c Sa::-".1 co Sa."';".plc Sn.;:-,;,.le 
sr;.TJS 
NO \o,'/,G£ 
~;() CA ?ILl:: 9 ( ,7) (2~' ) 
-
(-) ( : I ) 3(2C) . 2») 21 ( '6) (2, ) ( 13)) (2 ;) ) 
:;0 ... ·"cs ) 
C;"l"JLE 14 (26 ; , ( ·,9) 2\~)) lj(l1) (17) l 
... ·AGE 
;;0 CAT"ii..E 8 ( '5) l 9 (53) ) f:'C')l . 36(30)) (30) ) (r-..,' (lt3 ) l (81) (60 (6"0 (60) lOI ) (60) ) (69) (57) ) J" ) 
... ·f.Gt. ) ) ) ) ( 39) l 
CATi'LE 2~' (~2) ) 
" 
(4(,)) 4(27)) 50(4 1)l 
TC7AL: 53(100) 26 (10,)) 1:'( 10J) '20( 100) (99) 
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husband's and son's wage incomes. 
labour and built the latrine from 
Her other son was able to provide 
materials taken from the collapsed 
latrine. Her husband brought roofing material from his place of work in 
South Africa. In this way, they were able to reduce the costs of 
construction to a minimum. 
A non-participant: Grace Raketse. 
Grace is an unmarried mother of two, who lives with her mother and-
children in a run down twin roomed house in Artesia. Her family is 
desperately poor with no steady source of income and no assets. Though 
she has lands, she cannot afford to hire cattle or labour to do the 
ploughing so the fields have been abandoned. Consequently, she survives 
as a recipient of drought relief food rations. Her grandmother earns a 
little money by brewing Khadi - a traditional alcoholic concoction -
while Grace has been looking for work in Gaborone where she sometimes 
stays with her aunt. Under these conditions, she cannot imagine being 
able to take part in the-project, even though she dislikes having to use 
the bush, and is concerned for her mother who is getting increasingly 
feeble and has difficulty going to the bush. 
The non-project latrine owner: Isaac Mopipi. 
Isaac is a wealthy and respected man who owns a bottle store and a share 
of the 1 oca 1 bus company. He li ves in the new part of Maba 1 ane in a 
large modern-style house which was built by a South African contractor 
from Zeerust. Here, he lives with his wife, who is the chairwoman of 
the local Botswana Council of Women, his mother .. uncle, son, daughters 
and grandchild. His son is employed in the Broadhurst industrial estate 
in Gaborone, and is only home on the week-end while one of his daughters 
is schooling at Molefi secondary school in Mochudi. His uncle spends 
most of the time looking after the cattle and trekking them to the 
Lobatse abattoir. While Isaac did not want to disclose his income, it 
was clear that he was comparatively wealthy, as a self-employed local 
businessmen, who owned an undisclosed number of cattle and owned a 
Toyota Stout pickup. He had had a latrine built when the main house was 
constructed-but employed a local-contractor from Oodi who charged him 
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Table 32: Socio-Economic Status 04 Households whIch Already OWr') a Latrine - Kweneng DIstrict 
l'\oJepol 01 e. 
Tota] S~l'Ilp]c 
110 WAGE 
~o CAnu; 6 ( 1 ~) 
NO \iAGE 
tlO CATILt" 4- (9) 
~AGE 
)010 CA1Tl,.l'O: 16 (35) 
) (78) (60) 
"Ar,;E 
tiC CATn.f 20 (4,) 
TOTAl-, 1)6( 100) 
Table 33: Socio-Economic Status of Single. Divorced and Widowed FHHs Which Can Either MaKe a 
Full Cor>tributlon oc No Con~ributlor, t: SHESP - I("'ener,g DIstciq 
r;o Co"trlbutior. 
':'ota'i Sa;:-.;,.1 c Full Contribution 'lot?l Sa;nple 
t:o \oI/.CE 
iJJ(.. CATTLE jj (~8) 0' ) '0 (32) ( 1 » 
N0 ",'AC;t 
CATTLE j ( I}) ~ ( 13) 
~A~E 
~10 CA'M'-LI 7 (jO) ) (42) 11 (j5) ) 
l (39) l(~O) (69) WAG!:: ) ) 
CA'TrLE 2 ( 9 ) l 6 ( 19) l 
,",OTAL' 23 ( 100) 31 (99) 
ACC·):n:T5 F'JR 27% OF rril-! SA.':?~E ACCllt'l;l'£: roFi. 3F1)& OF Frm Sk·a-LF. 
CQV.PA.Ri3 'N 20)~ OF TCY!"AL COl';PiI.R.::.:.J TO 53% OF TOC'j,L SAj-~LE 
SAi'2i.E 
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over P450 to build it. He thought that the project was only supposed to 
help the destitute, and that other people ought to build their latrine 
themselves. 
SUMMARY: 
It is clear that while a partially subsidised project offers a service 
to a proportion. of the community, which would be prohibitively expensive 
if it were unsubsidised, the requirement of a self-help contribution can 
discriminate against the poorest. Certain households are unable to 
provide either cash or labour and cannot participate irrespective of 
their need for the service. Furthermore, dependence on household 
contributions means that the project must be designed to suit local 
social and economic conditions. This concerns, in particular, the 
timing of project activities. Too many households were unable to 
participate because household members were seasonally unavailable and/or 
. because household income was temporarily scarce. To achieve full 
participation, the project must be available for a longer period while 
alternative funding arrangements must be made to accomodate the poorest. 
Because the project depends on individual self-help contributions, 
success is contingent on these broader. socio-economic variables. 
However, the socio-economic status of rural households has been largely 
determined by government's rural development strategy. Policy has not 
been conducive to improving the socio-economic status of the rural 
household but has on the contrary created poverty and inequality. Under 
such circumstances, households have not been provided with the means to 
be able to make voluntary contributions to projects which in themselves 
provide no direct economic benefits. 
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THE CONSTRAINTS TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: 
This section seeks explanations for the poor record of community 
participation examined above. Discussion focusses primarily on the VDC 
as the principal village institution charged'with mobilising and 
implementing community development projects. Constraints to more 
effective partiCipation can be attributed to four factors: 
- The struggle for power between modern state and tribal institutions. 
- The use of a top-down delivery system in rural development. 
- Administrative and techn'ical constraints. 
- The modest supportive role provided by the Extension Worker. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN MODERN STATE AND TRIBAL INSTITUTIONS. 
An underlying power struggle between tribal authority and the modern 
state at the village level, is responsible for the disharmony in 
COlll11unity part'icipation which has led to the reported ineffectiveness of 
COlll11unity institutions. This conflict forms part of a larger power 
struggle between the modern state and tribal authority which can be 
traced back to colonial times (see ch 2 & 3). At the root of this 
struggle is the state's desire to extend its influence to the rural 
periphery and to gain legitimacy in a rapidly changing society has 
emerged from a history of colonial rule and societal transformation. 
Leaders of the independent country, educated according to Western 
standards and keen to develop their country along Western lines, have 
sought to do away with the tribal system, perceiving it as an 
anachronism and obstacle to its ambition of integrating the separate 
tribes into a cOlll11on nation-state and to develop a common nationalist 
sympathy. 
While at the national and, even at the district level, this struggle has' 
been largely settled, with the curbing of any form of tribal influence 
in the decision-making arena at the cOlll11unity level, the strength of 
tribal authority has remained substantial despite efforts by the state 
to weaken it through legislation and the introduction of modern 
institutions such as the VDC, councillor and extension worker. 
Nevertheless, the state has been unab'le to sever the 1 ink between the 
Kgotla, as the symbol of tribal authority and the rural population. The 
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state has had to accept that for the time being tribal authority is the 
only institution which can claim to represent the legitimate interests 
of rural society. 
Yet, while the Kgotla has indeed maintained a high level of political 
influence at the village level, it has been effectively excluded from 
socio-economic rural development activities. It, therefore, enjoys 
political leverage but no economic leverage. By contrast,. the VDC 
enjoys responsibility for managing socio-economic development affairs, 
recelvlng support from local authorities, donors and extension workers, 
but lacks any political legitimacy at the cOlTTl1unity level. In 
recognising the political authority enjoyed by tribal authority, the 
state has, inspite of its long-term ambitions to do away with tribal 
authority, accepted the need to work through it as a means of 
legitimising its rural policy objectives at the village level. 
The state recognises that the achievement of policy objectives is 
contingent.on COlTTl1unity support which depends, in turn, on obtaining the 
support of the Kgotla. The rural constituency continues to channel its .. 
political aspirations through the Kgotla rather than through modern 
state institutions. In fact, the state, and more particularly the 
Botswana Democratic Party; has not created a local party·system 
recognising that most of rural society is still insufficiently familiar 
with western political culture to merit one, while remaining faithful to 
Tswana pol~tical culture (Vengroff, 1977). In such circumstances, it is 
difficult for the state to extend its legitimacy to the periphery. For 
most of rural society, of which a large part is semi-literate or 
illiterate and whose social and political life does not extend beyond 
the cOlTTl1unity, or the district, modern state institutions are perceived 
as alien to their culture. 
Therefore, rural households tend to vote according·to the political 
choice of their chief, whom they view as their legitimate leader and 
spokesman (Vengroff, 1977). Government has, therefore, concentrated on 
attracting the support of tribal leaders to their policies. Dn the 
whole, this policy has been successful, with rural areas voting 
uniformly for the government party, though there have. been notable 
exceptions too (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980; Parson, 1984). By contrast, 
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the locally elected councillors have failed to command any meaningful 
support from the electorate (see below). 
The Kgotla, therefore, is instrumental in providing political support to 
the socio-economic activities of modern institutions such as the VDC. A 
number of contradictions can, therefore, be identified in the 
relationship between the modern state and tribal authority. 
Therefore, most modern institutions working at the village level such as 
the VDC are established as SUb-committees of the Kgotla while tribal 
leaders are normally appointed as ex-officio members to such 
institutions. By linking the modern institution to the traditional, the 
kgotla legitimises the activities of these less well known institutions 
(Fortmann, 1983). Inso doing, it is antici.pated that the de facto 
political strength of the Kgotla can be married to the·de jure economic 
authority of the VDC. The particular way in which the Kgotla can 
legitimise the activities of .the VDC in community participation can be 
attributed to several factdrs. 
Under Tswana custom, tribal authority enjoyed a right to mobilise labour 
according to the system of age-regiments to support a variety of tribal 
activities ranging from public works, such as well sinking and bush 
clearance, to active engagement in battle. This represented a form of 
indigenous community participation. Under.contemporary circumstances, 
community participation requires similar cooperation and this can only 
be achieved by involving the Kgotla. To this effect, the state has 
accepted that the Kgotla must be used to provide legitimacy to its own 
inspired self-help projects. 
In reality, it has been difficult to convince the Kgotla to cooperate 
with modern institutions when it recognises that it no longer enjoys the 
right to determine policy itself. Tribal authority resents the loss of 
power to such institutions and the right to determine tribal affairs. 
By taking over the responsibility for community development, the VDC in 
particular, symbolises the intrusion of the modern state into tribal 
life. Tribal authority is all too aware that the VDC is the first 
village institution to have executive rights which are separate from the 
judicial authority of the Kgotla (Wynne, 1981). 
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Tribal leaders can, therefore, refuse to cooperate with this rival 
institution when it is felt that the VDC threatens their customary 
status and authority. The paradox, then,is that while the Kgot1a feels 
threatened by modern institutions such as the VDC, it still enjoys 
widespread community support. Older sections of the community who 
retain their faith in tribal authority also tend to treat the VDC with 
suspicion viewing it .as an alien institution which is out of tune with 
Tswana culture - a sentiment which can be exploited by the headman. The 
attitude of the old is, moreover, especially important because as senior 
tribesmen, their opinions carry more weight than those of younger 
members. Furthermore, it is precisely the old who tend to reside in the 
village on a permanent basis and who can, therefore, determine village 
politics while the younger and more. able-bodied, who have the potential 
to exert a greater influence on village development are absent. 
The basis for community partiCipation must depend on the Kgot1a and the 
VDC accepting the need to.cooperate with each other (Fortmann, 1983) as 
well as with extension workers and councillors. Such cooperation cannot 
be forthcoming so long as tr.iba1 leaders resent the economic power that 
the VDC enjoys. Moreover, t ri ba 1 leaders are often frustrated by 
unfamiliar bureaucratic and technocratic procedures with which they are 
not familiar. This problem is all the more apparent when it is noted 
that the majority of. tribal leaders at the village level have received 
only primary education, and in some cases, no formal education at all 
and, therefore, feel threatened by the formally educated government 
officers. 
In its ambition to extend modern political culture to the grassroots 
level, the state faces two choices. It can either disband tribal 
authority comprehensively or it can try to coopt its support. The 
former choice has faced substantial resistance. The second choice may 
be more realistic but there are strong reservations felt as to how far 
cooperation should allow tribal authority to retain power. 
THE MARGINAL ROLE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT. 
The characteristics of government's rural development strategy (see ch 2 
& 3) have rendered community participation moribund. Self-help village 
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development has become increasingly uncommon in contemporary Botswana, 
represent i ng the except i on r'ather than the rul e. Consequent ly, 
institutions responsible for community participation have fallen into 
disuse, or are characterised by apathy and unpopularity. Rural 
residents are increasingly unfamiliar with the ethos of self-help and no 
longer accept the responsibility for contributing to their own 
development. The underlying cause of this trend has been government's 
strategy of direct intervention in social infrastructure provision 
within the rural sector. The emphasis on top-down decision-making and 
implementation and the bias toward social service provision has affected 
the status of community participation in several ways. 
First, it has called 'into question the whole rai"son-d'etre for community 
participation. The VDC was created to promote rural development through 
community self-help at a time when the government was unwilling or felt 
unable to.fully support· a subsidised rural investment programme. 
Communities were encouraged to provide much needed social infrastructure 
such as schools and health facilities until such time as government 
could intervene directly. Once government did assume responsibility for 
social infrastructure provision, as a consequence of the economic boom 
following the discovery of diamonds, the role of the VDC'wascompromised 
as the activities for which it had been responsible were taken over by 
the state (Fortmann, 19B3). Increasingly, rural development came to be 
equated with state-provided social infrastructure and, consequently, 
rural residents no longer felt the need to provide contributions 
themselves. AS.a result, the VDC has suffered an identity crisis with 
nobody clearly knowing what it is supposed to be doing. A number of 
authors have been emphatic in attributing the failure of community 
participation to this bias towards state social service provision (Brown 
et al, 1982). 
Second, the emphasis placed on social infrastructure provision has done 
little to develop the economic base of the rural sector, in the communal 
areas. While the rural village has become well endowed with social 
infrastructure, it can provide few formal employment opportunities while 
the subsistence agricultural sector has been marginalised. These trends 
have had two major effects on community participation. The subsequent 
out-migration of the able-bodied and able-minded to the urban sector has 
meant that only the less able are left in the village to support 
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community institutions. They, however, lack the necessary resources and 
skills to ensure effective community participation. In particular, 
rural households are unwilling to provide free labour and to make 
financial contributions when they can barely scratch an existence. They 
correctly point out that as the poor, they are least able to help 
themse lves. 
Third, a related point is that self-help has become increasingly 
unpopular as a result of the on-going drought. It has become all the 
more necessary for available labour and assets to be used to safeguard 
subsistence. Any available labour is used to participate in drought 
relief projects (Noppen, 1982). Under these schemes, small-scale 
-
infrastructure projects, such as dam building or drift fence erection, 
have been undertaken through the employment of village residents, in 
return for a basic wage with which to purchase essential foodstuffs. 
However, it is precisely these sorts of prOjects which had been the 
mainstay of the VDCs. Committee members.exlained that as a result, 
residents are no longer prepared to provide self-help contributions for 
such projects when they know that under the drought relief schemes, they 
would be paid for doing the same work. 
Community participation will remain redundant unless institutions such 
as the VDC are provided with more clearly defined responsibilties within 
rural development and unless they are provided with necessary manpower 
and financial support (Fortmann, 1983). The VDC could be more effective 
if it were able to mobilise production orientated projects rather than 
only social infrastructure ones (Brown et al, 1982; Iskasen, 1980; 
Vengroff, 1977; Wynne, 1981). This is because such projects would 
provide both immediate economic returns to participants, thereby 
justifying the provision of self-help contributions and also, longer 
term economic spin-offs, by generating economic activity which could 
help stem the tide of out-migration and the state of rural stagnation. 
As a consequence, the able-bodied might remain in the rural sector and 
in turn be able to provide better support to community institutions 
while even the less well-off might accept the value of contributing to 
projects which produce economic results. Under these circumstances, 
community participation would become relevant to community needs, as the 
example of the drought relief programme has demonstrated. 
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However, it is unlikely that this approach will be adopted as the VDC is 
not supposed to engage in any directly profit-making ventures. The LG17 
Village Development Programme which provides financial and technical 
support to self-help projects only reconfirms the bias towards social 
infrastructure provision. Projects supported by these funds must not be 
money-making nor commercial (RECC, 1980). As such, the programme only 
serves to complement government's wider social infrastructure provision 
and to reconfirm the attitude that rural development only represents the 
provision of social infrastructure. 
In this respect, what may be termed a 'social service' rationale has 
developed in the minds of both planners and rural households and this 
has served to inhibit the promotion of alternative development 
strategies. In this sense, the concept of rural development has come to 
be equated with the provision of social infrastructure, based on 
experience to date. Against this background, it is difficult to change 
attitudes to what development ought to be. Residents have come to 
accept that the state satisfies their "basic needs" by providing 
tangible symbols of development free of charge and free of contribution. 
It is for this reason that both rural households and VDC committee 
members have expressed uncertainty as to what exactly community 
participation is supposed to achieve and are sometimes unenthusiastic 
about contributing to self-help projects such as SHESP. 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS. 
A third constraint concerns 'the capacity of village institutions to 
implement policy. Practical constraints have limited the potential 
impact of village institutions on rural development (Fortmann, 1983). 
In particular,'such institutions have lacked experience and adequate 
training and have received little extension support (Manzardo, 1982). 
During survey work, VDC committee members frequently expressed their 
frustration towards administrative and technical procedures imposed by 
government with which they are not familiar. While the LG17 programme 
was set up to facilitate project implementation for the VDC by provi9in9 
financial assistance and by simplifying administrative procedures, 
evidence suggests that bureaucracy continues to frustrate the VDC in 
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project implementation (Isaksen, 1980). Moreover, results from 
fieldwork suggest that many village institutions are not even aware of 
the assistance that LG17 is supposed to provide. Committees consider 
themselves ill-equiped to manage development projects without the 
assistance of government workers. This sense of inadequacy, expressed 
by VDC committee members in Olifants Drift and Mabalane has become more 
apparent as government has improved its own standards of workmanship and 
organisation, as a result of its top-down rural development strategy. 
It is not uncommon for VDC's to feel that there is little pOint to build 
a school classroom, when if they were to wait a little longer, 
government may build one of a much higher standard. Increasingly, 
residents have come to expect higher standards and not to settle for 
second best. 
The constraint on the VDC to execute village projects can be attributed 
to several factors concerning access to appropriate manpower. A major 
problem is that membership to the VDC committee .is often based on 
community status rather than on merit. Often the commit tee is composed 
of the old who have high traditional status but who are poorly educated. 
Furthermore, the old and wealthy who might be,elected to the committee 
do not always represent the interests of the whole community (Fortmann, 
1983). This situation has been exacerbated by broader socio-economic 
factors which are linked to rural development. Lack of attention to 
employment creation has resulted in out-migration by the able":bodied and 
the able-minded - precisely those sections of society which could make a 
valuable contribution to the running of the VDC through the provision of 
ideas and skills. The responsibility, therefore, falls on those 
sections of the community who are least familiar with necessary 
administrative and accounting skills, and who have had least exposure to 
modern state institutions with which they increasingly must work. These 
include the elderly, the very young an'd women. Moreover, as suggested 
in chapter 3, often the' residents who stay in the vi 11 age have least 
access to labour and cash and, therefore, are least able to provide 
contributions to self-help projects. 
Furthermore, the activity of the VDC is effectively suspended for six 
months of the year, during the wet season, when a large proportion of 
the village population is absent, working at the lands. Against this' 
background, the positive contribution that the VDC could be making to 
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village development is severely compromised. The fact that for a large 
part of the year, the community as such does not exist, cannot be 
overlooked; 
Given the marginal status of the VDC in rural development, it is not 
surprising to find that support for the VDC is lacking and that 
committee members are at best reluctant volunteers, who lack basic 
necessary skills and who lack the incentives to fulfil job requirements 
(Brown et al, 1982; Isaksen, 1980). This problem has not been helped by 
the attitude of extension workers as elaborated below. Institutions 
such as the VDC can only be effective if they are equipped with the 
means and political support to promote, or9anise and implement projects 
which are genuinly sought by the community. 
THE LIMITS OF SUPPORT FROM THE EXTENSION WORKER. 
The technical and administrative constraints facing village institutions 
is recognised by government. Extension services have been established 
precisely for this reason to support village based development (Isaksen, 
1980). The· role of the extension worker has, however, proved 
disappointing in practice. As a result, a critical input to the 
achievement of community participation has been lost. The limits to 
extension support can be attributed to four factors. These are not 
unique.to the extension worker, but reflect the major constraints which 
characterise the implementation capacity of the District Council. 
The first constraint is an administrative one which concerns the issue 
of accountability. Because of the recruitment system, extension workers 
are accountable not to the communities on whose behalf they work, but to 
their employer, the government. Recruited, trained and paid by ULGS, 
extension workers are concerned to satisfy demands imposed from above 
rather than those imposed by the community they serve (Hoppen, 1982). 
Their own priority is to guarantee upward career mobility by satisfying 
their employer. As with district-based personnel (with the exception of 
the FWE), they can anticipate regular transfers to other communities or 
districts after a two or three year period (Isaksen, 1980). There is 
little compulsion to feel accountable to the community since to do so 
could not influence their career prospects (Brown et al, 1982; Noppen, 
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1982). Moreover, the community has no formal communication link to the 
district to complain about unsatisfactory.extension workers. 
The second constraint concerns socio-cultural values and perceptions. 
Even though extension workers have been trained specifically to work 
with and for the rural community, they are socially, if not culturally 
isolated from the community. At the village level, they represent the 
elite class - they have been trained and educated in the city, are 
provided with government housing and receive a government salary. 
Moreover, they share more closely the values and aspirations of the 
elite and, therefore, treat the rural resident with contempt. This lack 
of cooperation and understanding can in part be attributed to the type 
of training that the extension worker receives (Brown et al, 1982). As 
a result, their working relationship with the community is often poor 
even with such groups as the VDC (DET/KgDC, 1982). They are perceived 
as outsiders by the indigenous.community and are often resented by the 
headman and village elders who see them as young educated upstarts. 
A third constraint which follows on concerns conditions of employment 
and the nature of their training. Working conditions are 
unsatisfactory. Ministerial support is lacking, accomodation is often 
inadequate while transport is sometimes unavailable for lengthy periods 
of time (Brown et al, 1982). Moreover, extension workers must service 
several villages which may be spatially remote, and which ·may not be 
able to provide adequate office or administration facilities. It is 
also felt that pay is insufficient. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the training which extension 
workers receive is inappropriate in that it develops the wrong skills 
(Hoppen, 1982). Rather than producing personnel who are keen to explore 
development initiatives, by thinking in a creative manner, and who are 
prepared to make personal contibutions which exceed normal expectations, 
low grade bureaucrats have been moulded to fit into a static 
administrative framework (Hoppen, 1982). This has done little to 
encourage community participation on the basis of decision-making, 
problem-solving and self-reliance (Manzardo, 1982). This is compounded 
by the fact that the issue of what exactly community partiCipation 
should involve is not clear and, likewise, there is uncertainty as to 
the means of developing it. 
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SUMMARY: 
Evidence from the field has identified a number of factors which have 
constrained the implementation capacity of the District Council and 
community institutions in project delivery. These constraints are 
summari sed. 
THE DISTRICT COUNCIL. 
With respect to the VWSP programme, the Council's Water Maintenance 
Units have experienced under-capacity in the operation and maintenance 
of village water supply systems. A shortage of manpower, funds and 
equipment has meant that the units are unable to meet demand for repair 
work and the delivery of fuel. Under these circumstances, water 
supplies are abandoned and traditional sources are resorted to. With 
respect to the SHESP project, the Council's project team has been 
disorganised and has provided poor coordination in the latrine 
construction programme and the organisation of health education. These 
problems can be attributed to a shortage of appropriate manpower and 
inadequate funding. The low implementation capacity experienced in both 
programmes is symptomatic of the wider constraints which the District 
Councils face. This, in particular, concerns manpower and finance. 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION. 
To date, the community has not participated in the water supply 
programme. Evidence from the sanitation project and of the wider 
activities of community institutions in policy implementation suggest 
that community participation makes only a small and ineffective 
contribution to rural development. With respect to the sanitation 
project, community institutions have played a secondary role in project 
delivery relying rather on the activities of the project team. There 
have, however, been exceptions too. Participation at the household 
level has been determined primarily by the capacity to provide cash and 
labour. Evidence suggests that the ability to participate is determined 
by the socio-economic charactersitics of the individual household. 
The poor record of participation by community institutions in the 
project are symptoma tic of the constra i nts whi ch face commun ity 
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participation more generally and. which it is contended. will affect the 
water supply programme should it be decentralised. The constraints 
noted can be attributed to three major contributory factors. First. the 
lack of harmony within the community. based on a power struggle between 
tribal and modern state institutions. Second. the marginal relevance of 
community participation to government's rural development strategy. 
Third. a shortage of appropriate skills. experiences and resources 
within the community. 
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Chapter 7: DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: THE CONTEXT OF RURAL POLICY 
FORMULATION. 
I NTRODUCTJ DN : 
This chapter examines the role of local government and community 
institutions in rural policy formulation. It investigates the system of 
District Development Planning recently introduced as the forum for 
rural policy making. The analysis is divided into two parts. First,' 
the District Development Planning system is described according to the 
mechanisms set up by government and to its pronouncements on the purpose 
and objectives of the planning system. Second, an attempt is made to 
identify how far the planning system provides local government and 
community institutions with the scope to influence policy formulation. 
The objective is to assess how far District Development Planning has 
created the conditions for devolved deci sion-mak ing and the bottom-up 
delivery of development projects. The implications for implementation 
capacity are then examined. 
The constraints faced by institutions in policy implementation can be 
rel~ted to the access these same institutions have to decision-making 
and tothe control of resources. A major factor determining the 
implementation capacity of an institution is its access to the 
decision-making process. This has been stressed in relation to 
community part icipat ion in community water supply and. sanitation 
(Bourne, 19B4) and in relation to building up the capacity of local 
government institutions more generally (Conyers, 19B2; Rei1ly, 19B1). 
It is suggested that the planning framework established at the 
sub-national level, has served to deconcentrate rather than decentralise 
rural policy formulation and implementation (Mawhood, 19B3; Reilly, 
19B3). It has only provided limited scope for devolved decision-making. 
This means that rural·development has remained top-down even though the 
planning framework is supposed to incorporate bottom-up planning. As a 
result, the role of local government and the community has been 
restricted to supporting the implementation of policy. The absence of 
decentralised decision-making is a.major factor which has constrained 
the implementation capacity of local government and community 
institutions. 
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DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: 
INTRODUCTION: 
The first substantial measure to decentralise decision-making in rural 
development policy was taken in 1977 when government introduced the 
system of District Development Planning, based upon the preparation of 5 
year plans to coincide with the preparation of NDP 5 (Noppen, 1982). 
The proposal to introduce district planning to the policy agenda was 
made at the National District Development Conference in 1976, in a 
speech presented by the late president, Seretse Khama. It received 
unanimous support from delegates. These plans would be designed to 
include the aspirations of the rural community for their own development 
and would provide an. important input to the preparation of the National 
Development Plan. 
The plans would be based on decision-making by local authority 
departments, after consultation with village institutions. For this 
reason, the slogan; " Planning with the People" was chosen to herald 
the introduction of this new planning initiative. Emphasis was placed 
on the idea that planning should not rest with the district technocrat, 
but should be a political process in which the aspirations of the people 
would be heard and translated into policy. The introduction of this new 
planning system must· be seen to represent a significant change in 
government policy towards local .authorities and community institutions 
in rural development. For the first time, an explicit proposal had been 
made which accepted that sub-national institutions ought to be involved 
in policy formulation as well as in policy implementation. 
What was the thinking that lay behind this move after ten years of 
centralised decision-making? Why was it .that govermnment was now 
interested in promoting 'bottom-up' planning? According to government 
publications, District Development Planning was introduced as a means of 
improving and widening its rural development strategy. In particular, 
it was felt that greater consultation with recipients would help to: 
- obtain feedback from the community on the planning process. 
- educate and inform the community on the activities of government. 
- encourage a degree of bottom-up planning from the community. 
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evaluate or monitor current government activities in the districts 
(Wheeler, 1979). 
Development planning would be delegated to local authorities who would 
be encouraged to prepare plans on a cross-sectoral or regional basis and 
to link social infrastructure provision to production activities (GOB, 
19BO). The new planning framework reflected broader changes in 
government's national and rural development strategy. As such, the 
system of rural policy delivery had been restructured to accomodate 
revised policy objectives. Thus, during most of the period since 
independence when rural development concentrated on social 
infrastructure provision, there was little incentive to decentralise 
decision-making and implementation. Furthermore, central governmerot 
benefitted from being seen to be actively involved in policy 
implementation for pol it ical reasons, while it was also clear that local 
government capacity was at the time low. However, when government 
revised its rural development strategy for NoP 5 and began to place more 
emphasis on rural production and employment creation, as a major element 
of national development. in the face of changing political and economic' 
circumstances, greater decentralisation was justified in order to create 
a stronger planning and implementation capacity to administer this 
strategy. Furthermore. government had come to recognise that the 
through the creation of the ooC, the implementation capacity of local 
government had improved significantly. 
At,a more general level. government recognised that national development 
objectives would be more popular if those objectives were seen to be 
based on common participation .. As such, the national development plan 
would symbolise the satisfaction of both central government and rural 
community aspirations. In theory. the acceptance of the need for 
'bottom-up' planning represented a significant political step towards 
achieving a considerable level of decentralisation. For the first time, 
the District Council would be able to influence resource allocation at 
the' national level as well as determine development priorities in the 
district, while community members would be invited to express their 
opinions and aspirations, as the basis for planning. 
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THE PLAN. 
District planning is based upon the preparation of a District 
Development· Plan (DDP). The Plan provides details of all existing and 
planned development activities for the district over a three year 
period. The content of the Plan document is comprehensive. It. is 
sub-divided into sections which examine activities by sector: 
production, employment, social welfare and services, and by institution: 
central and local government, community institutions, and the private 
sector (Wheeler, 1979). The Plan, therefore, takes account of the 
majority of activities which lie beyond the scope of the District 
Council. This is because the Plan is designed to provide an integrated 
review and forecast of all district development activities. 
The Plan is, therefore, designed to encourage regional or spatial, 
rather than sectoral planning (Noppen, 1982). Emphasis has been 
directed to the preparation of an integrated planning framework which 
considers the cross-sectoral needs of the whole district. The Plan 
represents a shift away from the previous approach according to which 
central government prepared .a planning agenda for each line ministry, 
responsible for a discrete sector. Through a regional approach, it is 
hoped that greater coordination can be achieved and that a better 
understanding may ensue as regards the needs of individual regions 
(Wheeler, 1979). To this end, it has been recognised that vital 
information can be obtained by encouraging greater district 
participat.ion through technocrats and rural residents themselves. 
It is suggested that regional-based planning makes more sense to the 
recipient community which is supposed to contribute to the 
decision-making process through consultation (Noppen, 1982). Rural 
households can more easily identify with a tangible concept such as the 
physical area in which they live and work, rather than with abstract 
concepts such as the agriculture, health or education sectors (Noppen, 
1982). 
The Plan is designed to fit into the planning agenda of central 
government departments which prep~re the National Development Plan.. The 
District Development Plan fulfils two functions. First, Phase 1 of the 
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plan sets out an implementation agenda based upon resources which have 
already been allocated to each district according to the existing 
National Development Plan. Second, Phase 2 represents an indicative 
plan which sets out a district's preferred development strategy for the 
next NDP period. To this end, the Plan outlines priority areas and the 
resources that will be needed to fulfil these objectives (Reilly, 1981; 
Wheeler, 1979). It is this second phase of the Plan which is supposed 
to be based on consultation with the rural community. The DDP, 
therefore, represents an integral part of the NDP, reflecting on the one 
hand guidelines set by central government and on the other hand, 
priorities set by the District Council on behalf of the rural 
constituency. 
The completed Plan must be ratified by the Council before it is 
submitted to government. Once ratified, the DDP becomes a political 
document which reflects the preferred development strategy of a 
particular district (Noppen, 1982). The government is by law prohibited 
from amending the document once it has received Council ap~roval. At 
the same time, government is under no obligation to commit itself to the 
demands of each Plan. As such, it is not a formally approved policy 
document but serves as an indicative plan. However, the Plans are 
discussed within government circles in the preparation of the NDP, and 
are further discussed at the annual Districts' Development Conference 
and then with each respective district (Noppen, 1982; Wheeler, 1979). 
Approved expenditures outlined in phase 1 are then translated into 
working annual plans detailing manpower and financial allocat.ions and an 
implementation-schedule (Noppen, 1982). 
THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. 
Emphasis has been placed on the fact that the DDP must reflect the 
aspirations and expectations of rural residents. Consultation has been 
encouraged between the local authority officer and the rural resident. 
In this way, the Plan should be prepared through a 'bottom-up' 
framework. The basis of consultation has been spelt out clearly in a 
government,publication produced in 1979, which serves as a reference 
manual for District Council officers (Wheeler, 1979). The participating 
local government and community institutions are briefly reviewed. 
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Local Government; 
The DDP is co-written by the Council Planning Officer (CPO) and the 
District Officer (Development) (DO(D)), on behalf of the District 
Council and the District Administration. The preparation of the Plan 
involves consultation with heads of individual departments who meet 
together through the forum of the District Development Committee (DDC) 
or the District Extension Team (DET). 
Community; 
Consultation between the Council and the community is channeled through 
a number of institutions. At the formal level, the community is 
represented by the councillor. 'With regard to specific development 
issues, the Village Development Committee, assisted by the Village 
Extension Team is approached. More often than not, meetings are held at 
the Kgotla after an introduction has been made to the local headman. 
, , 
To'date, ,experience of consultation in the preparation'of the DDP is 
limited. ,So far only two,plans have been prepared, and in all fairness,' 
the first Plan must be judged as something of a pilot project. The 
whole idea of consultation was new so that few participants from either 
side knew what to expect, nor knew what was really expected of them 
(Noppen, 1982). Moreover, none of the participants were really equiped 
to make a coherent contribution to the planning exercise, since the 
experience until then had been that government was wholly responsible 
for managing rural development affairs. 
While central government,provides guidelines for undertaking 
consultation under the new scheme,each district is encouraged to choose 
the means by which it wishes to conduct this exercise. The first round 
of consultation represented an exercise in trial and error, but feedback 
from this exercise has prompted both central government and local 
authorities to reconsider how best to organise consultation. An outline 
of the consultation process can be sketched here, based on experience to 
date and on guidelines provided by government (see Fig 9). 
The DDP is drafted by the CPO and DO(D). The draft document should 
, . 
reflect the outcome of consultation and negotiation at all institutional 
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levels. Central government provides broad guidelines and expenditure 
ceilings,especially for Phase 1, while it provides technical support on 
planning matters. Proposals are discussed between Council departments 
and other interested parties in the DDC. These discussions should only 
follow after consultation with the community. The proposals that are 
discussed should-be based on the priorities and problems identified by 
the cOllll1unity. 
It is recognised by all involved, that the consultation exercise 
represents the most challenging stage of the planning process. 
Experience to date has been disappointing. Consultation serves two 
objectives. First, it is used to inform communities of guidelines and 
policies prepared under Phase 1 of the Plan. Second, it is used to 
elicit the views of the community towards rural development and the sort 
of policies that it would like to see introduced in their cOllll1unities. 
This information is gathered by several means, of which a few are 
outlined. Different methods' have been employed according to 
socio-econ'omic and environmental features of the different districts. 
What might be feasible in one district may be quite inappropriate in 
another. Some districts have depended on a centralised approach whereby 
rural delegates are invited to attend an annual district development 
conference, as in Kgatleng 
local authority officers. 
district, where matters can be discussed 
Others, such as Central and Kgalagadi 
with 
districts, have favoured more decentralised approaches based on 
conducting a tour through each village and discussing development 
matters at fora usually held at the Kgotla. In ,some cases, the opinions 
of the residents have been tape-recorded for future reference. In 
others, more' emphasis has been placed on educating participants on the 
meaning of development, so that consulation has represented more of a 
learning process (Hoppen; 1982). Yet in most cases, it is usual that at 
some stage, an annual district development conference is held. At this 
conference, proposals based upon the conclusions of consultation tours 
are discussed in greater depth amongst representatives from all levels. 
It may, however, be questioned to what extent the planning technocrat at 
either the district or central government level, is influenced by the 
opinions expressed by the rural cOllll1unity. There is clear scepticism 
over the consultation process and some,outright resentment on the part 
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of some officers who feel that it serves only to frustrate the planning 
process. These attitudes have been reflected, for example, in only a 
token commitment to consultation in preparing DDP 2 in Kweneng district. 
First, a preliminary meeting was organised by the Communal Area 
Development coordinators within the district to brief the district 
VDC's, on the impending planning exercise. It is admitted, however, 
that only some of the eleven coordinators managed to organise the 
meeting. Second, the District Development Committee Conference was held 
in Molepolole. During this conference attended by both district and 
village personnel, such as the VDC, FWE, ACDD, councillor and headman, a 
questionnaire, written in Setswana, was circulated concerning the 
development priorities of the VDC's from different CADs. Again, it was 
noted that attendence was poor. Third, on completion of these 
questionnaires, the extension workers responsible for the different CADs 
added their comments and recommendations to the proposals. Yet again. 
only some extension workers bothered to do this: Finally. the proposals 
made were supplemented with comments from the various district 
departments which would be responsible for implementing the approved 
projects (KDC. 1984). At this stage. a list of priorities would be 
established before a final Plan proposal would be submitted to a full 
Council meeting for ratification (KDC. 1982) .. 
Once the draft has been prepared by the CPO and 00(0), it is submitted 
to the District Plans Committee in MLGL. The draft Plan is then 
returned to the DDC for further comment and alterati9ns. in light of 
recommendations made by the District Plans Committee. At this stage. 
the draft is intended ·to be presented to the communities once more. in 
order that they might see how their own demands and priorities have been 
received by central government. The community is able to make further 
comments which might be included in the preparation of the final draft. 
The Plan is then re-submitted to the DDC in its final form and is then 
presented to a full Council meeting for ratification (Noppen. 1982;· 
Reilly. 1981). 
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THE LIMITS TO BOTTOM-UP PLANNING: 
This·section examines how far the system of District Development 
Planning has decentralised decision-making to the local government and 
community levels and, therefore, considers the extent to which it 
constitutes the basis for effective bottom-up planning. Two questions 
are addressed: 
Who are the decision-makers in District Development Planning and whose 
interests do they represent ? 
- to what extent does the planning system influence the allocation 
and distribution of resources .in the rural sector? 
CONSULTATION AND REPRESENTATION: WHO ARE THE DECISION-MAKERS? 
The District Development Plan is actually determined by central and 
local government technocrats, and not by representatives of the rural 
community. The apparent objective of "Planning with the People" has 
not been used to incorporate the interests of the ruralcolTll1unity in the 
planning process. This situation has arisen primarily because 
government technocrats at the local government level have deliberately 
excluded community representatives from decision-making while failing to 
represent those community interest~ themselves. This.policy has been 
made possible by two factors. First, the absence of political concensus 
at the community level over who s~ould represent community interests. 
Second, the shortage of appropriate skills and expertise at the 
community level to articulate· community interests effectively at the 
local government level. These latter points are discussed first. 
Community Representation: 
Rural opinion can potentially be expressed through a number of 
vi 11 age-based inst itut ions which can function as representatives in the 
planning process. The most·important of these are the Kgotla, the·VDC, 
the councillor and the extension worker (Wheeler, 1979), all of which 
have been discussed in the context of policy.implementation. According 
to the district planning procedure, cOnsultation .with local 
representatives forms the basis of decision-making, and must be 
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considered seriously by the local government officer. The District 
Council should serve as a platform for the representation of community 
rather than government interests and it should be accountable to those 
interests. It is, therefore, necessary to consider·which institutions 
do articulate community opinion in this process. It has been argued 
that genuine decentralised decision-making can only exist when decisions 
are taken by locally elected and accountable representatives (Mawhood, 
1983). 
Using Mawhood's criteria of legitimate representation, the locally 
elected councillor would represent a legitimate decision-maker in the 
context of Botswana, since he is the formally elected local 
repesentative. The councillor is responsible for·lobbying community 
interests in local government, and for providing a formal channel of 
communication· between the District Council administration and grassroots 
institutions. He is elected by the rural constituent though nominated 
by the central party and has been provided with the responsibility for 
determining Council policY,·including the ratification or rej~ction of 
the District Developm~nt Plan. The basis of his judgement'should be 
determined on how proposed policy affects his constituency. The 
counci 11 or is after .a 11 accountable to hi s electorate, rather than to 
the local government administrat ion. The counci 11 or, therefore, has 
inherited the responsibility to ensure the welfare of the rural village 
community which had been traditionally upheld by the chief. In redUCing 
the authority of the Kgotla, the state has appOinted the councillor as 
the surrogate decision-maker thereby usurping the role of the tribal 
leader. 
The councillor must, therefore, face two challenges in order to be an 
effective decision-maker. First, he must be acceptable to his 
constituency and more especially to the Kgotla. Second, he must be 
respected by the government technocrat. In reality, the councillor has 
been unable to meet either challenge. He is the least respected and 
least effective representative involved in District Development Planning 
having neither influence within the village constituency where he enjoys 
little respect nor within the District Couniil and wider local 
government departments where he is unable to influence the technocrat in 
the formulation of 'policy, .notwithstanding the right he .enjoys to ratify 
the plan. 
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The other· institution which has been provided special responsibilities 
for articulating community interests is the VDC. The previous section 
illustrated how consultation can make use of the VDC, supported by 
extension workers,· to discuss rural policy in d·iscussions, meetings and 
workshops. This is considered appropriate in view of the fact that the 
VDC is responsible for the implementation of village development 
projects (Noppen, 1982). However, the VDC is not any better equipped 
than the councillor to defend community interests. While a mechanism 
has in principle been created to encourage communication, ·the VDC must· 
face similar constraints to the councillor, as the discussion of the 
constraints to implementation has demonstrated. 
The Issue of Political Concensusat the Community Level: 
Neither th·e councillor nor the VDC is able to provide acceptable 
political representation.of community opinion. The inability to do so 
is linked to the power struggle between tribal authority and the modern 
state~ The key issue in this struggle is the deliberate exclusion of 
the Kgotla from the decision-making process and the aPPointment of 
modern institutions to fulfil this responsibility. Yet so .long as the 
Kgotla remains the accepted.representative of community opinion, as 
evidence strongly suggests, it will not be possible to obtain concensus 
as to which alternative institution can articulate community interests. 
While the VDC and councillor have been vested with the legal authority 
to determine socio-economic policy within the community, this has proved 
ineffective against the de facto power base of ·the Kgotla. This 
contradi ct ion typffi es the anomaly between tradit i ona 1 and modern 
institutions at the community level. While the Kgotla has been used as 
a forum for decision-making at this level, it has not been vested with 
executive or judicial powers within the planning system. As such, its 
participation is only symbolic. 
Yet, the councillor has not succeeded in replacing the Kgotla as a 
decision-maker and community representative. As a symbol of the modern 
state, the councillor represents an alien political institution which is 
incompatible with Tswana socio-political culture.· So long as the Kgotla 
is able to exercise influence at the village level, the status of the 
councillor will remain subordinate. This is because the Kgotla remains 
the primary forum for village-based decision-making. While tribal 
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authority has the customary right to address the Kgotla, the councillor 
must remain an invited and, therefore, outside speaker. The rural 
household, therefore, views the appointment of the councillor as their 
representative ,with suspicion. This suspicion is heightened because the 
central party is responsible for nominating councillor candidates. 
Grassroots representation is, therefore, imposed from above even if the 
nominee is eventually elected by the community. The failure of the 
councillor to provide a link between the community and local government 
has, therefore, severed access to the decision-making process. 
The VDC, likewise, is unable to substitute itself for the Kgotla. 
Previous discussion has illustrated how the VDC does not necessarily 
enjoy the support of the Kgotla ,and is not accepted as an official 
representative for the community. So long as external modern 
institutions afe imposed, the Kgotla remains defiant as the genuine and 
'legitimate defender of community opinion. Therefore, the VDC is unable 
to mobilise community support so long as the'Kgotla boycotts it. 
Community participation will continue to be constrained so long as the 
struggle between tribal authority and the modern state remains 
unresolved. Implementation capacity depends on cooperation between 
village institutions and this requires that the struggle is reconciled. 
It afso is contingent on the. community being able to take part in 
decision-making. It is, therefore, essential that an institution which 
is acceptable to both government and community is found. 
The,Issue of Technical Capacity: 
In the analysis of implementation capacity, it was argued that a major 
constraint to more effective community participation was a lack of 
suitably qualified committee members and of households with the means to 
provide self-help contributions. Furthermore, support from extension 
workers has been inadequate while the government has been accused of 
complicating administrative procedures such as in the LG 17 Vi 11 age 
Deve lopment Programme (I saksen, 1980). Gi ven this background, the 
constraints to participation in planning are that much greater. 
Participation in planning and the ability to negotiate on the terms of 
,the professional technocrat demands familiarity with modern government 
----------
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and certain literate and technical skills. However, these 
pre-conditions are not easily found amongst village institution 
committee members, or amongst councillors. Consequently, there are 
clear limits as to how far the community can influence the planning 
process and it would, therefore, be unrealistic to expect village 
institutions to provide a significant contribution to decision-making 
beyond the expression of simple 'felt needs' (Conyers, 1982; Jeffers, 
1982) . 
Councillors are unable to influence the technocrat in policy formulation 
because they lack the necessary educational background and technical 
skills and are unfamiliar with the technical formalities of planning. 
As politicians, they can lobby opinions and suggest policies but cannot 
easily influence how policy is prepared. The councillor is, therefore, 
squeezed out of the consultation process and is only called in to ratify 
pre-determined policies. Unable to make an impression on 
decision-making, the councillor is apt to accept the decisions that are 
taken by the technocrat (Noppen, 1982). The result is that 
decision-making becomes the responsibility of the technocrat. 
It is also unrealistic to expect the VOC to shoulder the responsibility 
for negot i at i ng rura 1 po 1 icy on the same" terms as the government 
planner, beyond the identification of immediate community needs. The 
constraints which face the voe are not surprising given that "their 
primary responsibility is to coordinate small-scale village projects. 
Committee members elected from within the community rarely have the 
experience or technical capacity to articulate. negotiate and present 
coherent policies within the consultation agenda. This problem of 
unfamiliarity and of inadequate skills has not been helped by extension 
. workers who rarely provide the level of support to such institutions as 
had been anticipated. Consequently, institutions such as the VOC, can 
at best contribute to the consultation exercise by presenting a list of 
projects which their community would like to have. More often than not, 
all villages submit similar "shopping lists" and focus almost 
exclusively on social infrastructure projects (Nappen, 1982). Under 
such circumstances, consultation counts for very little, and indeed 
planners argue that consultation does no more than confirm what they 
a 1 ready know. 
2~O 
In conclusion, the pooi reputation of the councillor and the VDC within 
the community can be explained in terms of the struggle for power being 
waged between tribal authority and the modern state. The 
ineffectiveness of these institutions within local government can be 
attributed to the relatively junior educational and skill status of the 
councillor and VDC as compared to the local government technocrat. 
They, therefore, display neither political nor technical credibility and 
consequently fail to make a major impact on the decision-making process. 
The Role of the Technocrat in Blocking Community Participation: 
While, in principle, the local government technocrat is employed to 
serve rural interests and to be responsive to community opinion, in 
real ity, the technocrat takes decisions as the basis· for policy which 
are informed by their own priorities rather than those of the commu·nity. 
This practice can be attributed to two factors. 
First, the technocrat overlooks community opinion because he feels that 
he is the rightful and qualified person to make decisions (Noppen, 
1982). By contrast, village representatives are viewed as unqualified 
and, therefore, as a hinderance to an activity which·should be left to 
professionals. This belief in the superiority of the professional has 
had the.effect of blocking community access to the decision-making 
arena. 
Councillors, for example, are often elderly and have not received the 
level of formal education which the younger technocrats have enjoyed 
(Noppen, 1982). The technocrat is, therefore, inclined to dismiss the 
counci 11 or as an uneducated rural politician who ought to stay out of 
decision-making and who is perceived as a low status and· subordinate 
government officer. 
These comparatively highly trained government technocrats, therefore, 
dismiss their rural village counterparts as 'illiterates' who can only 
frustrate the planning process. While the technocrat may claim to 
consider the priorities which have been expressed by the VDC, the 
culture of professionalism (De Kadt, 1983; Segall, 1983) ensures that 
technocrats base policy upon decisions reached by themselves without the 
benefit of community opinion. "Planning with the People" is, therefore, 
accepted by the planner as a political gesture to participatory planning 
but recognise that in actual fact the contribution made by the community 
to policy formulation is negligible. 
Second, the technocrat blocks community participation in decision-making 
when it threatens the vested interests shared by modern state elites 
(Noppen, 1982). They might, therefore, deliberately. block attempts to 
address sensitive issues which concern income, employment and production 
should they be raised at the community level (Picard & Morgan, 1985). 
While there has been evidence of a conflict of interest between 
technocrats within local government and between itself and central 
government on occasions (Picard, 1979c), there is a strong case to 
suggest that these technocrats share common attitudes, aspirations, and 
interests, and, therefore. seek to present policies which are compatible 
with their shared self-interest (Reilly, 1981). This conclusion is 
based on the argument that policy formulation is determined by a broad 
·socio-political and economic alliance between public sector bureaucrats, 
.government politicians and also the small elite of industrialists and 
businessmen, and the rural cattle-owning elite (Parson, 1977). Under 
these circumstances, decisions taken by the local government technocrat 
in preparation of the DDP are influenced by policy objectives presented 
by this alliance of interest rather than by community representatives. 
Consequently, the Plan which is eventually produced does no more than 
reconfirm elite policy objectives. As such, planning is undertaken from 
the top down and not from the bottom up. 
This alliance determines the policy formulation agenda at the national 
and district level. facing little challenge from alternative lobby 
groups. The strength of this alliance, founded upon a comprehensive 
control of financial resources, Skilled manpower and information, and 
the subsequent extent to which it determines policy formulation can be· 
contrasted to.the weak lobbying power vested in the majority of the 
rural population who precisely lack finance, manpower and information 
and who have not been provided with a platform which unites their 
community interests. 
The ability of the government technocrat to ·determine policy without t~e 
inconvenience of opposition from alternative interests can be attributed 
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to the fact that the public sector dominates formal sector employment 
and economic activity. In particular, it monopolises employment 
opportunities in Botswana's formal sector, and thereby the recruitment 
of educated and skilled manpower. By comparison, the private sector is 
inconsequential in terms of size and status (GOB, 1985) •. As a result, 
the public sector has become a forum for an educated and wealthy elite, 
which is unchallenged·by any other powerful interest group. There are 
simply no other powerful lobby groups in the country at the national 
level. While the mass of the rural population does constitute an 
interest group, it is highly fragmented and has neither the political 
nor economic power to lobby government, nor the organisation to 
articulate common grievances, as discussed above. Consequently, the 
public sector elite is in a position to dictate policy according to its 
own interests without fear of challenge. Within this alliance, the 
local government officer shares common interests with the civil servants 
in central government. This situation helps to explain the bias in 
national policy towards capital-intensive urban development, to 
investment in the livestock sector, and into providing high civil 
service salaries (Holm, 1985). It is also a reflection of the near 
absolute power that the Botswana Democratic Party has enjoyed since 
independence. 
The system of manpower recruitment used in the public sector also 
reinforces the alliance between local and central government civil 
servants and serves to weaken local government accountability to the 
rural community. The creation of the Unified Local Government Service 
(ULGS) in 1973 served to transfer responsibility for manpower away from 
local government to central government (Reilly, 1983). Under this 
system, local government officers are recruited by a central 
organisation and allocated to local authorities for a specified period 
of time. While they are paid by the District Council and are 
accountable to the Council Secretary during their term of office, their 
employer is central government. This has reduced accountability to the 
local community in two important respects. First, Council officers 
sense accountability to the ministry which has recruited them, rather 
than to the district which ~hey serve. This is because their future 
employment is determined by satisfying central government interests 
rather than community aspirations. It is ULGS rather than the District 
Councils which is responsible for promoting officers.· They, therefore, 
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look upwards to central' government rather than downwards to the 
community. Second, under the ULGS system, it is normal practice for a 
local government officer to be transferred from one district to another 
every two or three years (Reilly, 1983). In this way, the officer in 
not able to build"up a strong link with the district community which he 
is supposed to be representing. While it could be argued that this 
should not be considered a significant problem since the district 
officer is a civil servant responsible for implementing decisions taken 
by politicians, such as the elected councillors, on behalf of the 
community, in reality, it is the technocrat who is the decision-maker. 
On the basis of these factors, community participation in policy 
formulation is of only marginal influence and, therefore, major policy 
decisions continue to be taken by the government technocrat. Community 
institutions supposedly involved in the consultation process are 
constrained from determining policy objectives. The conditions 
necessary for articulating community opinion do not exist. It is 
argued, therefore, that no effective lobby power exists outside of 
government (Holm, 1985). Planners are accountable only to themselves 
within government, but not to any interest outside of government. They, 
therefore, enjoy the position of being free to determine policy 
according to the objectives ,that they set for themselves. These are 
based on government, objectives rather than on opinions expressed by the 
rural community. 
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HOW FAR DOES THE PLAN PROVIDE SCOPE FOR DETERMINING RURAL RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION ? 
It is argued here that the District Development Plan (DDP) provides 
limited scope for determining how resources are·allocated and 
distributed within the rural development budget. The major part of the 
Plan covers sectors of the economy which continue to be administered 
from the centre and which are based on central government policy 
objectives. Therefore, the creation of the system of participatory 
planning has done little to change a system of top-down planning. It 
has only served to devolve a number of administrative responsibilities 
of marginal political significance from central government to local 
government. 
The contention is based on two arguments. First, that at the local 
government level, the autonomous District Council is only able to 
influence the preparation of a small part of the total rural budget. 
Second, that the DDP has only been able to exert a minimal influence on 
policy formulation at the central government level. These arguments are 
examined in more detail. 
While local government technocrats are responsible for the formulation 
of rural policy and share common political objectives with their central 
government counterparts, closer examination of the planning process 
suggests that decision-making is shared between potentially competing 
institutions within the government. system. It is, therefore, necessary 
to consider the respective role of each government institution involved 
in planning in order to identify the extent to which the District 
Council is able to determine policy. 
In creating the system of District Development Planning the District 
Development Committee (DDC) was given responsibility for coordinating 
the preparation of the Plan at the local government level. This 
committee comprises repesentatives of the District Administration which 
is accountable to central government and the District Council, which is 
supposedly accountable to the rural constituent. Within this framework, 
the District Officer (Development) (DO(D)) and the Council Planning 
Officer (CPO) have been appointed to draft the plan document. This 
division of labour between the two institutions is important because 
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according to a White Paper presented, in 1972, after the creation of the 
DDC, government argued that: 
" ... councils should maintain a position as a decision-making body 
independent of central government. .. " whi le, " ..• the DDC and District 
Administration ••• wouJd have the responsibility for the coordination of 
rural development and the preparation of rural development plans." 
(Picard, 1979:p291) 
Of most significance is the fact that the 00(0) is responsible for 
planning all central government activities within the district while the 
CPO only determines resource allocation for the major Council statutory 
duties. The former activities, moreover, account for over 80% of the 
rural budget and concern all major production-orientated investment 
programmes. By contrast, the 20% of the budget which the CPO determines 
concerns primarily social infrastructure programmes. Yet, the 00(0), as 
the senior planner, is employed by the District Administration and is, 
therefore, accountable to central government who provide major,policy 
proposals and not to the rural constituent, as is theoretically the CPO. 
"Planning with the People" is consequently restricted to the 20% of the 
budget which the Council can influence (Reilly, 1981). Those activities 
which are still centralised cannot be determined by the Council since 
they are not charged with their implementation. At best they are able 
to provide suggestions but does this amount to participatory planning? 
Furthermore, a high proportion of rural investme'nt funds are provided by 
international aid organisations and are normally Channelled through 
central government ministries rather, than directly to the local 
government level. 
In relation to the second argument, there is evidence to suggest that 
irrespective of,who influences the preparation of the Plan document, the 
ratified Plan makes very little difference to rurai resource allocation 
and that in, effect, central government continues to determine rural 
policy. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, the DOP is not taken 
seriously by the central, government planner (Reilly, 1981). This 
attitude is symptomatic of a deeper prejudice towards the local 
government officer especially those in the District Council, and to a 
general denigration of the importance of rural affairs. This attitude 
can be compared to that of the local government officer towards the 
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rural repesentative, as discussed above. So while there is evidence of 
an alliance of interest between all public sector technocrats, it is at 
the same time apparent that the DDP is treated with a certain derision 
at the central government level, especially outside of the Ministry of 
Local Government and Lands (Reilly, 1981). This attitude must be 
partially responsible for the reluctance on the part of central 
government to provide the District Councils with adequate resources to 
support a more comprehensive implementation and decision-making capacity 
and of the important role that is still attached to the District 
Administration. Yet this attitude towards local government is likely to 
be perpetuated so long as the Councils are denied the responsibility to 
extend their influence over key productive sectors. 
It has, in fact, been reported that difficulties have been experienced 
in trying to establish a closer working relationship between the centre 
and the districts (Reilly, 1981) .. The district depends on the centre 
taking the plan seriously as a major policy document. In practice, this 
is not the case. The central planner is preoccupied by more immediate 
ministerial imperatives, which might more directly affect his own career 
and, therefore, tends to underrate the relevance and importance of the 
districts. Furthermore, central government personnel feel no particular 
attachment to the districts. This is most evident in relation to the 
macro-economic planners in the MFDP, who are the principal policy 
writers (Reilly, 1981). As a result, consultation at this level is 
characterised as top-down. Directives are presented by the central 
planners, and little attention is paid to the proposals contained in the 
draft DDP plans, or. to the related negotiations. 
Second, what is probably the most astonishing fact is that the most 
recent DDPs have not been produced ! The Plan documents did not proceed 
beyond the draft stage. Therefore, the supposed key document which 
symbolises government's commitment to bottom-up planning has not 
materi a 1 i sed. NDP 6, presented in 1985· was, therefore, prepared without 
reference to district aspirations. According to a planner working for 
MLGL, budget allocations for individual districts and sectors were 
calculated according to broad forecasts based on past trends, and 
national development priorities. Resource dis.tribution was based upon 
technocratic considerations such as population size, a remoteness 
factor, and the implementation capacity of individual districts. The· 
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question to ask is whether or not the submission of a plan would have 
made any tangible difference to these allocations? 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DISTRICT COUNCIL AND COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING: . 
The establishment of Distri,ct Developing Planning represented an 
apparent policy shift towards greater decentralised decision-making in 
rural affairs. Government rhetoric and the mechanics of the planning 
framework, indeed, suggest that local government and the ·community had 
been provi ded with the means and po 1 it i ca 1 support to i nfl uence the 
formulation of rural policy. The basis for planning from the bottom-up 
appeared to have been created. 
Yet a more rigorous examination of the planning system suggests quite 
clearly that the emphasis placed on bottom-up planning is only symbolic 
and that rural policy formulation has remained centralised. 
The District Council: 
The DDP has not provided the District Council with the means to 
determine rural policy. In practice, it is only able to influence a· 
small part of ·the total rural budget, amounting to no more than 20% of 
total investments, which concern almost exclusively Councils' statutory 
duties (Noppen, 1982). Within this sector, decision-making is largely 
restricted to· recurrent expenditure forecasting as a large proportion of 
capital funds are provided by donor agencies. 
little more than providing a list of priority 
forecasts within pre-determined sectors. 
Planning amounts to 
investments and budgetary 
Under these circumstances, the scope for determining resource allocation 
and distribution is highly restricted. Councils can only provide inputs 
for those social services such as health and education which they 
administer, but are unable to influence the major productive investment 
progranmes whi ch concern agri cu lture, conmerce, secondary educat i on, 
rural employment creation and housing (Reilly, 1981). These have 
remained the responsibility of line ministries who are represented by 
the District Administration at the local government level. They, 
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therefore, remain centralised even though they can have the most 
far-reaching effects on the status of the rural economy. Consequently, 
Councils are unable to determine the key issues which concern the'rural 
sector. 
The restrictions placed on Council autonomy reflect a conscious 
government decision to ensure that policies which could challenge 
, 
sensitive economic vested inte~ests, remain centralised. The government 
is nervous about empowering local goverment officers and. politicians 
with the means to influence such policies. Central government has only 
permitted devolved decision-making over those sectors which least affect 
political and economic power relations. This is why,for example, 
Councils have not been able to impose a cattle tax as a means of 
increasing local revenue (Hudson, 1981). All major production related 
programmes such as the Tribal Grazing Lands Programme and Arable Lands 
Development Porgramme are implemented by central government, with the 
exception of the Communal Area Development programme (CAD), though it is 
too early to say what impact this is likely to make. An alternative-
explanation is offered by· the government, and cannot be wholly 
dismissed, in view of recent policies such as CAD. It argues that until 
recently, the .District Councils lacked the implementation capacity to 
administer complex production-related programmes. It has only been by 
strengthening the Councils that it has become possible to devolve such 
programmes more recent ly, as in the 'case of CAD. Yet thi s programme, 
too, may only amount to ~hetoric and unfulfilled pronouncements. 
It is suggested, on the contrary, that the implementation capacity of 
the Council has remained weak precisely because of the secondary role it 
has been ascribed in rural development. By comparison, the District 
Administration has fared well receiving, in particular, more highly 
qualified manpower. Graduates have, for example, been apPointed to the 
posts of District Officer, while counterparts in the Councils may only 
have secondary school qualifications. This begs the question why the 
Councils have not been treated by the same standards and why the 
District Administration continues to exist at all? It is because 
government is un-willing to strengthen a local government institution 
which is not accountable to the centre. Therefore, it has only provided 
it with a restricted implementation capacity. While the means are 
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provided to service statutory duties, there is no scope for the Council 
to become more autonomous. 
The Commmunity: 
The community does not really participate in District Development 
Planning. Contrary to the rhetoric which stresses the centrality of 
consultation to the decision-making process, in reality, it is of 
marginal importance. A number of factors have blocked the channels of 
communication in the planning process, while the Plan itself provides 
only limited opportunity to influence resource allocation. Lack of 
political consensus and a shortage of appropriate skills at the 
community level have constrained the effectiveness of participation, 
while local. government technocrats ignore opinions which are expressed. 
Consultation with community groups is seen as a hinderance to the 
achievement·of elite aspirations even if it does provide a useful 
gesture to the ideal of "Planning with the People". Public employees 
will try to obstruct the course of the consultation process should it 
try to question aspects of national policy which defend vested interests 
(Noppen, 1982). Furthermore, the importance attached to participation 
seems unfounded when it is recognised that decision making is restricted 
to sectors which only concern social-infrastructure provision and not 
production, and when it is realised how uninfluential the Plan is on 
overall rural policy formulation. At best, community participation 
represents an opportunity to provide a list of priority 'felt needs' 
(Noppen, 1982). 
The notion of a "social service" rationale based on the his"torical 
experi ence of government's rural deve 1 opment strategy is relevant to 
this discussion. Consultation that does take place between the d'istrict 
planner and the rural community is influenced by this heritage and; 
moreover, serves to reinforce this bias (Noppen, 1982). It may be noted 
that special programmes such as CAD and the Remote Area Dwellers 
Programme have all been successful in relation to social service 
provision, but are far less successful in relation to production 
activities (Egner, 1981). 
Rural residents are, moreover, apt to accept this situation 
limited knowledge and understanding of the planning system. 
given their. 
It is of 
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little surprise, therefore, to find'that the priorities expressed in the 
Plans for rural development tend to cOincide with those expressed by 
central government (Noppen, 1982) since they rarely question the 
sensitive issues of access to the means of production, which is 
manifested, for example, in the skewed ownership of cattle. 
The District Development Plan is, therefore, prepared by the government 
technocrat who is only accountable to centr,al government and not to the 
rural constituent. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the Plan 
is in any case,of'only marginal importance to rural policy formulation 
since decisions continue to be based on criteria and priorities set by 
central government. 
SUMMARY: 
The constraints on implementation capacity can in part be attributed to 
an absence of dec is i on-mak i ng respons i bil ity. Institut ions wh i ch are 
prescribed implementation duties but which are not responsible for the 
formulation of polic'y relating to these duties are likely to confront 
constraints which will limit their effectiveness. It is suggested that 
this holds true in Botswana and is a major explanatory factor for the 
constraints which have been experienced in the implementation of the 
rural water supply and sanitation programmes. 
The delivery systems used in the implementation of VWSP and SHESP have 
been constrained by problems faCing local government and community 
institutions. The problems can be attributed to a planning system which 
does not provide scope for determining rural policy. This'is 
Significant given that the delivery systems of each programme include a 
decision-making component. 
The system of District Development Planning in Botswana has not been 
designed to empower those institutions, currently responsible for policy 
implementation, to influence policy formulation. The planning system 
remains centralised while the District Council and c~mmunity development 
institutions are only used as an input for supporting policy 
implementation. Therefore, according to the definitions of 
decentralisation presented in chapter 1, the system of rural policy 
formulation and implementation fits into the category of 
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deconcentration, while community participation is used as a means of 
achieving ·an end, but not as an end in itself (Oakley & Marsden, 1984). 
The supposedly autonomous wing of local government, the District 
Council, has he 1 d on to lega 1 autonomy but in all other respects is 
dependent on central government and District Administration support. 
Consequently, these Councils serve as mere symbols of political 
pluralism but are deprived of funds to be able to influence and 
implement policy effectively (Picard, 1985; Reilly, 1983). 
This deconcentrated system has had serious effects on the implementation 
capacity of the District Council and the community, which have been 
manifested in the implementation of VWSP and SHESP. The system of 
policy formulation. and implementation which characterises rural 
development in Botswana, generally, cannot accommodate. bottom-up 
delivery systems as prescribed by the Decade. Consequently, policy 
implementation based on the participation of sub-national institutions 
is likely·to face constraints associated with the weak implementation 
capacity of these institutions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: 
Local government intervention: The Role of the District Council. 
The comparatively low implementation capacity of the District Council as 
compared to the District Administration and central government, results 
from its subordinate position as a decision-maker •. This is most 
apparent in'relation to manpower and financial resources. The ability 
to execute policy is determined by.the ability to determine resource 
allocation. However, the planning system has only reinforced Council's 
dependence on central government support. The has had·the following 
results: 
- Manpower and financial allocations are centrally controlled. The 
Council can only forecast resource requirements but cannot determine 
how central government will distribute resources between sectors and 
between districts. 
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The Plan can only be used to influence policy towards social 
infrastructure projects. Because these are not of primary national 
concern and more especially are non-productive, the Council is unable' 
to· command the quality of manpower and level of financing.that is 
required .. _ The District Administration, for example, is better 
endowed with manpower resources. 
It is suggested that if Councils were able to engage in production 
orientated projects, they would be able to contribute to the economic 
generation of the rural sector which in turn could provide revenue, 
more skilled manpower and better incentives to the Councils. They 
would then be in a position to reduce their dependence on central 
government. 
In the meantime, District Council officers recognise the limitations to 
their legal autonomy and ability to influence policy, created by their 
continued dependence on central government for the determination of 
resource allocation (KDC, 1979). Districts have pointed out that the 
lack of access to finance means that much of the planning exercise-is 
mere rhetoric (KDC, 1984). Fiscal limitations mean that objectives are 
rarely attained and this, in particular, is resented by the rural 
community, who feel that the consultation process makes promises wh.ich 
are never kept. 
Community Participation: The Role of Community Institutions. 
The lack of harmony and the apathy which characterises community 
participation can be attributed to the fact that community institutions 
are barred from influencing the formulation of policy. Community 
participation has been restricted to supporting the implementation of 
rural policies which have been planned by government authorities. The 
scope has not been created to allow community institutions, themselves, 
. . '" to determine the sorts of investments which ought to be made or on 
deciding how they should be made. Community participation, therefore, 
functions within a top-down decision-making framework. Some 
implications include: 
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- Socio-political disharmony. A pre-condition to achieving a better 
implementation capacity is to achieve cooperation between village 
institutions. This is not feasible so long as the political struggle 
based upon the role of the Kgotla in decision-making is not resolved. 
An acceptable political representative of community 'interests is 
required. The existing planning system has excluded the Kgotla whi le 
alternative institutions have proved themselves so far to be 
unacceptable substitutes. 
- Participatory planning is restricted to the determination of social 
infrastructure projects. Consequently: 
a) this takes away the raison-d'etre for community participation since 
social services are implemented from above by government, while it 
reconfirms a belief that rural development can only mean social 
infrastructure provision. 
b) there are no opportunities for production-related projects which 
could provide higher incomes and create skills which could benefit 
the rural economy while providing the resources for implementing 
, 
self-help projects more effectively. Participation would also be 
more popular if it was felt that economic benefits could be enjoyed. 
c) extension workers are provided with few opportunities to mobilise 
community interest in participation so long as the government is 
responsible for implementation. The extension worker could be more. 
effective if production-related projects could be encouraged and if 
consultation was taken more seriously. 
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION: 
At the start of the 1980s, the United Nations began a campaign to 
encourage member countries in the developing world to provide domestic 
water supplies and sanitation as a way of improving community health. 
Policy prescriptions recommended were based upon the use of community 
participation and decentralised coordination, upon the development of 
appropriate technologies and upon the promotion of health education. 
However, at' its mid-point, the United Nations' International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade has recorded only modest.results. 
This poor record of achievement has been attributed to a variety of 
constraints in the various countries hosting water supply and sanitation 
projects. 
Botswana's Village Water Supply Programme and Self-Help Environmental 
Sanitation Project have been studied in order to determine why the 
Decade has not succeeded in meeting -policy objectives. The study has 
compared the methods prescribed by the Decade and methods used by a 
particular country to achieve policy objectives. Research was based 
upon participant-observation and action research in the field, supported 
by an investigation of theoretical literature on the role of the state 
in development in 'post-colonial societies. This approach was required 
in order to observe how the policy recommendations of the Decade were 
being translated into action in the specific context of rural Botswana. 
It included an investigation of the two projects in two different 
districts and at the central government, local government and community 
levels. The evidence obtained through this type of fieldwork could not 
readily have been obtained by alternative means. 
The research has indicated that rural development in Botswana relies 
heavily on central government for the design and implementation of 
policy. By contrast, sub-national institutions play only a peripheral 
role and, therefore, have been unable to build up a strong institutional 
capacity. With respect to the water supply and sanitation programmes, 
comparable findings have been reached. The Village Water Supply 
Programme has relied on central government intervention with support 
from a donor agency, Dut little participation by either local government 
or community institutions. This top-down approach has achieved rapid 
installation of infrastructure but has overlooked the need to establish 
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an effective system of operation and maintenance while health education 
has been ·ignored. The Self-Help Environmental Sanitation Project has, 
by contrast, relied·on institutional support at the local government and 
community levels in order to support a latrine construction programme 
and a health education campaign. This bottom-up approach has, however, 
recorded modest results, characterised by a low overall level of 
participation, poor community mobilisation and little health education. 
In seeking explanations for these findings, fieldwork has identified the 
low implementation capacity of sub-nationa.1 institutions as a major 
factor for the lack of success experienced in bottom-up delivery. 
District Council capacity is constrained primarily by a shortage of 
skilled manpower and inadequate finance. Access to manpower is 
restricted by an absolute shortage nationally and a centralised system 
of recruitment which restricts the Council's ability to determine 
manpower needs. Access to adequate finance is constrained by the poor 
resource base of the districts which have become unproductive and serve 
primarily.as sources of labour for the urban sector. Councils must, 
therefore, depend on central government for deficit grants. These· 
constraints have limited the ability of the Councils to provide adequate 
support to the sanitation project or to the Water Maintenance Units 
associated with the water supply programme. 
Community participation provides only limited and peripheral support to 
rural development. With village development institutions, the lack of 
activity and support for rural development can be attributed to 
political factors concerning the relationship between modern state and 
tribal institutions which has led to an absence of political concensus, 
to the nature of rural development which has been highly centralised and 
to a shortage of skills and resources which can be attributed to the 
nature of the rural economy; which has encouraged the able-bodied to 
migrate away, and to an unprofessional and under-resourced extension 
service. In the case of household self-help contributions, self-help 
depends on both the willingness and capacity of a household to provide 
contributions. Willingness to contribute is a function of the benefits 
which the project is perceived to provide and often depends on wider 
community mobilisation from above. Capacity to contribute depends on 
the socio-economic status of the hoLisehold. This status· is determined 
by the opportunities provided by the rural economy, which in turn have 
been determined by state policy and to the specific choices that have 
been made by the individual household. Participation in the sanitation 
project has been compromised by the low socio-economic status of the 
household and the perception of the project as a social service which 
ought to be provided by the state. In these circumstance's, short-term 
part~cipation has been modest while the long-term objectives of 
institution-building at the village level and of designing a replicable 
health education campaign have been unfulfilled. 
The study sought to provide more rigorous explanations for these poor 
levels of institutional capacity. Existing explanations have tended to 
be restricted to a consideration of the practical constraints identified 
in the field and findings have been interpreted within a non-theoretical 
framework. As such, the conclusions reached are incomplete. It has 
been demonstrated here why it is necessary to investigate beyond the 
immediate issues and to examine the wider context of rural development 
within which the particular projects take place in order to identify 
underlying factors which .account for the observed field evidence. An 
examination of the role of the state in determining rural policy as it 
concerns objectives set and the means used .to achieve those objectives 
in post-colonial society is required. Particular attention has focussed 
on the issue of the devolution of decision-making authority in rural 
development. The continued centralisation of decision-making, despite a 
limited attempt to introduce a system of decentralised planning, has 
restricted the institutional capacity of local government and. the 
community. While decision-making remains centralised, Decade objectives 
whiCh rely on decentralised decision-making cannot be achieved. In 
Botswana, rural development operates within a de concentrated system of 
formulation and implementation. 
An Explanation for Deconcentration: The Role of the Post-Colonial.State 
in Nation-Building: 
The apparent tendency towards the centralisation of decision-making and 
implementation can be explained by conSidering the primary challenge 
which faces the post-colonial state in the task of nation-building. The 
state is better equipped to achieve a level of pol iticalauthority and 
short term stability than to achieve economic' strength and long term 
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prosperity (Sandbrook, 1982). It is, therefore, i nc 1 i ned to promote 
p'olicies which guarantee the short-term control of power by the 
governing interest, even when this might necessitate the use of force, 
than to promote longer-term developmental objectives which might 
compromise short-term political' interests. In much of the developing 
world, such political expediency tends to prevail over economic 
rationality (Cohen et al, 1986; Sandbrook, 1986). This approach is 
reflected in the distribution of decision-making power between the 
central state and other interests within society. 
Political stability can, therefore, be best guarded through the 
centralisation of power over decision-making. By contrast, 
decentrdlisation is politically undesirable even if from a managerial 
point of v'iew it is highly desirable (Cohen et al, 1986). The option to 
centralise is especially attractive to the state durlng the process of 
nation-building when it is imperative to extend its influence over 
peripheral rural areas which might express allegiance to opposition 
interests. In Africa, rural areas have often been the breeding ground 
for tribal opposition while in Botswana, the rural sector has remained 
the stronghold of tribal authority over that of the modern state. Under 
such circumstances, political decentralisation carries risks when it can 
be exploited by such political opponents against the interests of the 
state (Alldred, 1976). It is for this reason that former British 
colonies in Africa have experienced a progressive if not erratic trend 
towards the recentralisation of power since the setting up of local 
government systems prior to independence (Kasfir, 1983; Mawhood, 1983). 
This has been most noticeable in those nations which have faced tribal 
and ethnic conflict, and which also have lacked the financial and 
manpower resources to support local government systems (Kasfir, 1983). 
In Botswana, the degree of recentralisation has been less complete with 
evidence of a political commitment by the state to decentralisation. 
This is reflected in the fact that the District Councils were never 
disbanded, tribal authority still exists while, more recently, the 
system of District Development Planning was created. A form of 
decentralised decision-making has, therefore, survived albeit in a 
, 
weakened capacity because the conditions experienced in other parts of 
Africa which have prompted more extensive centralisation have been less 
apparent (Picard, 1979b, 1979c; Reilly, 1981). In particular, Botswana 
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has not experienced tribal conflict nor financial' constraints on the 
same scale while a bold effort has been made to defend one of the few 
remaining democracies in Africa (Picard, 1979). At the same time, the 
state has faced resistance by tribal authority in the districts and this 
has prevented it from extending the influence of the modern state to the 
grassroots level in a comprehensive manner. It is, therefore, suggested 
that the state perceives tribal authority as a greater threat to its 
political security than it perceives the urban based modern opposition 
parties (Picard & Morgan, 1985). 
The case of.Botswana illustrates the primacy of internal political 
factors in determining the political economy of rural development and 
this in turn has affected the way in which particular prOjects have been 
organised. The state will only decentralise power when it becomes 
politically expedient, and not when recommendations based on managerial 
criteria are presented from outside. The immediate implications for 
sub-national institutions is that their implementation capacity will 
remain compromised so long as 
empower them does not exist. 
therefore, filters through to 
the political conviction to support and 
The effect of political considerations, 
the field level where they.are expressed 
as practical constraints on institutional capacity. 
Implications for the Decade: 
The limits to external intervention, be it by the Decade in relation to 
specific projects, or more generally by the international donor 
community in relation to more comprehensive sectoral support programmes, 
can be recognised. The "Conditions-Precedent" approach,'based on the 
linking of financial assistance to prescriptions for economic and 
administrative reform, which have been influenced by a managerial 
rationale, must recognise the primacy of these internal considerations 
(Cohen et al, 1986). It is a major factor for explaining why 
recommendations are deliberately ignored or why projects sometimes fail, 
or do not manage to reach their intended beneficiaries (Tendler, 1982). 
While there is an apparent consensus over the desired, objectives of the 
Decade at the international level, it is possible to detect variations 
in the real motives of governments in supporting the Decade and that 
often political rather than health objectives are sought (Cairncross, 
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1986). Under such circumstances, the rationale for supporting bottom-up 
delivery may not exist. 
The policy prescriptions of the Decade cannot be faulted. Bottom-up 
delivery is the best means of ensuring that long term objectives are 
met. Yet by definition, this approach is likely to disturb state 
interests in perhaps trying to empower institutions which reflect 
opposing local interests, while it is also likely to have to contend 
with existing institutions and mechanisms whch are unsuitable for 
supporting bottom-up delivery (Ayres, 1983). It is likely that 
prescriptions wi"; therefore, become modified either by the state or 
even by external agents seeking to introduce an acceptable project to 
. the country. It has not been uncommon for external agenci es to try to 
by-pass internal institutions and to deal directly with the recipient to 
maximise efficiency (Cairncross, 1986). 
In order to achieve policy objectives, the Decade must ensure that 
'policy prescriptions can be modified to suit local circumstances. It is 
evident that universally applicable prescriptions do not work. This 
justifies the need to undertake feasibility and evaluation studies as 
the basis for policy design. Yet, while these are in fact undertaken, 
inadequate attention has focussed on examining the political, social and 
cultural factors at both the national and sUb-national levels which can 
influence policy recommendations for institution-building. In this 
respect, the major challenge for the Decade is to encourage member 
countries to make a genuine commitment to decentralised decision-making. 
This is a major challenge for both donor and recipient and, therefore, 
it becomes all the more important to plan for contingencies and to plan 
for the medium and long-term. Institutional reform is impractical and 
undesirable when it must be undertaken within, perhaps, a two year time 
span. 
Implications for Botswana: 
The SHESP project is organised according to the principles of bottom-up 
delivery and, therefore, can potentially meet policy objectives. 
However, it is constrained because rural development in Botswana is not 
geared to supporting bottom-up delivery. As a result, there has been a 
tendency to seek short-term results based on the rapid installation of 
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infrastructure· in a top-down manner and to abandon the 
institution-building and health education components which demand a 
longer term commitment to bottom-up delivery on the basis of 
decentralised decision-making. The long-term success of the project 
depends both on it receiving a long-term commitment from the government 
to provide technical and financial support and on a commitment by 
government to genuine decentralisation so that the institutions involved 
in bottom-up delivery can contribute effectively. 
By contrast, the VWSP depends on top-down delivery in line with rural 
development policy more generally. The context of rural development 
has, therefore, been suitable to ensuring that the limited objectives 
set have been met. Yet, the limits of this approach have·become 
apparent with the experience of poor operation and maintenance and 
neglected health education. This evidence reinforces the justification 
for the use of bottom-up delivery as prescribed by the Decade. The 
programme is, therefore, likely to be decentralised in the future, but 
in order to succeed, must also depend on reform to the system of rural 
policy formulation and implementation. More detailed recommendations on 
how the programmes must evolve in the future could be usefully the basis 
for further research; 
The onus is, therefore, on the Botswana government to spell out clearly 
how far it is prepared to extend decision-making authority to. 
sub-national institutions as the basis of improving implementation 
capacity in rural development. The District Councils must, in 
particular, be strengthened while community institutions must be more 
fully involved in decision-making. ·Government policy, in this respect, 
is likely to be influenced by wider considerations of national political 
and economic importance. There is already evidence that the government 
has embarked on a cautious programme of decentralisation. It remains to 
be seen how far this will effectively transfer decision-making away from 
central government. There is also evidence that rural policy has 
shifted towards promoting production-related development. This is also 
a pre-requisite for ensuring that the community has both the willingness 
and capacity to contribute to its own development. As the rural sector 
becomes more critical to the health of the national economy, it is 
questionable how far the state will be ready to relinquish authority 
over decision-making. 
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(If ch' latrin, i; in=o~pl"e: «pl'i" ~"y)."""".""."" .. "" .. 
5. ~h~ built the sup~rstru:[u:-c? 
C:5P? L..\..30IJR~RS 
(a) If not SELf, explaill w~y: 
7. I,..'hac ".·~.e the r",ason:: fo:- ch~':>5ing co use thi:'se bdlding ~atcri .. ls? 
AI:AIL~.~!LITY COST f":\:-l I L 1..\;< I TY OTHE:R .•.••..• 
(a) F:-o~ t.."hcrc did you obtain these nJ:erials? 
8. Die! yO'J need to use iI co.-:.?ressorl ja:kha;";Jm;:or to ci.(; th,:- p~t? 
Y::S ~;o 
9. H~~ much ~on;:oy did you pay the Council for th~ latrine? 
~OTHI~G PI-5 P6-10 Pll-l :> P16-20 P2l-25 P26. 
(a) Did you pay in instaLments? 
YES ~;o 
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). · ..:~.u IS TEE A\·ER.;CE ~:O:--:THL':' l~~CO~=: Of THIS HOL'SEHOLO? 
-. 
o. 
Less tr.a:o PIca (specify) .!.Cl - 500 Pula 
1')1 
-
2)0 P'J la )'21 - 600 P;Jla 
2(1 - }(,J rd3 601 
-
700 P'J 1 a 
301 - .:..:',) Pula 7Cl 
-
600 Pl,.!la 
::'; Y:::..' Rf.C:: i. \'S D?CLC~T F::U :::": 
y;.:s :-:0 
GC.!" is . SHEE? 
:. ,) 5 . : 
C~ ~~ARE A CA17LE POST'. 
c··.· 
DO Y0~ ~" LA~OS~ 
YES 
c) 
e) 
~~a~ la~our do y~u ~se? HOUSEHOLD 
~~ich of [~~sC ~0 you o~n? PLO',~ 
801 
901 
Over 
OTHER. 
DO:-;KEYS 
HIRED 
CL'LTI"';l.TOR 
-
900 PUl3 
- 1000 Pula 
lOCO P'.J 13. 
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10. In return fer this pay~en::. ,.:hat r.'laterials did the 'Counei 1 p,Qvice 
),ou with? 
VEST?lPE SEAT DOOR OTHER •.•...••..••.••....••.•• 
11. How ~uch did it cost )'ou to build the su?erstructure in terms of: 
~_';T~Rl.!"LS ...................... . LABOCR ••.•.•••..•.••••.•••••. 
12. Ha\.'-e YC'u ma':e ar.)' alteraLiens 0, repairs to the latrine sir,ce it ·...:.35 
tuil .. ? 
I). ~C~ long a~o dl~ y~~ build your latrine? 
193':' 1<;33 1:;52 \(j':l 19.50 1979 1973 19i7 1976 197j-1970 
l~. CIf it ~as b~il: bct~een 19S1-S)) ~hy didn't takepart in ESP?? 
1 ) . '''::-:0 bui ! : the latrine? 
SELF CO.'~ :-RAC TOR OTI-:£:2. •. 
16. Eow r.1uch Ct':! i , COSt you (0 oui 1 d i r, e e r ... 5 of: 
~.),TER 1..\.1,5 .•.... LA30t:R 
17. ~hat ~as [he rCJson for using these building materials? 
COST CQ.';TRACTOR CHOICE 01;;ER ..•...... 
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(3) RESPO~DE~T EVALUATION Of LATRINE 
1. \..'ha:. \oi3S tb·~ r('a~O:1 for you bui \jtr':5 a latrine, .... :-:y cid )"0'..1 .... ant on~? 
...................................................................... 
2. \.,'hat C) you CQ:1sid.?r to r.i!.':':- bL'';>", the r.13jor benefi~s 0: the latrine to 
you:- f3:71i1)'7 (Lis: in orc?~ of i::"?):-t3n~2) 
1. ................... . 1 ............... c .... . 
) .................... . 
3, 1,..':':1: p,,:.'::rle:'"l5 h3':e 1':lI..': h.ld ... ·ith cr.? latrine? (Lfsi: in order of 
... ~··.·t~rl:y) . 
1. 2 ................... . 
3 .................... . ~ ................ . 
YES '0 
(a) H')~ do yo~ think it could be 
i:-:".;>rove':? 
BUILD A ~;E'''': 0\£ P~?TY 0:'0 PIT 
(4) HOUSEHOLD HYG IENE-RELATED PRACTICES 
A. HOlJSEH0i...D wITH LATR!;-';E. 
1. 00 all me~bcrs of this household. us(' the la:rine? 
YES NO 
(a) Llst !,.,':-!v does not, I,.;HERE they go. \.iH'i they c~n't 
use ch.:- la::rin .. : 
!";HO 1 ..;:.<'1 
-_.' 
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2. How of [en is [he latrine cleaned? 
...................................................................... 
3. Yho normally cleans the latrine? 
~. ~hat cleaning agents are used for cleanin~ the latrine? 
5. Do you wash your hands after using [he latrine? 
YES 
6. Do you make sure [hat your children wash their hands after using the 
latrine? 
YES ~O 
(Check if soa? and ;,.'ater is available near the latrine: YES t\O) 
7. Do you allow other people, such as neighbours, to use the latrine? 
8. (\.,'hcre applicable) Co )'ou alwa,'s keep the larrine doer closed? 
YES so 
9, (\.,'here ap?licable) Can the latrine be locked? 
YES 
( . ) Do )'0': a 1,,-,.1)'s leek it 
after ~se? 
NO 
YES 
10. Do you co a:1Y of the follo·..Iing in the latrine? 
:-':0 
Y . .1..SH BODY DISPOSe Of 50TTLES/RUBS1S" 
S. HOeSEHOLDS WITHOUT LATRINE. 
1. I..'hy don't ycu have a lat:-ine? 
2. Did you know about/hear about the ESPP project? 
YES =--0 
(a) ~hy didn't you take pare? 
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). \.'~uld y;JU lik!' to have cl lac.rine? 
YES 
( a ) For ""h,H reason? ..................................... ',' ........ . 
(b) ~~en ~3 yo~ plan to build it? .................................. . 
(c) Ho·,.1 much could you afford to pay? .......................•....... 
~. ~herc do ~cm~ers of your household normally defecate? 
ADULTS, CHILDREN' 
5. [):) yOu \..lash your hands after dcfec.lc ion? 
YES NO 
.b. u~ you r.:,)~:(' SUf(' char your childrl.':'l · ... 3~!1 thelr h:lnds after cefecac.ion: 
YES 
HEALTH EOUCATION A.~D EXTENSlON 
1. D~es y~:lr village have a fa~ily ~elfare Ed~ca~or? 
YES 
(a) fi~vc they vi5it~d you? 
1'::'5 
DON'T K:-lOI,.J 
YES NO 
(~) ~hat did they tell you? 
(bl HT"" long ago did they visic )'ou? 
DOS'T K..-'O:·; 
YES :-,'0 
(a) What did th~y 
tell you? 
). Has any~ody from yoyr village or from the Council told you to build.a 
lat rin~? 
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4. Have you been given any infor~ation, such as leaflets, or attended any 
talks. concerned ~ith health, sanitation and hygiene? 
YES ~O 
( a ) Describe: 
S. (FOR ESP? U,TRl:-;E O'.;~ERS OSLY) I,.,'hen you built the latrine, were you 
given any advice or infor~3tion on sanitation hygiene. and looking 
after the latrine? 
YES :--;0 
( a ) Ocscri':>e: 
[6] COKHUNlTY PARTlClPATlON 
YES so ~hy not? ..............•...... 
(a) How often: 
2. 00 you attend village group!volwntary group meetings? 
YES :-:0 ~hy not? .................... . 
(a) ~hic~ o~es? " ........ ,." .... " .......... , ..................... . 
( b) Are you a me~ber of any of ~hese (indicate)? 
3. Is there a village cevelo;:>",.cn: COI7I,'ninee (\'DC) in your village? 
YES :\0 DO~J I T K~O'''; 
(a) ~!1ac do you think is the purpose of this committee? 
4, "I-!ave )',)u ever taken part i:l ~ village Self-Help project? 
YES :\0 
( a ) '..ihich ones? 
B. $UBSTRL'CTURE. 
\. Cover Sla~s: 
1. ?: : 
c. \ ... ::~TPlPE. 
) . \'cntpi~(': 
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(b) Position 1:1 relation: OPPOSITE ADJACE~T '~EXT 
TO ,he ventpipe. 
( a ) Ho''''' Hany: 2 ) .) l"A 
( , ) CondU ion: COOD CHIPPED CRACKED HISSI:\G 
(c ) Fitting: TIGHT LOOSE UNALIGSED 
( C ) Su:'siCcnce: YES ~:O 
( a ) Dc j:l{ h (as;" i f necessary) : •••••••••••••••••••• r.l 
(~ ) ! s i, I i :1.:-d: YES :-;0 
(i) ~hat ~ith: BRICKS ~IRE 
MESH OTHER ............. . 
(c) Ho· ... full·isi:: 0-25~1. 25-50i. 50-75:/.75-100;. 
Cd) tlas it been e~?~ied? YES NO 
(a) ~hen? .••.• _ •........ 
(b) By Whom? ........... . 
(a) l~ there a vcntpipe? YES NO. 
(i) Maceda!, 
(ii[) fly Scrte~: 
(iv) Condlticn: 
~hy not? ...... . 
P·,C HESS IA~ 
PlTCH fIBRE OTHER ............... . 
...................... m 
YES 
GOOD 
SAD 
NO 
ACCEPTABLE 
VERY BAD 
Cv) Side Insralled: NORTH SOUTH 
EAST 'EST 
1. Typ~ o! la:ri~~: 
1. 
. . F. ,-' ~ : : 
) . 1 rl: ,_. ~ , "j ~ ; 
c. En:ra:-:ce: 
[7J ISSPECTIOS OF LATRINE 
0:=-:-S::1 \.::;-OffSET 
(hI M3terial: CJ:;CRETE 
E:"O·:::.5 
Cc) c.c.~::,t~o:-.: 
(~) A?~~0~. E~ig~: 
a: l:··~·.:'5: p':>~i.: 
Ca) ~!3 : er i at: Tl~ 
(D) CO:-::lti):;" GJOD 
BAJ 
( a ) ! s t hi.':-£, 
" 
s~at ? 
(i) t-~?I • (. :- i 3 I ; ''':·)OD 
?L . l.STIC 
(d) l~~':':-.:'c Sr. :>:l: : YES 
( i i i) $e('l: Co'.'(' r: YES 
( i v ) C0:1C:: i:)~: GOOD 
B . '..~ 
( b ) Gt'neral CO:-:::lti::>n? 
(i) 0:::1'..1:-5 : G00D 
e."" 0 
( i i) Insects: GOOD 
B."" 0 
(i i i) Cleanliness: 
GOOD 
BAO 
OTHER ................ . 
SQUARE: 
HUD 
BRIC':(S 
OTHER •..•.•...••.• 
OTHER ......•. : .••. 
ACCE?TA3LE 
VEK! BAD 
THATCH OTHER .•... 
ACCEPTABLE 
VERY BAD 
YES t\O 
fiBREGLASS 
OTHER .......... 
NO 
~;) 
ACCEPTABLE 
VER.Y BAD 
ACCEPT .. \BLE 
VERY BAD 
ACCEPTABLE 
VERY BAD 
ACCEPTABLE 
VERY BAD 
( a ) Type: DOOR SCREENED ENTRANCE on~ER ........ 
(il Does it close properly? YES NO 
(b) Does it have a lock? YES NO 
THE SURVEY VILLAGES: 
- Holepolole -
Population - 20 565 
Location and Settlement -
District capital located 50Km from Gaborone along a tarred road. 
The village is very large, characterised by donse settlement towards the 
centre and dispersed settlement to the periphery. Housing comprises a 
mix of traditional rondavel .• and mode en cement and iron roofed housing. 
Social Services -
Secondar;- school, primar:' schools, hospi tal, cl inics and health posts, 
reticulated water supplies, churches, post office, police. Local 
author i ty headquarti'rs. 
Formal Sector Activitie. -
Industrial estate, construction companies, bank" 'Nholesalers, hotel, 
bottle stores and boes. 
- Thamaga -
Population - 6 520 
Location and Settlemeot -
Situated along a grat.d dirt road bltweln Molepolole and Moshupa in 
Southern dist~ict. The village i. spread out between rocky outcrops and 
a sand;; platoau. Rand.vels of mud and that~h prevail. Housing is ver;; 
dispersed .toward. the periphery. 
So~ial S€r'Jic~s -
Primary schools, c1inic, reticulat::d water supplies. 
Formal Sector Activities -
·General stores~ bottle stores, butcnerr, bricK-maKing plants. 
- Mankgodi -
Population - 2 693 
343 
Primary school, health post & maternity w~rd, reticulated water supply. 
Formal sector acti"ities -
General store sub-depot, bottle stor·e. 
- Artesia -
Population - 566 
Location & Settlement -
Situated along the main Gaborone - Francisto'~n road and raih.ay 1 ine, 
approximately 60 km from r10c.hudi. Settlement is concentrated. Houses 
are typically made of mud bricks with·thatch or grass rooves. Rondavels 
are most common. 
Social Services -
Primary school, cl inic p~ maternity ward, reticulated water supply. 
Formal Sector Activit:---
General store, bottle store, bus service. 
- Mabalane -
Population - 681 
Location and Settlement -
Situated next to Sikwane close to the South African border, 
approximately 40km from Mochudi along a graded dirt road. 
Settlement is dispersed ouer hilly and rocky terrain. Houses are 
typically built with cement walls and corrugated iron rooves. There are 
few 'traditional'· rondavels. 
Social Services -
Primary school, health post, reticulated '~a'er supply, church. 
Formal Sector Acti,!it:e.-
General store, bottle store, butchery, bus service. 
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Location and Settl~ment -
Situated along an graded dirt tracK in a sandy valley beh.een Thamaga 
and Gabane close to the border with Southern district. The village is 
very scattered especially on the eastern side, Almost all housing is 
traditional in style 'with few cement bricK square houses. 
Social Services -
·Primary school, cl inic with maternity ward, reticulated water suppl ies. 
Formal Sector Activities -
General store, bottle store, petrol station. 
- Gabane -
Population - 2 688. 
Location and Settlement -
Situated between ManKgodi and Mogoditsane along a poorly graded dirt 
tracK. The village is built on very sandy soil bel 0 1" a range of cliffs. 
Housing is scattered along the length of the cl iffs and comprises a mix 
of modern and traditional styles. 
Social Sert)ices.-
Primary school, cl inic, reticulated I"ater suppl ies. 
Formal Sector Activities -
General stores, bottle store, run.l crafts centre. 
KGATLENG DISTRICT. 
- 01 ifants Drift -
Population ~ 323 
Location & Settlement -
Situated on the Limpopo river approximately 100 Km from Mochudi along an 
un-graded dirt road. Settlement in the village is dispersed. House" are 
typicall;, made of mlj': bricKs l,oJith corrlJgated iron rooves, to ~ square 
design, but there are traditional rondav~ls too. 
Social Services -
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Table AI: Number 01 Buc~ets of Water Collected by Households Per Day - Kweneng District 
P'~,:~et£ 
'Tr.a.rr""t:a Mr.,;'ln<c:::! i G·.'~"n~· !-:Ql "P(' 1 ') ~ e 
1-2 e (,) (7) ) (9 ) ,!'-
'" 
( 12) 
3-~ ~7 (:..~) ,; ())) 1) (;, i 1;1 ( ;6) 
!'-9 L':" (, ;) 9 ( " ) 1 ; ( :1) f.3 ( ,7) 
~+ 
" 
( , )) , ( I , ) , ( q) I') (;) 
;;':- ;.:'::'~-:::':~ , (2j ) (7) ) ( ,\ 
.' , (- ) 
::':-."~ : =~ ( 10") ~) (,:q )) ( , :.,.:,) ,',< ~-~ " (Dc) 
Table A2: Type of Container Used to Store Water - Kweneng District 
:: .. ;.~ ::: 
'7ha......asa :V06.ots: :: GaCi!ne f>bl"pc;'o:e. C:',.·.:..i,.~r 
f'L.AS1I: 
CO!lTAltItR )1 ( ;3) 2:, (" ) i ~ (~:' ) ~:, ) (,3) 
F:,,;,Z7 2~ (,:) ~ (d '. ( ,7) i,..: OJ) 
7?",::':TIT:;.:" 
CA";" :\:'~ 9 ( ~.;) 11 (?' ) " (?0) )' (1:) 
'r~:; II:G:-: 2 (, ) ~ (; ) E (?,) c (j) 
ii :.~ J~;S',.~ ? ( ,) (j) (-) f (2) 
7 .. :;'.5...: E:3 (, )C) ~; ( ",:) ); ( lOJ) :z..,:: )" " ( E·}) 
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Table A3: Cost of ESPP Superstructure: Completed latrines Only - Kgatlrng District 
Table A4: Cost of No,~-ESPP latrine Superstructure - Kgatleng District 
MATERIALS LABOUR 
I oLlr ANIS I ARTESIA ! MABALAN[ ; AGGREGA lE I OLlFANIS I ARESIA i MABALAN[ AGGREGATEj i , 1"- . , ; 0 0 I I 13% , i s 2.:. ~~ i ;9% I 4 r (,0/ I 8 8 8~~ III J:~% 43"0 I I .\.;'" '\ - .,., I i Pi 010 I 1 15% ! ) S% , '7% 1 2 ~~~ i ! 4 11% 1 !t I 
!P?l-~-:'~ i 1 25% i 1 L?7.; 1 5~; I 1 l~" ! ! 3~: I : 1 1St 1 5~{ I , : 
!O~!-?:C"J I I In I 3 33\ , l' ;: ; l' " -., i ! le 11% I ! 9't 
-
0 , . , 1·1 11'<: " 
I ??'Jl-?3:'C' I ? 2 t:~ !, ~; i 
"! C':.:- , : 1, .... ':\ . ..; 2 25% '<, : :' !, : ~~ 3 3~~ ! 3~~ S !!,% I p~ 
I 
I T .... 1 T ' , 8 101% S c ~c" i l' e:" ~, 1 CO?; E 1 n' 0, .g 9 j?; )1 10 I" IC'P: ,y·"l - :> '. I . , . , , ~ ;.'~ I 
Table AS: De Facto Population by Type of Settlement 1971 & 1981 
(Sourc.: GOB. 1985) 
}971 Cnl,JIj,\ 
T~·r)(" :and ~i/(, :\(1, (If :-';u. of 
" , selllemtllt~ !)(,'~Ol\\ .' [If ~ltltm{,l1ls " 
Crb3n: 
:"\on.mining: to",'1\S 3 -;8 267 8,,1 
~1ining lO .... ·ns 2 G 149 1.1 
Sub·TotAl 5 5·1 116 9,5 
Rural: 
20000+ 0 0 0 
10000·19999 3 384'13 6,7 
5000·9999 
" 
39215 6,8 
1000·4999 50 8" 49'1 1'1.9 
,,00·999 120 8S 709 15,5 
cnder 500 4 :) 14 6·11 2.G 
Sub·TOtol 223 2GG SO~ 46,.1 
Other SettJemtnts 
(L1.nds. cattlqxHIS) 2:,:; ~ iG 14, I 
Tot.al Country 57; 09·1 100.0 
1981 Crns!l.t 
i'\(J. of f\,'o. of 
Sfltkl1\t'lll'o pnsons % 
;, I~G 001 13,.1 
3 40 2G'1 4,3 
8 166265 17,7 
·1 SS 153 9,0 
3 46320 4,9 
5 30 101 3,2 
87 H5139 15.4 
112 7950'; 8,4 
206 52 161 5,5 
·117 438 37M 46,6 
336 38·1 35.7 
941 027 100,0 
------ - ------
SfRV'lC[S UB~ 
1966 
GOVERN~NT 
("IJ.3"l11.1 
TRADE.HOTElS 
("184 .... ) 
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-J.. __ -1\.c---1MNUF ACTUAING p. 9%1 
CONSTAu::::TION 15 7%1 
WATER/HIe (0 8"\.l 
FIgure AI: GDP by Industrial Origin 1966 & 1983 
(Sourc@: GOB. 1985) 
1977178 
(P5~i [,I) 
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Figure A2: Composition of Real Output 1977178 & 1982183 
(Source: GOB. 1985) 
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Figure A3: Exports & Imports (Pula millions) 
(Source: GOB, 1985) 
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FiQure A4: Value of Main Exports \978-\983 (Units of Account millions) 
(Source: GOB. 1985) 
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Figure AS: Government Revenue 8. E.penditure 1966167 a. 1982183 
(Source: GOB, 1985) 
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Figure A6: Formal Sector Employment 1971-83 
(Source: GOB, 1985) 
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